

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

AN INTRODUCTION TO
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

Aristoteles

"

AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

BOOKS I—IV.

(BOOK X. CH. VI—IX. IN AN APPENDIX)

WITH A CONTINUOUS ANALYSIS AND NOTES

Intended for the use of Beginners and Junior Students

BY THE

REV. EDWARD MOORE, D.D.

HON. D. LITT. DUBLIN

PRINCIPAL OF S. EDMUND HALL, OXFORD, AND LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR
OF QUEEN'S COLLEGE



SIXTH EDITION
WITH REVISED TEXT

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.

39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON

NEW YORK AND BOMBAY

1897

B430

A2M6

INTRODUCTION TO

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS

BOOKS I-IV

(FROM THE NINTH CENTURY)

WITH A COMMENTARY BY WILLIAM D. ROBERTS

THE FIRST OF THE TWO VOLUMES OF THE

NEW EDITION OF THE

68819


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS



CONTENTS.

	PAGE
PREFACE,	ix
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION,	xi
INTRODUCTION,	xiii
GLOSSARY,	xxix

BOOK I.

CHAP.

I. Explanation of Terms, 'End,' 'Good,' 'Chief Good'—Different kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality,	1
II. and III. There is such a thing as a <i>final</i> end of action, <i>i.e.</i> a Chief Good. If so—(a) It will be practically useful to define it. (b) The Political (or Social) Science is the Science which treats of it. (c) This is not an exact Science. (d) Its study requires special training and conditions,	4
IV. What is the Chief Good?—Conflicting opinions—Determination of the method to be adopted,	10
V. Criticism of the chief typical theories as to the nature of Happiness,	15
VI. Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief Good is the abstract 'Idea' of Good,	18
VII. Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good. §§ 1-8.—Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good stated with a view to its Definition. §§ 9-16.—A Definition constructed out of another such characteristic. §§ 17-21.—The Definition not to be treated as mathematically exact,	26
VIII. Other views, popular and philosophical, on the subject of Happiness compared with the above Definition,	38
IX. On what does the acquisition of Happiness depend?	46

CHAP.	PAGE
X. and XI. What is the relation of Happiness to the varying fortunes of life, especially in reference to a well-known dictum of Solon's,	49
XII. Comparison of another popular theory with Aristotle's Definition,	59
XIII. Commencement of the elucidation of the several terms in the Definition of Happiness, and especially of the word Soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$),	62

BOOK II.

I. Moral Virtue is not implanted in us by Nature,	70
II. Some general characteristics of such Habits as are Virtuous,	74
III. The test of the formation of Habits is the pleasure or pain by which acts are accompanied,	78
IV. Explanation of the apparent paradox that we become just by doing just actions,	83
V. The Genus of Virtue determined,	86
VI. The differentia of Virtue determined, and thus its full Definition arrived at,	89
VII. A Table or Catalogue of Virtues with their related Vices,	97
VIII. The nature and degrees of the opposition existing between Virtues and the Vices related to them,	105
IX. The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attaining the Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment in points of detail,	108

BOOK III.

I. Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed, and Non-Voluntary Actions distinguished and discussed,	114
II. Deliberate Choice ($\pi\rho\omicron\alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$) is compounded of an element of impulse and an element of judgment,	123
III. The proper objects of Deliberation ($\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\epsilon\nu\sigma\iota\varsigma$),	128
IV. The proper objects of Wish ($\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$),	134
V. A refutation of the theory that Virtue is voluntary, but Vice involuntary,	136

CONTENTS.

vii

CHAP.	PAGE
VI. The proper sphere and objects of Courage,	145
VII. Courage considered as a mean state, with its related excess and defect,	148
VIII. Spurious forms of Courage described,	152
IX. How can the exercise of Courage, which involves pain and loss, have a 'pleasure in itself'?	158
X. The proper objects of the Virtue of Temperance,	161
XI. The excess and defect related to the Virtue of Temperance,	165
XII. (a) Is the external compulsion stronger in Cowardice or in Intemperance? (b) The nature of ἀκολασία is illustrated by its etymology,	169

BOOK IV.

I. On Liberality,	173
II. On Magnificence,	188
III. On Highmindedness or Self-Esteem,	197
IV. On Ambition,	210
V. On the regulation of the Temper,	212
VI. On Friendliness, or Amiability,	217
VII. On Straightforwardness or Truthfulness,	221
VIII. On Geniality,	226
IX. On the quasi-virtue, 'Sense of Shame,'	230

APPENDIX.--BOOK X.

VI. Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but in Active Excellence,	242
VII. Pre-eminence of Intellectual over Moral Excellence,	247
VIII. Secondary position of Moral Excellence,	254
IX. Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and transition to the Complementary Science of Politics,	262

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS,	275
--	-----



P R E F A C E.

THE object of this work is to provide a simple introduction to the subject of the Ethics for beginners generally, and especially for those who are commencing it with a view to the Oxford Final Examination. It may also perhaps be found useful in the Upper Forms of Public Schools. The chief aim throughout has been clearness and simplicity, even at the risk of occasional repetition and diffuseness. Technical phraseology has been as far as possible avoided, and the principal technical terms occurring are explained in a Glossary.

The author hopes that this specific object of the work will be borne in mind throughout the whole of it.

Thus the Introductory Sketch, which simply aims at giving a beginner an intelligent notion of the subject upon which he is entering, makes no pretence to be exhaustive. Several important systems and writers are omitted altogether. The object has been to select systems which have a distinct

(perhaps one-sided) character: such as are typical of some well-defined bias or direction of thought. In fact names and references have been added in the notes almost as an after-thought, to give the clue to further inquiry to those who may desire it.

In the Glossary likewise, the explanations given of some of the more important technical terms of Aristotle's philosophy are altogether popular and rudimentary. To have attempted anything like an adequate account of such difficult words as ἀρχή, φύσις, ψυχή, δύναμις, etc., would have defeated the purpose of the work altogether, and repelled those for whose benefit it is intended.

The same considerations must serve as an apology for language sometimes consciously loose and unphilosophical in the Analysis and Notes. The attempt to put such a treatise as that of Aristotle into such a 'modern' light as may be intelligible to a reader *ex hyp.* unacquainted with philosophical phraseology, seems necessarily to involve the sacrifice of technical accuracy. This desire to appeal as far as possible to modern sympathies has occasioned a certain amount of diffuseness in parallel quotations from recent popular writers.

The best thanks of the author are due to several friends who have kindly assisted him by their advice in various parts of the work: and he will feel grateful for any further criticisms or suggestions that may be offered to him.

The difficulty of the task has become more apparent on further acquaintance with it, and this experiment is now made public not without hesitation and a full consciousness of its defective execution.

S. EDMUND HALL, OXFORD,
June 1871.

PREFACE TO FIFTH EDITION.

THE University of Oxford having adopted Professor Bywater's revision of Bekker's text for use in the Examination Schools, I have, by permission of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press, availed myself of the opportunity afforded by the demand for a new Edition of this Book to embody in the text the more important alterations which appear in Professor Bywater's work.

E. M.



INTRODUCTION.

MUCH difficulty is sometimes felt, especially by beginners, in distinguishing the spheres of Ethical and Religious teaching. A dilemma like that which traditionally proved fatal to the Alexandrian library represents not inaptly the feeling with which the Science of Ethics is regarded in its relations to Religion. It is thought that if its conclusions agree with those of Religion they are superfluous, if they differ from them they are wicked. We will first then endeavour to gain a clear conception of the purpose and limits of the Science of Ethics, as contrasted with those of Religion.

We may consider this and kindred sciences to have their origin somewhat as follows.

Man is obviously compounded of two distinct natures, which may be roughly described as Body and Soul. He desires to know more of each of these natures. The nature of his Body is investigated by the Science of Physiology, which reveals to him that it is composed of Bones, Nerves, Muscles, etc. His Soul (using the word broadly for the immaterial side of man's nature) is similarly discovered by the Science of Psychology to contain Reasoning, Imaginative (or Artistic), Moral, and other powers. Further inquiries in each of these last-named departments give rise to the practical Sciences of

Logic, *Æsthetics*, *Ethics*, etc., which are *Sciences* because their main object is to ascertain the laws and facts of the several portions of our compound nature; *practical* because the enunciation of these laws and facts, when discovered, constitutes *ipso facto* practical rules for the direction of the faculties to which the investigation refers. In each case we notice that the process is one of a careful but simple observation of *facts*, followed by a judicious enunciation of the laws which bind those facts together. In a word the method is what logicians call *Inductive*. This cannot be too clearly insisted upon. Let us therefore explain it a little more fully in each of the cases mentioned. The primary object of *Logic* is to ascertain under what laws, principles, limits, men do, *a matter of fact*, reason and think. The statement of the laws becomes the groundwork of practical rules for reasoning. The primary object of *Æsthetics* is to ascertain what constitutes, *as a matter of fact*, good and bad taste in art of all kinds according to the decision of those competent to judge. The enunciations of these principles become the practical rules to which the Sculptor, Artist, Poet must conform. Lastly, the primary object of *Ethics* is to ascertain, *as a matter of fact*, what are the principles, feelings, or motives which regulate men's conduct as *moral* agents, what is the distinction which men do actually draw between Right and Wrong, by what faculty or faculties are they enabled to draw such distinction? on what sanction do such distinctions rest? The answers to such questions, when formulated, become *ipso facto* practical rules for the conduct of life. But in these cases the practical rules are as it were adjuncts to the

Science in question is concerned. We will reduce them to these four questions :

1. What constitutes the difference between Right and Wrong *in actions* ?
2. What is the faculty *in ourselves* which is able to recognise that difference ?
3. What is the nature of the feeling of Duty or Moral Obligation ?
4. What is the 'Chief Good,' or ultimate aim of human action ?

A brief account of the answers that have been given to each of these questions by the best known systems of Moral Philosophy will serve as a general introduction to the subject before us.

I. The various answers given to this question reduce themselves to two types. One is that Right and Wrong may be resolved into manifestations of some other familiar notions, such as (*e.g.*) Advantageous and Disadvantageous. The other is that they cannot be resolved at all, but are ultimate ideas which are incapable of analysis. The former systems may be called Utilitarian¹ systems of Morality, because they consider the

¹ *Note.*—Owing to the difficulty of finding one word to include all systems non-Intuitive, I use Utilitarian here and elsewhere in this Introduction in its widest sense, to include all Systems which reduce Virtue to a question of Utility or Advan-

tage whether it be of one's-self only, or of others only, or of one's-self and others conjointly. These are sometimes distinguished as Selfish, Benevolent, and Utilitarian Systems respectively.

recognition of Right and Wrong to depend upon a calculation of Utility or Advantage. The latter are called *Intuitive Systems* because they refer the perception of Right and Wrong to a special faculty which simply approves and disapproves without being able always, or even usually, to assign its reasons: in other words to an *Intuitive Faculty*. But we must not encroach upon our second question. We will now therefore illustrate these two divergent theories as to the nature of Right and Wrong in themselves.

(A) UTILITARIAN SYSTEMS.

(α) Some assert that all Morality is a thinly-disguised selfishness, that man has and can have, no motive for action but self-interest¹, and that even benevolence, gratitude, and love are but forms of the desire of power, the wish to exhibit our superiority, the appreciation of possible advantages to be derived from the goodwill of others. (β) Others again that virtuous actions are simply the observance of the varying enactments of law, framed at first by the rulers in their own

¹ Hobbes, Mandeville, La Rochefoucauld, etc. Take as a specimen Hobbes's account of Love—'a conception a man hath of his need of the person desired.' Or Mandeville's statement that 'men do not really admire such actions as those of Regulus or Decius, but only observe that men of such dispositions are very useful for the defence of any state, and therefore by panegyrics, etc., encourage such tempers in others.' Or La Rochefoucauld (Maxime 264): 'Pity is a clever foresight of ills into which we may ourselves fall. We assist others in order to secure their services for ourselves under similar circumstances: and the services we render are strictly speaking conferred upon ourselves in advance'!

interest¹, and observed afterwards by others from fear of civil punishments or hope of rewards, *i.e.* from a calculation of self-interest. (γ) Others², that 'honesty is found by experience to be the best policy,' that virtue conduces to health of body, and peace of mind, that it secures the honour and goodwill of society, and, as some add³, above all the friendship and goodwill of Heaven. Hence taking a far-sighted view of their best interests in this world, and still more, regarding the overwhelming balance in favour of virtue in the probable arrangements of the next, men prudently choose virtue and avoid vice. (δ) A more refined system⁴ teaches us that human nature is by its very constitution endowed with so strong a feeling of sympathy that it cannot but experience pleasure and pain at the happiness and misery of others, and that it is thus impelled to strive after what makes for the general welfare, to dislike whatever has a contrary tendency; and that this

¹ The ancient Sophists, Hobbes, Mandeville, etc. *e.g.* Hobbes says, 'The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there (*i.e.* in a state of nature) no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law, where no law, no injustice.'

² Butler to some extent—See especially *Anal.* pt. I. c. iii.—though his Utilitarianism is qualified by the frequent assertion that 'duty' and 'conscience' are really supreme, yet 'Conscience and self-love, if we understand

our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident,' etc. See Summary at the close of Sermon iii.

³ Especially Paley.

⁴ Hume and Hutcheson maintain that Right is what conduces to Utility in general, as contrasted with mere personal and selfish Utility, as Hobbes would say. Hume, Adam Smith, and Bentham in different ways connected these opposing theories through the medium of the feeling of Sympathy.

instinct of sympathy overrides the instinct of self-interest: in a word, that Right is that which tends to produce the greatest aggregate amount of happiness, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number;' Wrong, the reverse of this. (€) Finally we ought to notice a theory¹ which serves as a sort of connecting link between the Utilitarian and Intuitive systems—viz., that originally Virtue was chosen for its advantages, but that soon it came to be sought without a conscious sense of the advantage to be derived from it. It had been found from the first so uniformly to be advantageous that the calculation whether it was so in any special case was omitted, and virtue as such, and so apparently for its own sake, was chosen. Just in the same way that money is sought after, first with a view to its use, and then, as the habit of hoarding grows, for its own sake, and without any thought of using it.

Such are some of the answers given by various systems of Ethics, which resolve Right and Wrong into some form of Utility or the reverse. We pass on now to the

(B) INTUITIVE SYSTEMS.

The following will serve as specimens of this type of solutions. It is said that Right and Wrong are distinctions *sui generis*. They cannot be further analysed or explained. They differ from any other notion as much, for example, as Light differs from Sound. All we can do is to recognise them and accept them simply as we do the phenomena of Light, Sound, etc. Thus Right is something which commends itself necessarily and naturally to us. To explain this (α) some

¹ Hartley, Mackintosh.

maintain that it exhibits a certain propriety, and an accordance with 'the fitness of things'¹ which we cannot choose but recognise, though we cannot analyse the feeling, or explain the grounds of our approbation. The distinction between Right and Wrong would thus be eternal and invariable. (β) Or if 'accordance with the fitness of things' be thought vague and beyond the reach of verification, at least it is said there is in Right and Wrong a conformity or suitableness (and the reverse) to the *nature of Man*² in the truest sense and highest development of that nature; very much in the way that fresh and bracing air is naturally wholesome to our bodily constitutions provided they are in a sound and healthy state, or that certain tastes and smells are agreeable to us, whatever they may be to other animals or organisms, from some suitableness to our organs of sense which we are unable to explain.

Thus these and similar systems regard the distinction between Right and Wrong as a specific and essential difference in the nature of things, which we must simply recognise as a *fact*, just as for instance we recognise the contrast between Hot and Cold, Black and White, Bitter and Sweet.

It is no part of our purpose to criticise the merits of these several systems, but only to state them in outline: we will therefore now proceed to our second question, viz. :—

II. By what faculty in ourselves is the distinction between Right and Wrong recognised?

The answers given to this question fall under two general

¹ Cudworth, Clarke. Plato's it is loved by the gods, but is 'Ideal' System. [e.g. Plato in loved by the gods because it is the *Euthyphron* contends that a holy.]
quality or act is not holy because ² Butler.

types, as is pointed out by Hume. The one, that the recognition of Right and Wrong is derived from Reason; the other, that it is derived from Sentiment. To these may be added the view which Hume himself maintains, that 'Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.' To illustrate these types:—

Those who (as we have seen) maintain that Right and Wrong consist in an immutable 'conformity to the nature of things' hold further that Reason in general (*i.e.* Intuitive Reason), or a special department of Reason (*i.e.* Practical Reason), is the faculty by which such distinctions become known to us¹.

Those who refer the origin of the notions of Right and Wrong to Sentiment in some form or another may again be divided into two classes, (1) those who trace it to some already recognised Sentiment, such as Self-Love or the Desire of Utility; and (2) those who assert that the notions of Right and Wrong, being primary and fundamental notions, require a special sense or faculty for their recognition. The latter class, with whom we are chiefly concerned, argue somewhat as follows. Looking at the case of our bodily senses we observe that differences of Colour, Sound, Taste, Smell, Touch, can only be appreciated each by a special sense. If any of those senses be wanting the distinction of objects corresponding to it is lost. One sense cannot do the work of another, except perhaps in a very slight degree and by artificial training. Thus each sense has a special and appropriate object of its own. Another characteristic of the Senses is

¹ Cudworth, Clarke, Whewell, etc.

that they are 'Intuitive,' i.e. they tell us *as a fact* that one object is green, another red, that one sound is loud, another soft, and so on; but they cannot say *why* the rose is red or the leaf green, much less inform us as to the essential distinction in the nature of things between red and green. Here then we have an exact parallel (it is argued) to the recognition of the distinction between Right and Wrong. That distinction we feel to be *sui generis*, and whether the feeling be, as the Utilitarian would say, a deception or no, at any rate we do feel that we mean by it something different from the distinction between Advantageous and Disadvantageous or any other such antithesis that might be suggested; just as the difference between a good and bad Smell is distinct from the difference between a good and bad Taste. If this be so, then, on the analogy just explained of the bodily senses, it will require a special faculty for its recognition, just as much as Taste and Smell require different faculties; and further, that faculty must be Intuitive, because it is clear that we continually apply the terms Right and Wrong instinctively, and without being able to say exactly *why* we apply them, much less to explain what constitutes the precise difference implied by the words. Hence this faculty is not inaptly described as the Moral Sense¹. But, it is said by

¹ Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, (e.g. Honesty, Generosity, etc.) etc. The latter insists on the in reference to which he sums up his theory as follows:—
 'Natural' Good (e.g. Riches, (i.) 'That some actions have to Health, etc.) which we pursue men an immediate goodness; from a view of Interest or from or that by a superior sense, Self-Love, and 'Moral' Good which I call a Moral one, we

others, this Moral faculty not only affirms Right and Wrong of certain acts, but it also involves a sentiment of approbation and disapprobation of them. The Senses in fact suggest here a further analogy. To recognise the distinction between Harmony and Discord so as to derive satisfaction or the reverse from sounds, it is necessary not only that we have the sense of hearing, but also that we have to some extent what is called 'a musical ear.' To appreciate harmonious and inharmonious combinations of colour it is necessary not only to possess the sense of sight, but also to have what is called 'an eye for colour.' Hence, it is urged, the recognition of Right and Wrong, involving as it does also the approbation and disapprobation of them, is analogous to the operation of the cultivated ear and eye rather than to that of the simple Senses of hearing and seeing. In a word the element of Taste is so conspicuous in the operations of this moral faculty that some have preferred to describe it as a Moral¹ *Taste* rather than a Moral *Sense*. Others observing

perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further *natural* advantage from them.

(ii.) That what excites us to these actions, which we call virtuous, is not an intention to obtain even this sensible plea-

sure, much less the future rewards from sanctions of laws, or any other *natural* good, which may be the consequence of the virtuous action, but an entirely different principle of action from Interest or Self-Love.'

An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil—Introduction.—See further § I. viii.

¹ e.g. Hume: 'As virtue is an end and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward,

that this perception together with approbation (or the reverse) of Right and Wrong is further accompanied by a feeling of Duty, or of Obligation to regulate our own actions accordingly, lay stress upon *this* portion of the complex phenomenon and describe the moral faculty as Conscience¹.

Thus the complex phenomenon is threefold. It involves (1) The *recognition* of Right and Wrong; (2) *Approbation or disapprobation* based upon that recognition; (3) A *Sense of obligation* to regulate our own actions accordingly. As each of these functions respectively is considered the most important the Moral Faculty is described as Moral Sense, Moral Taste, or Conscience.

III. This brings us naturally to our third question, What is the Motive for Moral Action? or in other words, the nature of Moral Obligation?

The distinction which we have met with before reappears in this part of our subject. Some regard the Motive to Moral Action as something *sui generis*; others as a particular application of some other already recognised Motives. Among the latter we may class those who view it as merely a natural

merely for the immediate satisfaction it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches, some internal taste or feeling, or whatever you please to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other.'—(*Inquiry concerning Morals*, App. I. p. 331, Ed. 1825.) 'Morality is deter-

mined by *sentiment*. We define Virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the *pleasing sentiment* of approbation.'—(*Ib.* p. 326.) Compare also *Ethics*, II. iii. 7 (καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται), and the argument in III. ix. 2-5.

¹ e.g. Butler.

prudential regard for our own interest, or as an instinctive benevolent desire for the good of our fellow-men, or as a combination of both these impulses. Those also who adhere to the theory of a Moral Taste give a somewhat similar answer to the question, viz., that the *pleasure* derived from the gratification of that Taste disposes us to act so as to secure it, as naturally as a musician would seek for the enjoyment of good music. So far then the answer given would deny the existence of Duty or Moral Obligation in any distinctive sense. It is merely a phase, or a special application, of some other familiar instinct.

Many Intuitive Moralists however claim for this feeling of Duty a character perfectly distinct and independent. They affirm it to be different from a sense of approbation, or of gratification; from a desire of self-interest, or of general expediency. It is declared to be a primary fact of our nature¹, and as primary, to some extent inexplicable, just as is the case with the axioms of Mathematics or the fundamental Laws of Thought. That it is so is evidenced by an appeal to the various languages of men² which provide a distinct word for the idea of 'Duty,' 'Ought,' 'Obligation,'—distinct that is from Self-

¹ *e.g.* Kant.

² Compare the following argument of Hume for the reality of our conceptions of Moral distinctions:—'Had Nature made no such distinction founded on the original constitution of the mind, the words "honourable" and "shameful," "lovely" and "odious,"

"noble" and "despicable," had never had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.'—*Inquiry concerning Principles of Morals*, § 5.)

Interest, Benevolence, Utility, Approbation, or any other motive that can be assigned—while each and all indicate it by a metaphor, the imperfect applicability of which bears witness to the difficulty of expressing the thing signified. Two metaphors generally occur—that of a *debt due*, or that of a *binding* or *compelling* force. Of the former, *χρεῖα*, *χρῆ*, ‘debeo,’ due,’ ‘duty,’ ‘ought’ (owed), are examples: of the latter, *δεῖ*, ‘religio,’ ‘obligation,’ ‘bound.’ Imperfect metaphors they are, because a *debt* implies a creditor, as well as some service received from him which is to be repaid: *obligation* implies a superior power by which the compulsion is exercised. But in the case before us, though we feel that there is a ‘due’ or ‘debt,’ we have no distinct conception of the accessory circumstances just enumerated, or at least not necessarily so: and the ‘obligation’ is one which is not strictly binding or compulsory. The debt is one which we are free to repudiate, the obligation one which we are free to neglect. These metaphors thus indicate efforts on the part of the mind to express a feeling which it cannot adequately explain to itself or others because it is *sui generis*, the effort to do so however evidencing the real existence of some such feeling.

Thus we see the same broad twofold division runs through the various answers given to the three questions we have now discussed, a division depending on the consideration whether (1) the distinction of Right and Wrong in themselves, (2) the faculty by which it is appreciated, (3) the motive by which it is acted upon, *are, or are not, sui generis*. It is not however the case that systems which adopt either of these

opposed lines in answer to any one of the questions necessarily adopt the same line in regard to the others.

IV. Whatever be the character of the motive power of our moral nature, whether it be a calculation of self-interest, or a desire for the good of others, or the instinctive gratification of a Taste, or a Sense of Duty generically distinct from other motives, the question still remains open, What is the ultimate end to which our moral nature tends? What is it, by the conduct which it adopts, struggling or hoping to reach at last as its ideal consummation? or, as Aristotle phrases it, 'What is the Chief Good for man?' This is a question scarcely, if at all, inferior in importance, and certainly not so in practical interest, to the three already considered. Aristotle, as we have seen, regards it as *the* main question of Ethical Science.

We cannot then do better than answer this question in his own words. That final end and aim is Happiness, *i.e.* a state in which there shall be no deferred hopes, no unsatisfied desires. All are agreed upon this, high and low, learned and unlearned, but the conceptions of the conditions constituting such a state are as various as the varieties of human aims and human characters. Each selects his own favourite desire or pursuit, and considers the state of Happiness to depend mainly upon *its* gratification. (It will be remembered that we are now speaking of Man apart from the influence of revealed Religion on his aspirations or his conduct.) Still in the midst of this variety certain leading types may be noticed, which are generally speaking characteristic of different

stages of growth in Society or in the Individual. (See Ethics, I. v.)

1. The whole occupation of savage life (where society means little more than local proximity of habitation), is to secure by hunting and fishing the precarious support of daily life. The highest happiness conceivable is the abundant supply of the best food without toil, trouble, or anxiety. Heaven is a perpetual banquet. The full and free gratification of Bodily pleasure (ἡδονή) constitutes Happiness.

2. When the growth of civilisation (by organization of labour, mechanical improvements, etc.) is able to secure the supply of these simple wants of the community, then the desire for power over others and social distinction (τιμὴ) becomes the ruling passion. Successful kings, rulers, generals, are the ideals which command the admiration of mankind at large. Nobler spirits however regard these distinctions as deriving their value from Active Virtue and Goodness of Character (ἀρετή), and endeavour to persuade themselves and others that the desires of human nature would all be satisfied if this type of Character were fully attained.

3. In a state of still more advanced cultivation and refinement, this divergence between higher and lower natures, the one pursuing ἀρετή, the others τιμὴ, becomes yet more marked. The former—experience having shown the practical attainment of their ideal standard (ἀρετή), at least on any large scale, to be hopeless—take refuge in literature, philosophy, intellectual cultivation (θεωρητικὸς βίος). The latter, and the majority, —finding out of the pursuit of distinction and power that ‘the quest is not for them,’—betake themselves to the accumulation

of wealth (*χρηματιστικὸς βίος*). Hence the familiar remark that both high literary cultivation, and also wealth with its natural accompaniment of luxury, are signs in societies of full maturity verging towards decay.

In the life of the Individual we may trace a somewhat similar progress in his various conceptions of Happiness. Pleasure is the sole thought of youth; Ambition to excel, in its lower or its higher forms, is the characteristic of manhood; and the closing scene is marked either by 'years that bring the philosophic mind,' or by 'avarice, the prevailing passion of old age.'

Such are the chief types of that aim or end of life which men are found, as a mere observation of fact (see p. xiv.), to place before themselves as the Chief Good, the attainment of which they think would wholly satisfy the desires of their nature. In this last, as in the case of the other three questions, it becomes the office of the Science of Ethics to judge of the merits of these conflicting theories, and if all must be pronounced imperfect, to point out if possible 'a more excellent way.'

¹ We are now in a position to explain the broad features of Aristotle's system of Ethics in particular, as delineated in the following Treatise. We may perhaps notice these three distinctive characteristics:—

(1) His attention is directed to the *external* rather than to the *internal* aspect of morals². The central question of this

¹ The student may omit pp. xxx. to xxxv. until he has acquired a certain familiarity with the text of the Ethics.

² This idea will be found clearly worked out in Grant's *Ethics*, vol. i. Essay vii.)

system is, What is the Chief Good for Man? What is the Final End of action, the End-in-itself? So again it will be seen that a large portion of Books II. III. and IV. is occupied with the distinction between Virtues and Vices as manifested in outward actions, while we hear little or nothing of the faculty in ourselves by which that distinction is apprehended further than that it is 'right reason' (*ὁρθὸς λόγος*); and the sense of Duty or Obligation is scarcely touched upon (Cf. perhaps III. i. 24 *ὦν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι*). So again we find a full discussion of Voluntary and Involuntary actions (B. III. chaps. i.—v.), but not of the Nature of the Will in itself or of its relation to the other parts of our moral constitution.

It must be clearly understood that this is no depreciation of Aristotle's system. It simply amounts to a statement of the totally different standpoint of ancient and modern times. The accumulated experience of more than two thousand years, together with the influence of Christianity pervading, even when not explicitly recognised, all modern thought, has given us an utterly different position *at starting* in Ethical Science, just as in Natural Science now-a-days a schoolboy starts with appliances and discoveries at his disposal which enable him to leave the wisest of the ancients far behind before he has mastered the very alphabet of his subject.

(2) The *political* or rather *social*-character of Aristotle's system of Morals will also attract our notice. The science of Ethics is regarded at the outset as a branch of Political or Social Science (*πολιτική τις* I. ii. 9), while at the close of B. X. it is said absolutely to require the sanction and compelling powers of Civil Government to enforce its precepts in

practice. Throughout the treatise the discussion of various moral questions is justified by the argument that Statesmen have employed or might employ such knowledge (*e.g.* ἀρετή in I. xiii. 2-4; ψυχὴ *ib.* § 8; add I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, and III. v. 7, etc.). This characteristic again is due to the circumstances of the writer's age and country. If we consider (1) the absence, comparatively speaking, of domestic life among the Greeks; (2) the fact that in the ancient Greek states, which were *cities* and not *countries*, representative government was comparatively unnecessary, and practically regarded with disfavour¹; (3) the practical disabilities and general contempt visited upon trading and commerce; we can see how, under all these circumstances, a man's social and political life acquired an importance which it is difficult for us, with our domestic habits, our vast empires, and our commercial pursuits, at all to realize. It was in fact the only avenue to distinction. Poets, philosophers, artists, were almost always statesmen or soldiers. The wealthy did not merely pay a larger sum to the aggregate of national taxation. A rich man raised and equipped so many horsemen, or he fitted out a vessel of war (which was usually commanded by himself), or he undertook the expenses of an embassy, or of a public festival. Hence the prominence of civic virtues in Aristotle's² and other

¹ Aristotle says in the *Politics* that one who does not himself share in political life might as well be a resident alien (ὥσπερ μέτοικος γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων).

² *e.g.* The primary importance

of Courage, which is, in Aristotle's conception, almost restricted to military Courage. With the Spartans this Virtue was so pre-eminent that others were entirely subordinate to it: *e.g.* Theft was encouraged because of the cour-

ancient systems of morality. Hence too the tendency to regard virtues generally from their social or political side¹. The relative badness of different vices is frequently estimated by Aristotle in reference not to the depravity of character which they either imply or tend to generate, but to their effect on society². With many ancient moralists, and notably with Plato, the consideration that 'public benefits' may result from 'private vices' is so strong as to obscure the sense of wrong in such cases altogether, *e.g.* when community of wives, the practice of abortion, the destruction of weakly children, pious frauds, etc., are not only sanctioned, but advocated, on the ground of advantages that may be secured thereby to the State³. That Aristotle's Ethical System

age cultivated by its execution. That the Greeks in earlier times generally displayed an excessive regard to this Virtue is noticed by Gladstone, *Juventus Mundi*, p. 380. It was not the treachery nor the adultery but the effeminate cowardice of Paris which chiefly moved their indignation. The very name for Courage is ἀνδρεία, Manliness. Also the distinction drawn between μεγαλοπρέπεια and ἐλευθερία (II. vii. 6, IV. ii. 1), and we may perhaps add that between μεγαλοψυχία and φιλοτιμία (in its good sense) (II. vii. 8, IV. vi. 1) are socially rather than morally important.

¹ The limitations imposed upon

the sphere for the exercise of Courage in III. vi. may be so explained. (Plato's Definition of Courage exhibits still more strongly this tendency, which in fact distorts his whole Ethical system. See *Rep.* p. 429, B. Courage is 'such a power as will preserve under all circumstances that precise estimate of things to be feared which the legislator has imparted in education.')

² *e.g.* ἀσωτία is preferred on this ground, among others, to ἀνελευθερία, IV. i. 32, 44. Compare IV. v. 12, in reference to Anger.

³ We even find a moralist (Archytas) quoted in *Cic. de*

should have a 'political' hue is almost as much a necessity of his age and country as that the language in which he wrote should be Greek¹; that this colouring but seldom disguises important moral questions is a merit peculiarly his own.

(3) Thirdly, the attentive student will be struck by a tendency in Aristotle to regard Virtue very much on its *intellectual* side. This again was an inheritance from the times in which he lived², and with his master Plato it is found in a vastly greater degree. With Plato Virtue is Knowledge and Vice is Ignorance. No man, according to his system, can deliberately act *against* knowledge. When any man chooses the Wrong he must do so with the conviction, at least for the moment, that it is preferable to secure the forbidden pleasure and risk the future consequences than to undergo the present pain of the self-denial. This is simply a miscalculation, and Vice is due therefore to an error of

Senect. xii. § 40, denouncing sensuality on the main ground that it leads to actions politically dangerous.

¹ 'Every nation, from its peculiar circumstances and position, tends to some particular type, both of beauty and of virtue, and it naturally extols its national type beyond all others.'—(Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, vol. i. p. 82.)

² 'If we compare the different virtues that have flourished

among Pagans and Christians, we invariably find that the prevailing type of excellence among the former is that in which the will and judgment, and among the latter, that in which the emotions are most prominent. Friendship rather than love, hospitality rather than charity, magnanimity rather than tenderness, clemency rather than sympathy, are the characteristics of ancient goodness.'—(Lecky, *Eur. Mor.* vol. i. p. 200.)

judgment, a mistake, an intellectual blunder, and is consequently with Plato, at least in theory, involuntary. We find no such exaggeration of the intellectual portion of moral action in Aristotle, but on the contrary frequent protests against it. But we do find, as compared with our modern ideas, little account taken of the emotional or impulsive side of Virtue. Though Aristotle insists in III. ii. at much length on the compound character of Moral Choice (*προαίρεσις*)—which is an essential condition of all Moral Action (see II. iv. 3)—as involving an element of Impulse (*ὀρεξις*) as well as of Judgment (*δόξα*), yet in his detailed account of the Virtues it often strikes us that he makes the Moral Agent too self-conscious¹; there is a sort of cold and studied propriety, an absence of impulse and enthusiasm, even in virtues which seem to involve a large element of impulse in actual practice, such as Courage, Liberality, Benevolence, and High-Mindedness.² No doubt it might be said that this unruffled philosophic self-control is his ideal of Moral perfection. We are not now discussing the merits of such an ideal. We are simply noting that Aristotle's conception of Moral Virtue does in a marked way, compared with our modern habits of thought, fall under this type.

Finally, the beginner should be warned of the difficulties

¹ The often-noted absence of one's-self and especially of one's humility in Aristotle's ideal moral character, which, if undeserved, is mere folly; if deserved, the High-Minded Man (IV. iii.), is an instance of this. implies the reverse of a Virtuous Humility viewed on its intellectual condition.

side (as a Greek would view it) becomes a low estimate of
² See notes on IV. i. 27, ii. 10, iii. 24.

which lie before him in the way of (i.) literal translation, (ii.) analysis and distinction of argument, in this Book.

i. It is difficult, or rather in many cases impossible, to translate the technical language of Aristotle by any precisely equivalent terms in English. It is very rare to find two technical words in different languages precisely agreeing in their significance, in their extent, and still more in their associations. The words of different nations, like their coinage or their weights and measures, are often incommensurable. We cannot exactly translate francs into shillings or kilomètres into miles. Hence we must not be startled if we read that it is absurd to 'praise' (ἐπαίνεῖν) the gods (I. xii.), or if we find physical functions such as nutriment and growth attributed to the 'soul' (ψυχὴ) (I. xiii.), or if we are told that moral science is a branch of 'political' science (πολιτική) (I. ii.). The explanation is that our words 'praise,' 'soul,' 'political,' have different meanings and associations from those of the most nearly corresponding Greek terms. Still more impossible is it to translate passages the force of which depends on the double meaning of a Greek word or phrase (e.g. ἀκόλαστος in III. xii., λόγον ἔχειν in I. xiii., τέλειος 'final' and 'perfect,' I. vii. 4), or upon the etymology of a technical term (e.g. ἡθικὴ in II. i. 1).

In all such cases as we have mentioned, we must either (1) paraphrase, *i.e.* describe rather than translate the words in the text (e.g. this will be found recommended in I. ii. for πολιτική), or (2) adopt different English words at different times for the same Greek word according to the particular side of the complex idea which is for the time prominent, *e.g.*

we may sometimes translate $\psi\chi\eta$ 'soul,' sometimes 'mind,' sometimes perhaps 'vital principle.' It must always be borne in mind that the object of translation is not 'verbum verbo reddere,' but to convey to a modern hearer as far as possible the same ideas and impressions as the original would have produced in a contemporary.

ii. It would be an error to regard this work in the light of a modern treatise carefully written and revised by its author, put forth as the formal result of his labours in one special field of knowledge, and intended by him to occupy a definite position among his collected works. So far is this from being the case that the Nicomachean Ethics as they have come to us are generally thought to consist of fragments of two or more distinct treatises which were never intended to form parts of one whole. And more than this, they have sometimes been regarded as merely notes of different courses of oral lectures, taken down by one or more pupils, perhaps, and perhaps not, revised by Aristotle himself. We find (1) promises of subsequent discussion unfulfilled, or announced arrangements departed from¹; (2) inconsistent theories or statements in different Books²; (3) confusion in the grouping of arguments or in the statement of single arguments³; (4) sometimes a series of arguments appears in a sort of skeleton form, as if they were merely heads or memoranda⁴; (5) sometimes arguments in support of a point from which the discussion has passed on, seem to be added like after-thoughts, just

¹ See II. vii. 16.

³ As perhaps in I. viii. 10

² This applies chiefly to other Books than I.-IV.

etc., I. ix. 4.

⁴ See II. iii., v.; III. ii.

as they occurred to the author, instead of being placed in their natural position¹; (6) misquotations occur from well-known authors, which have evidently been cited from memory and not verified²; (7) perhaps the note-theory might explain occasional instances of confusion, such as that in respect of *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* (II. vii. 15); or the sudden collapse of an unfinished discussion, as in IV. ix.³ These blemishes, and especially the last four, are just such as might be expected in oral lectures, or notes from such lectures, but not in a revised or finished treatise. Hence the student must not expect to be always able to analyse satisfactorily, or distinguish quite clearly, the several arguments in the text, as it stands; nor to develop a finished plan of treatment for each subject under discussion.

¹ e.g. I. viii. 12, etc.; II. iii. 7; III. iii. 14, etc.

² e.g. Calypso for Circe, II. ix. 3; and perhaps the illustration from Homer about Thetis, IV. iii. 25; but see *Suppl. Notes*.

³ To the arguments given above might be added two considerations derived from the diction: (i.) the frequent use of *ἀκροαταί*, *ἀκούειν*, etc. Shilleto (note on Thuc. i. 90) remarks on this: 'If the Nic. Ethics and some other works of Aristotle were not syllabuses of lectures, what is the meaning of more than once calling *ὁ πεπαιδευμένος* (the pupil) *ἀκροατής*, and of the expression *ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ*

ἀνωφελῶς?' He proceeds to defend the reading *πρῶτην* for *πρότερον* in Eth. II. iii. 5 = 'as we said in our lecture the other day,' and suggests that the frequent use of *ἀλλὰ νῆ Δία* in the Politics [i.e. the Ethics continued] points in the same direction. (ii.) The use of *accusative* and *infinitive* without any strict grammatical construction; which quasi-reminiscence of *Or. Obl.* is suggestive of the process of jotting down notes. This is very common in the *Politics*, and in the *Ethics* we may cite as examples, IV. iii. 25 (*διὸ καὶ κ.τ.λ.*), *ib.* § 28 (*εἰρῶνα δὲ κ.τ.λ.*), etc.

GLOSSARY.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THESE NOTES.

- cf. 'confer,' 'compare.'
q.v. 'quod vide,' 'to which refer.'
sc. 'scilicet,' 'namely.'
s.v. 'sub voce' (e.g. 'see Glossary s.v. τέλος' means 'see the Glossary under the word τέλος').
l.c. 'loco citato,' 'in the passage quoted.'
h.l. 'hoc loco,' 'in this passage.'
ib. 'ibidem,' 'in the same place or passage.'
κ.τ.λ. 'καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ,' 'et cetera.'

The references to Books, Chapters, and Sections are made in different figures, thus: II. iii. 5 means Book II., Chapter iii., Section 5.



LIST OF TERMS EXPLAINED IN THE
GLOSSARY.

	PAGE
πρᾶξις—ποίησις,	xliii
θεωρία,	xliii
Art—Science,	xliv
<i>A priori</i> — <i>a posteriori</i> ,	xlv
δύναμις—ἐνέργεια,	xlvi
τέλος—τέλειος,	xlvi
ἀρχή,	xlvii
ψυχή,	xlviii
ἀρετή,	xlix
προαίρεσις,	l
<i>The Four Causes</i> ,	li
θεὸς—φύσις,	lii



πρᾶξις—ποίησις.

Πρᾶξις (1) has the general sense of outward action, in contrast with inward and mental activity (*θεωρία*, for which see below). (2) It is applied to a particular kind of outward actions, *viz.*, such as have no tangible result distinct from the action itself; where our aim is not at *making* something but at *doing* something. *e.g.* The practice of the Art of Navigation, or the Art of Healing: for the safety of the ship or the health of the body is not a result of a distinct and tangible character. (3) Since the most important cases of such actions are Moral Actions, where either the action itself is the result in view, or the character which it tends to form, *πρᾶξις* acquires the still more limited sense of Moral Action.

Ποίησις is applied to actions which leave some definite and tangible result; actions which aim at *making* something; as is the case in most of the Arts: *e.g.* in house-building or ship-building the house or the ship is such a result, in composing poetry (*ποίησις*), the poem (*ποίημα*); in sculpture or painting, the statue or the picture.

The adjectives *πρακτική*, *ποιητική*, *θεωρητική*, naturally follow the same distinction. See in illustration, X. viii. 7. So in *Pol.* I. iv. 4, Aristotle describes a Shuttle as *ὄργανον ποιητικόν*, its value consisting in its *productions*, but a Bed or Clothing as *ὄργανα πρακτικά*, their value consisting in their *use*.

θεωρία.

Θεωρία is grouped with *ποίησις* and *πρᾶξις* by Aristotle, and he regards these three as the only possible forms which intelligent activity can take. Observe they are all forms of *activity* (*ἐνέργεια*). Activity of the productive or artistic powers is *ποίησις*. Activity of the powers of action, and especially moral action, is *πρᾶξις*. Activity of the powers of intellect or contemplation is *θεωρία*. In the first, there is outward action and a tangible result; in the second, there is outward action but no tangible result; in the last, there is neither outward action nor tangible result; still it is not a passive state, but one of internal, mental activity, 'the depth, and not the tumult of the soul' (Wordsworth). (See *Pol.* IV. (VII.) iii. *sub. fin.*) As Pope writes (*Essay on Man*, ii. 106), the 'strength of mind is exercise, not rest.' But further, it must be distinguished from

the mental activity displayed in the pursuit or acquisition of knowledge. It is the active fruition of knowledge already possessed. (See X. vii. 5, οὐδὲν ἄπ' αὐτῆς γίγνεται πλὴν τὸ θεωρῆσαι.) It is, to use a homely illustration, like 'chewing the cud' of knowledge, dwelling upon it, assimilating it. Persuasion, or discovery, of a truth leads to belief or knowledge of it; if it be a matter of personal interest, faith in it follows; finally it may become as it were a part of our very selves, our intellectual food, the thought upon which our minds for ever dwell and meditate. This last condition would constitute *θεωρία* of it. These stages are admirably expressed by Wordsworth:

One in whom persuasion and belief
Had ripened into faith, and faith become
A *passionate intuition*.

This 'passionate intuition' is *θεωρία*. It is this intellectual energy in repose, this active yet tranquil contemplation and enjoyment of Truth and Knowledge already possessed, that, under the name of *θεωρία* (in B. X.), Aristotle considers to be perfect and ideal Happiness, as realized only in the life of the gods.

Art—Science.

Science is knowledge for its own sake (*scire ut sciamus*). Art is knowledge for some practical end (*scire ut operemur*). It is objectionable to say that Art is 'Science turned to account,' because an Art is generally prior in time to its related Science. In fact the existence of an Art in a rude state is generally the stimulating cause of the study of the related Science. *e.g.* The Science of Astronomy was originally cultivated with a view to the Art of Navigation, or the Art (or practical Science) of Astrology: the Science of Anatomy with a view to the Art of Surgery: the Science of Chemistry with a view to the Art of Alchemy.

So much for the general distinction of the terms. There is however an ambiguity about the word 'practical,' which causes some difficulty in the application of the words Art and Science (*e.g.* Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Astrology, Navigation, etc., are called by either title). This makes it desirable to have an intermediate term, 'practical Science.' Let the reader refer to the difference already explained (p. xli.) between *πραξις* and *ποίησις*, and he will then understand the following distinction: 'Art' is strictly applicable to cases of *ποίησις*, 'Practical Science' to cases of *πραξις*, 'Science' (as above explained), to knowledge for its own

sake. Hence Logic, Grammar, Rhetoric, Ethics, and Politics are 'practical Sciences.' (See further, Introduction, p. xiii.)

Speaking broadly, *ἐπιστήμη* corresponds with Science, and *τέχνη* with Art. We find however *ἐπιστήμη* used in reference to practical applications of knowledge (e.g. I. i. 5, vi. 15, II. vi. 9, III. iii. 8) and *τέχνη*, at least by implication, referred to Moral action, i.e. *πρᾶξις*, not *πολιτεία* (II. i. 4, vi. 9, etc.). We must not therefore press the correspondence too closely.

Also it must be observed that *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη* with Aristotle more usually refer, not to Art and Science regarded as external results of man's genius (i.e. a body of practical rules, or a system of abstract knowledge), but rather to the *mental states* by which we stand related to the objects of practical or theoretic knowledge respectively.

a priori—*a posteriori*.

These terms refer to what is prior, or posterior, to observation and experience.

An *a priori* argument means one which starts from principles which are (or were thought to be by those who invented these terms) prior to, and independent of, experience. Such for instance are Mathematical and other Axioms. These have been held to be prior to experience, either as being 'innate ideas,' or as not depending *for proof* on experience. Without entering into this controversy further, we may assert that the phraseology *a priori*, having arisen in this manner, is now used to describe arguments starting from general principles.

An *a posteriori* argument, on the other hand, is one that derives its whole force from experience and observation of facts. Its premisses are not general principles or obvious truths, but statements of facts of experience.

Consequently the Mathematical Sciences are purely *a priori* Sciences. They start from general principles such (e.g.) as Euclid's Axioms, and end in particular, or at any rate less general, statements, such as Euclid's Propositions. They proceed, as Aristotle would say, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

On the other hand the Physical Sciences are purely *a posteriori* Sciences. They assume no general principles, but start from observed facts, and end in the discovery of general laws, e.g. that of gravitation. They proceed ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

As to the Science of Ethics, or Morals, both methods have at different times been advocated and adopted. See note on I. iv. 5.

δύναμις—ἐνέργεια.

We first explain the principal meanings of *δύναμις*, which may be connected thus:—*δύναμις* is (1) power or capacity, in a literal or general sense; (2) power *merely*, *i.e.* power existent, but not exercised; dormant, not in operation (see below); (3) power regarded as the source and spring of practical results, such as is given us by Arts in contradistinction to Sciences (see p. xliv). Hence *δύναμις* is sometimes used as a sort of equivalent term for *τέχνη*, *e.g.* *τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δυνάμειον*, I. ii. 3; and again *ib.* §§ 5 and 6. See also V. i. 4.

The most important of the usages of the word is (2). In this sense it stands in contrast with *ἐνέργεια*, somewhat as 'potential' and 'actual,' 'latent' and 'developed,' are contrasted in English. Take these illustrations. The flower exists potentially but not actually (*δυνάμει* but not *ἐνεργείᾳ*) in the bud, or in the seed; the ear of corn in the 'bare-grain'; the oak in the acorn. So the photographic picture, which exists *potentially* on the collodion film, becomes *actual* when brought out by the developing fluid. Again, an infant has not actually the power of speaking or reading any more than a horse or a dog. Still there is an important difference between the two cases, because experience tells us that there is that in the infant which may be developed into these powers, whereas no amount of training would develop anything of the sort in the lower animals, any more than cultivation could produce an oak from an imitation acorn though undistinguishable to the eye from a real one. It is convenient therefore to say that these powers exist in the infant potentially (*δυνάμει*), in distinction to cases where they do not exist at all. So again if we have information given us in cipher, or in sympathetic ink, or in a sealed document, we have the information *δυνάμει* but not *ἐνεργείᾳ*. This distinction is also sometimes indicated by the antithesis of *ἔξις* and *ἐνέργεια*, or of *κτῆσις* and *χρῆσις*. Passages in illustration will be found in I. viii. 8, II. i. 4. See also the use of *δύναμις* in contrast with *πάθος* and *ἔξις* in II. v. 2.

Again, the distinction may be applied both to *existence* and *action*. As regards the former, *δύναμις* is applied to that which *can be*, but is not: as regards the latter to that which *can do*, but does not. See especially the use of *δύναμις* in I. xii.

τέλος, τέλειος.

Τέλος = our word 'End' (1) in its literal sense of a 'termination'; and (2) in its other sense of a 'motive' or 'aim': of which the latter use is much more common in Aristotle. (3) It is also used in reference to his doctrine of the 'end-in-itself,' or 'final end' of all human action, described in other words as 'the Chief Good.' Often however these meanings are combined in a manner which it is all but impossible to represent in translation, *e.g.* I. ix. 3, τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀθλον καὶ τέλος. Similarly τέλειος means 'complete,' 'perfect,' and also 'final': *e.g.* in I. vii. it is difficult to retain this double signification in translation.

Aristotle's doctrine of the 'end-in-itself' may be thus explained:— There must be an end or purpose (in sense (2)) for which man exists in the world, as there is for everything else (see I. vii. 11). There must also be an end or limit (in sense (1)) to man's desires and efforts, else they would be in vain and useless (see I. ii. 1). That end once attained, man would 'rest and be satisfied.' There could be nothing further to look to or to wish for. Hence it is called the 'absolute end,' or the 'end-in-itself.' To discover this in theory, and to secure the attainment of it in practice, is regarded by Aristotle as the main object of Ethics. This is spoken of as τὸ τέλος, *e.g.* III. ix. 5. Also as to τῶν πρακτῶν τέλος, I. vii. 8, and τὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων τέλος, X. vi. 1.

ἀρχή.

Ἀρχή means literally a 'starting-point' or 'beginning,' or, as Aristotle himself explains it, ἡ ἐστὶν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γινώσκειται τὸ πρᾶγμα, 'that by which anything exists, or is produced, or is known.' Thus it is a very general term.

As a cause of *existence* or *production*. In this sense it may be used for any of the Four Causes (explained p. li); see *Metaph.* I. iii. We find it in the *Ethics* for Efficient Cause, as when man is said to be the ἀρχή of his own actions (III. v. 5); and when Volition is described as the ἀρχή of the movement of the limbs (III. i. 6); for Final Cause, as when Happiness is said to be the ἀρχή of our actions (I. xii. 8).

As a cause of *knowledge*. At either end of the scale of knowledge there must be a starting-point (ἀρχή), which is taken for granted with-

out demonstrative proof, otherwise *πρόεισιν οὕτω γ' εἰς ἀπειρον*. Hence the general principles or axioms, at the top of the scale, and the particular facts of perception or observation, at the bottom, must be *assumed* to start with, and hence both are sometimes called *ἀρχαί*. Hence (says Aristotle) *νοῦς τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρα*, 'There is an intuitive faculty for the truths we start with in both directions.' An example of one kind would be, 'Two straight lines cannot enclose a space.' An example of the other, 'This is a straight line, a triangle,' 'This magnet attracts iron,' etc. See the following passages in illustration: I. vii. 20, *τῶν ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν θεωροῦνται κ.τ.λ.*, 'Of the truths we start from some are *apprehended*, etc.; the last word, purposely vague, expresses at any rate an *immediate* apprehension, independent of proof. Again, *τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή* (*ib.* and I. iv. 7), 'The fact is a beginning and a point to start from.'

In the quotation, I. vii. 21, *ἀρχή . . . πλεῖον ἢ ἡμῖν παντὸς*, we have *ἀρχή* in its literal meaning, but the *dictum* is applied by Aristotle to the technical sense of the word also.

Since the Greeks seldom employed any other than the *a priori* method (see p. xlv) in the pursuit of knowledge, *ἀρχή* comes to stand often for 'general principle,' 'first principle,' or 'axiom.' This will explain its use in I. iv., where *λόγοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν* = 'arguments starting from general principles'; *λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς* = 'arguments leading up to general principles.'

ψυχή.

This word, generally translated 'Soul,' has no precise English equivalent. It stands for all that is immaterial in man, including Mind, Desires, Will, and even Life. On the one hand, 'Soul' includes too much. It is impossible to disconnect theological and religious ideas from the word 'Soul,' which are quite foreign to the conception of Aristotle: *e.g.* To employ such expressions in translation as 'the life of the Soul,' 'the good of the Soul,' would be misleading. On the other hand, 'Soul' includes too little, as it does not reach to mere physical life, such as Animals and even Plants possess (see I. xiii. 11). Again, the word 'Life,' or Vital Principle, is too narrow, excluding Reason, Moral action, etc. So also is 'Mind,' excluding all else beside Reason.

The following passages will serve to show how impersonal, and how widely different from our notion of 'Soul' is Aristotle's conception of *ψυχή*. 'If the eye were a living creature, sight would be its *ψυχή*'

(*De An.* II. i. 9). So again the Soul is said to bear a relation to the Body like that of Form to Matter. Again (and this throws light on the abbreviated discussion in *Eth.* I. xiii.—note especially the expression in § 15, ἀλλὰ τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς), in *De An.* II. ii. Aristotle explains that there are different kinds of Life (cf. *Eth.* I. vii. 12, etc.), such as Motive, Nutritive, Sentient, Intelligent, and that to each of them, ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ καὶ τοῦτοις ὀρίσται, each kind of Life corresponding either to a different *kind* of ψυχὴ, or to a different *part* of the ψυχὴ (*De An.* II. ii. 8; cf. *Eth.* I. xiii. 10), but in either case the higher kinds or parts possess all the qualities of the lower, as well as their own (*De An.* II. iii. 5). The Nutritive ψυχὴ belongs to Plants; the Sentient (+ Nutritive) to Animals; the Intelligent (+ Sentient + Nutritive) to Man.

Compare Dryden (*Knight's Tale*)—


'First vegetive, then feels, and reasons last;
Rich of three souls.'

In reference to the two important controversies as to (1) the Origin; (2) the Immortality of the Soul, we may note—(1) Aristotle considers that Man derives the θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ from the Female (hence the state of the embryo at first is that of mere vegetative life), the αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ from the Male; while of the διανοητικὴ he says, λείπεται τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον (*De Gen. Anim.* II. iii. 4, 7, 10). Thus it would seem that Aristotle (like Dante, *Purg.* xxv. 77, etc.) combines in some sense the Traducianist and Creationist theories of the Origin of the Soul. (2) As to its future existence, Aristotle never explicitly pronounces himself, not even in *Eth.* I. x. and xi. It would appear, however, even from the above very imperfect sketch, that a personal immortality could not attach to ψυχὴ as understood by Aristotle; and it is clear, throughout the present and other treatises, that such a notion did not at any rate enter into his Ethical theories. (See further Grant's *Aristotle*, Essay V.)

On the whole, we may perhaps best translate ψυχὴ conventionally by 'Soul' as a general rule, adopting the words 'Life' or 'Mind' occasionally, when the passage refers especially to those parts of the complex idea.

ἀρετή.

Ἀρετή means 'excellence' in all its various senses and applications. (It is obviously connected with the same root as ἀριστος, ἄρης, etc. Compare the connexion of *virtus* in Latin with *vir*.) Hence we find it



applied to the eye, and to the horse, in II. vi. 2; to a musician (by implication) in I. vi. 14; and by Plato to the dog, to a pruning-knife, etc. etc. in short, to anything that has any work or function to perform; the *ἀρετή* in each case consisting in the good performance of that work. We cannot describe this general sense of the term better than in Aristotle's own words in II. vi. 2: 'Every excellence (*ἀρετή*) perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes its work to be well performed.'

There are however two special kinds of excellence to which the word *ἀρετή* is most frequently applied:—(1) Excellence of our *intellectual* or *rational* nature. Instances of such excellences are, prudence, wisdom, intelligence, argumentative power, retentive memory, acuteness, etc. etc. (2) Excellence of our *moral* nature; i.e. a well-regulated condition of the appetites, passions, and desires. Instances of such excellences are, temperance, courage, gentleness, high-mindedness, etc. etc., in other words, the *moral virtues*. It is in this restricted sense of the term that we translate it by 'Virtue.' These two kinds of excellence will be found in I. xiii. 20.

In this case, as in others that have been mentioned, the meanings are often so blended in Greek that we cannot translate by one word in English.

προαίρεσις.

In any deliberate action the following steps or processes may be traced:—

(1) Desire or *wish* for some *end* to be attained (*βούλησις*).

(2) Reflection or *deliberation* upon the several *means* by which the end may be reached (*βούλευσις*).

(3) *Deliberate Choice* of some one means or series of means as the most eligible (*προαίρεσις*). This choice once made, the *action* follows accordingly.

Thus the distinction between *βούλησις*, *βούλευσις*, and *προαίρεσις* resembles that with which we are familiar between 'holy *desires*, good *counsels*, and just *works*' (or at least *resolutions* to act).

προαίρεσις sometimes corresponds nearly with 'purpose,' or 'resolution,' or even 'will,' but as these translations, and especially the last, would often be misleading, it seems best to adopt 'deliberate choice.' This translation has the further advantage of displaying the composite nature of the process, which Aristotle constantly insists upon, it being not merely 'choice' or 'purpose,' nor merely 'deliberation,' but a choice succeeding upon deliberation.

The following passages from the *Ethics* may be referred to in illustration. For a general account of *προαίρεσις*, especially in its compound character, and its relation to processes or faculties more or less similar to it, see III. ii. and III. iii. 17, 18. (Compare also VI. ii. 5, where *προαίρεσις* is described as *ἡ ὀρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ ὀρεξις διανοητική*.) It has to do with the Means, not (like *βούλησις*) with the End in action, III. ii. 9. It is coupled with *πρᾶξις* in I. i. 1 and I. vii. 1. It occurs in the sense of 'purpose,' or a 'particular state of the Will,' in contrast with 'action' or 'performance,' in II. iv. 3, VIII. xiii. 11, X. viii. 5; and similarly in IV. vii. 12 (on which see *Suppl. Note*). It is an essential condition of a Virtuous Act, see II. iv. 3, and the Definition of Virtue as *ἐξίς προαιρετική κ.τ.λ.*, in II. vi. 15. It can only be good under the guidance of *φρόνησις*, VI. xiii. 7. Finally, in two passages it seems to waver between the ordinary sense of 'purpose' or 'intention,' and 'the design or plan purposed' ('*id quod disputatione propositum est*,'—*Bonitz*); viz., I. xiii. 4, *κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν*; X. ix. 1, *τέλος ἔχειν τὴν προαίρεσιν*.

The Four Causes.

A complete knowledge of any Being or Object implies an acquaintance with Four different Causes to which its Existence is in different senses due.

- (1) The *Matter* of which it is composed. The *Material Cause*.
- (2) The *Form* by which it is distinguished. The *Formal Cause*.
- (3) The *Force* which has brought about the particular combination of Matter and Form which constitute the Being or Object under consideration. The *Efficient Cause*.
- (4) The *Purpose* or *Object in View* in such a combination. The *Final Cause*.

(2) and (4) require further explanation.

(2) 'Form' is to be taken not merely for external shape, but for whatever is characteristic or essential. The same *Matter* may be made into a hundred different objects, but the same *Form* (within certain limits) belongs to one class of objects only, and hence 'formal' came to mean 'essential'; and the 'formal cause' = 'the essential nature'; i.e. the group of such qualities or characteristics as are essential to the existence of anything in its barest form, or to the simplest conception we can have of it; which qualities are therefore always present in all different types

or developments of it.¹ Thus the 'formal cause,' when described in words, becomes the *Definition* of the object.

In Aristotle's phraseology, 'Formal Cause' is identical with *οὐσία* (when = essence), and with *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, which will be found explained in note on II. vi. 17. See *Metaph.* I. iii. 1.

Hence to take a single example—a Statue:—

The Material Cause is the marble or metal of which it is made.

Its Formal Cause is in one sense the shape by which we recognise it as a statue, and in another, the qualities which would constitute the scientific definition of 'Statue.'

Its Efficient Cause is in one sense the Artist, in another the Chisel, or the Furnace.

Its Final Cause the purpose with which it was made, *e.g.* the gain of the artist, the decoration of some public place, honour to be paid to some great man, etc. etc. Again, the Final Cause of a clock is to mark time. As soon as a certain combination of wood, brass, etc., fulfils this condition, we call it a clock, and thus 'marking time' may be said to be the *cause* of its being a clock rather than anything else.

(4) The Final Cause (an expression familiar to us from the theological 'Argument from Final Causes,' or 'Argument from Design'), is the Purpose, End, or Object-in-View of anything. In all cases however we may trace (as Aristotle shows, B. I. c. i. and c. ii. *init.*) both proximate and ultimate purposes. All purposes if traced far enough resolve themselves into this one, that there is some *good* to be gained by the action; or, in more technical language, all ends ultimately converge to the Chief Good or *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. Thus, strictly speaking, there is only one really Final Cause. The term however is applied to any subordinate end or inducement to act. (See further *s.v.* *τέλος*, *τέλειος*.)

It will further follow that the Efficient Cause must be *prior to*, but need not be *simultaneous with*, its Effect; the Formal Cause must be *simultaneous* but need not be *prior*; the Material Cause must be *both*. (Cf. *Post. Anal.* II. xi.)

θεὸς—φύσις.

It may be worth while to explain very briefly once for all Aristotle's conception of God and Nature in relation to the world, as several passages

¹ In this sense Bacon speaks of the *Form* of Light and of Heat. Compare Wordsworth's use of the word in the passage:—

Who in this spirit communes with the *Forme*
Of Nature,
i.e. the great essential types of Nature's
varied operations.

in the Ethics would mislead those who adopted without some precaution the two English words in question.

Aristotle's philosophical conception of God excludes the ideas of the Creation, the Moral Government, and even the Providential Government, of the world. *Creation* and *providential government* are excluded, since Aristotle maintains that the world is eternal, and distinctly asserts (in X. viii. 7) that *ποίησις* (creative energy) of any kind is unworthy of God, and also in B. X. and elsewhere, that God is absolutely unmoved, unchangeable, unaffected by anything external to himself; his existence consisting in thought thinking upon itself (*νόησις νοήσεως νόησις*), or in a conscious fruition of perfect knowledge (see above s.v. *θεωπλα*). *Moral government* is excluded, partly for the same reasons; and also because *πρᾶξις* (or moral action) is likewise in the same passage of B. X. distinctly stated to be unworthy of the divine nature. Also in VII. i. 2, it is asserted that the condition of excellence in *θεός* is *τιμιώτερον ἀπεριήs*. (Cf. the distinctions made in I. xiii.)

In short, any kind of *agency* was held by Aristotle to be unworthy of the Divine perfection. Such action would be *ἀναγκαῖος, βλαύς τις* (see note on I. v. 8). This was the main point of the much misunderstood theory of Epicurus as to the gods. (See Grote's *Aristotle*, ii. p. 436.)

Yet Aristotle maintains that God, though unmoved, is the cause and source (*αἴτιον καὶ ἀρχή*) of all motion. This paradox is thus explained: God is not the *efficient* but the *final* cause of all motion (see above, s.v. 'The Four Causes'). In other words, the universe moves under the attraction of, and by striving after, the supreme Good, which is God: in its endeavours thereafter, it for ever, so to speak, circles and revolves about God as a centre, who thus, himself unmoved, becomes

The one far-off divine Event
To which the whole Creation moves.

So Dante:—

(Dio) Solo ed Eterno che tutto il cielo move
Non moto, con amore e con disio.

(Parad. xxiv. 131.)

Still it should be noted that Aristotle often speaks popularly of Divine agency, feelings, etc., in a manner quite inconsistent with his formal theories, e.g. *Eth.* I. ix.; X. viii. 13; ix. 6. Cf. *Rhet.* II. ix. 2, *τοῖs θεοῖs ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νευμεσῆν*. It should be added also that Aristotle (like Plato), following the popular usage, speaks indifferently of 'God' and 'Gods' (e.g. I. xii. 3; X. viii., etc.), yet his conception of the nature of God, taken strictly, excludes altogether the idea of plurality of Gods.

The precise meaning of *φύσις*, and its relation to *θεός*, in Aristotle, is perhaps as difficult to define as it would be to formulate accurately our own conception of Nature. Aristotle doubtless would not, in strict speaking, regard Nature as a personal or rational agent (see *Eth.* III. iii. 7, note), though he often (as we do) uses language which would imply it. Confining our attention chiefly to such passages as occur in the *Ethics*, or obvious illustrations of them, we may note :—

(1) Optimism in Nature. See *Eth.* I. ix. 5, *εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν*. [Compare *De Caelo*, I. iv. fin., *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάρτην ποιοῦσιν*. Also *Pol.* I. ii. 8-10. Again, in various passages cited by Bonitz, *s.v.*, *ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάρτην ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ περιέργον οὐδὲ ἐλλεῖπον, οὐδὲ ἀτελές, ἀλλὰ πάντα πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον ἀποβλέπουσα*.]

In regard to this Optimism we may observe :—

(a) It is assigned to a conscious and intelligent purpose in Nature in such passages as *De An.* II. iv. 5, *ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς ἐνεκά του ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις*, etc. etc. Also such expressions as *δημιουργεῖ, βούλεται, ἀποδίδωσιν*, and many others, are frequently applied to *φύσις*.

(β) Nature, like Art, often falls short of its aim, being thwarted by Necessity, or Chance, or the Matter it has to work upon. Hence the limitation *ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν* above. Cf. *De Caelo*, II. v. 3, *ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων τὸ βέλτιστον*, and see *Pol.* I. vi. 8, *ἡ φύσις βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται*. With this we may compare the exquisite simile of Dante—

‘La natura . . .
Similmente operando all’ artista,
C’ha l’abito dell’ arte e man che trema.’—(*Par.* xiii. 75.)

‘Nature . . .
Resembling thus the Artist in her work,
Whose faltering hand is faithless to his skill.

(2) *φύσις* is the source of order, fixity, and regularity in the Universe (*e.g.* seeds and animals reproducing their like), being intermediate to Necessity on the one side (implying the impossibility of any variation), and Chance on the other (implying the absence of any law). Cf. *De Caelo*, III. ii. 8, *ἡ τάξις ἡ οἰκεία τῶν αἰσθητῶν φύσις ἐστίν*.

Hence we may perhaps explain *τὰ φύσει ἡδέα*, I. viii. 11, and *φύσει βουλητόν*, III. iv., as contrasted with the irregular tastes of individuals. [Comp. *Rhet.* I. xi. 3, where *ἡδέα φύσει*, and *ἡδέα ἐθει* are contrasted, especially, *ἐστίν ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ἐθος τοῦ πολλάκις*.] So *Eth.* I. iii. 2, *καλὰ καὶ δίκαια φύσει* as opposed to *νόμῳ*. (Cf. *φύσει* opposed to *κατὰ*

συμβεβηκός, *De An.* I. iii. 3.) See also the distinction between φυσικόν and νομικόν δίκαιον, as explained in *Eth.* V. vii. 1; the former, however, not being rigidly invariable (as though due to ἀνάγκη; see note on III. iii. 7), though exceptions are so comparatively rare as 'to prove the rule'; just as (Aristotle adds) the right hand is φύσει stronger than the left in spite of the existence of ἀμφιδέξιοι. So again, γνώριμα τῇ φύσει elsewhere occurs as synonymous with γνώριμα ἀπλῶς in *Eth.* I. iv. 5. Under this head also compare *Eth.* II. i. 2, οὐθὲν τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται.

(3) φύσις and θεός seem sometimes almost identified, as our own usage might lead us to expect; e.g. in *Eth.* X. ix. 6, that which belongs to us φύσει is said διὰ τῶας θείας αἰτίας ὑπάρχειν. Many passages occur elsewhere in which direct creative and providential functions are attributed to φύσις.

(4) φύσις is often used in reference to the operations of Nature in a limited sphere, such as the constitution of Man, or of some other Animal, or class of Objects. Though it is difficult to discriminate such a usage precisely, yet something like 'human nature' seems to be the prominent idea in the following:—*Eth.* II. i. 3, etc., ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ neither φύσει nor παρὰ φύσιν; III. v. 18, 19, whether our end and aim in action φύσει ἢ ὅπωςδὴποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται. See X. ix. 14, in reference to πατρικοὶ λόγοι, children προϋπάρχουσι στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ φύσει. Compare further with this usage the sense in which some moralists have held that Human Virtue consists in 'following Nature.'

(5) φύσις and τέχνη are frequently put into relation and comparison, e.g. *Eth.* I. ix. 6; II. vi. 9. These passages may be illustrated by others in which it is more definitely laid down that Art follows and supplements Nature; and also that the mode of their operations is similar, e.g. πᾶσα τέχνη . . . τὸ προσλείπον τῆς φύσεως βούλεται ἀναπληροῦν (*Pol.* IV. (VII.) xvii. 15); ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται (*Phys.* II. viii. 8). Dante, referring to the *Physics* by name (*Inf.* xi. 101), amplifies this Aristotelian idea by making Nature the child of God, and Art the child of Nature (si che vostr' arte a Dio quasi è nipote), and therefore includes in the same punishment those who have offered violence to God, or Nature, or Art.



ΗΘΙΚΩΝ ΝΙΚΟΜΑΧΕΙΩΝ

I

[N.B.—The marginal figures on the left-hand side denote Sections, and on the right the lines in the page. See the first page of the Glossary for an explanation of the references to Books, Chapters, and Sections occurring in the Notes.]

I. ΠΑΣΑ τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ

CHAP. I.—*Explanation of Terms, 'End,' 'Good,' 'Chief Good'*
—*Different kinds of Ends, and their degrees of finality.*

I ALL human action, of whatsoever kind, implies an end or purpose, i.e. the attainment of some good. The Chief

The summum bonum may be described as the ultimate end of all our actions.

The main purpose of the Science of Ethics is, in Aristotle's conception, the discovery of the Chief Good, or Final End of all man's actions and aspirations, the attainment of which would leave him nothing to desire. He commences, therefore, in this chapter with first laying down broadly the conception of the Chief Good, and points out the *prima facie* difficulty in accepting such a conception of it. Next (in ch. ii. and iii.), having asserted that it is a reality notwithstanding (i.e., that there is a Chief Good or Final End), he settles some preliminary points as to the utility, scope,

method, etc., of its investigation. Then, in ch. iv., he passes on to the question, *What is the Chief Good?* and finding that the general agreement that it is Happiness vanishes as soon as we further ask, *In what does Happiness consist?* he usually puts the main question thenceforth in the modified form, *What is Happiness?*

1. μέθοδος is strictly a method or process of science, and is therefore contrasted with τέχνη, which stands for a process of art. (See Glossary, s. v. Art and Science). πρᾶξις = action, and especially moral action. προαίρεσις = purpose or resolve which

2 καλῶς ἀπεφάνησαν τὰγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά· Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ

Good is well described as the ultimate end of *all* our 2 actions and desires. Ends differ from one another in a

But it appears that there is a vast difference of ends;

precedes action. The opening sentence then amounts to this:— Whether we are working to *produce* anything (τέχνη), or to *know* anything (μέθοδος), or to *do* anything (πρᾶξις), or even are forming *resolutions* to act (προαίρεσις), in all these cases we must have an end or purpose (in other words, some *good*), in view.

1. τὰγαθόν, literally 'the good,' i.e. the chief good, or 'summum bonum.' 'End' and 'good' are nearly synonymous. The 'end' of an action is the 'good' we hope to secure by the action; it being obvious that every end must at least *appear* good or desirable, at the time it is chosen, to the person choosing it. 'Tis real good or seeming moves us all.'—*Pope*. See III. iv. and III. v. 17. The first words of the next chapter assert the identity of the Final End (the conception of which is developed in this chapter) and the Chief Good, the definition of which is the main object of the whole treatise.

1. Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] Though the general conception of a Chief Good can be readily explained, as has just been done in the words οὗ πάντ'

ἐφίεται, yet the variety of our ends and aims (διαφορὰ τῶν τελῶν) is such that we cannot assume that all things *do* converge to any one such end; in other words, that there is a Chief Good, much less say *what* it is. The former point is established in ii. 1; the solution of the latter is the subject, more or less, of the whole treatise. See especially, however, iv. 1 and vii. 1.

2. If we take a walk simply for the sake of walking, or to 'kill time,' the action (ἐνέργεια) of walking is itself so far the end that we look for no *ulterior* result (ἔργον). If we walk to get an appetite, or for the sake of health, then the appetite or health is a further end beyond the action of walking, and is therefore, as Aristotle proceeds to point out, an end of higher value to us than the act of walking. In this passage, however, Aristotle is thinking chiefly of acts of ποίησις, which are distinguished from acts of πρᾶξις by having definite and tangible products resulting from the action. (See Glossary.)

3. τέλη obviously correspond with ἔργα, and πρᾶξεις with ἐνέργειαι, in the previous sentence.

παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίῳ πέφυκε τῶν ἐνε-
 3 γειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν
 καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς
 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ
 4 νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιούτων 5
 ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἵππικὴν ἢ
 χαλινοδοιοῦν καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἵππικῶν ὀργάνων
 εἰσὶν· αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν
 στρατηγικὴν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας·
 ἐν ἀπάσαις δὲ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν 10
 αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά· τούτων γὰρ χάριν κακεῖνα

variety of ways. (α) They differ in kind: sometimes the (α) In kind;
 action is itself the end; sometimes a definite result beyond
 the action. And notice that when there is such an end
 beyond the action it is obviously something better than the
 3 action itself, which is subordinate to it. (β) But further, (β) in gener-
 the character of ends is as various as the character of the al character;
 actions of which they are ends: e.g. health, victory, wealth,
 a boat, a house, the equipments of a horse, etc. etc., are all
 ends of different actions, and differ *inter se* accordingly.
 4 (γ) In the midst of this variety, however, we may trace a re- (γ) but many
 lation of subordination, or degrees of finality, in ends. One of these are
 art often embraces a variety of others, and their ends being connected in
 subservient to the production of its end are of inferior value; the way of
 for the ends of the higher and more comprehensive arts are subordina-
 tion.

6. δύναμις is here equivalent
 to τέχνη. Art, differing from
 Science in that it supplies the
 power to produce practical re-
 sults, is not unfrequently de-
 scribed as δύναμις. See in next
 ch. § 3. τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
 ἢ δυνάμεων, i.e. 'of which of the
 sciences or arts.' (See Glossary

under δύναμις, and also under
 Art and Science.)

10. ἀρχιτεκτονικὴ] i.e. master-
 science, or arch-science, if we
 allowed such a compound. ἀρχι-
 τέκτων is literally a ruler or
 director of workmen. (See next
 chapter, § 4, and esp. the expres-
 sion αὕτη διατάσσει in § 5.)

5 διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

I II. Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον 5 αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὀρεξίν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη

5 obviously more final than those of the subordinated arts. In regard to this relation of subordination, it will make no difference whether the ends compared together are actions themselves or the results of actions.

CHAPS. II. AND III.—*There is such a thing as a final end of action, i.e. a Chief Good. If so,*

(a) *It will be practically useful to define it.*

(β) *The Political (or Social) Science is the Science which treats of it.*

(γ) *This is not an exact Science.*

(δ) *Its study requires special training and conditions.*

However, I this subordination must stop somewhere; i.e. there must be some Final End.

Now we may safely infer that this subordination of ends cannot go on *ad infinitum*, because we should in that case be endued with a desire (viz. of finality) which would be objectless and useless: in other words, we may infer that there is

3. τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν] ἐπιστήμη appears to be used here, as elsewhere sometimes, for τέχνη. (See Glossary.)

7. κενή, empty, i.e. objectless. ματαία, vain and useless. This passage resembles what is called the argument from design. The major premiss is (as Aristotle elsewhere phrases it) οὐδὲν μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ, 'Nature does no-

thing in vain;' or, as we read in ix. 5, τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἶον τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκε, 'All things are by nature ordered in the best possible way.' The fact that human nature is created with a desire for some final good proves that such a good must exist. That it should not exist is as inconceivable as that nature should have created an animal re-

2 τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ
 γνώσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ῥοπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται
 3 σκοποὺν ἔχοντες, μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος; εἰ
 δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ'
 4 ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' 5
 5 ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονικῆς. Τοι-
 αύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν

one supreme and Final End, to which all other ends converge; If so, the
 3 and that is, in fact, the Chief Good. (α) If this be so, it knowledge
 must be useful to define it, because we shall be more likely to of it would
 4 hit the mark when we have a distinct view of it. (β) The be practi-
 science to which pertains the knowledge of the Chief Good is cally useful.
 naturally the supreme of sciences, and this is the Science of It is the
 5 Social Life. We argue this supremacy on two grounds—(1) Science of Social Life
 which treats
 of it,

quiring a particular sort of food, and then have placed it where that sort of food could not be procured. Take as another illustration the precisely similar argument for a future state (which is still often regarded as the strongest, apart from revelation) based upon the aspirations of mankind for immortality, and for a higher ideal than can be reached in this life. 'It is not at all probable (says Dr. Clarke) that God should have given men appetites which were never to be satisfied, desires which had no objects to answer them, and unavoidable apprehensions of what was never really to come to pass.'

1. καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον] 'even upon life.' These words are emphatic. The knowledge of the Chief Good, might perhaps be thought to be theoretically

interesting, but not practically important—just as Optics and Acoustics increase our knowledge, but do not help us to see and hear better. The objection here implied may be compared with that sometimes made to the utility of the study of Logic, viz., that men do reason correctly without it. The answer would be similar to that given in the text.

5. δυνάμεων] See note on i. 4.

6. κύριος = authoritative or supreme—as explained by the first argument in § 5.

ἀρχιτεκτονικῇ] (see note on i. 4). This epithet is justified by the second argument in § 6. § 7 merely sums up the two preceding arguments, inverting their order.

7. πολιτικῇ is difficult to translate, because both 'Politics' and

τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους
 6 μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει. Ὅρωμεν δὲ
 καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας,
 7 οἷον στρατηγικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν. Χρωμένης δὲ
 ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ
 νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ
 ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ'
 8 ἂν εἴη τὰνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. (Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν
 ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μείζον γὰρ καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως
 φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ
 ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.)
 9 Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις
 οὔσα.

for this
 may be
 shown
 to be the
 supreme
 Science.

this science regulates the study of all the other sciences in a
 6, 7 community; and (2.) it employs their results, even in the
 case of the most esteemed of them, in its own service, and
 8 thus their ends are subordinated to its end. (If it be argued
 that the good of society, which is the end of this science, is
 only another name for the good of the individual men who
 constitute society, we reply that the science which secures
 9 this good on a large scale is still the supreme science.) Hence
 the Science of Ethics is a branch of the Science of Social
 Life.

'Social Science' have acquired
 a technical and inappropriate
 meaning. Paraphrased, it means
 the science which investigates
 the conditions of the perfection
 of social life, or of man living as
 a member of a well-ordered
 community. Aristotle remarks
 elsewhere, Man is created by
 nature a social animal, and

therefore unless he lives in a
 society a portion of his nature is
 undeveloped. We cannot there-
 fore treat of the well-being of
 man without considering him as
 a member of a society, nor
 therefore without also consider-
 ing the conditions of the well-
 being of society. See further
 note on vii. 6.

1 III. Λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην
 ὕλην διασαφηθείη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι
 τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουρ-
 2 γουμένοις. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολι-
 τικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην 5
 3 ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. (Τοιαύτην
 δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμ-
 βαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἥδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο
 4 διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.) Ἀγαπητὸν οὖν
 περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ 10

1 CHAP. III.—(γ) In this subject we must be content with This is not
 general and approximate conclusions. Ethics is not an a Science in
 2 exact science. Exactness in a science must always be which exact-
proportionate to the nature of its subject-matter. Now the ness is at-
 ideas of 'right' and 'wrong,' 'just' and 'unjust,' are so tainable;
 3 fluctuating that some have been led to deny the reality of
 such distinctions altogether. (We may just note in pass-
 ing that this is due to a confusion of thought between
 'wrong' and 'harmful,' or 'injurious.' Many things in them-
 4 selves good and desirable are on occasions a source of consequent-
 mischief.) Such then being our subject-matter and such ly, our con-
 clusions will
 be general
 and approxi-
 mate only.

1. ὕλη and ὑποκειμένη are philosophical terms. The former = 'matter' or 'material,' and the latter (as is seen from its etymology) = 'underlying' or 'subject.' Hence the words together = 'subject-matter.'

3. δημιουργουμένοις] δημιουργός is a workman. Hence δημιουργούμενα are 'products of art.' See note on vii. 18. As we do not expect a model in cork or wood to be as well finished as one in ivory, so we ought not to expect an argu-

ment in a subject variable and fluctuating to be as rigid as one in mathematics.

6. We may notice, once for all, that δοκεῖ in Aristotle's phraseology does not necessarily imply (like our expression 'it seems') that what follows is the writer's own opinion. Here, for instance, he proceeds to argue against the statement introduced by δοκεῖ in § 3. It would generally be better to translate, 'it has been thought.'

τύπῳ τάληθές ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τὰκριβές ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον 5 ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι 5 καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. "Ἐκαστος δὲ κρίνει

our premisses, such must also be our conclusions, in respect of exactness.

Qualifications requisite in the student of this Science are

(δ) The aims of the teacher being thus qualified, so also must be the demands of the learner. He must neither require too rigid accuracy, nor be content with any needless generality. Such exactness as is admitted by the subject-matter, neither 5 more nor less, should he demand. But this discrimination

1. ὡς-ἐπὶ-τὸ-πολὺ is equivalent to one word, and means 'general' or 'variable.' τὰ ὡς-ἐπὶ-τὸ-πολὺ γινόμενα are things which happen as a general rule in such and such a way; 'generalities' as opposed to 'certainties.'

3. ἀποδέχεσθαι means 'to allow,' in the old English sense of 'to approve' (e.g. 'The Lord alloweth the righteous'); hence *h. l.* 'to accept as satisfactory,' 'to acquiesce in.' See IV. vi. 3, where ἀποδέχεται, 'he will allow,' stands in opposition to δυσχεραεῖ, 'he will disapprove.'

6. παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] It would be equally absurd to be satisfied with plausible arguments from a mathematician, as to insist upon rigid

demonstration from an orator. Mathematics being an exact science, no considerations of the probability of a theorem being true, however great, are of the slightest use. Rhetoric being the 'art of persuasion,' the logical value of its arguments is entirely subordinate to their persuasiveness.

8. ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει κ.τ.λ.] 'Cuique perito credendum est in sua arte.' The right of criticism in any subject depends on special training in that subject. We bow to the dictum of the painter in painting, to that of the musician in music. In general matters we look, in like manner, to the man of general knowledge and cultivation. This is evidently the sense re-

καλῶς ἂ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκείος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον 5 πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. "Ἐτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ 7 πρᾶξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἢ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιού- 10 τοις ἀνόνητος ἢ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσιν

implies special education and special qualities in the learner, else he will have neither the right nor the power of exercising such a judgment. (The young therefore are not fit students of (1.) mature age; 6 Ethical Science, partly from their ignorance of life and its experiences, and partly from the strength of their passions, which 7 they have not yet learned to master.) And we must further (2.) well-regulated passions. exclude all who, however old in years, are but children in

quired; and so the following passage would certainly be clearer if it read thus:—Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ [καθ' ἕκαστον] πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δὲ κ.τ.λ., the words in brackets being supplied. Some critics suppose this to have been the original reading.

3. The young should be taught the *practice* of morals before they attempt the *theory*. Their duty is to obey, without asking questions, without criticising the principles of what they have to obey, until the habit of obedience is gained. Then they may be trusted to

look into the theory and principles of conduct, and indeed, unless they would always be children, they ought to do so. 'Oportet discentem credere, edoc-tum judicare' (Bacon). For the latter point see the end of § 7, where εἰδέναι is emphatic; for the former see X. x., where Aristotle maintains that moral teaching will be lost labour unless either parental authority or State laws can be relied on to enforce this preliminary work of training and discipline.

11. ἀκρατέσιν] The following explanation of terms may be useful:—

τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πρᾶτ-
 8 τουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι. Καὶ
 περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτι-
 θέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω τοσαῦτα.

1 IV. Λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ 5
 προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγομεν

8 character; all, that is, who live under the sway of passion and not reason. For Ethics is a science in which right knowledge profits nothing unless it is accompanied by right practice; while right practice will ever derive the greatest advantage if supplemented by right knowledge.

CHAP. IV.—*What is the Chief Good?—Conflicting opinions—
 Determination of the method to be adopted.*

All allow I
 that 'Hap-
 piness' is
 the Chief
 Good.

After these preliminary explanations we recur to the ques-
 tion, What is the aim of this Science of Social Life? or,

ἀκρατής is a man who acts
 wrongly after a struggle be-
 tween good and bad desires.

ἐγκρατής is a man who acts
 rightly in a similar case.

ἀκόλαστος is one in whom vice
 has become a habit, and the
 desire of good is eradicated;
 he does wrong without a
 struggle.

σώφρων is one in whom virtue
 has become a habit; bad
 desires are conquered; he
 does right without an effort;
 or, as Bishop Butler expresses
 it, 'particular affections be-
 come absolutely coincident
 with the moral principle.'
Anal. p. 101 (Angus's edit.).

See, in illustration, I. xiii. 15;
 III. ii. 4. Hence the ἀκρατής is
 precisely in the case described
 in the text: he *knows* right but
does wrong.

IV. Compare Pope, *Essay on
 Man*, iv. 1 :—

Oh Happiness! our being's end and aim!
 Good, Pleasure, Ease, Content, whate'er
 thy name—
 That something still which prompts the
 eternal sigh,
 For which we bear to live, or dare to die.

Or again, line 21, etc.

Some place the bliss in action, some in
 ease,
 Those call it Pleasure, and Contentment
 these;
 Some, sunk to beasts, find pleasure end
 in pain;
 Some, swelled to gods, confess ev'n
 virtue vain:

τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν
 2 πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν
 πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ
 καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν
 ταῦτον ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν. Περὶ δὲ τῆς 5
 εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ
 3 πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν
 ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν,
 ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον νοσήσας
 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον συνειδότες δ' 10
 ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας
 θαυμάζουσιν. Ἕνιοι δ' ὥντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα
 ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν

- 2 as we put it at first, What is the Chief Good? In name all
 alike agree that it is Happiness: but when we further ask
 3 What is Happiness? one says one thing, and one another,
 and even the same person says differently at different times.
Pleasure, wealth, honour, health, some abstract ideal of good,

But there
 endless var-
 ety of opin-
 ions as to
 what Happi-
 ness consists
 in.

Or indolent, to each extreme they fall,
 To trust in everything, or doubt of all.
 Who thus define it, say they more or less
 Than this, that Happiness is Happiness?

2. *πρακτῶν* is emphatic. See note below on line 13.

4. *χαρίεντες* [‘men of culture.’]

6. This divergence of opinion may be illustrated by the fact that an ingenious writer (Varro) claimed to have counted 285 different theories on this subject.

10. *συνειδότες κ.τ.λ.*] We always value that most which for the time we want. In sickness we think no good can compare with health; in poverty we think nothing would make

us so happy as money; when conscious of ignorance ourselves we are dazzled by a display of knowledge which is beyond us.

13. This is Plato's theory of the ‘Idea’ of Good, criticised by Aristotle at length in chapter vi. The Chief Good, according to Plato, is the Quality or Condition invariably present in everything Good, the possession of which causes the same term ‘Good’ to be applicable in each case. We speak of a good man, or horse, or poem, or poison, or antidote, etc. etc. We should not apply the same term ‘Good,’

4 αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. Ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν
 τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα
 5 ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λαν-
 θανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι
 καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει
 τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς
 ἀρχάς ἐστὶν ἡ ὁδὸς, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλο-
 θετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρασ ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ
 τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ

4 are some of these various answers. We shall not attempt to
 do more than investigate the more obvious or more reason-
 5 able of these conflicting views. At the very outset we must
 determine the *method* of our inquiry. Shall we start *a priori*
 from general principles, or shall we start *a posteriori* from
 observed facts? One thing is clear: we must argue from the
 known to the unknown; and that in reference to our human
 knowledge, not in reference to any abstract or ideal system of
 knowledge. Now, in the order of *our* knowledge, facts come

We deter-
 mine the
 method of
 our inquiry
 to be from
 facts of ob-
 servation to
 general prin-
 ciples, and
 not *vice*
versa.

unless the same idea were pre-
 sent in all these various cases.
 Whatever that be which is thus
 the one cause of Goodness, where-
 ever it is found, is itself the
 Chief Good of all. This Plato
 termed the 'Ἰδέα' of Good.
 Notice the contrast between the
 search for this 'Idea' of Good,
 and Aristotle's carefully limited
 inquiry for the Chief Good for
man, the Chief Good of *human*
action, etc.

3. ἐπιπολὴ is a 'surface' or
 'superficies'; ἐπιπολάζω is 'to lie
 on the surface; hence *h.l.* either
 'obvious' (the reverse of 're-
 condite'), or 'widely-spread.'
 (See *Suppl. Note*.)

4. See the Glossary on the
 terms *a priori* and *a posteriori*,
 and also *s.v.* ἀρχή.

9. γνωρίμων διττῶς]
 Aristotle elsewhere explains that
 general laws are better known
 than particular facts in the *per-*
fect or *ideal* order of knowledge
 (γνωριμώτερα φύσει or ἀπλῶς),
 but particular facts are better
 known than general laws in the
 order of *human* knowledge (γνω-
 रिμώτερα ἡμῖν). We are more
 familiar with the fall of an apple,
 or the motion of a particular
 star than with the law of gravi-
 tation. A being with more
 perfect knowledge would be
 more familiar with the general

δ' ἀπλῶς. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν
6 γνωρίμων. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ

before general laws. We must therefore start from facts.
6 But seeing that the very facts of moral science are unintel-

laws governing the universe, than with particular instances of their application. As we ascend in the scale of intelligence 'the individual withers and the world is more and more.' Hence, practically, γνώριμα φύσει come to be Laws, Principles, Universals; γνώριμα ἡμῖν, Facts, Particulars.

1. Observe the emphasis on ἡμῖν γε. 'Perhaps then *we* at any rate must begin from what is known *to us*.' Aristotle does not assert that there may not be a more ideally perfect way of approaching the subject. Compare the two methods of ethical teaching explained by Bishop Butler (Intro. to Sermons): 'There are two ways in which the subject of Morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, etc. (ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). . . . The first seems the most direct *formal* proof: . . . the latter is, in a peculiar manner, adapted to satisfy a fair mind, and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life.' So also Hume (*General Principles of Morals*, p. 221, ed.

1800): 'As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success by following the experimental method, and deducing general maxims from a comparison of particular instances (λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς). The other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established (λόγοι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν), and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature' (ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων). To begin with γνώριμα ἡμῖν is, of course, to proceed ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς, and not ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.

2. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι] The *facts* of morals (in the sense of this passage) are the notions (in their most simple and rudimentary form) of right, wrong, just, unjust, duty, etc. The study presupposes that these notions are, at least to some degree, intelligible to us; that when the terms are used they convey some sort of meaning to us (τὸ ὅτι), though we may not be able to define them accurately, or to say *what constitutes* rightness, wrongness, etc. (τὸ διότι), or even to prove that there are any real distinctions in the

καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον
 7 ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρ-

ligible without some preliminary training in good habits, we
 7 must further presuppose such a training. Nor is it necessary

nature of things corresponding to the notions expressed by these and similar words. Still, even such a dim appreciation as this implies some training in good habits, and it would scarcely be found in a perfectly untutored savage. Nay more, even in civilized life it is only experience of a virtue (τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι) which can make it intelligible to us individually. Hence the idea of 'humility' was unintelligible to the Greeks; it was never practised, and so their language had no word for it. Missionaries find it impossible to explain or express to savages some of the fundamental ideas of the Christian religion for the same reason. The condition 'τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι' has not been fulfilled.

2. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι] 'For the fact is a starting point;' or, 'the assumption of moral facts (without their reason or theory) will enable us to make a start.' All that we need presuppose, and that much we must presuppose, is the *primâ facie* fact of moral distinctions, and a capacity for their recognition in the learner, though he may not at first know how to apply them to the details of action. Without this much, Ethics would have no *raison d'être*

(see Introd. p. xvi); there would be no subject-matter for the science to treat of, or faculties to which it could appeal. This will appear plainly if we look at the case of one or two other sciences. The Science of Painting (1) assumes, or does not question, the existence of colours; and (2) presupposes that the learner is able to distinguish colours—that he is not blind. The Science of Music (1) assumes the existence of harmonious and discordant sounds; and (2) presupposes that the learner can appreciate the difference—that he is not deaf. That would be the meaning of ἀρχὴ τὸ ὅτι as applied in these two cases. Similarly the Science of Morals assumes (1) a distinction between Right and Wrong; and (2) a capacity in the learner to recognise that distinction (hence δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι). The grounds in Nature which constitute differences of colours, or harmony and discord of sounds, or the essential distinction between Right and Wrong,—these lie not at the threshold, but in the inmost shrine of the respective sciences. These questions would correspond with τὸ διότι, with which, as Aristotle says, we have nothing to do at the commencement.

κούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ραδίως. Ὡς δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου

Οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
Ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακείνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθεται.
Ὅς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
Ἐν θυμῷ βάλλεται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνὴρ.

5

- 1 V. Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτικώτατοι τὴν 10 ἡδονήν, διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν.
2 Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προύχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρη-

at the outset that the learner should be able to explain the principles and reasons of the facts from which we start. To the learner who is worth anything these will come in due time, if he have them not already.

CHAP. V.—*Criticism of the chief typical theories as to the nature of Happiness.*

- 1 Returning from this digression, let us consider some typical
2 views as to the nature of Happiness. Some say that it consists in bodily pleasure, others in honour, others in philosophic

We next consider some of the chief theories about Happiness, such that it consists in (a) Pleasure;

CHAP. V.—Three main theories about Happiness, which may at least be inferred from the actual lives of men, are suggested for examination in this chapter; two more come in incidentally. That they are justly selected as typical and progressive views of the nature of Happiness is shown at length in the Introduction, p. xxix.

9. 'They are not unreasonably inferred from their manner of life to suppose happiness to consist in pleasure.' Most men have no conscious theory about Happiness and the Chief Good, but what they really think may be inferred from their practice.

10. φορτικὸς = 'troublesome,' 'burdensome;' and then (like βάνυστος) 'coarse,' 'vulgar.' It is applied to buffoons in IV. viii. 3. See also X. viii. 7.

8. ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν] viz., the promise in § 4 of the last chapter.

3 μένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός. Οἱ μὲν
 οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκη-
 μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ
 πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδανα-
 4 πάλλῳ. Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμὴν τοῦ γὰρ 5
 πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπι-
 πολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
 τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τὰγαθὸν δὲ
 5 οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἐτι δ'
 εἰκότασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν, ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγα- 10
 θοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονιμῶν τιμᾶσθαι,
 καὶ παρ' οἷς γιγνώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι

3 contemplation. As to the *first*, it is the life of mere animals,
 though the ignorant have the example of the great and
 4 powerful to justify their choice. As to the *second*, we object:
 Honour;—(1) Honour is precarious, being dependent upon others,
 5 who may refuse it however well it be deserved; and (2)
Honour is only sought as a kind of recognition of merit, and
on the ground of virtue. And if so, Virtue is, according to
the principles already laid down, a more final end than

4. Sardanapalus was the last king of Nineveh, whose name became proverbial for luxury and effeminacy.

5. *πρακτικοῖ*] 'of an active turn.'

6. *ἐπιπολαιότερον*] 'too superficial.' See note on iv. 4.

7. *ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι*] Compare Pope—

What's fame? A fancied life in others' breath,

A thing beyond us, e'en before our death.

And with the next clause compare—

All fame is foreign, but of true desert.

9. *οἰκεῖόν τι*] 'something peculiarly one's own.'

10. Compare Bacon's *Essay on Praise*, which commences,—
 'Praise is the reflection of Virtue (*ἵνα πιστεύωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι*), but it is as the glass or body which giveth the reflection. If it be from the common people it is commonly false and naught, and rather followeth vain persons than virtuous' (*ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονιμῶν τιμᾶσθαι κ.τ.λ.*)

12. *ἐπ' ἀρετῇ*] 'on grounds of merit.' We do not care to be held in honour by worthless

6 κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχασθαι καὶ
 καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ
 πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' 5
 οὕτω ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν δια-
 7 φυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλis· ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ
 ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοis εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν
 ὁ θεωρητικὸς, περὶ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοis
 8 ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις ἐστὶν, καὶ ὁ 10
 πλούτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον

6 Honour, which cannot therefore be the Chief Good. If it be
 further asked, Is Virtue itself the Chief Good? we reply, No: (γ) Virtue;
 because a man may be virtuous and yet through various
 accidents lead a life of forced inactivity or of positive suffer-
 ing, and this could not without paradox be called a happy
 7 life. As to the *third*, we reserve what we have to say for the (δ) Philoso-
 8 present. We ought perhaps to add that wealth cannot be phical con-
 the Chief Good, because wealth is obviously a means and not templation:
 (ε) Riches.

men, or upon trivial or discreditable grounds. Cf. IV. iii. 17.

6. θέσιν διαφυλάττων refers to the discussions in the rhetorical schools, where, a subject or thesis (θέσις) being proposed, the pupils took different sides of the question to defend (διαφυλάττειν) as an exercise, irrespective of their own views on the subject.

8. ἐγκυκλίis] sc. λόγοis. i.e. 'Popular treatises,'—such as might be met with in the ordinary round of life.

9. ἐπίσκεψis] 'a thorough investigation.' This will be found in B. X.

10. βίαιός τις may be explained either (1) 'under a sort of constraint,' opposed to ἐκούσιος (as in III. i., etc.), because no one would toil for wealth if he could secure the luxuries etc. which wealth procures without this toil; (ἀναγκαῖος is used to express the same idea in X. vi. 2); or (2) 'unnatural' (= παρὰ φύσιν), because it is a perversion of the nature of things to make an end of wealth, which is essentially a means, as much as it would be (e.g.) to accumulate railway-tickets without any intention of travelling.

γὰρ καὶ ἄλλον χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δ' οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

VI. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γινομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεία ἀναιρεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας 10

an end, and, as such, men seek it of compulsion and not of free choice, in order to secure the results to which it leads.

CHAP. VI.—*Criticism of the Platonic Theory that the Chief Good is the abstract 'Idea' of Good.*

1 We proceed to the last of the important theories as to the nature of the Chief Good above mentioned (iv. 3), viz., that it is some one abstract ideal entering into each several manifestation of 'good.' Respect for the authors of this theory makes the discussion unwelcome, but the love of truth renders

4. καταβέβληνται] 'have been constructed.' The metaphor is probably from καταβάλλειν θεμέλια, 'to lay down the foundations of a building.'

CHAP. VI.—This chapter simply continues the proposed examination of the theories of the Chief Good selected in ch. iv. as being the most important and worthy of notice. See note on iv. 3 for a brief explanation of the theory criticised in this chapter.

5. τὸ καθόλου] literally 'the Universal,' i.e. the theory of one abstract and universal Good present in all particular manifestations of Good, and yet separable from them. This was called by Plato the 'Idea' of Good.

8. τὰ εἶδη] much the same as τὰς ἰδέας, i.e. the theory of 'Ideas.'

φίλους ἄνδρας] Especially Aristotle's own master and teacher, Plato.

ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντιον φίλοιον ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

- 2 Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἔλεγον, διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον· τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ 5 καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι παραφνάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος,
- 3 ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. "Ἐτι ἐπεὶ

- 2 it necessary. We argue against it as follows:—(i) There can be no one abstract 'Idea' of several objects of which some are necessarily prior or posterior to others. (This is allowed by the authors of the theory, who on this account denied its application to *numbers*.) Now this is evidently the case with the numerous objects called 'Good,' since we have Good in Substance and Good in Relation, etc. Therefore
- 3 there cannot be one abstract Idea of 'Good.' (ii) If all Good

We object to this—
That Good is predicated (1) of objects prior and posterior to one another in nature;

(2) of objects falling under various Categories;

1. Hence the well-known saying, 'Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.'

6. πρότερον τῇ φύσει.] Aristotle (Categ. xii. 1, 2) distinguishes πρότερον κατὰ χρόνον and πρότερον in the following sense (which practically amounts to πρότερον τῇ φύσει): When two things, A and B, are so related that the existence of B necessarily implies the existence of A, but not *vice versâ*, then A is πρότερον 'in the order of Being' as compared with B. He gives as an instance the numbers 1 and 2, which stand in this relation to one another. On this ground (he argues in the text) the Platonists made no 'Idea' of Numbers, such an

interdependence in respect of essential priority and posteriority being out of the question among phenomena partaking of one 'Idea' (see further note on § 6). Thus the major premiss would be granted by his opponents. In the minor premiss Aristotle contends that such an essential priority (πρότερον τῇ φύσει) belongs to Substance as compared with Accident or Relation, and as Good is predicated of each, there cannot be a common Idea of Good in these cases.

8. This second argument is little more than a repetition of the first, clothed in more technical Aristotelian phraseology, and worked out into more detail.

ταγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τί λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρὸς, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετ' ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, 5
 4 ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. "Ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' 10

were included under one 'Idea,' it ought to be predicated under one Category only: but it can be predicated under all and each of the Categories. Hence again it cannot be reduced to one 'Idea.' (iii) The knowledge of things reducible to one Idea must be one and indivisible, whereas of things Good there are many divisions of knowledge, and that even of Goods

(3) of ob- 4
 jects treated
 of by vari-
 ous divisions
 of know-
 ledge.

1. ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι] 'can be predicated in as many ways as Being itself.' The expressions which follow are taken from the phraseology of Aristotle's Categories. Only the first six out of the ten usually given are mentioned in the text. They have been variously held to be a classification of things, words, or thoughts. For a clear and succinct account of Aristotle's Categories, and the controversy respecting their nature, the student is referred to Dean Mansel's edition of Aldrich's Logic. Note B. in the Appendix (Ed. iii.) The argument in the text is, that as 'good' may be predicated of each and all of the

several modes of existence classified in the Categories, such variety cannot be reduced under one 'Idea.'

7. "Ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ] Aristotle now argues that the divisions of Knowledge relating to the various manifestations of Good indicate a still further subdivision even than the distinction of Categories. It should be remembered that ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle refers rather to a mental state (see VI. ii., and Glossary, s.v. Art, Science) than to a concrete body of knowledge. He argues therefore that if the various manifestations of Good were reducible to one 'Idea,' the knowledge of one would be the knowledge of all.

ἰατρικῇ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικῇ ἐν πόνοις
 5 δὲ γυμναστικῇ. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βού-
 λονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἓν τε αὐτοανθρώπων
 καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
 που ἢ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, 5
 6 οὐδ' ἢ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι μᾶλλον
 ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον
 7 τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δ' εἰκόσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι

5 which can be brought under one Category. (iv) Again, Further we
 What is this abstract 'Idea' of anything? and how does its object (4)
 definition differ from that of any object in which it is em- That this
 bodied? and if there is no difference how can the 'Idea' lay 'Idea' is in-
 6 claim to a separate existence? We cannot admit the answer distinguish-
 that the 'Idea' is eternal, while the objects in which it is able from the
 embodied exist only in time, for mere length of duration does phenomena
 7 not alter the intrinsic nature of anything. In short we pre- which em-
 body it.

2. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις] Aris-
 totle now argues, 'There is no
 difference between the Definition
 of anything and the Definition of
 its 'Idea,' and conceptions with
 one and the same definition are
 not to be distinguished.

3. αὐτοέκαστον] 'the ideal of
 anything,' or more literally, 'the
 abstract-anything.'

6. τῷ αἰδίον εἶναι] Aristotle
 here assumes that 'duration of
 time' and 'eternity' are identi-
 cal. This at any rate would be
 repudiated at once by Plato, who
 held that time and eternity were
 different in kind, and that time
 was created, so to speak, when
 the material world was created.
 Moreover, he held the Abstract
 Ideas to be eternal and uncreated,

and therefore prior to and inde-
 pendent of all relations of time.
 They existed independently of
 the Deity himself, and were
 voluntarily adopted by Him as
 the types which the created
 world should embody. Another,
 but later, view of the Platonists
 was, that they existed only in
 the Divine Mind, as His ideas
 (in the modern sense) of what
 creation should be. In either
 case, however, they would be
 independent of relation to Time.

8. Πιθανώτερον κ.τ.λ.] There
 is not exactly a logical opposi-
 tion between the theory of the
 Pythagoreans and that of Plato.
 They deal with the question of
 the relation between Unity and
 Goodness from somewhat differ-

λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ
 τὸ ἐν οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθήσαι δοκεῖ.
 8 Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχ-
 θεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ
 παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους εἰρῆσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' 5
 ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ
 ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυ-

fer the Pythagorean formula (apparently adopted even by Speusippus) that 'All Unity is Good,' rather than that of Plato, that 'All Good is one.' (v) If our opponents take the ground of distinguishing 'Goods' into two classes, according as they are (1) desired for their own sake, (2)

ent, though not hostile, points of view. Aristotle merely says that if he had to choose one of them, he would rather adopt the Pythagorean formula.

1. ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ] συστοιχία is literally 'a standing together in a row' (στοίχος), then a 'co-ordinate arrangement,' a 'series' (L. and S.) Some Pythagoreans held that all the variety of Existence in the Universe might be divided into two antithetical or opposed classes, and that in ten different ways, the one set being the συστοιχία of Good, the other set the συστοιχία of Evil: in other words, they held that the Universe exhibits everywhere a conflict or opposition between Good and Evil, and that ten various forms of each may be distinguished. Among the manifestations of Good (ἐν τῇ συστοιχίᾳ τῶν ἀγα-

θῶν) is found Unity (ἐν); among those of Evil is found Multiplicity (πλήθος). All that is One is Good; all that is multiplex, that lacks unity, is Evil. The former involves the idea of order, the latter of confusion.

2. Speusippus was Plato's nephew, and his successor as head of the Academy, and yet even he (καὶ Σπευσίππος) abandoned the theory; which is a strong point against it.

3. τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν] Aristotle now deals with an objection that might be taken to his previous arguments, that they assume an extension of the Ideal theory to *relative* Goods, whereas it was meant by its author to apply only to *absolute* Goods.

5. τοὺς λόγους apparently refers to Plato's language or arguments. καθ' ἐν εἶδος means 'in one class or species' (Grant).

(5) If the theory be limited to Goods desired *per se* only, we deny that even they can be reduced to one Definition.

9 *τικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. Χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν*
 10 *ιδέαν. Ὡς καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη τις ἂν ; ἢ ὅσα καὶ μο-*
νούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί
τινες καὶ τιμαί ; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομέν,
ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θεῖη τις ἂν. Ἡ οὐδ' ἄλλο
οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας ; ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος.
 11 *Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἔστι τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον*
ἐν ᾧ πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθά-
περ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. Τιμῆς
δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ

9 desired for their results, and then should limit the application of the theory under consideration to the first of these classes,
 10 we should ask for some instances of this class. Probably intellect, sight, certain pleasures and honours, would be admitted as Goods desired for their own sake. (a) *If they are not*, and if in short nothing but the 'Idea' of Good is admitted to be desired for its own sake, then the first of these classes
 11 is useless, having no objects included under it. (β) *If they are*, then supposing them to have one 'Idea' in common, they must have one Definition; but as this is obviously not

3. ὠφελίμων is used as equivalent to τῶν διὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθῶν.

9. μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος] 'The class (viz. that of *absolute*, as opposed to *relative* Goods) will come to nothing.' If the Platonist maintains that only absolute Goods have one Idea, and then refuses to admit that there are any absolute Goods, except the one 'Idea' of Good, then the supposed class of absolute Goods

to which the 'Idea' refers has no contents, and is therefore useless. εἶδος (as in § 8) is not here to be taken in the technical sense of *ιδέα*.

13. ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες κ.τ.λ.] This, if not a direct *petitio principii*, is an off-hand and dogmatic way of disposing of the very kernel of the whole question, to which the opponents would doubtless at once demur.

- λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθά. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν
 12 τι κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ
 ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τῷ
 ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι, ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον
 κατ' ἀναλογίαν; ὥς γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄφεις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, 5
 13 καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῃ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν ἀφετέον
 τὸ νῦν ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλο-
 σοφίας οἰκειότερον. Ομοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας εἰ

the case, we conclude that there cannot be one 'Idea' even of this limited class of Goods. (vi) If asked ourselves to account for the application of the one term 'Good' to such a variety of objects (which of course cannot be a mere coincidence), we should suggest that it is in virtue of a certain analogy between them, though we cannot now pause to fully investigate or justify such a theory. (vii) Finally, such a

(6) If asked 12 for a theory ourselves, we prefer to say that Goods are called by a common name, by analogy.

2. πῶς δὴ λέγεται;] These words represent a supposed attempt on the part of the Platonist to shift the burden of establishing a theory on his opponent. 'If you reject my theory, how do you account yourself for the acknowledged

fact of a unity of name for the diverse manifestations of Good?'

3. ὁμωνύμοις] When the same word was applied to different objects in more than one sense, they were termed ὁμώνυμα. The following classification of ὁμώνυμα is implied in the text:

ὁμώνυμα	{	ἀπὸ τύχης	{	i.e. equivocal words, e.g. νέω, Gallus, page, etc.
		accidental		
		ἐκ διάνοιας		
		intentional	{	ἀφ' ἑνὸς coming from one source.
			{	πρὸς ἓν tending to one result.
			{	κατ' ἀναλογίαν by virtue of resemblance or analogy.

The last-named abound in every language as a means (*inter alia*) of economizing the number of words—e.g. 'foot' of an animal and of a mountain, 'hand' of a man and of a clock, etc. etc. Aristotle here asserts his preference for some such explanation as this in reference to the various applications of the word 'Good.'

8. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας] In short, a theory respecting an abstract Ideal of good belongs to Metaphysics (*ἄλλης φιλοσοφίας*), and its truth or falsehood is indifferent to Ethics, which deals with the *practical* well-being of Man. We may therefore dismiss the subject as far as this treatise is concerned.

γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἓν τι τὸ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον ἀγαθὸν ἢ
χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη
πρακτὸν οὐδὲ κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεί-
14 ται. Τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον εἶναι γνωρίζειν
αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητα καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν οἷον γὰρ 5
παράδειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσομεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν
15 ἀγαθὰ, καὶ εἰδῶμεν, ἐπιτευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα
μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ ὁ λόγος, εἴκοι δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις
διαφωνεῖν· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφειέμεναι καὶ τὸ
ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦσαι παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ. 10
Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτον ἅπαντας τοὺς τεχνίτας ἀγ-
16 νοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ τί
ὠφελήσεται ὑφάντης ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην

theory as this, whether true or false, may be dismissed from
further consideration in a treatise which is rigidly limited to
the inquiry into that which is *practically* useful to and attain-
14 able by man. And if it be argued that the knowledge of the
abstract Idea of Good will advance us towards the knowledge
15 of human good, we reply that this argument though plausible
is unsupported by experience. The Sciences, pursuing each
the knowledge of some special good for man, know nothing of
16 this abstract 'Idea' of Good. Still more striking is it that

(7) In any case this 'Ideal' theory, if true, is not of any practical use.

3. τοιοῦτόν τι ζητείται] See ii. 1 note.

6. παράδειγμα] 'model,' or 'exemplar.' Compare Aristotle's own argument in ii. 2. Plato frequently maintains the practical utility of the 'Idea' as a παράδειγμα—e.g. *Rep.* p. 484 C, p. 501 B, etc. etc. As a question of *fact*, Plato and Aristotle would of course admit that men do not avail themselves of these abstract Ideals in prac-

tice. As to whether they *might* do it, Aristotle asserts that it would be impossible, but Plato maintains the reverse, and declares that all real progress is hopeless until this shall be the case.

10. τὸ ἐνδεές ἐπιζητοῦσαι] 'seeking to supply that which is lacking.' Science is ever seeking to supply defects of knowledge, Art defects of practical power. (See Glossary, *s.v.* Art, Science.)

εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὰγαθόν, ἢ πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρὸς, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε καθ' ἑκάστον γὰρ ἱατρεύει.

I VII. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ'

the Arts, with their practical aims, derive no help from it, nor, as far as we can see, could they ever do so.

CHAP. VII.—*Construction of the Definition of the Chief Good.*

§§ 1-8.—*Certain positive characteristics of the Chief Good stated with a view to its Definition.*

§§ 9-16.—*A Definition constructed out of another such characteristic.*

§§ 17-21.—*The Definition not to be treated as mathematically exact.*

In seeking now to build up a Definition of the Chief Good we observe—
(1) That it is τελειότατον.

After these refutations of others we must now endeavour ourselves to answer the question, What is the Chief Good?

3. οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν] Not only does the physician disregard the abstract 'Idea' of health, but he does not aim at producing even health in any general sense, but the health of the one particular individual whom he has in hand. This, it must be admitted, is captious. Indeed, here and elsewhere in the Chapter, in spite of the profession of § 1, Aristotle shows little sympathy with, scarcely even fairness to, the theory he is criticising. This argument, if it proved anything,

would be a defence of empiricism against scientific knowledge.

CHAP. VII.—Here commences the constructive part of the treatise. Ch. iv. having set forth the conflicting theories on the subject before us, and chapters v. and vi. having been destructive, i.e. having shown which of these theories are *not* true, or in other words, What the Chief Good is *not*, we now proceed to inquire What the Chief Good *is*. The chapter naturally falls into three divisions—(1) §§ 1-8, (2) §§ 9-16,

ἀν εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς
λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί οὖν ἐκάστης τὰγαθόν; ἢ οὐ χάριν
τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν ὑγίεια,
ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῃ 5
δ' ἄλλο, ἐν ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος·
τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι πάντες. Ὡστ'
εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἀν εἴη
2 τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων

One characteristic of it is this: The *good* of any art, science,
action, or purpose, is always the *end* in each several case,
however many other points of difference there may be between
them. So that the *Chief Good of action* will also be the *Final*
2 *End of action*. This however is the same conception as that

(3) §§ 17-21. [§§ 1-8]—In this part Aristotle enumerates certain positive characteristics, or conspicuous qualities, of the Chief Good, which any Definition must embody, in order, if possible, to construct a Definition upon them.* Three such characteristics are suggested, which however prove too vague for this purpose.

In the 2d Division [§§ 9-16] another more specific characteristic is found, upon which Aristotle then builds his own Definition of Happiness or the Chief Good.

In the 3d Division [§§ 17-21] he renews the protest of ch. iii. against demanding mathematical exactness in such a Definition.

This chapter, and especially the 2d portion of it, is one of the most important in the treatise. It contains, in fact, the answer

to the main question with which the Book opened. All that follows is simply the confirmation and defence of the Definition here given.

9. Μεταβαίνων κ.τ.λ.] 'By a different course then the argument has come round to the same point,' viz. the same point as in ch. i. The conclusion in each case is the identity of the Chief Good and the Final End. The slightly *different courses* are as follows:—In this passage we argue, The 'good' and the 'end' are identical in all *individual* cases, and therefore the *Chief* Good and the *Final* End will be identical also. Thus ἐκάστης in l. 3 and ἀπάντων in l. 8 are the emphatic words. In ch. i. we argued, Every action, etc., aims at some Good, and therefore the

δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφίκεται. Τοῦτο δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
 3 διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη,
 τούτων δ' αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλούτον
 αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πάντα
 τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τελειόν τι φαίνεται. "Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν 5
 ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον,
 4 εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ
 λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον, καὶ τὸ
 μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ
 τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ 10
 5 αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαι-
 μονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ
 δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν
 καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά
 (μηδενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), 15

with which we started. We may however further explain
 3 this idea of Finality. Any End which is itself but a means
 to a further End, or indeed which ever can be such a means,
 4 cannot be final. And hence we obtain this conception of the
 Chief Good, that it is something always desired for its own
 5 sake, and never with a view to anything beyond it. Obviously,
 Happiness fulfils this condition, and we can think of nothing

Chief Good is what all things aim at, i.e. it is the ultimate aim or Final End of all things; and hence among the Chief Good and the Final End are identical.

5. We cannot adequately translate *τέλειον*, which combines the meanings of 'perfect' and 'final.' (See Glossary s. v. *τέλειος*.) That the Chief Good fulfils this positive condition follows from the primary con-

ception of it given in the opening words of the Book, and in the beginning of ch. ii.

11. τοιοῦτον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Thus the steps of the argument are:—The Chief Good is *τελειότατον*: then (after the notion of *τελειότης* has been expounded) Happiness is shewn to fulfil this condition: the result of which is, that Happiness, as before, is found to constitute the Chief

αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων
 ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ-
 6 δεῖς αἰρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαί-
 νεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν τὸ
 γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκές εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δ' αὐταρ- 5
 κές λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην,
 ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς
 φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.
 7 Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς
 γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους 10

else which does. This however will not help us to a clearer
 6 Definition of the Chief Good. The same may be said of (2) It is αὐ-
 another characteristic of the Chief Good, viz. that it is entirely
Self-sufficient, by which we mean that it needs nothing besides
 itself to make life all that we could desire. (We must not
 however understand this to mean that it would enable a man
 to be independent of his fellow-men and live happily in isola-
 7 tion. That would be a spurious self-sufficiency, being a
 mutilation, not an elevation, of human nature.) Happiness

Good, but we are not as yet any nearer to a Definition of it. In §§ 7, 8 similar steps occur.

4. ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας] That the Chief Good fulfils this condition as it is defined in § 7 *fin.*, follows again from ii. 1. For if we desire everything else only for the sake of Happiness, the possession of it would render all such minor desires superfluous: we should be 'μηδενὸς ἐνδεεῖς.'

5. τὸ δ' αὐταρκές λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.] 'When we use the term "αὐταρκές," we do so not in reference to a man's self alone, in the case of one living a life of isola-

tion, but also in reference to his parents, etc.'

8. φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος] 'Man is by nature a social animal.' Nature intended man for society as much as she intended him to use two hands or to walk on two feet. A man who should accustom himself to live out of all relation to his fellow-creatures would not have gained in real independence any more than one who should go always on one leg, or should use only one hand. The error thus protested against by Aristotle was conspicuous in the teaching of the Cynics.

εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ τοιούτου δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην, μὴ συναριθμουμένην, συναριθμουμένην δὲ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μείζον αἰρετώτερον αἶε. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὔσα τέλος.

9 Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον
10 τί ἐστὶν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ', εἰ

And so it must also be *sui generis*.

again fulfils this condition of Self-sufficiency, but we cannot yet advance to a Definition of the Chief Good. Once more, the Chief Good is *sui generis*. If it were only the chief good of a class, the addition to it of any other good in the class, however small, would make it better, which is inconsistent with the supposition that it is itself the Chief Good. Happiness is then perfectly Final and Self-sufficient, and is the end of all human action.

(3) But more particularly, it consists in the fulfilment of Man's proper function.

9 All this, however true, is too vague to construct a definition upon. Another consideration may perhaps serve this
10 purpose. Could we ascertain the proper function of man

5. μὴ συναριθμουμένην κ.τ.λ.] 'provided it be not counted in the same class with other Goods; but if it be so counted in,' etc. The expression 'Chief Good,' by which we are obliged to translate the simple τὸ ἀγαθόν is misleading. τὸ ἀγαθόν must be held to include in itself all other Goods, such as health, wealth, honour, etc., in the most perfect degree, i.e. the utmost amount of them really desirable. Clearly if A

be only the principal Good of a class made up of the Goods A, B, C, D, etc., then A + B, or even A + Z, is a greater good than A alone. Therefore no single member of the Class can ever be the Chief Good. It must be something *sui generis*, in a class by itself.

12. The conception now started, that Happiness consists in the fulfilment of man's proper function (or as we might say, the

ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "Ωσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἐστὶν ἔργον τι καὶ πράξεις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι
 11 ἔργον αὐτοῦ. Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως 5
 ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου δ' οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς καὶ ὅλως ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις
 12 ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ 10
 ζῆν κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ

as man, his Chief Good would surely consist (as in all similar cases) in the perfect fulfilment of that function; and this is a more definite conception of it than those already suggested. We ought perhaps first to show that man, as man,
 11 has such a proper function, and this we should argue (1) from the fact that man in every individual character and relation of life (e.g. as an artist or any other sort of workman) has a definite function, and therefore man *simply as man* cannot be purposeless; and (2) from the consideration that every part of man, the eye, the hand, the foot, etc., has its proper
 12 function, and therefore man as a whole has one also. Now, granting this, it is clear that this function must be something

purpose of his being, the object for which he was created and sent into the world), is found sufficiently fruitful to form the basis of a Definition.

7. ἀργὸν has precisely its etymological force (ἀ-ἔργον) 'without any work.' Translate 'has no work assigned to him by nature.'

11. ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον] 'We are seeking for that which is peculiar to himself.' This would

be explained by Plato's definition of the ἔργον of anything, viz. 'that which it either alone, or better than anything else, is able to perform.' Hence he says, though we might prune a vine with a sword, a chisel, or a pruning-knife, the operation would be so much better performed with the last instrument that we say that it is its ἔργον. It is ἴδιόν τι, something peculiarly appropriate to it.

- τὸ ἴδιον. Ἀφοριστέον ἄρα τὴν θρεπτικὴν καὶ αὐξητικὴν
 ζωὴν. Ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη, φαίνεται δὲ
 13 καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Δείπε-
 ται δὲ πρακτικὴ τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος. (Τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοοῦμενον.) 5
 Διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν
 14 θετέον κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ'
 ἐστὶν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ

peculiar to, and characteristic of, man. This excludes that mere existence which he shares with the animal and vegetable world, and also that conscious life (or life endued with sensation) which is common to the brute creation. There remains then what we may call a life of action belonging to the rational part of our nature; including by the term 'rational' that which recognises the sway of Reason as well as that which exerts Reason. This being the function of man, we now seek the perfection of that function. First it must be in active operation. Hence the Chief Good from this point of view will be 'An active condition of the soul guided by, or not
 14 opposed to, Reason.' But further, such an active condition

From this
 point of
 view we
 may now
 define it
 as

ψυχῆς ἐνέρ-
 γεια,

4. *πρακτικὴ* is easier to explain than translate; 'moral,' 'active,' 'practical,' being in different ways misleading. Man is sometimes said to be the only animal that can form a conception of actions as distinguished from events. *πρακτικὴ* is co-extensive with 'action' in the sense here indicated. 'Τις' implies that the expression in the Greek is felt to be not quite satisfactory.

[Τούτου δὲ κ.τ.λ.] This distinction is more fully explained in ch. xiii. Its relevancy here has been thought so questionable, that some Editors have

treated the sentence as an interpolation, though against ms. evidence.

6. κατ' ἐνέργειαν] as opposed to κατὰ δύναμιν or καθ' ἑξίν. See Glossary, p. xlv., also viii. 9. The various steps by which each term of the Definition is gained should be carefully noted.

7. εἰ δ' ἐστίν] The apodosis to this εἰ is found in § 15 *init.*, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν κ.τ.λ. We are reminded that the sentence is still unfinished by the twice repeated εἰ δ' οὕτω in l. 6 and l. 9 of the next page.

8. ψυχῆς is translated 'soul'

μὴ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου, ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων, προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εἶναι) 5 —εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δ' ἀνδρὸς εἶ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ' εἶ 15 κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται—εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀν-

admits of various degrees of excellence. The function of a good or of an ordinary artist is *generically* the same, only by one it is well performed, and by the other not necessarily so.

15 We must therefore include this condition of excellence in our κατ' ἀρετὴν

in the Analysis for want of a better word (see Glossary s. v. ψυχῇ). It seems to stand here as a sort of substitute for *πρακτική* above, because *πρακτική* ζωὴ must belong to this part of man (as Aristotle plainly states in viii. 3), in contrast with *θρεπτική* and *αἰσθητική* ζωὴ, which belong to the body. Similarly κατὰ λόγον corresponds to τοῦ λόγου ἔχοντος above.

1. τῷ γένει] This is the emphatic idea in the sentence. 'The work of anyone and of a good anyone are the same *in kind*.' . . . the superiority in respect of excellence being (in the latter case) added to the description of the work. e.g. If the 'anyone' be a musician, 'to play' in the former case, 'to play well' in the latter case, would describe the work of each. 'Well' is the

ὑπεροχὴ κατ' ἀρετὴν which is added.

3. δὴ = as it obviously is. Supply εἰ again before ἀπλῶς.

9. οἰκεία ἀρετὴ] 'appropriate excellence.' It should be remembered that ἀρετὴ is simply 'excellence,' though it is most frequently applied to a particular sort of excellence, viz. moral excellence, and so is translated *Virtue*: just as *πρᾶξις* and *πρακτική* come to be similarly restricted in meaning (see Glossary under ἀρετὴ and πρᾶξις). This general meaning of ἀρετὴ is explained by Plato's Definition, that the appropriate excellence (οἰκεία ἀρετὴ) of anything is that quality by which it is able to perform its own function well. Aristotle's account of ἀρετὴ in II. vi. 2 should also be referred to.

- θρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταὶ, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειο-
 16 *τάτην*. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.
- 17 Περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταύτη· δεῖ γὰρ ἴσως ὑποτυπῶσαι πρῶτον, εἰθ' ὕστερον ἀναγράψαι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν παντὸς εἶναι προαγαγεῖν καὶ διαρθρῶσαι τὰ καλῶς

ἀρίστην

ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

Too much
precision is
not to be
expected in
such a De-
finition.

- Definition; and as there are various kinds and degrees of excellence, we must also specify the highest excellence. And so the Chief Good becomes 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its highest excellence.' One other condition: it must be a permanent settled state, the habit of a life, not the accident of a moment. We add then the words 'in a complete life,' and so our Definition stands thus: Happiness is 'An active condition of the soul in accordance with its
 17 *highest excellence in a complete life.*' Let this serve as an outline sketch at any rate of our conception of the Chief Good

3. βίος τέλειος] 'a complete life,' not necessarily 'a completed life;' or 'life as a whole,' though not necessarily 'a whole life;' else we get into the difficulty raised at the beginning of ch. x. 'Can we not call a man happy till his life is completed?' We should not describe a man as having good spirits, or excellent health, unless we had known him for a certain time, and had had opportunities for observing him under various circumstances; in fact, till we can judge of his life *as a whole*. Sometimes even a few observations enable us to form such a judgment, and for practical purposes these represent

βίος τέλειος. So it is in the case of Happiness. All we need is a sufficiently complete period of duration to be sure that it is a settled habit of life, and not a momentary or transient gleam of joy. It is a well-known point of distinction between 'pleasure' and 'happiness,' that pleasure is perfect at any moment, whereas happiness implies duration and permanence.

7. ὑποτυπῶσαι is a metaphor from sculpture, ἀναγράψαι from painting: but it should be remembered that ancient statues were frequently painted.

8. παντὸς is emphatic here and in l. 3, next page. In *Morals*, as in

ἔχοντα τῇ περιγραφῇ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τῶν τοιούτων εὐρε-
 τῆς ἢ συνεργὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι. "Οθεν καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν
 γεγόνασιν αἱ ἐπιδόσεις· παντὸς γὰρ προσθεῖναι τὸ ἐλ-
 18 λείπον. Μεμνήσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν προειρημένων χρή, καὶ
 τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιζητεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν 5
 ἐκάστοις κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον
 19 ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ. Καὶ γὰρ τέκτων καὶ γεω-

or Happiness. Time and individual experience will fill in
 further details in a subject like this, just as they advance our
 18 knowledge of the Arts. We make however two provisos:
 1. Exactness of treatment (as we have already said) must not
 be indiscriminately demanded. 2. The reason, as well as the
 fact, must not in all cases be required. As to the first, let
 us not forget that two considerations limit the amount of
 precision to be required in any case. (1) The nature of the
 subject-matter, of which we have spoken already (iii. 2); and
 9 (2) our immediate object in handling it: as for instance a car-

the Arts (both being [1] *practical*,
 and [2] *not*, like Mathematics,
exact), every one's experience may
 contribute something to their pro-
 gress, and every additional fact
 adds something in confirmation
 of their very principles; and
 moreover, every one is interested
 in their progress, and in the sub-
 jects of which they treat. In
 the exact science of Mathematics,
 on the other hand, though pro-
 gress in the knowledge of facts
 and the efficiency of methods is
 continually being made, nothing
 can ever add to the clear-
 ness and certainty of its funda-
 mental Definitions and Axioms.
 Besides, it is not every one (*παν-*
τὸς) who can understand or

feel interest in such a subject.

6. κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην]
 'dependent on the subject-mat-
 ter;' *e.g.* a model in cork or
 deal could never be finished like
 one in ivory.

7. οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ] 'suitable
 to the process in hand;' *e.g.* it
 would be possible perhaps to
 make the corner of a deal table
 precisely 90°, but there would be no
 object gained by such exactness.
 It would not be οἰκεῖον τῇ μεθόδῳ.
 Cf. restrictions on discussion of
 ψυχὴ in c. xiii. §§ 8, 10, 16.

Both these considerations apply
 to the case of morals. The sub-
 ject-matter does not admit of
 exactness, and the practical pur-
 pose in view does not require it.

μέτρης διαφερόντως ἐπιζητοῦσι τὴν ὀρθήν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον χρησίμη πρὸς τὸ ἔργον, ὁ δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἡ ποίον τι θεατῆς γὰρ τάληθους. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιητέον, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων
 20 πλείω γίγνηται. Οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον δ' οὐδὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐν ἅπασιν ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἱκανὸν ἔν τισι τὸ ὅτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς, οἷον καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς· τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ

penter does not always make the most perfect square even
 20 that the wood admits of, if he is engaged on rough work. As to our second proviso, some propositions, *e.g.* certainly first principles, are exempt from the necessity of demonstrative

As to the former, we may compare Bp. Butler, *Analogy*, p. 105 (ed. Angus): 'Observations of this kind cannot be supposed to hold universally in every case. It is enough that they hold in general.'

1. ὀρθήν] Understand γωνίαν, *i.e.* an right angle.

6. τὸ ὅτι (the *fact* that a thing is so and so) is constantly opposed to τὸ διότι (the *reason* why it is so); *e.g.* In Euclid's Axioms and Definitions the fact alone is stated (τὸ ὅτι); in his Propositions the reasons for asserting the fact are given (τὸ διότι).

τὸ δ' ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή] 'The fact is something primary and a starting-point.' It is so at any rate in *Morals*, where the *fact* that we feel sentiments of approbation or disapprobation on certain occasions forms the starting-point of the inquiry. See note on iv. 7 (Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι), and Introduction, p. xiv. Trans-

lation fails to preserve the full meaning of ἀρχή, including not only 'first principle,' but also 'beginning' or 'starting-point' (see Glossary). Indeed all sciences require to make assumptions independent of demonstrative proof (as Aristotle points out elsewhere), at *both* the higher and the lower ends of the scale of knowledge. General principles rise above, and facts of observation fall below, the limits of such proof; and both are sometimes called ἀρχαί. *e.g.* the Mathematician assumes the Axioms on the one hand, and on the other assumes the existence of triangles, circles, and other figures, the properties of which he investigates. In the latter case, τὸ ὅτι πρῶτον καὶ ἀρχή applies.

7. Axioms or first principles rest upon such grounds as the *universality* of their belief, the *necessity* of their belief, and the *greater certainty* attaching to

ἀρχή· τῶν ἀρχῶν δ' αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται, αἱ δ'
 21 αἰσθήσει, αἱ δ' ἐθισμῷ τινὶ, καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως. Με-
 τιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἐκάστας ἢ πεφύκασιν, καὶ σπουδα-
 στέον ὅπως ὀρισθῶσι καλῶς· μεγάλην γὰρ ἔχουσι ῥοπήν
 πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα. Δοκεῖ γὰρ πλείον ἢ ἡμῖν παντὸς 5
 εἶναι ἢ ἀρχή, καὶ πολλὰ συμφανῇ γίνεσθαι δι' αὐτῆς
 τῶν ζητουμένων.

proof, and the primary facts themselves of any science are in
 21 some sense first principles. Now first principles rest upon
 evidence of different kinds in different cases; and though
 never *demonstratively* proved, they must be, each in its own
 appropriate way, fully established and clearly defined. This
 is of the utmost importance, and it is just an instance in which
 'well begun is half done.'

them than to any other principles that could be alleged in their support (Sir W. Hamilton). If any higher principles could be found (the necessary condition of demonstrative proof), the others would *ipso facto* cease to be *first* principles.

1. ἐπαγωγῇ] *h.l.* probably = 'by appeal to experience': i.e. (as VI. iii. 3 seems to show) 'that amount of experience which is the *condition*, not the *cause*, of necessary truths' (Grant's note *l.c.*): e.g. in Mathematics we need *some* experience to comprehend what is meant by straight lines, right angles, etc.; but the ἀρχαί, or Axioms relating to them, are not (like Physical Laws) *proved* by such experience.

2. αἰσθήσει] 'by perception'; probably referring to the *facts*

of Physics, which are 'the truths we start from' (ἀρχαί) in such subjects.

ἐθισμῷ τινὶ] 'by a kind of habituation.' We become so familiar by frequent repetition with some truths, that by a sort of 'unconscious induction' (Grant *h. l.*) we come to believe them as axioms. This is especially common in the case of principles of conduct. 'Numberless little rules of action and conduct, which we could not live without, . . . are learned so insensibly and so perfectly as to be mistaken perhaps for instinct, though they are the effect of long experience and exercise' (ἐθισμός) Butler, *Anal.* pt. i. ch. v. p. 95 (ed. Angus). In all these three cases, it will be observed, there is no *demonstrative* proof.

3. Μετιέναι δὲ πειρατέον ἕκασ-

- 1 VIII. Σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγόμενων περὶ αὐτῆς· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεῖ πάντα συνάδει τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τῷ δὲ ψευδεῖ ταχὺ διαφωνεῖ τὰ ληθές.
- 2 Νενεμημένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἔκτος 5

CHAP. VIII.—*Other views, popular and philosophical, on the subject of Happiness compared with the above Definition.*

Certain familiar general beliefs about Happiness fall in with our Definition;
"g.

- 1 We will now compare our Definition with the views held by
2 others, and test it by the facts of experience. (a) It is a

τας ἢ πεφύκασιν] 'We must endeavour to investigate them, each in its natural way.'

Chapters viii.-xii. form a sort of parenthetical section, in which Aristotle compares his Definition just found with various received opinions on the subject, and considers its bearing upon certain popular difficulties and questions of the day (esp. ch. ix. x. and xi.). His object throughout is to show how much there is in common between his own theory and others, while he asserts the superiority of his own. The latter consideration justifies a new treatment of the subject; the former not only conciliates opposition, but is itself an argument in favour of any new theory on the ground explained in § 7. This is a truth generally forgotten in controversy. The following are the contents of the five chapters:—ch. viii. Sundry popular and philosophical notions about Happiness compared with Aristotle's Definition; ch. ix.

Common views as to the acquisition of Happiness, on what it depends; ch. x. xi. The popular difficulty whether a man cannot be called happy (as Solon said) while still living, with questions arising therefrom, considered from the point of view of Aristotle's Definition; ch. xii. The relation of Happiness, upon Aristotle's theory, to another familiar classification of Goods.

1. ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος] 'We must not only consider this question from the point of view of our conclusion and of our premisses.' We had similar expressions in ch. iii. § 4.

4. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα] *h.l.* 'all facts' from ὑπάρχειν in the sense of 'to exist.' If a general theory is true, all the facts of experience in detail must be consistent with it.

5. The words Νενεμημένων . . . ἀγαθὰ state the popular opinion which is to be compared with Aristotle's Definition given

λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν
 κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ. Τὰς δὲ πράξ-
 εις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχὴν τίθεμεν.
 Ὅστε καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τὴν δόξαν
 παλαιὰν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούν- 5
 των. Ὅρθως δὲ καὶ ὅτι πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ
 ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος· οὕτω γὰρ τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν
 γίνεται, καὶ οὐ τῶν ἐκτός. Συνάδει δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ
 εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν τὸν εὐδαίμονα· σχεδὸν γὰρ
 εὐζωία τις εἴρηται καὶ εὐπραξία. 10
 Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαι-

time-honoured saying of philosophers that all goods are either (a) That
 of mind, body, or estate, and that those of the mind are the Goods be-
 highest. On two grounds our Definition may be said to imply longing to
 this: (1) because it describes Happiness as an active con- the Mind
 dition of the soul or mind; (2) because 'activity' or 'moral are the
 action' itself is not an external but an internal good. highest: (β) That liv-
 Others say that Happiness is living well and doing well. This ing well and
 again may be considered to be embodied in our Definition. doing well is
 To these general theories succeed others which enter more implied by
 into detail as to the precise character of Happiness, such that Happiness.
 Several of
 the popular
 theories in
 detail about
 Happiness
 are also,

in ch. vii. Τὰς δὲ πράξεις . . .
 οὐ τῶν ἐκτός state the grounds
 for asserting the Definition to be
 in accordance with that opinion,
 viz. on the strength of the two
 words ψυχὴ and ἐνέργεια form-
 ing parts of it.

8. τῷ λόγῳ] the definition in
 the last Chapter, to which also εἴ-
 ρηται in the next line refers. The
 concurrence of Aristotle's Defi-
 nition with *this* popular opinion
 would rest chiefly on the expres-
 sions κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀρίστην and ἐν

βίῳ τελείῳ, which form part of
 it.

11. ἐπιζητούμενα] 'quæ requir-
 untur ad beatitudinem' (Bonitz);
 'the conditions demanded as
 necessary to constitute Happi-
 ness.' To say that Virtue or
 Pleasure, etc., constitute Happi-
 ness, as contrasted with the
 two vague and general theories
 already spoken of, answers to
 this description. The former
 view is discussed in §§ 8 and 9,
 the latter in §§ 10-14.

6 μονίαν ἅπανθ' ὑπάρχειν τῷ λεχθέντι. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ
 ἀρετῇ, τοῖς δὲ φρόνησις, ἄλλοις δὲ σοφία τις εἶναι δο-
 κεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ταῦτα ἢ τούτων τι μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ
 ἡδονῆς· ἕτεροι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐκτὸς εὐετηρίαν συμπαραλαμ-
 7 βάνουσιν. Τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ παλαιοὶ λέγου-
 σιν, τὰ δὲ ὀλίγοι καὶ ἐνδοξοὶ ἄνδρες· οὐδετέρους δὲ
 τούτων εὖλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ
 8 καὶ τὰ πλείστα κατορθοῦν. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν λέγουσι τὴν
 ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀρετὴν τινα συνωδός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος· ταύτης
 9 γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια. Διαφέρει δὲ ἴσως οὐ
 μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν,
 καὶ ἐν ἔξει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἔξιν ἐνδέχεται
 μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀποτελεῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, οἷον τῷ καθεύδοντι
 ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πῶς ἐξηρηγκότι, τὴν δ' ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷον

under limi-
 tations, in
 accordance
 with our
 Definition:
 such as

(a) That
 Happiness
 consists in
 Virtue:

6 it is Virtue, Prudence, Wisdom, Pleasure, or that it cannot
 7 exist without external prosperity. Now all these views,
 whether popular or philosophical, are likely to have some
 element of truth in them. We will therefore consider some
 8 of them. (a) That Happiness consists in Virtue. Without
 going so far as this, our Definition asserts that it *implies*
 9 Virtue, and it adds the important condition that that Virtue

2. φρόνησις is practical, and
 σοφία speculative, wisdom. σο-
 φία is in fact nearly = philosophy.
 The distinction is fully explained
 by Aristotle in B. VI. These
 two theories are not referred to
 again in the discussion which
 follows here.

6. οὐδετέρους] 'neither of them
 (the many or the philosophers)
 are likely to be entirely at
 fault, but rather to be right in
 some one point at least, or even
 in most points.' There is no

error but it contains some germ
 of truth, however distorted or
 obscured.

11. κτήσει ἢ χρήσει . . . ἔξει
 ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ] See Glossary, p. xlvi.
 Though at the Olympian games
 there may be better men among
 the spectators than among the
 combatants, yet they are not
 crowned, because their prowess
 is not proved or exhibited. It
 is latent, it exists δυνάμει and
 not ἐνεργείᾳ.

τε πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει. "Ὡςπερ δ'
 'Ολυμπίασιν οὐχ οἱ κάλλιστοι καὶ ἰσχυρότατοι στεφα-
 νοῦνται ἀλλ' οἱ ἀγωνιζόμενοι (τούτων γὰρ τινες νικῶσιν),
 οὕτω καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ καλῶν ἀγαθῶν οἱ πράττοντες
 10 ὀρθῶς ἐπήβολοι γίνονται.] "Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος αὐτῶν 5
 καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν,
 ἐκάστῳ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον
 ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ· τὸν
 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ, καὶ ὅλως
 11 τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς 10
 τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ

10 must be not dormant, but in active exercise. (b) That Hap- (β) That
piness implies Pleasure. This we agree to, and moreover it implies
 claim that our Definition asserts it in a far higher and more Pleasure:
 real sense than that usually intended. (1) Because a virtu-
 ous life (*ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν* in our Definition) is necessarily
 one of pleasure, seeing that every one who is really virtuous
 takes pleasure in acting virtuously, and so the pleasure is
 11 inherent in the very actions themselves. (2) Because the

5. §§ 10-12] The emphatic words are καθ' αὐτὸν (l. 6) and φύσει (l. 11). The superiority of the pleasures derived from Virtue to other pleasures is argued, because (1) the former are intrinsic or inherent in the acts themselves (l. 5-10), and (2) they are natural and not artificial (l. 10, to l. 3, on next page). But in the statement of his conclusion in p. 42, l. 3—5, having repeated the words καθ' αὐτάς and ἐν ἑαυτῷ, Aristotle recurs to his former argument, stating it, however, more strongly, and then again summing up in p. 43, l. 4.

5. ἐπήβολοι] See x. 14 (note).

6. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν] 'For the feeling of pleasure is something internal,' i.e. it is not separable from the occasion which causes it, as two external objects might be separated. The pleasure and the act which is its source are separable in thought but not in fact (λόγῳ δύο ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα, as Ar. says in xiii. 10). Hence the pleasure of Virtuous acts is inherent in, and inseparable from, the acts themselves. ψυχικῶν (cf. ψυχικὰς, § 2) clearly refers to ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια in the Def. of Happiness.

φιλοκαλῶν ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ φύσει ἡδέα. Τοιαῦτα δ' αἱ
κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις, ὥστε καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν ἡδέαι καὶ
12 καθ' αὐτάς. Οὐδὲν δὲ προσδεῖται τῆς ἡδονῆς ὁ βίος
αὐτῶν ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός, ἀλλ' ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν
ἑαυτῷ. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις γὰρ οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς 5

pleasures of Virtue, being natural pleasures, never clash or
interfere with one another, as our artificial pleasures do; and
further, being both natural, and also, as we just now said,
12 inherent in the very actions themselves, there is no need of
any adventitious pleasure besides (as the theory we are con-

4. περιάπτου] literally 'something fastened round'; so an appendage, a charm, or amulet. It here indicates an arbitrary reward (which Hegel irreverently described as a 'Trinkgeld') for Virtue.

ἔχει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ] This touches upon a very important question in Morals, the relation of Virtue to the Pleasure or Satisfaction which its practice involves. The view in the text is admirably expressed by Seneca: 'We do not love Virtue because it gives us pleasure, but it gives us pleasure because we love it' (Non quia delectat placet, sed quia placet delectat); and again, 'Pleasure is not the motive, but the accompaniment of virtuous action' (Non dux sed comes voluptas). Again, 'Honesty is the best policy, but he who is governed by that maxim is not an honest man' (Whately). We must carefully distinguish between the *conscious aim* and the *actual tendency* of actions.

Happiness (according to Aristotle) *must* be the actual tendency of Virtue, but it *cannot* be its conscious aim. In fact, when it is the conscious aim, we run the risk not only of destroying the Virtue of the act, but even of losing the Happiness. The pleasure of Virtue is one which can only be obtained on the express condition of its not being the object sought. There are many other things which exhibit the same phenomenon (see some good remarks on this in *Ecce Homo*, ch. x. p. 113, 3d ed.) Just as in speculation, 'Wisdom is oftentimes nearer when we stoop than when we soar,' so in practice, Happiness is best secured by those who least consciously aim at it. Aristotle discusses at length in III. ix. an apparent exception to the statement of the text which occurs in the case of Courage, the exercise of which is accompanied by pain and loss.

5. Πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένοις] The addition to the former statement

ὁ μὴ χαίρων ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον
 οὔδεις ἂν εἴποι τὸν μὴ χαίροντα τῷ δικαιοπραγεῖν, οὔτ'
 ἐλευθέριον τὸν μὴ χαίροντα ταῖς ἐλευθερίοις πράξεσιν
 13 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, καθ' αὐτὰς
 ἂν εἶεν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις ἡδέαι. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ 5
 ἀγαθαί γε καὶ καλαί, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων ἕκαστον,
 εἴπερ καλῶς κρίνει περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος· κρίνει δ'

sidering would imply) to make a virtuous life happy; nor
 need the word therefore be *explicitly* included in the Defini-
 13 tion. (3) Nor, lastly, must it be forgotten that our concep-
 tion of Happiness, as dependent on Virtue, is such as to
 include, *besides* the highest kind of Pleasure, also the highest
 degree both of Goodness and Nobleness; all these being
 united in one, and not separated as the opinion under ex-
 amination would imply. That this union is real is testified

of the argument in § 10 consists in
 this: Aristotle said before that
 the Virtuous man loves Virtue,
 and therefore finds pleasure in it.
 He now goes further and says
 that unless a man feels pleasure
 in it he is *ipso facto* proved not
 to be virtuous at all. This
 would be further illustrated by
 the contrast between *σώφρων*
 and *ἐγκρατής* (explained above
 in iii. 7); for the conduct of the
 latter fails of being strictly Vir-
 tue, because it is accompanied
 with pain and difficulty. See
 also II. iii., where it is main-
 tained that pleasure accompany-
 ing actions is the test of the
 formation of the *habit* of doing
 them.

5. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ] 'But more-
 over they are also.' This for-
 mula, as usual, introduces the

answer to a supposed objection,
 or possible misunderstanding.
 It might be thought that plea-
 sure is the exclusive, or at least
 distinctive, characteristic of such
 acts, but this is not the case.
 Thus we have three points of
 superiority claimed for Aristotle's
 theory of the connexion of Plea-
 sure with Happiness over the com-
 mon view which we are consider-
 ing. (1) Pleasure is present in
 a higher manner,—it is *inherent*:
 (2) It is of a higher sort,—it is
natural, not artificial: (3) It is
 more *comprehensive*, as it includes
 also τὸ καλὸν and τὸ ἀγαθὸν as
 fully as τὸ ἡδύ.

7. σπουδαῖος] lit. 'serious' or 'in
 earnest,' just as φαῦλος is 'light'
 or 'trifling.' Then the two words
 come to be used respectively for
 morally good and bad. Aristotle

- 14 ὥς εἶπομεν. Ἄριστον ἄρα καὶ κάλλιστον καὶ ἡδιστον ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οὐ διώριστα ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ Δηλιακὸν ἐπὶ γράμμα.

Κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιοτάτον, λῶστον δ' ὑγιαίνειν
 "Ἡδιστον δὲ πέφυχ' οὐ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.

- ἅπαντα γὰρ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα ταῖς ἀρίστοις ἐνεργείαις·
 ταύτας δὲ, ἥ μίαν τούτων τὴν ἀρίστην, φαμέν εἶναι τὴν
 15 εὐδαιμονίαν. Φαίνεται δ' ὅμως καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν
 προσδεομένη, καθάπερ εἶπομεν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ρά-
 16 διον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. Πολλὰ μὲν 10
 γὰρ πράττεται, καθάπερ δι' ὀργάνων, διὰ φίλων καὶ
 πλούτου καὶ πολιτικῆς δυνάμεως· ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι
 ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακάριον, οἷον εὐγενείας εὐτεκνίας κάλ-

- 14 by the judgment of the best among men, and also that in
 Happiness this combination is found. The last opinion we shall
 (γ) That 15 consider is this:—(c) That external prosperity is a condition
 it cannot dispense with external prosperity. 16 of Happiness. This we are also disposed to agree to, up to
 a certain point, partly because many noble actions cannot be
 performed without means or appliances; and partly because
 (as we have already admitted) the absence of certain con-

appeals in a similar way to the decision of the σπουδαῖος as final in III. iv. 5, and still more emphatically in X. vi. 5, and to the decision of the φρόνιμος in his Definition of Virtue, II. vi. 15. (See note in each case.)

7. μίαν τὴν ἀρίστην] Though they are all inseparably united in Happiness, yet if one be more prominent or characteristic than the rest we might select it alone for the purpose of Definition.

9. εἶπομεν] viz. v. 6 (τὸν δ' οὕτω κ.τ.λ.).

10. ἀχορήγητον] lit. 'unfurnished with a chorus,'—and so generally 'without appliances.' The state provided the chorus for dramatic performances. This duty (called χορηγία) was one of the λειτουργίαι at Athens. (See note on IV. ii. 11.) Cf. conversely κεχορηγημένος in x. 15. The same statement is more fully illustrated in X. vii. 4.

14. εὐδαιμονικὸς] Observe the force of the termination—'adapted for happiness.' Compare πρακτικός, 'apt to do,' in ix. 8.

λους· οὐ πᾶν γὰρ εὐδαιμονικὸς ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχης
 ἢ δυσγενῆς ἢ μονώτης καὶ ἄτεκνος, ἔτι δ' ἴσως ἦττον,
 εἰ τῷ πάγκακοι παῖδες εἶεν ἢ φίλοι, ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες
 7 τεθνᾶσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν εἵπομεν, εἴοικε προσδεῖσθαι καὶ
 τῆς τοιαύτης εὐημερίας· ὅθεν εἰς ταὐτὸ τάττουσιν ἔνιοι 5
 τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἕτεροι δὲ τὴν ἀρετήν.

I IX. Ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ

7 ditions of prosperity is enough to mar Happiness. Some have even identified Happiness with external prosperity just as others have identified it with Virtue. It will be seen that we cannot go so far as this in either case.

CHAP. IX.—On what does the acquisition of Happiness depend?

I Such being our views as to the connexion of Happiness with external circumstances and internal conditions of character, Various causes have been suggested for the acquisition of Happiness.

4. Some degree then of external prosperity is demanded on two grounds, (1) because it assists towards the active exercise of Virtue. From this point of view too much of it is almost as great a hindrance as too little, and indeed always it is more or less a source of danger (as Aristotle explains elsewhere, *e.g.* X. viii. 6). Compare Bacon on Riches: 'As the Baggage is to an Army, so is Riches to Virtue: it cannot be spared or left behind, but it hindereth the March.' (2) The other ground is, that the total absence of it in important particulars is obviously enough to interfere with Happiness. See x. 12, where the same two rea-

sons are repeated (λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπιφέρει κ.τ.λ.). Also ix. 7 (τὸν δὲ λοιπὼν κ.τ.λ.).

7. Ὅθεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.] As Happiness has just been shown to imply both Virtue and also external prosperity in some degree, the former consideration would imply that its acquisition was in our own power (μαθητὸν, ἐθιστὸν, ἀσκητὸν), the latter that it was independent of ourselves (κατὰ θείαν μοῖραν, διὰ τύχην). Taking the latter first, Aristotle indicates somewhat hesitatingly that θεία μοῖρα cannot be the immediate cause of human Happiness, apart from all effort or conduct of our own. He then excludes τύχη at once, on the

ἐθιστὸν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητὸν, ἢ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοί-
 2 ραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ
 ἄλλο τι ἐστὶ θεῶν δῶρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὖλογον καὶ τὴν
 εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρω-
 3 πίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης
 ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰ μὴ
 θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετὴν καὶ τινα μάθησιν ἢ
 ἀσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς ἄθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν

it is natural to inquire upon what its *acquisition* depends:—
 whether it be on learning; on moral, or other, training; on
 2 Divine dispensation; or on chance. The best of all human
 goods is certainly the most likely of all to be the gift of
 3 Heaven; and whether thus given directly, or through the
 medium of instruction or discipline, to be of all human things

Relation of
Happiness
to Divine
Providence.

ground that it is clearly better
 that the Chief Good should not
 depend on chance. Arguments
 are then adduced in favour of
 considering Virtuous action as the
 main cause, or at least as an
 indispensable condition, of Hap-
 piness.

1. μαθητὸν refers to intellectual
 teaching; ἐθιστὸν to moral
 training; ἀσκητὸν to any sort of
 training or practice.

5. ἄλλης σκέψεως] i.e. it is a
 question rather for Theology
 than Ethics. The Science of
 Ethics only notes the observed
fact that Happiness depends in
 different degrees both on our own
 efforts and on external circum-
 stances. It leaves to Theology
 the question whether *theories* of

'Natural Laws' or 'Special Pro-
 vidence' will best explain the
 facts.

6. εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπος . . . τῶν
 θειοτάτων] The intervention of
 natural laws does not exclude
 Divine agency, which, having
 first established the laws, works
 through them as means. 'If He
 thunder by Law, the thunder is
 yet His Voice' (Tennyson).

This paragraph seems added
 to conciliate religious prejudices,
 which might be shocked by the
 bare statement that Happiness
 is secured by our own efforts, to
 the apparent exclusion of Divine
 help. It need be none the less
 a gift of God, though He wills
 only to 'help those who help
 themselves.'

4 τι καὶ μακάριον. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺκοινον· δυνατόν
 γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν
 5 διὰ τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν οὕτω
 βέλτιον ἢ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὐλογον ἔχειν οὕτως,
 εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὥς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω 5
 6 πέφυκεν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν
 αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. Τὸ δὲ μέγιστον
 καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.
 7 Συμφανὲς δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον
 εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. Τῶν 10

4 the most divine. It is moreover something within the reach
 of all, if it be sought after, or at least of all who are not in-
 5 capacitated for Virtue. Chance at any rate we may exclude
 from the inquiry at once, if it is better, as it most clearly
 6 is, that this greatest prize should depend on our own efforts
 rather than on chance. We argue for some such view as this,
 because (1) our Definition implies something of this sort,
 7 when it describes Happiness as an active condition in accord-

Happiness cannot depend on Chance, for it is obviously better that it have relation to our own efforts. That this is so is already virtually implied (1) in our Definition:

1. Εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ πολὺκοινον] 'It would also be within common reach,'—a consideration in favour of supposing Happiness to be in some degree at least the result of our own exertions (which Aristotle has rather hinted at than stated directly as yet, in the words εἰ μὴ θεόπεμπτος κ.τ.λ.), —'for every one can obtain it except those incapacitated, etc.'

7. αἰτία in this context refers to any sort of conscious or intentional causation as contrasted with τυχή.

ἀρίστη αἰτία seems to be Nature (φύσις l. 5), which would convey to a Greek a notion similar to that of Provi-

dence with us. See Glossary on θεός and φύσις, and compare a similar argument to this in ii. 1, and note there. The argument in this passage appears to be: Nature does all for the best; for indeed in like manner (ὁμοίως) every art and every intelligent cause does its best, whatever that may be; and therefore *a fortiori* Nature, the First of Causes, above all others, does what is best; its best being of course the absolutely best.

10. κατ' ἀρετὴν] It is taken for granted here and elsewhere that Virtue depends on our own efforts.

- δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ
 8 συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. Ὁμολογού-
 μενα δὲ ταύτ' ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς
 πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούσιν τινὰς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς 5
 9 πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. Εἰκότως
 οὖν οὔτε βούν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν
 εὐδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἶόν τε κοινωνῆσαι
 10 τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. Διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς

ance with Excellence or Virtue, though we do not deny the necessity of other goods as aids and instruments even towards that excellence. (2) Our original conception of the Chief Good as the End of the Science of Social Life points in the same direction, the primary object of that Science being to secure the virtuous life of all the members of society. (3) Lastly, we derive an argument from the use of language, which does not apply the term Happiness (in its full and proper sense) either to the lower animals or to children, both being

(2) in our original conception of Ethical Science:

(3) and in the common language of men.

1. λοιπῶν] i.e. Goods other than Virtue just mentioned. These it is true are not wholly under our control. Observe the same two grounds as before (viii. 15, 16) for the need of some measure of external Goods.

3. τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ] viz. ii. 5.

4. Hence πολιτικὴ has a wider sense than the 'science of government,' because it aims at making good men, as well as good citizens. See note on xiii. 3. The point of the argument here is that πολιτικὴ aims at securing Happiness through the means of Virtuous conduct and character, and this implies that the acqui-

sition of Happiness depends mainly on ourselves.

7. If it sound strange to say that neither the lower animals nor children can be called happy, we must remember the full meaning attached to the term in the Definition of ch. vii., and not be misled by the popular application of the word 'happy' in English. See further, X. vi. 8 (note).

9. τοιαύτης] viz. πρακτικῆς τῶν καλῶν from I. 6.

οὐδὲ παῖς] 'not even a child.' This is a stronger case than that of the lower animals just cited, because a child has Happiness ἐν

εὐδαιμόνων ἐστίν· οὐπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. Δεῖ γὰρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. Πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστ' εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.

X. Πότερον οὖν οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων εὐδαι- 10

characterized by incapacity for Virtuous practice,—the former absolutely, the latter temporarily: for both Virtue and Happiness are imperfect unless exhibited in 'a complete life'; the changes and chances to which life is exposed being so many and so various.

CHAPS. X. XI.—*What is the relation of Happiness to the varying fortunes of life, especially in reference to a well-known dictum of Solon's.*

Hence arises the question, Must we (as Solon used to say) wait till we see the end of a man's life before we can call him Solon's dictum stated.

δυνάμει though not ἐν ἐνεργείᾳ (See Glossary, p. xlv.), and hence διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται, whereas a brute has it not in any sense, either δυνάμει or ἐνεργείᾳ.

CHAPS. X. and XI.—The mention of βίος τέλειος at the end of the last Chapter, and the statement made in reference to it, suggests the popular question said to have been first raised by Solon, 'Can we not call a man happy till his life is completed?' In §§ 1-5 Aristotle points out

the difficulties involved in every solution or interpretation of this question, especially as it cannot be separated from the wider question of the condition of the departed. In § 6 he returns to the consideration of the dictum of Solon, proposing afterwards to apply its solution (gained by the help of his own theory of Happiness) to that of the wider question just mentioned. It is so applied in ch. xi.

10. οὐδ' ἄλλον οὐδένα] i.e. even

- μονιστέον ἕως ἂν ζῇ, κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὄραν ;
 2 Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ θετέον οὕτως, ἀρά γε καὶ ἔστιν εὐδαίμων
 τότε ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ ; ἢ τοῦτό γε παντελῶς ἄτοπον,
 ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡμῖν ἐνέργειάν τινα τὴν
 3 εὐδαιμονίαν ; εἰ δὲ μὴ λέγομεν τὸν τεθνεῶτα εὐδαίμονα, 5
 μῆδὲ Σόλων τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι τηνικαῦτα ἂν τις
 ἀσφαλῶς μακαρίσειεν ἄνθρωπον ὥς ἐκτὸς ἤδη τῶν κακῶν
 ὄντα καὶ τῶν δυστυχημάτων, ἔχει μὲν καὶ τοῦτ' ἀμφισ-
 βήτησίν τινα· δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναί τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν
 καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δὲ, οἶον 10
 τιμαὶ καὶ ἀτιμίαι καὶ τέκνων καὶ ὅλως ἀπογόνων εὐ-
 4 πραξίαι τε καὶ δυστυχίαι. Ἀπορίαν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα

- 2 happy? Those who say this mean, *either* that he is happy when
 dead—which is absurd, especially if happiness consists in ac-
 tivity (*ἐνέργεια*) as our Definition asserts, and indeed Solon pro-
 3 bably never meant this ;—*or* that we can then safely apply the
 term 'happy' to him, as being now beyond the reach of trouble.
 But are we so sure that he is beyond its reach? Do not the for-
 tunes of the family or friends that he has left behind affect him
 4 still? But this again opens another difficulty. If we suppose

any other than ὁ Πριαμικαῖς ξυμφοραῖς περιπεσών. This might be thought an exceptional case, and so the question is put, 'Can we not then call even any ordinary man happy while he lives, by reason of the changes and chances of life?'

9. δοκεῖ] 'It is supposed,' see note on iii. 2.

δοκεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'It is thought that both good and evil may occur to the dead, if indeed they can to the living without his being conscious of it.' Œdipus for instance would not have

been considered a happy man even if he had never discovered his incestuous marriage, but had gone on till death in 'happy' ignorance of it. His 'ignorance' would not have been 'bliss' from the Greek point of view. This at least is assumed in the text, and the argument drawn from it is, that it is equally natural to suppose that the happiness of a dead man, even though he be unconscious, is marred by misfortunes occurring to his family on earth. Aristotle however is only stating a popular belief.

It involves the further question of the condition of the dead in reference to the living, which is full of difficulties.

παρέχει· τῷ γὰρ μακαρίως βεβιωκότι μέχρι γήρως καὶ
 τελευτήσαντι κατὰ λόγον ἐνδέχεται πολλὰς μεταβολὰς
 συμβαίνειν περὶ τοὺς ἐκγόνους, καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγα-
 θοὺς εἶναι καὶ τυχεῖν βίου τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν, τοὺς δ' ἐξ
 ἐναντίας. Δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι πρὸς τοὺς 5
 5 γονεῖς παντοδαπῶς ἔχειν αὐτοὺς ἐνδέχεται. Ἀτοπὸν δὲ
 γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ συµμεταβάλλοι καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς καὶ γίνοιτο
 ὅτε μὲν εὐδαίμων πάλιν δ' ἄθλιος. Ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ
 μηδὲν μηδ' ἐπὶ τινα χρόνον συνικνεῖσθαι τὰ τῶν ἐκγόνων
 6 τοῖς γονεῦσιν. Ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον ἐπὶ τὸ πρότερον ἀπο- 10
 ρηθέν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν θεωρηθεῖη καὶ τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητούμενον

that they *do* affect him, then it would seem that the happiness
 of a complete life may be marred after death, and that even
 5 the dead may change from happiness to misery and *vice versa*
 with the fluctuating fortunes of their descendants on earth.
 And yet on the other hand, it is very hard to suppose that
 these *do not* affect the dead at all. How then are we to escape
 6 from this concourse of difficulties? Perhaps this large ques-
 tion concerning the condition of the dead, into which we have
 wandered, may best be solved by first giving an answer to the
 simpler one,—Was Solon right in saying we must never call a

Solon's ques-
 tion however
 should be
 solved first.

2. κατὰ λόγον] 'accordingly.'
 A quasi-mathematical expression
 = 'in proportion.'

5. καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασι κ.τ.λ.]
 'also in their several degrees of
 removal (i.e. in their several gene-
 rations) it is possible for them to
 be related in every variety of way
 to their progenitors,' i.e. some
 giving them pleasure and others
 pain.

6. ἀτοπον] This is 'out of
 place,' because even the dead
 (καὶ ὁ τεθνεὺς) would not at this

rate be exempt from the diffi-
 culty felt by Solon.

8. ἀτοπον] Why this is 'out
 of place' is more fully explained
 in xi. 1. It would be *λίαν ἀφίλον*
καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον. Notice
 here and elsewhere Aristotle's
 respect for popular feelings and
 beliefs.

10. The *πρότερον ἀπορηθέν* is
 the dictum of Solon, *χρὴ τὸ*
τέλος ὁρᾶν. The *τὸ νῦν ἐπιζητού-*
μενον is the relation of the dead
 to the fortunes of their friends,

- 7 ἐξ ἐκείνου. Εἰ δὴ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν δεῖ καὶ τότε μακαρίζειν
 ἕκαστον οὐχ ὥς ὄντα μακάριον ἀλλ' ὅτι πρότερον ἦν, πῶς
 οὐκ ἄτοπον, εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθεύεται κατ'
 αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον, διὰ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι τοὺς ζῶντας
 εὐδαιμονίζειν διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς, καὶ διὰ τὸ μόνιμόν τι 5
 τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπειληφέναι καὶ μηδαμῶς εὐμετάβολον,
 τὰς δὲ τύχας πολλάκις ἀνακυκλεῖσθαι περὶ τοὺς αὐτούς ;
 8 δῆλον γὰρ ὥς εἰ συνακολουθοίημεν ταῖς τύχαις, τὸν
 αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πάλιν ἄθλιον ἐροῦμεν πολλάκις,
 χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες καὶ σα- 10
 9 θρῶς ἰδρυμένον. Ἡ τὸ μὲν ταῖς τύχαις ἐπακολουθεῖν
 οὐδαμῶς ὀρθόν ; οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις τὸ εὖ ἢ κακῶς, ἀλλὰ
 προσδεῖται τούτων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος, καθάπερ εἵπαμεν,
 κύριαι δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας,

The diffi-
 culty is due
 to making
 changing
 circum-
 stances the
 test of
 Happiness
 which is
 most stable,

- 7 man happy while still living? Now surely if we can ever
 say with truth that a man *has been* happy, it must have been
 possible at some time or another to say that he *is* happy.
 8 The supposed difficulty in doing so is that Happiness is most
 9 stable, and the chances of Fortune most variable. The solu-
 tion is obvious. These chances ought never to be made the
 test of Happiness at all. The fact is that external prosperity,
 however necessary a *condition* of Happiness (and this we have
 amply admitted before), cannot be its *cause*. We say again,
 as we said in our Definition, that Virtuous Actions are the
 true cause of Happiness, as Vicious actions are of misery.

which question arose out of
 attempts to explain that dictum.

4, 5. διὰ three times repeated
 is somewhat awkward. It will
 be seen that the first διὰ explains
 μὴ ἀληθεύεται: the second and
 third explain τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι
 εὐδαιμονίζειν.

13, 14. Observe the contrast be-
 tween προσδεῖται = 'has further
 need of' (i.e. this is not a *primary*
 condition of Happiness) and κύ-
 ριαι εἰσὶ = they 'test' or 'deter-
 mine.' Compare προσδεομένη,
 viii. 15, and προσδεῖσθαι in viii.
 17 and iv. 7.

ο αἱ δ' ἐναντίαι τοῦ ἐναντίου. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ
 τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν. Περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ὑπάρχει τῶν
 ἀνθρωπίνων ἔργων βεβαιότης ὥς περὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς
 κατ' ἀρετὴν· μονιμώτεραι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὗται
 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Τούτων δ' αὐτῶν αἱ τιμιώταται μονο- 5
 μώταται διὰ τὸ μάλιστα καὶ συνεχέστατα καταζῆν ἐν
 αὐταῖς τοὺς μακαρίους· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔοικεν αἰτίῳ τοῦ μὴ
 γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτὰ λήθην. Ὑπάρξει δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον
 τῷ εὐδαίμονι, καὶ ἔσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἡ
 μάλιστα πάντων πράξει καὶ θεωρήσει τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν, 10
 καὶ τὰς τύχας οἴσει κάλλιστα καὶ πάντῃ πάντως ἐμ-

ο To the truth of that Definition in this respect, the very dif-
 ficulty that has now arisen bears witness. It is the recognised
 stability of Happiness that makes us so cautious in our appli-
 cation of the term. But what is there so stable as Virtuous
 action? Not intellectual knowledge. This may be forgotten.
 But active Virtue *vi nominis* must be in continual practice,
 and is thus necessarily permanent and stable, and the more so
 as it exists in its noblest forms and highest degree in perfect
 Happiness. How then will a man who thus lives stand in

whereas
 Virtue is
 the real
 test ;
 and Virtue
 is in fact
 more stable
 than any-
 thing else.

1. τῷ λόγῳ] 'our Definition,'
 which asserts Happiness to be
 κατ' ἀρετὴν. The present diffi-
 culty (τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν) turns
 upon the universally believed
 stability of Happiness, which
 makes us reluctant to apply the
 name where change may come.
 But this stability is intelligible
 if Happiness depends on Virtue,
 as our Definition asserts, be-
 cause Virtuous practice is more
 stable than anything else, as the
 reasons now to be adduced suffi-
 ciently prove. Thus the difficulty

itself is a support to the Defini-
 tion.

4-8. This may suggest one
 reason among others why
 'Knowledge (ἐπιστήμαι) shall
 vanish away, but charity (ἐνέρ-
 γειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν) never faileth.'

5. Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν] is 'of
 Virtues in active exercise,' ἐνερ-
 γειῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν.

8. τὸ ζητούμενον] 'the quality
 we are seeking for,' viz. stability.

10. Happiness being according
 to the Definition κατ' ἀρετὴν
 ἀρίστην.

- μελῶς ὃ γ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τετράγωνος ἄνευ
 12 ψόγου. Πολλῶν δὲ γινομένων κατὰ τύχην καὶ διαφε-
 ρόντων μεγέθει καὶ μικρότητι, τὰ μὲν μικρὰ τῶν εὐτυ-
 χημάτων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων, δῆλον ὡς
 οὐ ποιεῖ ῥοπήν τῆς ζωῆς, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ, 5
 γιγνόμενα μὲν εὖ, μακαριώτερον τὸν βίον ποιήσει (καὶ
 γὰρ αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν, καὶ ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῶν
 καλὴ καὶ σπουδαία γίγνεται), ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα
 θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται τὸ μακάριον· λύπας τε γὰρ ἐπι-
 φέρει καὶ ἐμποδίζει πολλαῖς ἐνεργείαις. "Ομως δὲ καὶ 10
 ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν, ἐπειδὰν φέρῃ τις εὐ-
 κόλως πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀτυχίας, μὴ δι' ἀναλγησίαν,
 13 ἀλλὰ γεννάδας ὦν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος. Εἰ δ' εἰσὶν αἱ
 ἐνεργεῖαι κύριαι τῆς ζωῆς, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, οὐδεὶς ἂν

How then
 does the
 virtuous
 man stand
 related to
 the changes
 of fortune?

- 12 relation to the gifts of Fortune? If they be *small*, whether
 good or bad, they will not affect the balance of his life. If
 they be *great*, and also good, they will naturally add a lustre
 to his happiness; but if evil, they will mar it, inflict on him
 pain, and impede his activity in virtue. Still the very great-
 ness of such troubles affords scope for nobleness of character,
 when they are keenly felt and yet complacently endured.
 13 Hence we conclude that if (as we have said) Virtue and Vice

1. τετράγωνος ἄνευ ψόγου] 'a cube without flaw,'—a mathe-
 matical metaphor to express per-
 fection. Squares, cubes, circles,
 spheres (i.e. 'regular' figures and
 solids), are familiar metaphors to
 express perfection in various
 languages.

7. αὐτὰ] 'of themselves.' This
 parenthesis is explained by viii.
 15. For the converse statement
 in l. 8 [ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συμβαίνοντα

θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] see
 viii. 16.

9. λύπας τε γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] See
 these two reasons expounded in
 viii. 15, 16 (note).

11. εὐκόλως] Contrast δύσκο-
 λος in IV. vi. 9.

12. δι' ἀναλγησίαν] Such was
 the view of the Stoics. Aristotle on
 the contrary maintains that natu-
 ral feelings, though under control,
 are not to be crushed or eradicated.

γένοιτο τῶν μακαρίων ἄθλιος· οὐδέποτε γὰρ πράξει τὰ μισητὰ καὶ φαῦλα. Τὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἔμφρονα πάσας οἰόμεθα τὰς τύχας εὐσχημόνως φέρειν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἀεὶ τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν, καθάπερ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν τῷ παρόντι στρατοπέδῳ 5
 χρῆσθαι πολεμικώτατα, καὶ σκυτοτόμον ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων σκυτῶν κάλλιστον ὑπόδημα ποιεῖν· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον
 14 καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τεχνίτας ἅπαντας. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἄθλιος μὲν οὐδέποτε γένοιτ' ἂν ὁ εὐδαίμων, οὐ μὴν μακάριός γε, ἂν Πριαμικαῖς τύχαις περιπέσῃ. Οὐδὲ δὴ ποικίλος 10
 γε καὶ εὐμετάβολος· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας κινηθήσεται ῥαδίως, οὔδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀτυχημάτων ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μεγάλων καὶ πολλῶν, ἕκ τε τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ

alone determine the happiness or misery of life, external circumstances (which in all cases the virtuous man will make the
 14 best of, like a good general) can never altogether destroy Happiness and change it into misery, though we do not pretend that they will not in some degree affect it. We conclude further (and this was another of the difficulties raised at the beginning of the chapter), that the happy man is not easily

In no case is he easily moved or changed by them.

9. Notice the contrast between εὐδαίμων and μακάριος, the latter being the higher state; though the distinction is by no means always maintained. The words 'happiness' and 'felicity' respectively are the best English equivalents, and in Latin 'felix' and 'beatus.' 'The happy man could never become wretched, though he would not be in a state of perfect felicity if he fell into troubles like those of Priam.' The Stoics would say that he could be. They maintained that the virtuous man would be per-

fectly happy even while being broken on the wheel. Aristotle says that external circumstances however great or various can never constitute either happiness or misery, but they can make the difference of greater or less degrees of either one or the other. Virtue and Vice alone have power to constitute these states. To regard external goods as the cause of Happiness would be like giving the lyre the credit of a brilliant musical performance. (See *Pol.* IV. (VII.) xiii. 8.)

ἂν γένοιτο πάλιν εὐδαίμων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ,
 ἐν πολλῷ τινὶ καὶ τελείῳ, μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἐν αὐτῷ
 15 γενόμενος ἐπήβολος. Τί οὖν κωλύει λέγειν εὐδαίμονα
 τὸν κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἀγα-
 θοῖς ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένον, μὴ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον 5
 ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον; ἢ προσθετέον καὶ βιωσόμενον οὕτω
 καὶ τελευτήσοντα κατὰ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μέλλον ἀφανὲς
 ἡμῖν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ τέλος καὶ τέλειον τίθεμεν
 16 πάντῃ πάντως; Εἰ δ' οὕτω, μακαρίους ἐροῦμεν τῶν
 ζώντων οἷς ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρξει τὰ λεχθέντα, μακαρί- 10
 οὺς δ' ἀνθρώπους.

1 XI. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωρίσθω τὰς

moved; and that as it will take a great deal to mar happiness,
 so it will take a great deal to restore it if once disturbed.

Solon's
 question
 may now be
 answered.
 We can call
 a man still
 living
 'happy.'

15 Finally then we ask, granted the conditions of perfect virtue,
 a sufficient supply of external goods, and both these for an
 adequate duration of time, why may we not call a man happy
 while he still lives? Some may desire that in view of the
 uncertainty of the future, and the perfect finality of happiness,
 we should add, provided such a life be crowned by a fitting
 16 death. Still it must be remembered that in calling men happy,
 we of course mean only happy as mortal men can be.

How far
 then is the
 condition of
 the dead
 affected
 by the for-
 tunes of
 the living?

1 CHAP. XI.—Now we can return to the solution of the other

3. ἐπήβολος] (ἐπὶ, βάλλω)
 'having hit upon.' ἐν αὐτῷ, viz.
 χρόνῳ.

9. Thus then the question
 raised by Solon is answered. We
 can call men happy while still
 alive, but happy as men, and
 not as gods; being as men
 still liable to the dangers inci-
 dent to humanity; and *this*
being understood, we need not
 explicitly add 'καὶ βιωσόμενον'

οὕτω κ.τ.λ.' (l. 6), when we
 apply the term 'happy,' any more
 than when we apply the terms
 'healthy,' 'rich,' 'wise,' etc.;
 any of which conditions are
 similarly liable to the possi-
 bility of disturbance. τὰ λεχ-
 θέντα are the three conditions
 specified at the beginning of § 15,
 viz. Virtue, External Goods in
 sufficiency, and Stability.

CHAP. XI.—In this Chapter

δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τύχας καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀπάντων τὸ μὲν
 μηδοτιοῦν συμβάλλεσθαι λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς
 2 δόξαις ἐναντίον· πολλῶν δὲ καὶ παντοίας ἐχόντων δια-
 φορὰς τῶν συμβαινόντων, καὶ τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον συνικ-
 νουμένων, τῶν δ' ἥττον, καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν διαιρεῖν μακ- 5
 ρὸν καὶ ἀπέραντον φαίνεται, καθόλου δὲ λεχθὲν καὶ
 3 τύπῳ τάχ' ἂν ἰκανῶς ἔχοι. Εἰ δὲ, καθάπερ καὶ τῶν περὶ
 αὐτὸν ἀτυχημάτων τὰ μὲν ἔχει τι βριθὸς καὶ ῥοπήν

difficulty, viz. whether the happiness of the dead can be altered
 by the fortunes of the living. To suppose the dead *wholly*
 untouched by these fortunes seems cold, and runs counter to
 2 received beliefs. To estimate accurately the various *degrees*
 of influence exercised by such occurrences great and small
 would be endless. This then may serve as a general solution.
 3 —*In life itself*, different circumstances affect us in very different

Aristotle returns to the question of the condition of the dead in relation to the fortunes of the living. He applies to its solution (as he promised in x. 6) the results arrived at in reference to Solon's problem thus:—if the fortunes of life are no obstacle to our calling a man happy while still alive and still exposed to their full force, *a fortiori* they cannot seriously interfere with the happiness of the dead who are removed from their immediate influence.

7, to l. 8 next page. Εἰ δὲ . . . ἀντικειμένων] The sentence is somewhat complicated. Two conditions are stated:—(1) If misfortunes even in this life differ in degree when they concern ourselves, and similarly when

they concern our friends (εἰ δὲ . . . ἀπάντας); (2) If absence from the actual scene of their occurrence in this world, and *a fortiori* if removal to another world altogether, dull their effect upon us (διαφέρει . . . πράττεσθαι); then the result (the apodosis of the sentence) is,—These points, and especially the latter (ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν), must be taken into consideration (συλλογιστέον δὲ) in determining the question before us. Unless indeed we go further still, and make the question not one of degree but of fact, i.e. not *How far* are the dead affected? but *Are they* affected even *at all*? (μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.). τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι = 'the utter doubt and uncertainty.'

πρὸς τὸν βίον, τὰ δ' ἐλαφροτέροις ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τὰ
 4 περὶ τοὺς φίλους ὁμοίως ἅπαντας, διαφέρει δὲ τῶν
 παθῶν ἕκαστον περὶ ζῶντας ἢ τελευτήσαντας συμβαί-
 νειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν
 5 ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι, συλλογιστέον δὴ καὶ 5
 ταύτην τὴν διαφορὰν, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὸ διαπορεῖσθαι
 περὶ τοὺς κεκμηκότας εἴ τινος ἀγαθοῦ κοινωνοῦσιν ἢ τῶν
 ἀντικειμένων ἔοικε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων εἰ καὶ διῴκνείται πρὸς
 αὐτοὺς ὅτιοῦν, εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν εἴτε τὸνναντίον, ἀφανρόν τι
 καὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις εἶναι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοσοῦτόν 10
 γε καὶ τοιοῦτον ὥστε μὴ ποιεῖν εὐδαίμονας τοὺς μὴ ὄντας
 6 μὴδὲ τοὺς ὄντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὸ μακάριον. Συμβάλλεσ-
 θαι μὲν οὖν τι φαίνονται τοῖς κεκμηκόσιν αἱ εὐπραξίαι
 τῶν φίλων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ δυσπραξίαι, τοιαῦτα δὲ
 καὶ τηλικαῦτα ὥστε μήτε τοὺς εὐδαίμονας μὴ εὐδαίμονας 15
 ποιεῖν μήτ' ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων μηδέν.

degrees, when they concern ourselves, and naturally also when
 4 they concern our friends. *After our death*, such circumstances,
 being acted on another stage, must affect us infinitely less.
 5 We must then make full allowance for this difference, even
 supposing we grant the general question that they do affect us
 6 somewhat. Hence we conclude that the dead are influenced
 by such occurrences, if at all, only slightly, and certainly not
 to such a degree as to change Happiness into Misery, or
vice versa.

5. The lines in Hor. *A. P.*
 180-2 will occur to every one:—
Segnius irritant animos demissa per aures
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fide-
bus, et quae
Ipsae sibi tradit spectantur.

(See *Supplementary Notes*.)

10. ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἐκείνοις] 'Either
 in itself, or to them.' Referring

to the two conditions respectively
 in §§ 3 and 4. The influence of
 these occurrences, if they do
 reach the dead, must be trifling
 anyhow, either in itself (as ex-
 plained in § 3), or at least trifling
 in the effect produced upon the
 dead (as explained in § 4).

- I XII. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεψώμεθα περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας πότερα τῶν ἐπαινετῶν ἐστὶν ἢ μᾶλλον τῶν τιμίων· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.
- 2 Φαίνεται δὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐπαινετὸν τῷ ποιόν τι εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν ἐπαινεῖσθαι· τὸν γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ τὸν 5 ἀνδρείον καὶ ὅλως τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπαινοῦμεν διὰ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὸν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν δρομικὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῷ ποιόν τινα πε-

CHAP. XII.—*Comparison of another popular theory with Aristotle's Definition.*

- I One more popular division of Goods calls for comparison with our theory, before we proceed. It is commonly said that Goods are *potential* or *actual*; the former *may* be good, the latter *must* be. Further, 'actual' Goods are said to be either objects of praise, or objects of admiration, as being beyond praise. It may be asked then under which of these three classes does our conception of the Chief Good or Happiness
- 2 fall. Obviously not under the first. Nor yet under the second, viz. objects of praise. Praise is only applied to things

Goods are sometimes said to be either potential, or praise-worthy, or admirable.

Our conception of Happiness would bring it under the last of these.

CHAP. XII. contains the last of the popular opinions and questions to which Aristotle adjusts his theory (see note at beginning of ch. viii.). This opinion is, that Good things may be divided into *δυνάμεις*, *ἐπαινετὰ*, and *τίμια*. The question is, To which class does the Chief Good in Aristotle's conception of it belong?

3. *τιμίων*] things on which we bestow *τιμή*, a much higher tribute than *ἔπαινος*, as is explained by IV. iii. 10.

δυνάμεων] i.e. things which

are potentially but not necessarily good, their character depending on the use made of them. Aristotle gives as instances elsewhere, power, riches, beauty, strength. Compare what was said in iii. 3. That Happiness is not of this class needs no proof.

4. *τῷ ποιόν τι κ.τ.λ.*] literally 'from possessing a certain character and bearing a certain relation to something else.' In other words, all praise is *relative* (*δι' ἀναφορὰς*) as Aristotle says in § 3.

- φυκέναι καὶ ἔχειν πῶς πρὸς ἀγαθόν τι καὶ σπουδαῖον.
 3 Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπαινῶν
 γελοῖοι γὰρ φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι, τοῦτο
 δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τοὺς ἐπαινοὺς δι' ἀναφο-
 4 ρᾶς, ὥσπερ εἴπαμεν. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἔπαινος τῶν τοιού- 5
 των, δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἐστὶν ἔπαινος, ἀλλὰ
 μείζον τι καὶ βέλτιον, καθάπερ καὶ φαίνεται τοὺς τε γὰρ
 θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν, καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν
 τοὺς θειοτάτους μακαρίζομεν. 'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγα-
 θῶν οὐδεὶς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπαινεῖ καθάπερ τὸ 10
 δίκαιον, ἀλλ' ὥς θειότερόν τι καὶ βέλτιον μακαρίζει.
 5 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀρισ-

- in reference to their results, and because they are well adapted
 3 to produce these results. Hence it is applied to justice,
 courage, strength, etc. Hence also we cannot employ the
 term 'praise,' involving this notion of commendation, to the
 4 Gods, nor is it applicable to the highest goods, which are not
 desired for their results, but for themselves; nor consequently
 5 can it be applied to Happiness. When Eudoxus claimed that

2. ἔπαινος involves the idea of commendation. In this sense it is clear we cannot 'praise' the Deity.

6. δῆλον ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] If praise is always applied with a view to results, and if results are necessarily higher than the actions or means which lead to them (see i. 2), then there must be something better than praise to apply to the results themselves. For we must suppose some results to be final (otherwise *πρόεισιν οὕτω γε εἰς ἀπειρον* ii. 1), and these at any rate cannot *ex hyp.* be subjects for praise.

8. Observe the distinction between *μακαρία* and *εὐδαιμονία*, 'felicity' and 'happiness.' See x. 14 (note). Both belong to the Gods, the former only in rare instances to men.

9. 'Ομοίως δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The same remark applies to the best among good things. 'Αγαθῶν is in the gen. after some superl. understood from *τοὺς θειοτάτους*, perhaps the word *θειότατα* itself, as it is so applied in ix. 3.

12. *καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι*] 'to have put in a good claim for the first place.' He was *right* in supposing that the fact of praise

τείων τῇ ἡδονῇ· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπαινέσθαι τῶν ἀγαθῶν
οὔσαν μὲν ἔστιν ὅτι κρεῖττόν ἐστι τῶν ἐπαινετῶν,
τοιοῦτον δ' εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ
6 καὶ τὰλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς·
πρακτικοὶ γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπὸ ταύτης· τὰ δ' ἐγκώμια τῶν 5
ἔργων ὁμοίως καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν.
7 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως οἰκειότερον ἐξακριβοῦν τοῖς
περὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια πεπονημένοις, ἡμῖν δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τιμίων καὶ τε-
8 λείων. Ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή 10
ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν,

Pleasure was the Chief Good because though good it was not
praised, as being above praise, the principle at least of his ar-
6 gument was sound. 'Praise' then is peculiarly appropriate to
virtuous *habits*, in consideration of the results to which they
lead, just as 'panegyric' is appropriate to great *deeds*. But these
7 refinements of language are carrying us too far. We decide
then that Happiness belongs to the third class mentioned
8 above, viz. things admirable, and this we might have at once

not being applied to some ac-
knowledge good indicated a
high degree of excellence: but
wrong in supposing that only
God and the Chief Good (l. 3)
corresponded to that description.

5. Thus ἐγκώμιον belongs to
noble *acts*; ἔπαινος to virtuous
habits, which result from, and
tend to reproduce, such acts;
μακαρισμός to Happiness, which
results again from those virtuous
habits.

5. πρακτικοὶ γὰρ] This reason
is explained by the first words
of § 2.

10. ἀρχή] This sense of the

word is a little unusual. It is
here almost the same as τέλος,
just as in English we can speak
indifferently of a *primary* or an
ultimate principle in the same
sense. The ultimate motive is
also the primary motive of an
action. If we desire money with
a view to obtain a certain luxury,
that luxury is the ultimate, and
also the primary, motive for the
effort to procure money. (See
Glossary, s.v. ἀρχή). Ἀρχή is
in fact here equivalent to 'final
cause.' (See Glossary, s.v. The
Four Causes.)

τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αἷτιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμιόν τι καὶ θεῖον τίθεμεν.

- 1 XIII. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ' ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. 5

inferred from the consideration of its being an ultimate principle of action, not chosen for its results, but itself the motive and result for which all else is chosen.

CHAP. XIII.—*Commencement of the elucidation of the several terms in the Definition of Happiness, and especially of the word Soul (ψυχή).*

The Defi-
nition of
Happiness
implies the
knowledge
(1) of the
nature of
Virtue,

- 1 We now proceed to a detailed analysis of our Definition of Happiness. Happiness was said to involve the highest degree of Virtue. We cannot therefore fully understand Happiness without a complete investigation of Virtue. We premise one

CHAP. XIII.—It is worth while now to review the position we have reached. Chaps. i—iii were introductory; ch. iv—vi criticised the principal existing theories about Happiness; ch. vii. constructed a new Definition of Happiness, which, if accepted, would close the treatise at once with a Q.E.D. All that follows now is the defence of that Definition. Ch. viii—xii contrast it with the principal received opinions on the same subject, in order to claim as much accordance with them as possible. Ch. xiii. commences a more formal analysis of the Definition itself. Two words in that Definition require special elucidation, ἀρετῇ and

ψυχή. ψυχή is explained, as far as is practically necessary, in this chapter. It is found to contain two parts at any rate which are capable of degrees of excellence (ἀρετῇ), viz. an appetitive and a rational part. The excellence of the former is Moral (ἠθικὴ ἀρετῇ). The excellence of the latter is Intellectual (διανοητικὴ ἀρετῇ). These two kinds of excellence are discussed at length, the former in Bks. II—V., the latter in Bk. VI.

3. ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία . . . τελείαν] This is simply a recapitulation of the Definition in ch. vii. omitting only 'ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.'

2 Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην
 3 μάλιστα πεπονήσθαι βούλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγα-
 4 θοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Παράδειγμα δὲ
 5 τούτων ἔχομεν τοὺς Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων νομο-
 6 θέτας, καὶ εἴ τινες ἕτεροι τοιοῦτοι γεγέννηται. Εἰ δὲ τῆς
 7 πολιτικῆς ἐστὶν ἡ σκέψις αὕτη, δῆλον ὅτι γένοιτ' ἂν ἡ
 8 ζήτησις κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν. Περὶ ἀρετῆς
 9 δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν
 10 ἀνθρώπινον ἐζητοῦμεν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀνθρωπίνην.
 11 Ἀρετὴν δὲ λέγομεν ἀνθρωπίνην, οὐ τὴν τοῦ σώματος
 12 ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δὲ ψυχῆς
 13 ἐνέργειαν λέγομεν. Εἰ δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι
 14 δεῖ τὸν πολιτικὸν εἰδέναι πῶς τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν, ὥσπερ καὶ

2 or two remarks. (1) As both the true theory and highest
 3 practice of the Science of Social Life aims at the attainment
 4 of Virtue, we are strictly within the limits laid down at the
 5 outset of this inquiry (2) It is *human* not *ideal* Virtue and
 6 Happiness which we are investigating, and as these both belong
 7 not to the Body but to the Soul, the nature of the Soul must
 8 also be expounded. And this also comes within the scope of

and conse-
 quently (2)
 of the nature
 of the Soul
 (ψυχῇ).

4. Κρητῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων] These political systems are selected for praise here and elsewhere, because beyond all others they attempted to regulate by legislation all the details of the private morality, the domestic life, the personal expenses, etc., of the citizens; regarding their character not only as citizens, but as men, see I. ix. 8, II. i. 5, etc. Contrast with this the tendency of modern legislation, which is not to interfere with private morality except so far as the

interests of society are compromised by it. *e.g.* No modern state punishes drunkenness, unless it be public and disorderly. 'Good government' (says Buckle) 'is often inversely to its "earnestness" and the amount of its interference.'

7. κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν] viz. I. ii. 9, ἡ μεθόδος τοιούτων ἐφίεται πολιτικὴ τις οὔσα.

9. ἀνθρώπινον] On this limitation see note on ii. 1. Cf. also vi. 13.

τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα, καὶ μᾶλλον
ὅσῳ τιμιωτέρα καὶ βελτίων ἢ πολιτικὴ τῆς ἰατρικῆς.
Τῶν δ' ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες πολλὰ πραγματεύονται περὶ
8 τὴν τοῦ σώματος γνῶσιν. Θεωρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ πολι-
τικῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, θεωρητέον δὲ τούτων χάριν, καὶ ἐφ'
ὅσον ἱκανῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰ ζητούμενα· τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ πλείον
ἐξακριβοῦν ἐργωδέστερον ἴσως ἐστὶ τῶν προκειμένων.
9 Δέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις
ἀρκούντως ἓν, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς. Οἷον τὸ μὲν
10 ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον. Ταῦτα δὲ πότε-
ρον διώρισται καθάπερ τὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη καὶ πᾶν
τὸ μεριστὸν, ἢ τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἐστὶν ἀχώριστα πεφυκότα,
καθάπερ ἐν τῇ περιφερείᾳ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον,

both how-
ever within
the practical
limits which
we have
already im-
posed on
ourselves.
The Soul is
commonly
divided into
a Rational
and an
Irrational
part.

8 the Science of Social Life, provided the inquiry be confined
within the limits of what is practically necessary to throw
9 light upon the subject of Virtue. For our present object the
ordinary popular treatises will suffice. We there find it stated
that the Soul consists of two parts, a rational part and an
10 irrational part. (Whether these parts be literally separate, like
the limbs of the body, or separate in thought only, like the
concave and convex sides of a curve,) is indifferent for our

1. After πᾶν σῶμα under-
stand again the words 'δεῖ εἰδέναι
πως.' As the Oculist must study
also to some extent the condi-
tions of health of the whole body,
so must the social philosopher
acquaint himself in some degree
with the whole ψυχῇ, though his
own practice is limited to a por-
tion of it.

3. χαρίεντες] 'accomplished.'
Opp. to οἱ πολλοὶ in iv. 2, and
somewhat similarly in v. 4.

8. ἐξωτερικὸς means what is
adapted for the world outside
(ἐξω), ἐσωτερικὸς what is adapted
for the inner (ἐσω) circle of
philosophic students. Hence
'exoteric' 'esoteric' refer to
'popular' and 'scientific' meth-
ods respectively. Some have
supposed οἱ ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι to
refer to a division of Aristotle's
own works. It is more probable,
however, that they denote ordi-
nary popular treatises.

οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. Τοῦ ἀλόγου δὲ τὸ μὲν
 ἔοικε κοινῶ καὶ φυτικῶ, λέγω δὲ τὸ αἷτιον τοῦ τρέφεσ-
 θαι καὶ αὔξεσθαι τὴν τοιαύτην γὰρ δύναμιν τῆς
 ψυχῆς ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τρεφομένοις θεῖη τις ἂν καὶ ἐν
 τοῖς ἐμβρύοις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην καὶ ἐν τοῖς τελείοις 5
 εὐλογώτερον γὰρ ἢ ἄλλην τινά. Ταύτης μὲν οὖν κοινή
 τις ἀρετὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη φαίνεται δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν
 τοῖς ὕπνοις ἐνεργεῖν μάλιστα τὸ μόριον τοῦτο καὶ ἡ
 δύναμις αὕτη, ὃ δ' ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι
 καθ' ὕπνον, ὅθεν φασὶν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸ ἡμῖς τοῦ 10
 βίου τοὺς εὐδαίμονας τῶν ἀθλίων. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο
 εἰκότως· ἀργία γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ λέγεται
 σπονδαία καὶ φαύλη, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν διῴκνουν-
 ταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ
 φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων. Ἀλλὰ 15
 περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλης, καὶ τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἑατέον, ἐπειδὴ

present purpose. 1. Let us first consider the *irrational* part.— (1) The irrational part is also twofold, including—
 (a) the source of nutrition and growth;
 (2) There can be no specially human Virtue in this part. In fact
 (3) it acts with most vigour in sleep, when good and bad men
 (4) differ not at all, or else in a manner which is of no conse-

4. ψυχῆς] Observe the wide use of ψυχή, which makes it so difficult a word to translate. We should scarcely regard the 'soul' as the seat of physical life, growth, and nutriment. (See Glossary on ψυχή.)

5. There is no difference in that which is the source of growth and nutrition in the embryo and in the full-grown animal. If there

were, *when* did the change occur? Aristotle insists upon this identity in order to show that this part of our nature is out of all relation to Virtue, Moral or Intellectual (see § 14), as there can of course be nothing of the kind in the embryo. This absence of change or progress cannot be asserted of the other two parts of the ψυχή, the Appetitive and the Rational.

- 15 τῆς ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς ἅμοιρον πέφυκεν. Ἐοικε δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογος εἶναι, μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου. Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὁρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ὃ μάχεται
- 16 τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. Ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ καθάπερ τὰ παραλελυμένα τοῦ σώματος μόρια εἰς τὰ δεξιὰ προαιρουμένων κινῆσαι τὸναντίον εἰς τὰ ἀριστερὰ παραφέρεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως· ἐπὶ τὰναντία γὰρ αἱ ὁρμαὶ τῶν ἀκρατῶν. Ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς σώμασι μὲν ὁρῶμεν τὸ παραφερόμενον, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς οὐχ ὁρῶμεν. Ἴσως δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νομιστέον εἶναί τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ἐναντιούμενον τούτῳ καὶ ἀντιβαῖνον.
- 17 Πῶς δ' ἕτερον, οὐδὲν διαφέρει. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο 15

(β) the appetites and desires, which are partly and in some sense rational.

- 15 quence to our present inquiry. (β) There is however another division of the irrational part, which seems to partake of reason in some degree. This is evidenced by the phenomena of Continence and Incontinence, terms which we technically apply to cases where either right or wrong is done *after a conscious inward struggle*. This struggle occurs between Reason and something opposed to Reason. In the continent man we applaud the triumph of Reason. In the incontinent man, though Reason directs one course, there is something in
- 16 him which causes him to do the reverse, just as a paralysed limb refuses to obey the control of the Will. We conclude therefore from this that there is something in the Soul distinct
- 17 from Reason (though in what precise way distinct we need

1. ἀνθρωπικῆς ἀρετῆς] to throw light upon *that* being the sole object of this inquiry about ψυχή. See § 8.

3. ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς] See the precise meaning of these terms explained in note on iii. 7.

6. ἄλλο τι κ.τ.λ.] 'We find another law in our members, warring against the law of our mind' (Rom. vii. 23).

15. Λόγου δὲ καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] Otherwise it could not even oppose Reason, as it does in the case

φαίνεται μετέχειν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν πειθαρχεῖ γοῦν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς. Ἔτι δ' ἴσως εὐηκοώτερόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ σώφρονος καὶ ἀνδρείου πάντα γὰρ ὁμοφωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυτικὸν οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ λόγου, τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν 5 καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ἢ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν. Οὕτω δὴ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ

not determine) which is thus able to oppose Reason. Yet since in the case of Continence, and still more in that of perfect Self-control, it harmonizes with Reason, it might be thought 8 itself to share in Reason and so to belong to the Rational part of the Soul. However the *irrational* part (which we are still considering) is at any rate twofold, viz.—(1) The source of physical life, nutriment, and growth. (2) The appetitive part, the passions and the desires. The former division is

of the ἀκρατῆς, much less could it side with Reason as it does in the ἐγκρατῆς (l. 2), or become as it were merged in Reason, as it is in the σώφρων (l. 3). If then the Appetitive part were purely Irrational it *could* not oppose Reason; if it were purely Rational it *would* not do so.

5. οὐδαμῶς κοινωνεῖ] The nutritive portion has no relation whatever to Reason. It can neither oppose it, nor obey it. 'No man by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature.' The appetitive part, however, has some relation to Reason, because it can 'by taking thought' be checked and regulated.

7. οὕτω δὴ κ.τ.λ.] The explanation seems to be this: The words λόγον ἔχειν have two different senses in Greek:—

(1) To possess reason; or, to have understanding of (as, e.g. of Mathematics);

(2) To pay regard to (as we do to admonitions of parents or friends).

If we confine ourselves to the strict sense of (1), then the Appetitive part belongs clearly to the irrational division (ἄλογον μέρος) of the Soul.

If we use the term loosely so as to include (2), then we may regard the Appetitive part as λόγον ἔχον, because it can 'pay regard to' Reason, and so in some sense shares in it. But the expression λόγον ἔχειν must be employed in a different sense in the case of the Appetites, and in that of the Reason. Compare what Aristotle says of a Slave (Pol. I. v. 9) κοινωνεῖ λόγον τα

τῶν φίλων φαμέν ἔχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ τῶν
 μαθηματικῶν. "Οτι δὲ πείθεται πως ὑπὸ λόγου τὸ
 ἄλογον, μηνύει καὶ ἡ νουθέτησις καὶ πᾶσα ἐπιτίμησις
 19 τε καὶ παράκλησις. Εἰ δὲ χρὴ καὶ τοῦτο φάναι λόγον
 ἔχειν, διττὸν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον, τὸ μὲν κυρίως
 καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, τὸ δ' ὥσπερ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκουστικόν τι.
 20 Διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην.
 λέγομεν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὰς μὲν διανοητικὰς, τὰς δὲ ἠθικὰς,

wholly irrational, the latter only partially so, because it is at any rate amenable to Reason.

Hence (2) the Rational part also may be regarded as twofold if the Appetites should be rather referred to it.

19 2. Let us now consider the *rational* part.—Here we have simply to determine the degree of strictness with which we will use the word 'rational.' If we use it so as to include the partially-rational *appetites*, then this part of the Soul may be considered as twofold, viz.—(α) The Reason itself; (β) The appetitive part. Thus the assignment of the appetitive part to the Rational or to the Irrational division of the Soul is a question of words, or of arrangement merely.

Correspond- 20 ing to the division of the Soul into Rational and Appetitive is the twofold division of Virtue into Intellectual and Moral.

Now to apply this to the question it was intended to elucidate,

σοῦτον ὥστε αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν. He adds that the lower animals (like τὸ φυτικόν in the text here) οὐδὲ λόγον αἰσθάνεται.

The result is, that it becomes to some extent a question of words to which of the two divisions of the Soul, Rational or Irrational,

we assign the Appetites. The main point is that, in either case, we recognise the three distinct parts φυτικόν, ἐπιθυμητικόν, λογιστικόν. The following scheme will exhibit the two methods of arrangement by which this result may be reached:—

I.		(i) wholly ἄλογον	τὸ φυτικόν.
ψυχὴ	{ ἄλογον μέρος	(ii) τὸ ἀντιτείνον τῷ λόγῳ	τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.
		(which τὸ φυτικόν is not)	τὸ λογιστικόν.
	λόγον ἔχον μέρος		
II.			
ψυχὴ	{ ἄλογον μέρος	(i) a part amenable to reason,	τὸ φυτικόν.
		and so λόγον ἔχον in sense (2)	τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.
	λόγον ἔχον μέρος	(ii) a part in full possession of reason,	τὸ λογιστικόν.
		λόγον ἔχον in sense (1)	

8. We speak of Intellectual *Excellences* and Moral *Virtues*. In Greek ἀρετὴ could be used

equally for both. (See Glossary, s.v. ἀρετή.)

σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικὰς, ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην ἠθικάς. Λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ' ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων, ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν· τῶν ἔξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς, ἀρετὰς 5 λέγομεν.

viz. the nature of Virtue. The part of the Soul relating to nutriment, etc., has nothing to do with Virtue, as we have already seen. The perfection of the purely Rational part gives rise to Intellectual Virtues or Excellences, e.g. Wisdom, Prudence, Intelligence. The perfection of the Appetitive part gives rise to Moral Virtues, such as Gentleness, Liberality, Self-restraint. The term 'Virtue' we apply to any permanent state or habit which is praiseworthy.

1. φρόνησις is inadequately translated by 'Prudence,' which indicates more or less a *Moral* Virtue. It is explained in B. VI. to be the intellectual element of right judgment which is essential to all moral virtue: 'essential,' because mere blind 'earnestness' without a reasonable exercise of judgment is not Virtue: or (as Dr. Johnson phrased it) 'intellectual imbecility is no excuse for moral perversity.' Aristotle thinks that we are bound to have 'a right judgment in all things,' and would have no sympathy with 'imbecile virtue.' In B. IV. he frequently insists on the necessity of applying intellectual judgment to the details of moral action (e.g.

esp. in μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐτραπεία, etc.). For proof that φρόνησις itself is an Intellectual and not a Moral quality, see *Supplementary Notes, h.l.*

5. κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν] 'in reference to his state,' i.e. if his wisdom is a settled state or habit.

Thus the *essential* or *fundamental* difference between Intellectual and Moral excellence is, that they belong to different parts of the Soul; the former being the perfection of the Rational, and the latter of the Appetitive, part. Upon this follows a *practical* difference in the manner of their acquisition or cultivation, which is pointed out in the beginning of the next Book.

II.

1. 1. Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἣ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἣ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται, ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλίνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους.

CHAP. I.—*Moral Virtue is not implanted in us by Nature.*

Moral Virtue I
differs from
Intellectual
Excellence,
in that it is
not innate:
because—

It is an essential difference between Intellectual Excellence and Moral Virtue, that the former is acquired and developed mainly by *instruction*, and the latter (as its name in Greek indicates) by *practice*. Dismissing the former, we proceed

1. See note at the beginning of I. xiii. for the connexion of the argument. The divisions of ψυχὴ led us to a corresponding division of ἀρετὴ into Moral and Intellectual (I. xiii. 20). These further exhibit an essential difference in the mode of their acquisition, which is first positively stated, and after this statement, the subject of Intellectual Excellence is tacitly dropped (to be resumed in B. VI.), and the discussion proceeds to establish the assertion just made so far as it relates to Moral Virtue, viz. that it is not implanted in us by nature.

2. τὸ πλεῖον] ‘for the most part.’ This qualification is meant to allow for the exceptional case of great natural genius.

5. This etymological argument is of course untranslatable. ἔθος (Lat. *mos*) is a habit or custom. ἥθος (Lat. *mores*) is character which is the result of habits. The value of this and similar arguments, such as that derived from the practice of men in legislation in § 5 and III. v. 7, is simply this:—They show the general belief of mankind as reflected in language, but they do not prove that the belief in

- 2 Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίξῃ τις ἄνω ρίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν 5
- 3 ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. Οὗτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ

- 2 to prove the important point involved in the latter, that *no Moral Virtue is implanted by Nature*. (1) Nothing fixed by Nature can be altered by practice. No amount of practice will make a stone rise, or fire burn downwards. But our moral habits can be so altered, and therefore (1) It can be altered by habit.
- 3 they are not implanted by Nature. The same argument proves that as they are not formed *by* Nature, so they are not formed *against* Nature. Nature gives us moral capacities; we ourselves by practice develop moral habits.

question is necessarily true; though, as we read in I. viii. 7, such consensus is not likely to be altogether at fault. Other instances will be found in v. 4 (the distinction between *κινεῖσθαι* and *διακίεσθαι*), III. ii. 17 (*προαίρεσις*), III. xii. 5 and 6 (*ἀκολασία*), IV. ii. 1 (*μεγαλοπρέπεια*).

1. This point is essential, because if Moral Virtue be implanted by nature, and not acquired by practice, the Science of Ethics has no *raison d'être* as a practical Science. See § 7, οὐδὲν ἂν εἶδει τοῦ διδάξαντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί, and the Appetitive part of the ψυχὴ (ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος) would be as much out of our control as the Nutritive and

vital functions (θρεπτικὸν καὶ αὐξητικὸν), see I. xiii.

6. ἄρα implies an inference from the preceding. It is clear that this same argument proves Virtue not to be contrary to nature; because if nature had decided the question positively or negatively, it would be equally out of our power to alter her decision. Thus we are neither 'predestined' to Virtue, nor 'reprobated' to vice, according to Aristotle. At the same time he would not of course deny that some have more tendency to virtue or to vice than others.

7. πεφυκόσι and τελειουμένοις both agree with ἡμῖν, which is dat. after ἐγγίνονται. Cf. Pope, 'Nature its mother, habit is its nurse.'

4 ἔθους. Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν. Ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκούσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. Τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν· ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιῶντες μαθαίνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ καθαρίζοντες καθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια 10 πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, 5 τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. Μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινόμενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς, καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομοθέτου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν 15 ἀμαρτάνουσιν, καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας 6 ἀγαθὴ φάυλης. Ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν

(2) Its existence does not precede its exercise in practice.

(3) Practical legislation proceeds on the assumption that Moral Virtue is not innate.

4 (2) In the case of natural faculties (*e.g.* the senses), we have them before we use them. In the case of Moral Virtues (as in artistic skill), we develop them by use, *i.e.* by trying to practise them: *e.g.* Temperance is acquired by acting temperately, Courage by acting bravely and so on. (3) The action of legislators bears witness to the general belief of mankind 5 that Moral Virtue is to be acquired by practice. (4) While

7. τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν] Virtue is often regarded by Plato and Aristotle as a kind of Art (*e.g.* iii. 10, iv. 3, vi. 9).

14. τὸ βούλημα κ.τ.λ.] See note on I. xiii. 3.

17. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν] 'from the same causes and by the same means.' The argument is, that *Natural* phenomena differ from *Moral* phe-

nomena in that, in the former case, the antecedents being the same, the consequents are always the same, whereas in Moral phenomena, from the same antecedents, so far as outward circumstances go, *opposite* results follow. This difference then must arise from something contributed by the moral agent himself.

καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
 τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοὶ
 γίνονται κιθαρισταί. Ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἱ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ
 οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ
 7 οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ 5
 οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντες
 ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
 ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι
 τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ
 ἄδικοι, πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι 10
 φοβεῖσθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἱ μὲν ἀνδρείοι οἱ δὲ δειλοί.
 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ
 τὰς ὀργάς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται, οἱ
 δ' ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀργίλοι, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως ἐν αὐ-
 τοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι, οἱ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὕτως. Καὶ ἐνὶ δὲ 15
 8 λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. Διὸ

in nature the same causes invariably produce the same results, (4) Out of the same circumstances are developed opposite results in respect of Moral Virtue and Vice.
 in the case of Moral Habits, as in the Arts, the same circumstances and courses of action produce opposite results; i.e. they produce both good artists and bad, just men and unjust,
 7 brave men and cowards. This difference of results then must be due to a difference in ourselves, in fact to the different ways in which different people act under the same circumstances. In short, as are our acts, so are the habits which
 8 spring from them. Hence it is important what sort of acts

7. ἐγίνοντο is emphatic:— 'every one would have been born a good or bad craftsman,' and so all apprenticeship and practice would have been useless.

16. 'All habits have their origin in courses of action similar to themselves.' Habits are simply the result of repeated acts. Why acts from repetition

should become easier we cannot say. What is the precise change that has taken place in us when (e.g.) the laborious acts of spelling out each word have grown into the easy habit of reading we cannot explain. We really know little more of the phenomena of the formation of habits than Aristotle here states; as a

δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ
των διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἔξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν
διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι,
ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

I II. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παρούσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά τ'
ἐστίν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἔν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστίν ἡ

we become familiar with from earliest youth; for to the
character of the resulting habits it makes simply all the dif-
ference in the world.

CHAP. II.—*Some general characteristics of such Habits as
are Virtuous.*

Virtuous
habits differ
from others
in being in
accordance
with Right
Reason:

I In a practical treatise like ours we at once follow up what
has now been proved by asking, What is the definite character

fact, all habits grow from the
repetition of acts similar to
themselves.

ομοίων] There is no contradic-
tion between this and the state-
ment in § 6 *init.*, viz. That simi-
lar acts produce opposite results.
Acts and circumstances may be
externally the same and yet very
different to different people. And
it is on the latter consideration,
viz. their relation to the indi-
vidual doing them, that their
influence on resulting habits
depends. e.g. A subscription of
precisely the same amount would
be liberal in one man and mean
in another. Thus the same act
has a tendency to form a *habit* of
liberality in the one case, and of
stinginess in the other.

CHAP. II.—This Chapter holds
a somewhat similar position in
the investigation of a Definition

of Virtue to that of I. vii. 1-8, in
the investigation of the Defini-
tion of Happiness. Aristotle
feels his way towards a Defini-
tion in each case by first laying
down certain broad and general
characteristics of the thing to be
defined. Two such are arrived at
in this Chapter. Next, Chapters
iii. and iv. consider questions
arising out of the statements here
made. Then Chapters v. and vi.
contain the systematic construc-
tion of the Definition of ἀρετή,
and so far may be compared with
the formal construction of the
Definition of Happiness in I. vii.
9-16.

6. αἱ ἄλλαι] Either 'the rest
of treatises on this subject,'—it
being a complaint of Aristotle's
elsewhere that this is a general
fault of the systems of his time
(τῶν χρησιμῶν διαμαρτάνουσι.

- ἀρετὴν σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν
 ἂν ᾔην ὄφελος αὐτῆς), ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι σκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ
 τὰς πράξεις, πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὐταὶ γάρ εἰσι κύριαι
 καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν.
 2 Τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ 5
 ὑποκείσθω, ρηθήσεται δ' ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τί
 ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας
 3 ἀρετάς. Ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ
 τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέ-
 γεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν 10
 ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ
 συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἐστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά.
 4 Τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ

of actions, and, by consequence, of habits, which determine
 2 them as Virtuous? We can at once say that they must be in
 accordance with right reason, but that is vague, and we must
 hereafter explain what right reason is, and what is its relation to
 3 the Moral Virtues. But though we admit this to be too vague we
 must at the same time renew our protest against demanding any
 4 thing like mathematical precision in such a subject as this, espe-

'they fail of being practical')—or
 else, 'treatises on other subjects'
 than morals, which may perhaps
 have a right to be theoretical and
 independent of practice.

2. αὐτῆς prob. σκέψεως under-
 stood from σκεπτόμεθα, or πραγ-
 ματείας, or possibly ἀρετῆς in
 the sense of Virtue in theory,
 severed from practice.

4. καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν] see esp.
 § 7 (*fin.*) of last Chapter (ἐνὶ δὴ
 λόγῳ κ.τ.λ.), πράξεις here being
 equivalent to ἐνεργεῖαι in the
 passage quoted. Thus πῶς in
 l. 3 is emphatic, *how* we are to

do the *acts*, so that the *habits*
 desired may follow.

6. ὑποκείσθω] 'Let it be taken
 for granted.' Compare the
 somewhat similar way in which
 τελειότης and αὐτάρκεια are put
 aside in l. vii. as vague, though
 real, characteristics of Happiness.

ὕστερον κ.τ.λ.] This will be
 found in B. VI., but the subject is
 touched upon in ch. vi. of this
 Book, where see the Definition
 of Virtue, and see also note on l.
 xiii. 20.

10. κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν κ.τ.λ.]
 For explanations of this see l.



τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ
 τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ'
 αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν,
 ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.
 5 Ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πει- 5
 6 ρατέον βοηθεῖν. Πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ
 τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι,
 (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις
 χρησθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν
 τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα 10

5 cially in matters of detail. With this proviso we may now make
 two general statements which hold good of Virtuous Habits.
 6 Both are suggested by the analogy of bodily habits, such as
 health and strength. (i) The first is:—*Excess and defect are*
injurious, moderation is beneficial, to the formation of such habits.
 This is true of bodily health in reference to the amount of

vii. 17, etc., also (and esp. in
 reference to the words of I. 10,
 p. 75) see I. iii. 2-4.

2. παραγγελία] 'body of
 rules.' αὐτοὺς in the next line
 is of course emphatic.

8. δεῖ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] This is the
 clue to the line of thought pur-
 sued in this Chapter. It is the
analogy existing between the Body
and Soul in respect of their habits
 or acquired capacities. In ch. vi.,
 where the formal Definition of
 Virtue is investigated, the argu-
 ment proceeds from another
 analogy, viz. that existing be-
 tween Virtue and Art. The
 words in the parenthesis express
 very well the principle of what
 is generally called 'the Argu-
 ment from Analogy.' e.g. In

Butler's 'Analogy' the 'φανερὰ'
 are the obvious arrangements of
 the *Natural* world, the 'ἀφανῆ'
 the arrangements of the *Moral*
 world, as indicated to us by
 Religion, Natural or Revealed.
 The point of similarity is that
 the arrangements in both cases
 proceed from the same Author,
 and the 'Argument from Ana-
 logy' is, that they are therefore
 likely to resemble one another.
 So in the present passage the
 φανερά are bodily habits, the
 ἀφανῆ habits of the Soul: the
 point of similarity that they are
 parts of the same complex Being:
 and the 'Argument from Ana-
 logy' is that they are likely to
 resemble one another in their
 nature and growth.

but, more
 definitely,
 like good
 bodily
 habits,
 (1) in their
 formation,
 they in-
 volve an
 avoidance
 of excess
 and defect,
 and aim at
 moderation:

φθείρει τὴν ἰσχὺν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία
 πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ
 7 σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σώζει. Οὕτως οὖν
 καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
 ἀρετῶν ὃ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ 5
 μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβού-
 μενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς. Ὅμοίως δὲ
 καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχό-
 μενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖ-
 κοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται γὰρ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ 10
 ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ
 8 τῆς μεσότητος σώζεται. Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις
 καὶ αἱ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ
 τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς
 ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων
 οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ 15
 πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομέ-

7 food, drink, and exercise; and so it is of Temperance in
 respect of pleasure, and of Courage in respect of fear, and
 similarly of other Virtues, in respect of the subject-matter

8 with which each is concerned. (ii) Our second point is:—
Virtuous habits when formed reproduce the acts by which ^{(2) when formed, they reproduce}
they were formed. Bodily habits suggest this law also: e.g.
 Strength is gained by taking food and exercise, and when ^{the acts which form them.}

9. ἀγροῖκοι] perhaps 'ascetics,'
 or 'boors,' with probable ref. to
 the Cynics. ἀναίσθητός τις, 'A
 sort of insensible man.' Τίς is a
 kind of apology for the term 'in-
 sensible,' because, as stated else-
 where, such phenomenon scarcely
 exists. See vii. 3 and III. xi. 7.

12. οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις κ.τ.λ.]

Observe that the former charac-
 teristic of Virtuous Habits had
 reference to their formation and
 growth (γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις),
 the present characteristic has
 reference to their operation
 (ἐνέργειαι) when formed.

14. φανερωτέρων] is explained
 by the parenthesis in § 6 above.

9 νειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω
 δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἕκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι
 τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα
 δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ 5
 ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρείοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα
 δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

1 III. Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἑξέων τὴν ἐπι-

9 gained enables us to take more food and exercise. So Tem-
 perance is acquired by resisting pleasure, and when acquired
 exhibits itself in the resistance of pleasure. Similarly of
 Courage and other Virtues.

CHAP. III.—*The test of the formation of Habits is the pleasure
 or pain by which acts are accompanied.*

We can judge at once whether a *habit* is already formed
 or is only in process of formation, by the pleasure or pain

A *habit* is I
 formed
 whenever
 we do the
 acts related
 to it with
 pleasure.

CHAP. III.—If the statement
 at the end of the last Chapter be
 true, how can we tell *when* a
 habit is formed? If we become
 brave by doing brave acts, and
 when we have become brave we
 still do brave acts, how are we
 to know whether our brave acts
 are tending to form the habit, or
 are results of the formed habit?
 Are they in the relation of cause
 or effect to the habit of bravery,
 and when do they pass the line
 from cause to effect? The
 answer is simple. If the acts
 are done with pain and difficulty
 the habit is not yet formed. If
 they are done with pleasure and
 ease they are the result of a
 habit already formed. When

then we feel pleasure in doing
 any act, if it be a right act we
 have formed a habit of Virtue,
 if a wrong act we have formed a
 habit of Vice. When we do any
 act, right or wrong, with pain or
 without pleasure, we have not
 yet formed a habit either Vir-
 tuous or Vicious in that respect.
 It would thus appear that Moral
 Virtue is an affair of pleasure and
 pain: that Virtue and Vice may
 be resolved into a question of
 feeling pleasure and pain when
 we ought. And so after § 1 the
 discussion proceeds upon this text
 as it were, the immediate question
 with which the Chapter opened
 having been sufficiently answered.

8. ποιεῖσθαι] the middle voice

γινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπε-
 χόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων
 σῶφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπο-
 μένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε
 ἀνδρείος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ 5
 καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν
 ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν
 2 καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων,
 ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς
 3 δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν. Ἔτι δ' εἰ ἀρεταί 10
 εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη, παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ
 πράξει ἔπεται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ἡ

respectively by which the *acts* related to the habit are accom-
 panied. From this it would seem that Moral Virtue may be
 described as feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. That
 this is so we now proceed to prove at length.—(i) It is pleasure
 which tempts us to wrong, and pain which deters us from what
 2 is right. Hence moral education consists in the due regula-
 3 tion of the feelings of pleasure and pain. (ii) All virtue is
 concerned with the management of our actions and feelings,
 and every action and every feeling is necessarily accompanied

Thus *Virtue*
 and *Vice*
 depend on
 our relation
 to *Pleasure*
 and *Pain*,
 as may be
 shown by a
 variety of
 arguments.

means 'to consider,' i.e. to make
 in one's own mind.

3. ἀκόλαστος and δειλός are
 rather loosely used here in con-
 trast with σῶφρων and ἀνδρείος.
 They imply strictly speaking the
 formation of a habit of the oppo-
 site kind, i.e. a state in which
 acts of intemperance or cowar-
 dice are done with ease and
 pleasure. The ἀκόλαστος (see
 note on I. iii. 7) does not restrain
 himself even ἀχθόμενος. Per-

haps, however, ἀκόλαστος is here
 used from the point of view of
 III. xi. 5, 6, where Aristotle
 states that the ἀκόλαστος is
 pained by the mere absence of
 pleasure.

11. παντὶ δὲ πάθει κ.τ.λ.] For
 this statement as far as πάθη are
 concerned see the Definition of
 πάθη in ch. v. ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται
 ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη, 'whatever is fol-
 lowed by pleasure or pain.'

- 4 ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. Μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κο-
λάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν,
αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασιν γίνεσθαι.
5 Ἔτι, ὡς καὶ πρῶτον εἶπομεν, πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις, ὑφ'
οἷον πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων, πρὸς ταῦτα
καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύσιν ἔχει δι' ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας
φαῦλοι γίνονται, τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν, ἥ ἂς
μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαυχὼς ἄλλως ὑπὸ
τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα. Διὸ καὶ ὀρίζονται τὰς
ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δὲ, ὅτι ἀπλῶς
λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
6 ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. Ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ

- 4 by pleasure or pain. (iii) The infliction of punishment by
means of pain (all remedies being through the medium of
contraries) proves that it is intended to remedy an excess of
pleasure: in other words, that vice consists in pleasure out of
5, 6 place. (iv) As we saw in ch. ii., whatever promotes or hinders
the formation of a Virtuous habit is the sphere of its operation
when formed. Now Moral habits are formed (not, as some
suppose, by indifference to pleasure and pain, but) by feeling

2. διὰ τούτων] 'by means of
these,' viz. pleasure and pain,
though the latter only is strictly
speaking referred to. The use
of διὰ with the accus. = 'because
of' must not be confused with
this. It occurs just below in l. 6.

On κόλασις see note III. v. 7.

4. πρότερον] viz. in c. ii. § 8.

10. ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας]
The Cynics and Stoics held this
view. Cf. Pope, *Essay on Man*,
ii. 101:—

In lazy apathy let Stoics boast
Their virtue fix'd: 'tis fix'd as in a frost.

12. ὑπόκειται ἄρα κ.τ.λ.] 'Virtue

therefore is established to be,'
etc. This seems to close the
discussion, but Aristotle adds
three supplementary arguments.

ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ τοιαύτη] This col-
location of article, adjective,
and substantive always denotes
an epithet added emphatically,
or by way of limitation, to the
substantive. Transl. 'Virtue,
at least Virtue of this kind,' i.e.
Moral Virtue (ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ), for
the statement here made would
not be true of διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ.
Compare a similar limitation in
vi. 10.

τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτικῇ,
 7 ἢ δὲ κακία τούναντίον. Γένοιτο δ' ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων
 φανερόν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. Τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν
 εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγὰς, καλοῦ
 συμφέροντος ἡδέος, καὶ τριῶν τῶν ἐναντίων, αἰσχροῦ 5
 βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ, περὶ πάντα μὲν ταῦτα ὁ ἀγαθὸς
 κατορθωτικός ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀμαρτητικός, μάλιστα δὲ
 περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ
 πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ
 8 καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται. Ἔτι δ' ἐκ νηπίου 10
 πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀποτρίψασθαι
 τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. Κανονίζομεν

pleasure and pain when we ought. Hence the exercise of
 Moral habits when formed (i.e. of Moral Virtue) will be ex-
 hibited in feeling pleasure and pain when we ought. In the
 case of Vicious habits this just relation to pleasure and pain
 7 is reversed. We may further add the following arguments:
 —(v) We choose things because they are either good, useful,
 or pleasant. We avoid things because they are either bad,
 harmful, or painful. Now though Virtue goes right and Vice
 goes wrong in all these motives, yet this is pre-eminently the
 case in regard to pleasure and pain, which in some sense in-
 8 clude all the other motives. (vi) Regarded as feelings pleasure

3. Observe the position of the
 articles, making τριῶν the predi-
 cate. 'The inducements for
 choosing being three in number,
 and the inducements for avoid-
 ing also three.'

9. πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ κ.τ.λ.]
 'accompanies all the motives
 which come under the head of
 choice.' For both the 'good' and
 the 'useful' are also 'pleasant.'
 In III. ix. 2-5, the argument im-

plies that τὸ καλὸν is a kind, and
 indeed a most exalted kind, of ἡδύ.

12. Observe the antithesis be-
 tween τοῦτο τὸ πάθος and καὶ
 τὰς πράξεις,—πάθος and πράξεις
 being, as we were reminded in
 § 3, the sphere of the operation
 of Moral Virtue. Also καὶ τὰς
 πράξεις='even our actions,' or
 'our actions also,' the continual
 presence of pleasure and pain as
 regulating action, being at first

- δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον οἱ δ' ἥττον, ἡδονῇ
 9 καὶ λύπῃ. Διὰ τοῦτ' οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα
 τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις
 10 εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι. Ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον
 ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος,
 περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετὴ
 καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. Ὡστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ
 καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς
 ἔσται, ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.
- 11 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας,
 καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται, ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὖξεται καὶ φθεί-
 ρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων, καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο,
 περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ, εἰρήσθω.

and pain have been more ingrained into our lives, so to speak, by familiarity than any others; and regarded as *motives for action* also they are constantly present, though in varying
 9 degrees, with all of us. With them therefore our whole
 10 treatise must be concerned. (vii) Finally, nothing is so hard to contend with as pleasure; nothing is therefore more meritorious, and consequently more virtuous, than to bring pleasure and pain under due control.

11 On all these grounds therefore we argue that Moral Virtue consists in the proper regulation of the feelings of pleasure and pain.

sight less obvious than the fact of our constant susceptibility to them as mere *feelings*.

5. Heraclitus was an Ionian philosopher who flourished at

Ephesus about 150 years before Aristotle.

6. περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον] This principle is again applied by Aristotle in III. ix. 2, IV. i. 8, 9.

- 1 IV. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν
 δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σῶφρονα
 σῶφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σῶφρονα,
 ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σῶφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ
 2 καὶ τὰ μουσικὰ, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ 5
 τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι
 ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. Τότε
 οὖν ἔσται γραμματικὸς, εἰ καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ
 καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ
 3 γραμματικὴν. Ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν 10
 καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα
 τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέ-

CHAP. IV.—*Explanation of the apparent paradox that we become just by doing just actions.*

- 1 Another difficulty is suggested by the last statement made in ch. ii. How can we become just by doing just acts? Are we not just already if we do them, as (*mutatis mutandis*) is the case in the practice of the Arts? To this we answer—
 2 (1) This is not so in the case of the Arts: (2) Even if it were, the Arts are not a parallel case. (1) It is not so in the Arts.—Unless an artist understands the principles of his art
 3 for himself, he is not properly speaking an artist. (2) The Arts are not a parallel case.—The Artistic Excellence of any work depends simply on the quality of the thing produced.

It may be asked, If we do just acts are we not therefore just men, even as we are artists if we produce artistic works? We reply—(1) It is not so in the Arts. (2) The Arts are not a strictly parallel case.

CHAP. IV.—This Chapter discusses another difficulty arising out of the statement at the end of ch. ii. 'that virtuous habits when formed reproduce the acts by which they were formed.'

6. In the Arts a beginner may go right by chance, or by following mechanically the directions

of his master. In either case he is not yet an artist. Or again, one may argue logically and yet not be a logician.

12. τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς] A work of art as such must be judged by its own merits. It is not affected by the circumstances, disadvantages, etc., of the artist.

σθαι τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ εἶναι αὐτὰ πῶς ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰναι ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν εἰδὼς, ἔπειτ' εἰναι προαιρούμενος, καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτὰ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ εἰναι βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. Ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται, πλην αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται, ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις
 4 πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται. Τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα λέγεται, ὅταν ἡ τοι-

Special conditions are required to constitute an act as moral.

But in Moral Excellence we further require in the agent himself, (α) Knowledge of what he is doing. (β) Deliberate choice so to act, and moreover a pure and disinterested choice. (γ) Resolute and unflinching purpose. Of these conditions knowledge is of the least weight, while it is the first and only requisite in the case of the Arts. The two latter conditions, on the other hand, are everything, and they can only be secured
 4 by often *doing* acts of justice, temperance, etc. Hence neither to actions nor to individuals can the terms 'just,' etc., be

1. So Pope (*Moral Essays*):—
 Not always actions show the man: we find
 Who does a kindness is not therefore kind.

6. Ταῦτα δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The artistic or technical merit of a work of art is not affected by the motive of the artist, whether good or bad, e.g. whether his work may have been done with a religious or charitable purpose, or from jealousy or spite. In judging of a moral act, such considerations would be all-important.

7. With πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς supply ἔχειν from l. 6.

8. Knowledge, though an essential requisite, of itself advances us but little in the way of virtuous character. This is explained by §§ 5 and 6 below. See also ii. 1.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα] i.e. the other conditions mentioned, viz. deliberate choice and unflinching purpose.

10. πράττειν is the emphatic word. See § 1, above. Also πράγματα μὲν δίκαια (just acts) in the next line stand in contrast with δίκαιος δὲ (just character) in the following clause.

αὐτὰ οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώφρων πράξειεν δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ σώφρονες πράττουσιν.

5 Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων ἐκ δὲ τοῦ 5 μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γενέσθαι 6 ἀγαθός. Ἄλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἷονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι, ὅμοιόν τι ποιούντες τοῖς 10 κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποι- οῦσι δ' οὐθέν τῶν προσταττομένων. Ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὔτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφούντες.

strictly applied, unless there be, beside the outward act, the inward spirit and purpose of the formed habit in the doing of 5 it. We were right then in saying that only by *doing* just acts 6 can we become just. Mere theories of Virtue without practice can no more form virtuous habits, than physicians' prescriptions if not followed can restore health. And yet this truth is very commonly forgotten.

Above all, knowledge without practice is, in Morals, useless.

7. This is well expressed by Bp. Butler, *Anal.* ch. v. (p. 91 Angus's ed.), 'Habits of the mind seem to be produced by repeated acts, as well as habits of the body. And in like manner as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the exertion of inward practical principles, i.e. by carrying them into act, or acting upon them. . . . But going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking

well, and drawing fine pictures of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible to all moral considerations.'

8. τὸν λόγον (in contrast with οὐ πράττουσι) means theory as opposed to practice.

13. φιλοσοφούντες] The word φιλοσοφία in Greek has a much wider significance than that

- I V. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, πάθη, δυνάμεις,

CHAP. V.—*The Genus of Virtue determined.*

All attributes of the Soul (including therefore Virtue) are either πάθη, δυνάμεις, or ἔξεις.

- I We have now to investigate the formal Definition of Virtue, and first, in natural order, to determine its Genus. It is evidently connected with the soul and not with the body.

which 'Philosophy' would convey to us. In the absence of any revealed Religion, and the admitted inadequacy of the popularly received system of Religion, Philosophy would to a thinking Greek supply to some extent the place of Religion. To it alone he could look not only for theories of morality, but for practical rules for the guidance of life. Thus when Plato speaks of men ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότες (*Rep.* p. 619), he would convey nearly the same notion, as if we should say 'men who have lived a life of morality without religion.'

CHAP. V.—We now commence the formal construction of the Definition of Virtue. And as all Logical Definition consists in assigning the Genus and the Differentia, we first ascertain the Genus of Virtue (τί ἐστὶν) in ch. v., and then its Differentia (ποῶν τι) in ch. vi. Now there are two ways in which we may hunt (θηρεύειν) for a Definition, according to Aristotle. (1) We may take a wide Genus or class which is sure to include the object to be defined besides a good deal more,

and then narrow that class by adding qualities or conditions till it becomes co-extensive with the thing to be defined; or we may exclude one by one such members of the class as are obviously beside our purpose. *e.g.* In this Chapter to define Virtue Aristotle takes the wide Genus τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ—and since all attributes of the soul may be divided into πάθη, δυνάμεις, and ἔξεις, and as Virtue cannot (for reasons assigned) be either πάθος or δύναμις, we thus obtain ἔξεις as the proper Genus of Virtue. (2) The other method of 'hunting' for a Definition is to take a number of concrete instances in which the quality to be defined is found, and then ascertain what it is which they have in common. *e.g.* On this plan Aristotle's course would have been to take the several virtues and find what they have in common in the midst of their various distinctions and individual peculiarities, and that common element would account for their being called by the common name Virtue, and would in fact constitute the Definition of Virtue.

- 2 *ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, φόβον, θράσος, φθόνον, χαρὰν, φι- λίαν, μῖσος, πόθον, ζῆλον, ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονή ἢ λύπη, δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα, οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι, 5 ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς*
- 3 *τᾶλλα. Πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ, οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ 10 φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὐτ' ἐπαινούμεθα, οὐτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. 15*

Now all attributes of the soul are either emotions, capabilities, or habits. 'Emotions' are any affections of the soul accom-
panied by pleasure or pain. 'Capabilities' simply render us
'capable' of being so affected. 'Habits' are the permanent
relations in which we stand to such affections, which may be
either good or bad relations, depending on the manner or
degree in which we allow ourselves to be affected by them.

Having de-
fined *πάθη*,
δυνάμεις,
ἔξεις, we
can show
that

- 3 i. Virtue is not an Emotion, because—(a) We do not apply
the terms right, wrong, praise, blame, to Emotions *per se*, as

Virtue is
not *πάθος*,

6. *ἔξις* is not exactly equiva-
lent to 'habit,' by which it is
conventionally translated. It is
rather 'state' or 'settled condi-
tion.' *ἔχειν* meant originally to
'hold on' or 'keep on' (hence
such phrases as *ἀτιμάσας ἔχει*,
ἔχεσθαί τινος), and so *ἔξις* was 'a
holding on.' e.g. *ἔξις τῶν ὀπλῶν*
'an armed state or condition.'

Hence Aristotle's Definition *ἔξεις*
καθ' ἃς ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ.

7. *ἀνειμένως*] 'remissly,' i.e. in
defect, opp. to *σφοδρῶς*, in ex-
cess. This fault in respect of
anger is criticised in IV. v. 5, 6.
It is possible to take *ἀνειμένως* as
in III. v. 10 = 'dissolutely,' but
this would repeat, rather than
oppose, *σφοδρῶς*.

4 Ἐτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεί-
5 σθαί πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσὶν οὔτε γὰρ 5 ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πᾶσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοὶ, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἔσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει εἰ-

4 we obviously do apply them to virtue and vice. (β) There is no deliberate choice in Emotions, as we have already stated (ch. iv.) that there is in Virtue. (γ) We are said to be 'moved' by our Emotions, but 'disposed' by virtue and vice, and this difference of language implies a difference of fact.
not δύναμις. 5 ii. Virtue is not a mere 'Capability,' because—(α) The argument above as to the application of praise, blame, etc., applies to Capabilities as well as to Emotions. (β) Capabilities come

1. ἀπροαιρέτως] = 'without purpose,' 'spontaneously.' The objects corresponding to particular passions or emotions being present, the emotion must be *felt* (though not necessarily encouraged or indulged), as necessarily as heat must be felt on approaching a fire. No reason or deliberation can prevent this.

Compare Butler's *Analogy*, pt. i. ch. v. (p. 98, ed. Angus). 'The principle of Virtue can neither excite them (viz. such affections) nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary, they are naturally felt when the objects of them are present to the mind, not only before all consideration whether they can be obtained by lawful means, but after it is

found they cannot. For the natural objects of affection continue so.' . . And again, 'Particular propensions (by which name Butler describes such affections) from their very nature must be felt, the objects of them being present' (p. 100).

2. προαιρέσεις] The authority for this statement at present is iv. 3. It is afterwards embodied in the formal Definition of Virtue in vi. 15.

4. οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακείσθαι] Not 'moved' but 'disposed.' The latter word implying a more permanent affection. The distinction being made in language is a proof that such a distinction is commonly believed to exist. See note on i. 1.

- 6 πομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.
- 1 VI. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις.
- 2 Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ 5 ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ

by nature, Virtue does not, as we have fully proved in ch. i.
 6 iii. Hence we argue that if Virtue is neither an Emotion nor a Capability it must be a Habit.

Therefore
 Virtue is
 a ἕξις.

CHAP. VI.—*The differentia of Virtue determined, and thus its full Definition arrived at.*

- 1 The next point will be to show *what sort* of a Habit Virtue
 2 is. Now speaking generally Excellence (ἀρετὴ) of whatever kind perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes

We next ask,
 What sort
 of a habit
 is Virtue?
 We conceive
 of Excel-
 lence gene-
 rally as
 perfecting
 any work.

CHAP. VI.—In this Chapter Aristotle discovers what sort of a Habit Virtue is, as follows. First he lays down the broad general conception that Excellence (ἀρετὴ) of any kind perfects the work of that of which it is the Excellence (§§ 1-3). Next he asks, In what then consists the perfection of *Man's* works? (§ 4). Having noted that all things capable of division at all can be taken in excess, defect, or moderation, he states that the perfecting of all human work, scientific, artistic, and therefore still more, moral, consists in securing the mean or moderate

amount (neither too much nor too little) of that with which it has to deal (§§ 5-9). He then explains that this is true only of Moral and not of Intellectual Excellence (§§ 10-13). After another argument pointing to the same conclusion derived from there being in all cases only one right and many wrong courses (§ 14), the formal Definition of Virtue is enunciated (§ 15), and the Chapter concludes with removing two possible misconceptions of, or objections to, the theory that all Virtue is a 'mean' state (§§ 16, etc.).

3 ὁρῶμεν. Ὅμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπου-
 δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπι-
 3 βάτην καὶ μείναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ
 πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν
 ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ
 4 ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτ' ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν
 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρή-
 σωμεν ποία τις ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὲ
 συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλείον, τὸ δ'
 ἔλαττον, τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα, 1
 ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ' ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλεί-
 5 ψews. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον

3 its peculiar function to be well performed. Hence Moral
 Virtue (*i.e.* human Excellence) will perfect human nature
 and cause the proper function of human nature to be well
 4 performed. How this will be has been already hinted at (in
 ch. ii.) from the analogy existing between the functions of the
 body of man and of his soul and of their respective Excel-
 lences, but we now proceed to discuss the question on more
 general principles. In everything which is capable of divi-
 sion at all, whatever be the nature of the connexion of its
 parts, we can have an excessive, a defective, and a just amount.
 These amounts may be taken either absolutely or relatively,
 and the just amount is always a *mean* in respect of the
 excess and defect, *i.e.* it lies somewhere between them. An
 5 'absolute' mean then is that which is precisely half-way

Whenever
 different
 degrees of a
 thing are
 possible,
 Excellence
 consists in
 securing
 a mean or
 moderate
 amount,
 and that
 judged in
 relation to
 circum-
 stances.

4. καὶ marks the conclusion
 of the argument.

9. *ἑννεχῆς* is applied to that
 whose parts are continuous or
 in close connexion, *e.g.* a stick
 or stone; *διαπερὸς* to that whose
 parts are not so connected, *e.g.* a
 heap of stones, a handful of sand

or gravel. In either case it is
 possible to take varying amounts
 of the things in question. An-
 other interpretation explains *ἑννεχῆς*
 of geometrical magnitudes,
 line, figure, etc.; *διαπερὸς* of
 arithmetical numbers.

ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἐκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ
 ταῦτον πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε
 6 ἐλλείπει. Τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἐν, οὐδὲ ταῦτον πᾶσιν, οἶον εἰ
 τὰ δέκα πολλά τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἐξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι
 κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσθι γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται, 5
 τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. ✓
 7 Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα
 μυαῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτῃς ἐξ μυᾶς
 προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληφόμενῳ
 ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν 10
 8 γυμνασίων πολὺ. Ὅμοιως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω
 δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν
 φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ
 9 οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα

between a given excess and a given defect, and is therefore
 7 always the same and easily found in every case. By a
 'relative mean' we indicate that intermediate amount between
 excess and defect which is *best for us*; i.e. the mean *relative*
 to our interest and advantage. This is of course sometimes
 more and sometimes less than the 'absolute mean,' and is
 9 different for different persons. Now when we say that every
 practical science places the perfection of its work in its being

This is ob-
 viously the
 case in
 artistic or
 scientific
 work.

6. ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν] Arithmetic progression or proportion: i.e. when each term differs from the preceding by a constant quantity. Consequently the absolute or arithmetic mean between two quantities is found by adding them together and dividing by 2.

10. Milo was a celebrated athlete of Crotona, a sort of Greek Samson, of whose mar-

vellous strength many traditions were preserved.

14. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.] Observe that the argument now depends on the analogy between Virtue and the Arts or practical Sciences, i.e. between the work of man as a Moral agent, and the work of man as an Artistic or Scientific agent: and the inference is that what constitutes excellence in one sort of work (Artistic) will also consti-

ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), οἱ δ' ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῦται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἔστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη
 10 στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἑλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἶον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρ-

neither excessive nor defective, but in due moderation, it is this *relative mean* that is always intended. And since then to attain to this relative mean is the end of every art or practical science, much more will it be so in the pre-eminent practical science of morals. Therefore it will be the characteristic feature of Moral Virtue that it perfects the work of man by aiming at a relative mean (in other words, at moderation) in all that it is concerned with. Moral Virtue, be it observed (for all this does not apply to Intellectual Excellence),

tute excellence in the other sort of work (Moral). This analogy must be carefully distinguished from that between the body and the soul of man in ii. 5-7.

8. ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις] i.e. Virtue is better than Art, just as Nature also is better than Art. Virtue is often regarded by Plato and Aristotle as a species of art, as has been noticed before, and indeed as its most perfect exemplification.

9. The argument only applies to ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, because it alone

comes within the general case upon which the whole argument is based (see § 4, ἐν παντὶ κ.τ.λ.), as being concerned with something (viz. πάθη and πράξεις) admitting of excess, mean, and defect. Such is clearly not the case in regard to Intellectual Excellence. That this is so with πάθη is proved in §§ 10 and 11, and similarly (ὁμοίως) it is asserted of πράξεις in § 12. πάθη and πράξεις are again thus united as forming the groundwork of Virtue in § 16 and also in iii. 3.

Hence it is so with Moral Excellence or Virtue.

This applies 10 to Moral Excellence only, not to Intellectual.

ρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον,

- 11 καὶ ἀμφοτέρα οὐκ εἶν' τὸ δ' ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ
 12 ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν 5
 ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ
 πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἔστιν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται
 13 καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. Μεσότης
 τις ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὕσα τοῦ μέσου. 10
 14 Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ

for Moral Virtue has for its object emotions and actions, both
 12 of which admit of excess, defect, and moderation. This moderation will consist in a due regulation of time, occasions, objects, motives, manner, etc., in regard to emotions and actions; and such regulation of emotions and actions is confessedly a characteristic of Virtue. Once more, it is possible
 14 to go wrong in many ways, right in one way only: just as we may miss a mark in any and every direction and can hit it

That Wrong is manifold, Right is one, points to the same conclusion.

9. ταῦτα ἄμφω] viz. both praise and success (ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται) are characteristics of Virtue, as they have just been shown to be of moderation (μέσον). Compare ὅπερ ἔστι τῆς ἀρετῆς above in l. 4, where ὅπερ similarly refers to excellence (ἄριστον) as being a characteristic of virtue.

12. The Pythagoreans expressed their teaching on Moral and other subjects by mathematical metaphors, which however have been often taken literally.

The doctrine quoted in the text is a specimen. All that is infinite (involving the notion of indefinite) is bad; the finite is good. Aristotle's inference from this, that right lies intermediate to the various courses of wrong, somewhat resembles the argument which is called the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' in Mathematics, as it is applied, e.g. to establish what is called the first Law of Motion. See further, note on I. vi. 7.

τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἢ ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἢ ἑλλειψις, τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἢ μεσότης·

ἔσθλοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

15 Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι

only in one direction, which lies *in the middle* of all the wrong directions. From this also we should infer that Virtue always consists in a mean or intermediate state, with related Vices on both sides of it, in the direction of Excess and in the direction of Defect.

DEFINITION
OF VIRTUE.

15 Hence we define Virtue as *'A Habit, involving delibe-*

6. This Definition of Virtue is only second in importance to the Definition of Happiness in I. vii. The student should carefully note the significance of every term in the Definition and why it is added to it. ἕξις is fully explained in ch. v. προαιρετικὴ is added on the strength of what was said in iv. 3. ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς is the main point established in the present Chapter. ὀρισμένη λόγῳ is necessary because the 'mean,' *being relative*, does not admit of being calculated by an arithmetical formula (§ 6 above and viii. 5, 6), and therefore its varying standard must be determined by Reason from time to time. (This accords with the statement that all Virtue is κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον in ii. 2.) Finally ὥς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσκειν is added, because it might be asked, Where is Reason

(which is an abstract term) practically to be found? How shall we be able to consult Reason as to the determination of this relative mean? And so finally we explain that we mean Reason as embodied in the man of recognised practical common sense. There may perhaps be another motive for this last addition. Suppose the authority of Reason is claimed by different men for opposite courses. (*Suppl. Note.*) Now though this may often happen in minor matters (ch. ix.), yet if it be allowed without restriction, it would lead to every one doing what is 'right in his own eyes,' and the denial of any absolute difference between right and wrong: just as the Sophists in Aristotle's day said, 'Whatever any man thinks to be right is right to him, and there is no other standard.' The remedy

οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρό-
 16 νιμος ὀρίσειεν. Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ'
 ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῶ τὰς μὲν
 ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ' ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς
 πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ 5
 17 εὕρισκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι· Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ
 τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ

rate purpose, conforming to the relative mean, which is de-
 16 *termined by reason, and as the man of practical common*
 17 *sense would determine it.' On either side of this mean, in*

17 *Excess or in Defect, lies Vice. Two possible misconceptions*
 must be anticipated. (1) It must not be supposed that, if
 Virtue is a mean state, it is a state of mediocrity, or of a
 moderate amount of good. It is only when considered in

Two supple-
 mentary ex-
 planations.

(1) Virtue is
 not a mean
 or moderate
 amount of
 good.

then against these eccentricities or aberrations of Reason is to be found by appealing to the Reason of the man of recognised practical common sense. (Cf. I. viii. 13 and note there.) It may be taken as the embodiment of the general reason of mankind, unbiassed by considerations of individual interests.

✓ 1. ὠρισμένη] There seems no doubt this should be ὠρισμένη, agreeing with μεσότητι, and not, as is usually written, ὠρισμένη. It is the mean (μεσότης), not the habit (ἔξις), which has to be determined by Reason, as is explained in the last note.

6. In order to comprehend what follows, it is necessary to understand clearly that the material (πάθη καὶ πράξεις, emotions and actions) in the various

degrees of which (i.e. excess, mean, or defect) Virtue and Vice consist must be in itself neither good nor bad, but absolutely indifferent. That this is so in the case of πάθη was explained in v. 3. e.g. anger, pleasure, fear, etc., are neither good nor bad in themselves, but only in the degree in which they are indulged. If such 'material' were in itself good (as the first misconception assumes), we could not have too much (excess) of it; if bad (as the second assumes), we could not have too little (defect) of it. In either case 'moderation' or a 'mean' amount would be out of the question. (See Supplementary Note.)

7. τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα may be thus explained:—

(1.) τὸ εἶναι (or εἶναι simply)

18 ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. Οὐ πάσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα· ἓνα γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία, ἀναισχυντία, φθόνος, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία, κλοπή, ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτῷ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ ἐλλείψεις. Οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατορθοῦν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνειν· οὐδ' ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ

itself and in the abstract that Virtue is a 'mean.' Considered in a special aspect and in reference to a special standard, viz. that of Excellence or Goodness, it is no longer a mean but extreme, i.e. it includes not a moderate, but the greatest possible, amount of good. (2) Conversely it must not be thought that because Virtue consists in moderation that a mean or moderate amount of *anything* is good simply because it is moderate. In respect of things essentially bad the right

(2) Not all
moderation
is Virtue.

means the 'essence' (i.e. the simplest form, or notion, of the existence) of anything.

(2) τί ἦν εἶναι = 'what was the essence of anything?'

(3) τὸ τί-ἦν-εἶναι = 'the what the essence [of anything] was'; or 'that which the essence was'; or in other words again, 'the essence' [of anything].

(4) τὸν λόγον τὸν τί-ἦν-εἶναι λέγοντα, 'the definition stating the essence'; i.e. the 'essential' or 'logical' Definition of anything: quite literally 'the Definition which says what [the] essence [of a thing] was.' Thus the whole expression is nearly equivalent to οὐσία occurring just before, which also means the

'being' or 'essence' of anything, 'essentia' being the exact Latin equivalent of οὐσία.

It remains to explain ἦν and not ἔστι being used. This is done to indicate that the Essence of a thing is *prior* to the existence of the thing itself. e.g. Before any individual man existed the essence of man, i.e. humanity, or the ideas constituting humanity, existed as the type after which man was created, just as the idea of a house exists on paper or in the architect's mind before the house itself is built.

3. εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα κ.τ.λ.] 'involve the notion of badness the moment they are named.'

ἦν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὥς μοιχεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν
 19 ὅτιοῦν τούτων ἀμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. "Ομοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν
 καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν
 εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ
 οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης καὶ ὑπερ- 5
 20 βολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. "Ωσπερ δὲ
 σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ
 ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον, οὕτως οὐδὲ
 ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδὲ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλ' ὥς
 ἂν πράττηται ἀμαρτάνεται ὅλως γὰρ οὐθ' ὑπερβολῆς 10
 καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν, οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ
 καὶ ἔλλειψις.

1 VII. Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ
 καὶ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς

amount is no longer a mean or moderate amount, but the least
 19 possible amount or rather none at all. If a thing is in itself
 bad, it is *already*, according to our theory, in excess or in
 defect, and therefore we cannot again have excess mean and
 20 defect of it. If it is itself good, it is, according to our theory,
already a mean, and therefore we cannot again have excess
 mean and defect of it.

CHAP. VII.—*A Table or Catalogue of Virtues with their
 related Vices.*

1 In order to prove that our Definition holds good of all the
 Virtues in detail, we proceed to classify them, shewing the

List of
 Virtues
 and Vices
 in detail.

8. πῶς] 'in some sense,' i.e. as
 is explained in § 17 *fin.*, Virtue if
 regarded in its special relation to
 the standard of excellence is an
 extreme and not a mean.

CHAP. VII.—Aristotle's plan
 now is to prove the correctness

of this Definition of Virtue, by
 showing it to apply in the case
 of every individual Virtue in
 detail. This is clearly expressed
 again in § 11, ῥητέον οὖν κ.τ.λ.
 With a view to this it is neces-
 sary to have an exhaustive Cata-

πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δ' ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν. *Ληπτέον οὖν*
 2 ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν 5 τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν

subject-matter in reference to which each Virtue is a mean state, together with its related Vices of excess and defect. Arranging them in the order of—1. Excess, 2. Mean, 3.

1. Courage. 2 Defect, we have—i. In reference to Confidence and Fear

logue of the Virtues. This is therefore given in the present Chapter, and it forms a sort of 'Table of Contents' for the discussion which follows to the end of Bk. IV.; though the actual order here indicated is not always observed.

2. ἀληθινώτεροι = 'more real,' not to be confused with ἀληθέστεροι = 'more true.'

4. διαγραφῆς] the table or catalogue. This will be found in an Appendix at the end of this Book, together with a note on the probable principle of classification upon which it is constructed.

Περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη] Observe that in each case Aristotle first lays down the morally-indifferent (i.e. neither good nor bad in itself, see note on vi. 17) subject-matter, upon the excess, defect, or mean amount, of which the related Virtue and Vices in each case depend. Observe further that this subject-matter is in several cases described by a pair

of words converse to one another, e.g. Confidence and Fear, Pleasure and Pain, Giving and Receiving, etc. Now of either member of these pairs we may have excess, mean, or defect, and therefore theoretically there would be *two* Virtues, each with two related Vices, belonging to each pair. But as excess of confidence is much the same as defect of fear, and *vice-versa*, (and similarly in the case of the other pairs), the subdivision in each case is a needless refinement, like the distinction between D \sharp and E \flat commonly in Music. Hence it is only carried out in two cases, viz. Courage and Liberality, and no stress is laid upon it in the fuller discussion of Bks. III. and IV.

6. πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα] It must often be the case that refinements of theory are not of sufficient practical importance to be represented by distinct words in common language, e.g. though in *theory* excess of confidence (ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλειν) and

τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλον θρασὺς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι
 3 ὑπερβάλλον τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. Περὶ
 ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς
 λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία.
 Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται 5
 διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι,
 4 ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ
 λήψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἑλ-
 λειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. Ἐναντίως δ' ἑαυταῖς
 ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν 10
 μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δ'
 ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει, ἐν δὲ προέσει
 5 ἐλλείπει. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγο-
 μεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον
 6 περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ 15

(especially the former)—(1) Rashness, (2) Courage, (3) Cowar-
 3 dice. ii. In reference to Pleasure and Pain (especially the ii. Temper-
 former)—(1) Intemperance, (2) Temperance, (3) Insensi-
 5 tiveness, if indeed such a state exists. iii. In reference to iii. Liberal-
 giving and receiving Money (especially the former)—(1) Pro-
 6 digality, (2) Liberality, (3) Sordidness. iv. In reference to iv. Magnifi-
 cence.

deficiency of fear (ἐν τῷ φοβεῖσθαι ἐλλείπειν) are distinct, yet practically the result of both is the same, viz. rashness, and so this one word serves for both cases. It should also be noticed that some languages possess refinements of this kind which others have not; and indeed it is seldom that any one word (in such cases as we are considering) in one language has its precise equivalent, meaning neither more nor less, in another language. (See Introd. p. xxxvi.).

3. οὐ πάσας] This limitation is fully explained in III. x.

ἦττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας] This is explained by III. xi. 5.

7. ἀναίσθητοι] 'insensible,' or perhaps 'insensitive,' the latter reproducing not only the meaning of the Greek word, but also the somewhat unfamiliar character which Aristotle admits it to have.

δόσιν καὶ λήψιν] That the former however is much more important is shown in IV. i. 6-11.

ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μέγала, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὖται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, 5
 7 ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη,
 8 ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρά διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, 10

v. High-mindedness.

vi. Laudable Ambition.

Wealth on a large scale—(1) Vulgar Display, (2) Magnificence, (3) Paltriness. v. In reference to honour and dishonour on a grand scale—(1) Vaingloriousness, (2) High-mindedness, (3) Little-mindedness. vi. In reference to the same in ordinary matters language supplies us only with the terms 'Ambition' and 'Ambitious' on the one hand, and 'Want of Ambition' and 'Unambitious' on the other. As

1. ἄλλαι διαθέσεις] The distinction between Liberality and Magnificence, and between High-mindedness and Laudable Ambition respectively, derives its value partly from the political or social aspect in which the Virtues were regarded by Greek philosophers. Socially the difference is considerable; morally (in the proper sense of the word, i.e. in reference to the character of the agent), the difference, though not perhaps wholly unreal, is less important. The term διάθεσις is here used as equivalent to ἔξις, though it is sometimes distinguished from it as indicating a disposition or tendency only, in contrast with a formed

habit (ἔξις), e.g. ἐγκράτεια is a διάθεσις related to σωφροσύνη as a ἔξις (see note I. iii. 7).

3. ἀπειροκαλία] 'bad taste'; literally 'inexperience of what is beautiful.' βαναυσία=βαυνανυσία (from βαυνος a forge and αὔω to burn), 'the practice of a mechanical art,' and hence 'vulgarity' generally. (Liddell and Scott.)

7. Translate 'As we said that Liberality was related to Magnificence, differing from it in that it is on a small scale, so also there is a certain Virtue related to High-mindedness, the latter being concerned with great honours, while the Virtue in question deals with small honours.'

περὶ τιμὴν οὕσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὕσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἥττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλο- 5 τιμία. "Οθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας. Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν 9 τὸν φιλότιμον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιούμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ 10 περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. "Εστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία 15 ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις 11 ἀόργησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσai

however excess and defect are thus recognised there must clearly be a mean state, though, in the absence of a settled name, either of the above pairs of terms are, according to

10 circumstances, applied to it. vii. In reference to the regulation of the Temper—(1) Passionateness, (2) Meekness, (3) vii. Meekness.

Impassionateness (if there be such a word to describe a state which rarely exists). Three Virtues follow relating to

Three Social Virtues. vii.,

5. διαθέσεις] 'The habits as well as the individual characters corresponding are nameless; (or, the abstract as well as the concrete terms are nameless)—except the term "ambition," corresponding with "ambitious." Similarly in English we have no word 'unambition,' to correspond with 'unambitious.'

6. ἐπὶ in Composition has a reciprocal force, e.g. ἐπαμοιβαδὶς, ἐπιμαχία (offensive and defensive alliance) (see *Suppl. Note*), etc.

10. ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ῥηθήσεται] See IV. iv. 4.

16. ἀόργητός τις] A sort of 'impassionate' man. 'τις' as it were apologizes for the uncouthness of the term employed: as it

μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐστὶ περὶ τᾷληθές τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ, τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν 5 καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετὸν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ' ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρ- 10

- 12 ακολουθήτου. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθές ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις, καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. 13 Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροϊκός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία. Περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν, φίλος, καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία,

our conduct in and towards Society—and here we must apologize for having to employ somewhat inadequate names to describe our meaning. viii. As regards Truth—(1) Boast-fulness, (2) Truthfulness, (3) Self-Depreciation. ix. As regards pleasantness in times of relaxation—(1) Buffoonery, (2) Geniality, (3) Boorishness. x. As regards general

does elsewhere for its inadequacy, when it does not express the precise shade of meaning desired: e.g. *χαυνότης τις* in § 7, *ἀληθής τις* in § 12, *ἀγροϊκός τις* in § 13, *ἀναίσθητός τις* in ii. 7.

4. ἐν αὐτοῖς] i.e. ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν.

14. *εἰρωνεία* = *dissimulatio*, i.e. a concealment of what you are; *ἀλαζονεία* = *simulatio*, i.e. a pretension to what you are not. *εἰρωνεία* is a difficult word to translate; see further note on IV. vii. 3.

19. *φίλος* and *φιλία* are not to

viii. Truthfulness.
ix. Geniality.
x. Friendliness.

ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα, ἄρεσκος, εἰ δ' ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν
 14 ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ
 αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. 5
 Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλ-
 λων, ὡς ὁ καταπληξ, ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος· ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων

pleasantness of demeanour—(1) Obsequiousness, degenerat-
 ing into Sycophancy if it be adopted to serve our own inter-
 14 ests, (2) Friendliness, (3) Churlishness. We add two condi-
 tions, which, though not so much settled *habits* as occasionally
 aroused *feelings*, are yet virtuous and praiseworthy as com-

Two imper-
 fectly Virt-
 ous states,
 viz.,

be translated 'friend' and
 'friendship,' but 'friendly' and
 'friendliness.' The character de-
 scribed is that of a man who
 naturally 'gets on' with every
 one he comes into contact with;
 one who naturally attracts every
 one, just as the 'churl' men-
 tioned presently is one who
 naturally repels every one.

1. οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα] 'Obsequi-
 ousness' is spontaneous and
 natural to the character in which
 it is displayed, and so may be in
 some sense sincere. 'Flattery'
 is put on, and is adopted to
 serve a man's own interests and
 advancement, and therefore is
 necessarily insincere.

4. Sense of Shame and Indigna-
 tion are not in the fullest sense Vir-
 tues, for two reasons;—(1) They
 are themselves occasional Feel-
 ings (πάθη) rather than perma-
 nent States (ἔξεις) in relation to
 the Feelings. This is more fully

expressed in IV. ix. 1. A per-
 manent State, either of Shame for
 our own wrong doings or of In-
 dignation at the success of others,
 would be in no sense desirable.
 (2) Because they cannot exist
 unless there has been previous
 wrong-doing on the part of our-
 selves or others. Hence they are
 only virtuous *on this condition*, ἐξ
 ὑποθέσεως, as Aristotle himself
 expresses it in IV. ix. 7.

On the other hand two reasons
 are given in the text why they
 are in some sense Virtues;—(1)
 They are objects of praise, and
 this is an indication of Virtue as
 we have seen in the concluding
 words of B. I., also in I. xii. 6
 and II. vi. 12 (see note). (2)
 The phenomena of excess, mean,
 and defect, are exhibited in
 these two cases, as well as in
 those already considered (καὶ γὰρ
 ἐν τούτοις κ.τ.λ. I. 6).

ἡ ὁ μὴδὲ ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος· ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. Νέ-
 15 μεσις δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας. (Εἰσὶ δὲ
 περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς
 πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ
 τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων
 τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρεκάκος τοσούτον
 16 ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ
 μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιο-

xi. Sense
of Shame.

xii. Resent-
ment.

Finally,
xiii. Justice
in its several
types.

pared with their opposites: viz. xi. In reference to shame felt
at our own conduct—(1) Excessive Bashfulness, (2) Sense of
 15 Shame, (3) Shamelessness. xii. In reference to indignation
felt at the success, deserved or undeserved, of others—(1)
 16 Envy, (2) Resentment, (3) Malevolence. xiii. Finally,
Justice is a word of such various meanings that we must

6. τοῦτον] viz. τὸν νεμεσητικόν.

ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαιρεκάκος κ.τ.λ.] This
account of ἐπιχαιρεκακία is very
confused. (1) There is no real,
but only a verbal, opposition
between grieving at the pros-
perity of others (φθόνος) and
rejoicing at the misfortunes of
others (ἐπιχαιρεκακία). These
two habits are related like those
which arise from excess of confi-
dence or defect of fear, which
are not really two but one, and
are called by the common name
θρασύτης, as was explained in
§ 2. (2) The mean (νέμεσις) con-
sisting in grieving at the pros-
perity of others, when it is
undeserved, and the excess
(φθόνος) in grieving at the pros-
perity of others in all cases,
whether deserved or undeserved,
—the defect ought to consist in
never grieving at the prosperity

of others in any case, but in
either rejoicing at it or being
indifferent to it. But in order
to make any sense of the words
as they stand, we must under-
stand with χαίρειν in L 7 ἐπὶ
τοῖς κακῶς πράττουσιν or some
similar words, about which
nothing has been said or im-
plied. (See *Suppl. Notes*.)

8. ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται] On
referring to the end of B. IV. it
will be seen that the subject of
νέμεσις is not referred to in the
fuller discussions which follow.
Otherwise the confusion of the
present passage would probably
have been corrected in some way.

δικαιοσύνη is a difficult word
to translate. It not only means
'justice' in the limited sense
(though even this, as Aristotle
shows in Bk. V., is used in two
or three distinct applications),

σύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἐκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν. [ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν].

I VIII. Τριῶν δὲ διαθέσεων οὓσων, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς 5 τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πασαι ἀντίκεινταιί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ

hereafter distinguish them, and then show of each kind separately how the law of the mean is applicable to it. The discussion on Intellectual Excellence will follow after that.

CHAP. VIII.—*The nature and degrees of the opposition existing between Virtues and the Vices related to them.*

I Excess, mean, and defect are all opposed to one another in 2 various degrees. Compared with the excess, the mean appears

The opposition of the two extremes *inter se* is greater than that of either of them to the mean.

but it has also the general sense of 'uprightness' or 'righteousness,' divested of the religious or theological savour attaching to these words. In this application, Aristotle in Bk. V. describes it as συλλήβδην πᾶσα ἀρετή, *i.e.* Virtue in the aggregate. Bk. V. is occupied with distinguishing and defining these several senses of δικαιοσύνη, and, as is promised here, showing how to each of them separately the law of the 'mean' is applicable in different ways.

2. ὁμοίως κ.τ.λ.] The words in brackets are probably interpolated by some copyist who thought it might be well to give the contents of Bk. VI., as well as those of Bks. IV. and V.

The objections to them are: (1) ὁμοίως is not true; for the Intellectual Excellences are in no sense 'mean' states, and Aristotle never suggests or attempts to prove anything of the kind (see note on vi. 10). (2) Aristotle never speaks of λογικαὶ ἀρεταὶ in this sense, but always of διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταὶ, *e.g.* see I. xiii. 20, II. i. 1, etc. If we retain the words we must attach a very loose sense to ὁμοίως and translate—'similarly we shall speak about the Intellectual Excellences also:' in fact understanding ἐροῦμεν only, and not ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν.

CHAP. VIII.—The fact that Virtue is a *relative* and not an *absolute* mean (*i.e.* not always

ἐλαττον μείζον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μείζον ἐλαττον, οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν, ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν. Ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσωτος, πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. Διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον, καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν, ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλὸν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον. Οὕτω δ' ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἁμφω τοῦ ἴσου. Ἐτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται, ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν

in defect; compared with the defect, it appears in excess.

- 3 A man who is in either extreme, reserving to himself the title of the mean, applies to the true mean the name of the extreme opposite to his own. Obviously however the opposition between the extremes (excess and defect) is greater than that between the mean and either of them;—partly because the interval between them is greater in actual distance, as we might say; and partly because sometimes one extreme appears

The mean is nearer sometimes to the excess, sometimes to the defect.

half-way between the extremes to which it is related) implies that it will sometimes be nearer to one extreme than the other, and hence that the degrees of its opposition to them will differ in different cases. The main results of this chapter are;—(1) There is a greater opposition

between the extremes *inter se* than between either of them and the mean. (2) Sometimes the excess and sometimes the defect is more opposed to the mean. (3) The degree of this divergence may depend either upon the nature of the case or upon our own dispositions in reference to it.

ἀνδρείαν, καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ
ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης. Τὰ δὲ πλείστον
ἀπέχοντα ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὀρίζονται, ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον

6 ἐναντία τὰ πλείον ἀπέχοντα. Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται
μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, 5
οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ'
ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναι-
σθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα.
7 Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ 10
ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ
τοῦναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνο-

to have a sort of affinity with the mean, whereas extremes
inter se are radically opposed. Thus Rashness (excess) is
more akin to Courage than Cowardice (defect) is, and so on.

6 This natural affinity to the mean of sometimes the excess and
7 sometimes the defect, depends on two causes:—i. *The nature*
of things.—Some faults would be universally allowed to be

This may
depend on
two causes.
i. The nature
of things.

2. τὰ δὲ πλείστον ἀπέχοντα
κ.τ.λ.] 'Things which differ
most widely are defined to be
contraries.' It will be under-
stood that we are speaking of
things falling under the same
class (*i.e.* πλείστον ἀπέχοντα ἐν
τῷ αὐτῷ γένει as Aristotle else-
where more fully expresses it).
All opposition or contrariety
implies some degree of similarity.
Otherwise Rashness for example
might be thought to differ more
from (say) Meanness, than from
Cowardice.

9. The twofold grounds of
opposition between Extremes and

the Mean explained in §§ 7 and
8 suggest the first two of
the practical rules for attaining
the mean given in the next
Chapter.

10. Practical applications of
this principle will be found in the
discussion of Liberality (IV. i.
31, 44), Highmindedness (IV. iii.
37), and Meekness (IV. v. 12).
In the first two cases, as in that
of Courage, the defect is more
opposed than the excess to the
mean. In the case of Meekness,
as in that of Temperance, it is
the reverse. (See *Supplementary*
Note.)

- μοιότερον δ' ἢ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλείον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
- 8 Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκα-
 μέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἶον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς, διὸ
 εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσ-
 μιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ
 ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία
 ὑπερβολὴ οὕσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.
- 1 IX. "Οτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης, καὶ

ii. Our own
 dispositions
 and inclina-
 tions.

'errors on the right side,' and therefore nearer the mean.
 8 ii. *Our own dispositions.*—If our natural bent or inclina-
 tion is to one extreme rather than the other, then that extreme
 appears more opposed to the mean than the other. Its indul-
 gence would carry us further from the Virtuous mean than
 would the practice of the opposite extreme.

CHAP. IX.—*The difficulty of Virtue—Practical rules for attain-
 ing the Virtuous Mean—The liberty of private judgment
 in points of detail.*

Difficulty
 of Virtue.

1 The various points now established concerning Virtue

4. ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν] This fol-
 lows because virtue is a relative
 mean (ἐν μεσότητι τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς).
 Theories of the most absolute
 morality (see Introd. p. xxi.)
 must allow some variation in its
 application to practical details.
 Within certain limits what is
 right for one man is not neces-
 sarily right for another. The
 fallacy of Casuistry is that it ig-
 nores the considerations pointed

out in this section. Conversely
 it might be said that theories
 which make moral distinctions
 purely relative err in overlooking
 the considerations of § 7.

9. ἐπίδοσις] lit. 'increase' or
 'addition,' hence, probably,
 'bias' or 'inclination.'

CHAP. IX.—Another result
 from the mean in Virtue being
 relative and dependent on cir-
 cumstances, and also from the

πῶς, καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν, ἱκανῶς εἴρηται. Διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι· ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον, οἷον 5 κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παντὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παντὸς καὶ ῥάδιον, καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι τὸ δ' ὧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα καὶ ὥς, οὐκέτι παντὸς οὐδὲ ῥάδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν. Διὸ δεῖ τὸν 10 στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
νῆα·

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον, τὸ δ' ἥττον 15
4 τον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἀκρῶς χαλεπὸν, κατὰ τὸν δευτέρον φασὶ πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν

2 plainly show that it is difficult to become Virtuous, and a complicated matter to attain the accurate mean. Three
3 practical rules are obvious. i. *Avoid the extreme most*
4 *opposed to the mean in the nature of things.* If we must
err, it is at any rate best to choose the lesser of two evils.

Three Rules
for attaining
the mean.
Rule i.

varying degrees of opposition between it and its related Vices explained in the last Chapter, is that it is hard to hit the exact mean in all cases. Hence (1) practical rules for this purpose are suggested, and (2) the right of individual liberty of action within certain moderate limits is maintained.

12. Καλυψὼ] There is a slip of memory here. Advice similar to this was given to Ulysses by Circe (*Od.* xii. 108). The actual words, however, occur in the subsequent admonition of Ulysses to his pilot (*Od.* xii. 219).

17. δεύτερος πλοῦς corresponds to our expression 'a second-best course,' or a '*pis-aller*.'

λέγομεν. Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί
 5 ἔσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ'
 ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινο-
 μένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τὸναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν
 δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπαγαγόντες τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον 5
 ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες
 6 ποιοῦσιν. Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ
 τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. Ὅπερ
 οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο
 δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν 10
 ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπού-

- Rule ii. ii. *Avoid the extreme to which our natural inclination
 5 tends.* The pleasure we derive from actions affords a simple
 Rule iii. 6 test of this inclination. iii. *Beware above all of allowing the
 pleasure of actions to bias our judgment respecting them.*

1. αὐτοῖ] Thus for example although as a general rule the Virtue of Courage would be gained rather by acts of Rashness than by acts of Cowardice, yet there may be fearless and hot-brained persons who would arrive at it best by acts of what would seem to them cowardice. Again, in order to arrive at the just mean in the way of spending money (ἐλευθεριότης) this rule would probably direct a Scotchman to aim at prodigality (ἀσωτία), but an Irishman to practise what he would consider sordidness (ἀνελευθερία). This second rule would recognise each man's 'besetting sin'; or, by a change of metaphor, would take account of his 'personal equation.'

8. ἀδέκαστοι] from δέκάζω (and this from δεκάς, a body of ten),

=decuriare, to tamper with the 'decuriae,' and so generally 'to bribe.' ἀδέκαστοι therefore = 'impartial,' literally 'unbribed.'

9. δημογέροντες] The reference is to *Il.* iii. 158 :—

"On Ilion's towers
 Sat the sage chiefs and councillors of
 Troy.
 Helen they saw, as to the tower she
 came;
 And, 'tis no marvel, one to other said,
 The valiant Trojans and well-greaved
 Greeks
 For beauty such as this should long en-
 dure
 The toils of war; for goddess-like she
 seems;
 And yet, despite her beauty, let her go,
 Nor bring on us and on our sons a
 curse."—Lord Derby's Translation.

Similarly, says Aristotle, we must dismiss pleasure from our consideration, while we are deliberating, else unbiassed judgment will be out of the question.

μενοι ἤττον ἀμαρτησόμεθα. Ταῦτ' οὖν ποιοῦντες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. Χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον οὐ γὰρ ῥᾶδιον διορίσαι πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς 5
 ὅτε μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φάμεν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὗ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται, οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον, ὁ δὲ πλεόν· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. Ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκ- 10
 τὸς οὐ ῥᾶδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετὴ, ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν 15
 οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾶστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὗ τευξόμεθα.

The observance of such practical rules will enable us, roughly speaking, to attain the Virtuous mean. And, after all, small deviations from the ideal mean are not important, nor is it easy to say when they become so. In such matters of detail much must be left to the decision of individual judgment. Indeed the surest way of attaining the mean in practice is to allow such liberty.

Slight variations must still be left to individual judgment.

4. What follows is another illustration of the often repeated caution in Bk. I., that it is neither possible nor desirable to reduce Morals to a rigid or mathematical precision, for 'Virtue itself turns Vice, being *misapplied*' (Shakespeare). See esp. § 9 just below ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.

13. αἰσθησις has no technical meaning here, such as Moral Sense. It resembles rather the popular use of the word in

English, as when we say 'That must be left to each man's own "sense" to decide.' See further note on IV. v. 13.

14. Observe the word δεῖ. Though the mean is always in theory the best, yet in order to attain it practically, it sometimes becomes a duty (δεῖ) to aim at something in excess or defect of it. See viii. 8 (note), and § 5 of this Chapter.

THE CATALOGUE OF VIRTUES AND VICES REFERRED TO IN B. II. c. vii.

Indifferent subject-matter neither good nor bad in itself.	Excess. (Vice).	Mean. (Virtue).	Defect. (Vice).	Remarks.
i. <i>περὶ θάρρη καὶ φόβου</i> . ii. <i>περὶ ἡδονῆν (καὶ λύπην)</i> . iii. <i>περὶ χρημάτων δόσω καὶ λήψιν</i> . iv. <i>περὶ χρήματα μεγάλα</i> . v. <i>περὶ τιμῆν (καὶ ἀτιμίαν)</i> . vi. <i>περὶ τιμὴν μικράν</i> . vii. <i>περὶ ὀργήν</i> . viii. <i>περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς</i> . ix. <i>περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδικῷ</i> . x. <i>περὶ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ</i> .	<i>θρασύτης</i> <i>δειλία</i> <i>ἀκολασία</i> <i>ἀσώτεια</i> <i>ἀνελευθερία</i> <i>ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία</i> <i>χαυνότης</i> <i>φιλοτιμία</i> <i>ὀργιλότης</i> <i>ἀλαζονεία</i> <i>βωμολοχία</i> <i>ἄρεσκος</i> <i>κόλαξ</i>	<i>ἄνδρεια</i> <i>ἄνδρεια</i> <i>σωφροσύνη</i> <i>ἐλευθεριότης</i> <i>ἐλευθεριότης</i> <i>μεγαλοπρέπεια</i> <i>μεγαλοψυχία</i> <i>(ἀνώνυμος)</i> <i>πραότης</i> <i>ἀλήθεια</i> <i>εὐτραπεία</i> <i>φίλος (φιλία)</i>	<i>δειλία</i> <i>(ἀνώνυμος)</i> <i>ἀναίσθησία</i> <i>ἀνελευθερία</i> <i>ἀσώτεια</i> <i>μικροπρέπεια</i> <i>μικροψυχία</i> <i>ἀφιλοτιμία</i> <i>ἀόργησία</i> <i>ἐλθωνεία</i> <i>ἀγροικία</i> <i>δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος</i>	In regard to <i>θάρρη</i> only. In regard to <i>φόβοι</i> only. In regard to <i>ἡδονή</i> only. In regard to <i>δόσις</i> only. In regard to <i>λήψις</i> only. In regard to <i>δόσις</i> only. In regard to <i>τιμὴ</i> only. Also in regard to <i>τιμὴ</i> only. viii. ix. x. are grouped as social virtues— <i>περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινῶν</i> . In the case of x. the names of the excess and defect are given only in the adjectival form. The former is <i>ἄρεσκος</i> , if his conduct be disinterested; <i>κόλαξ</i> , if it arise from interested motives. Occasional feelings rather than settled habits.
xi. . xii. .	<i>κατὰ πλῆξ</i> <i>(ὁ πάντα αἰδοῦμενος)</i> <i>φθονερός</i>	<i>αἰδήμων</i> <i>νεμεσητικός</i>	<i>ἀναισχυρτος</i> <i>ἐπιχαίρεκακος</i>	

The principle of Classification in the Catalogue on the opposite page appears to be (for Aristotle never explicitly states it) the *degree of relationship to society* implied by the different Virtues: a natural principle in a treatise which regards Ethics as a branch of the Science of Social Life (πολιτική τις, I. ii. 8). From this point of view the Catalogue breaks up into five divisions:—

I. (i and ii) Courage and Temperance are Virtues bearing no *necessary* relation to society. They might be practised on a desert island. They belong to the lowest part of our nature, which we have in common with the brutes, who are incapable of Society. (In III. x. 1 Aristotle hints that this is his reason for treating of these two Virtues first.)

II. (iii—vi) These four Virtues can only be exercised in a society of some kind, and yet they belong rather to ourselves and to our personal character than to our behaviour towards society. This is so especially from Aristotle's point of view, in which Benevolence and such feelings are scarcely, if at all, recognised. See notes on IV. i. 27, IV. iii. 24, etc. Hence the *personal* element still predominates.

III. (vii) The regulation of the Temper forms a sort of connecting link with the purely social virtues which follow. The personal and social elements in this case are nearly balanced.

IV. (viii—x) Three Social Virtues which derive their whole force and meaning from society, and relate simply to our conduct *in* and *towards* society. The *social* element now preponderates over the *personal*.

V. (xi—xii) Supplementary. Two virtuous states which (as is explained in the text) are not in the fullest sense Virtues, but yet under certain circumstances are commended.

III.

- I. Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων,

CHAP. I.—*Voluntary, Involuntary, Mixed and Non-Voluntary Actions distinguished and discussed.*

- The discussion of the difference between Voluntary and Involuntary actions is important (1) in reference to the

Recalling the Definition of Virtue in II. vi. 17 (ἔξις προαιρετική ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὀρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν), we shall obtain the clue to the plan of what follows to the end of Bk. VI., the whole of which portion of the treatise consists of the illustration of this Definition in detail.

(1) ἔξις—This was sufficiently explained in II. v.

(2) προαιρετική—This has been rather assumed than proved as yet (see II. iv. 3 and v. 4, etc.). Consequently the nature of προαίρεσις is now discussed at length in its relation to Moral action, ch. i—v.

(3) ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς—This point is next proved

of each of the Virtues in the list given in II. vii. in detail, from III. vi. to end of IV., and of δικαιοσύνη in each of its various senses (for which see II. vii. 16) in Bk. V.

(4) ὀρισμένη . . . ὀρίσειεν—The intellectual powers by which the variable relative mean is to be determined form the subject of Bk. VI., and this completes the discussion of the various terms in the Definition of Virtue.

The discussion of προαίρεσις or Deliberate Choice is approached by determining first the more comprehensive notion of voluntariness; since all that is deliberately chosen must of course be Voluntary, though not *vice versa* (see ii. 16). The contents of the

ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου,
 τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς
 περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομο-
 2 θετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. Δοκεῖ δὲ
 3 ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ 5
 οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλ-
 λεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι
 4 ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες. Ὅσα δὲ διὰ φόβον μει-
 ζόνων κακῶν πράττεται ἢ διὰ καλόν τι, οἷον εἰ τύραννος

verdict we pronounce upon them, whether it be one of praise,
 blame, pardon, or pity; and (2) from the social or political
 2 point of view, to which we have often referred. Briefly then,
 Involuntary acts are those done *under compulsion* or *through*
 3 *ignorance*. We will speak of these in order.

i. Compulsion occurs when our actions are entirely determined
 by some external cause, such as a storm or the superior strength
 5 of other men. There are also cases of *Moral* compulsion, *i.e.*
 when we do something in itself undesirable under the fear of

Involuntary
 acts defined
 as acts due to
 compulsion
 or ignorance.

i. Involun-
 tary acts
 from com-
 pulsion.

(§§ 3—12).

This may
 be Physical
 or Moral.
 The latter
 gives rise to
 Mixed Acts.

first five Chapters are briefly as follows:—

i. A general distinction between Voluntary and Involuntary Actions, together with the intermediate classes of 'Mixed' (if the *compulsion* [βία] is incomplete), and 'Non-Voluntary' (if the *ignorance* [ἄγνοια] is avoidable, or the act not regretted).

ii. Deliberate Choice is compounded of an element of impulse and an element of judgment.

iii. The relation of Deliberate Choice to Deliberation (βούλευσις), *i.e.* to the element of *judgment* in ch. ii.

iv. Its relation to Desire or

Wish (βούλησις), which it presupposes, *i.e.* to the element of *impulse* in ch. ii.

v. A digression to refute the view held by Plato and others that Vice is involuntary, while Virtue is voluntary.

3. Observe the frequent recurrence to the social point of view indicated at the commencement in I. ii. 8, μέθοδος πολιτική τις οὖσα, and see *Introduct.* p. xxxi.

4. κόλασις is punishment with a view to reformation (see note on v. 7), and so is naturally put in contrast with τιμή, reward for the sake of encouragement.

6. ἀρχή] the originating or

προσάττοι αἰσχρόν τι πράξαι κύριος ὢν γονέων καὶ τέκνων, καὶ πράξαντος μὲν σώζονται, μὴ πράξαντος δ' ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ἀμφισβήτησιν ἔχει πότερον ἀκούσιά ἐστιν ἢ ἐκούσια. Τοιοῦτον δέ τι συμβαίνει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς χειμῶσιν ἐκβολάς· ἀπλῶς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀποβάλλεται ἐκὼν, ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν πάντες οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες. Μικταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ τοιαῦται πράξεις, εἰκάσι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίους· αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν· καὶ τὸ ἐκούσιον δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον, ὅτε πράττει, λεκτέον. Πράττει δὲ ἐκὼν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ κινεῖν τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πράξεσιν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν· ὢν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχὴ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ μὴ. Ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔλοιτο καθ' αὐτὸ

6 some greater evil, or the hope of some greater good. But such actions are, so to speak, mixed, being neither purely voluntary nor purely involuntary. They are rather voluntary however, (1) because they are deliberately chosen *at the moment of performance*; and (2) because it is always physi-

Such mixed acts are rather voluntary than involuntary.

motive cause of the action: speaking technically, the Efficient Cause (see Glossary p. xlvii.).

9. τὸ δὲ τέλος κ.τ.λ.] The object or motive of an act is to be determined in reference to the time of its performance; so (δὴ) whether the action were voluntary or involuntary is to be determined in reference to the moment of action. If a conscious motive determined the action *then*, the action itself must have been voluntary, and that fact cannot

be altered by regrets or after-thoughts when the danger is past. That such is the case in the actions we are considering is evident, because the movement of the limbs at least is perfectly free at the moment of action (see l. 12).

12. ὀργανικὰ μέρη] the limbs which are instrumental in the performance of the act.

15. ἀπλῶς] i.e. simply or abstractedly, i.e. considered apart from surrounding circumstances.

7 τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. Ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσι δὲ ταῖς τοιαύ-
 ταις ἐνίοτε καὶ ἐπαινοῦνται, ὅταν αἰσχροὺν τι ἢ λυπηρὸν
 ὑπομένωσιν ἀντὶ μεγάλων καὶ καλῶν ἃν δ' ἀνάπαλιν,
 ψέγονται· τὰ γὰρ αἰσχισθ' ὑπομεῖναι ἐπὶ μηδενὶ καλῷ
 ἢ μετρίῳ φαύλου. Ἐπ' ἐνίοις δ' ἔπαινος μὲν οὐ γίνεται, 5
 συγγνώμη δ', ὅταν διὰ τοιαῦτα πράξῃ τις ἃ μὴ δεῖ, ἃ
 τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν ὑπερτείνει καὶ μηδεὶς ἂν ὑπομεί-
 8 ναι. Ἐνία δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ
 μᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν
 Εὐρύπιδου Ἀλκμαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα 10
 9 μητροκτονῆσαι. Ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίοτε διακρίναι ποῖον
 ἀντὶ ποίου αἰρετέον καὶ τί ἀντὶ τίνος ὑπομενετέον, ἔτι
 δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἐμμεῖναι τοῖς γνωσθεῖσιν· ὥς γὰρ ἐπὶ
 τὸ πολὺ ἔστι τὰ μὲν προσδοκώμενα λυπηρὰ, ἃ δ' ἀναγ-
 κάζονται αἰσχροῖα, ὅθεν ἔπαινοι καὶ ψόγοι γίνονται περὶ 15

8 cally in our power to abstain from them. Their moral and their
 character is various. We praise, blame, or make allowance moral char-
 9 for them, according to circumstances; but it is impossible to acter varies
 with circum-
 stances.

1. Regarded in their moral aspect these mixed actions fall into three classes. (Note, it is due to their *mixed* character, and so far as they have an element of *voluntariness* about them, that they admit of a moral aspect at all.)

(1) *Praise* is accorded, when something painful or humiliating (αἰσχρὸν) is endured from a noble motive, e.g. the case of martyrdom, and the legends of Scævola, Regulus, Lady Godiva, etc.

(2) *Blame*, when shame or disgrace is accepted without ade-

quate reason, e.g. the conduct of a traitor who betrays his country or friends to secure his own release from prison.

(3) *Allowance* is made, when the pain or danger is such as to overstrain (ὑπερτείνει) human endurance, e.g. confessions or revelations wrung out by torture. Aristotle adds that there are some acts so disgraceful that no torture could secure allowance for them, e.g. matricide.

11. τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα μητροκτονῆσαι] viz. his father Amphiarus's injunctions to do so, under pain of his displeasure.

- 10 τοὺς ἀναγκασθέντας ἢ μὴ. Τὰ δὲ ποῖα φατέον βίαια ;
 "Ἡ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἢ καὶ ὁ
 πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται ; "Α δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν
 ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετὰ, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ
 ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ 5
 καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. Μᾶλλον δ' ἔοικεν ἐκούσιους
 αἱ γὰρ πράξεις ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δ' ἐκούσια.
 Ποῖα δ' ἀντὶ ποίων αἰρετέον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι· πολ-
 11 λὰ γὰρ διαφοραὶ εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα. Εἰ δέ τις
 τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ 10
 ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν
 πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν. Καὶ οἱ μὲν βία καὶ ἄκοντες
 λυπηρῶς, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ καλὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Γε-
 λοῖον δὲ τὸ αἰτιᾶσθαι τὰ ἐκτὸς, ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτὸν εὐθὴ-

- 10 lay down any general rules on such a subject. We reserve
 then the term Involuntary for cases of physical compulsion.
 11 Under no circumstances, however, must the violent desire
 for what is pleasurable or honourable be regarded as caus-
 ing such compulsion as would make an act involuntary, for
 (1) This would make all our actions compulsory, and so
 would prove too much; (2) Such actions are pleasurable,
 while compulsion is painful. The fault really rests with those
 who allow themselves to be so easily 'compelled,' who wish to
 escape the responsibility of their bad actions and yet retain

The violent
 pleasure of
 actions is in
 no case to be
 considered
 as a source of
 compulsion
 which can
 excuse them.

10. No emphasis is to be laid on
 τὰ καλὰ here, because *practically*,
 no one does argue against the
 voluntariness of noble acts on
 the ground that the intense plea-
 sure to be derived from them
 forces us on. (This is clear from
 the concluding words of this ch.,
 and also from ch. v.) *Logically*,
 however, the higher pleasure of

τὸ καλὸν and the lower pleasure
 of τὸ ἡδὺ stand on the same
 footing, so far as they affect the
 voluntariness or involuntariness
 of actions. Indeed, as Ar. argued
 in II. iii. 7 (fin.), τὸ καλὸν as a mo-
 tive for action is in some sense
 included under τὸ ἡδὺ. This
 reference also illustrates what
 follows, τούτων γὰρ χάριν κ.τ.λ.

- 12 ρατον ὄντα ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἑαυτὸν,
 13 τῶν δ' αἰσχυρῶν τὰ ἡδέα. Ἔοικε δὴ τὸ βίαιον εἶναι οὐ
 ἔξωθεν ἢ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲν συμβαλλομένου τοῦ βιασθέντος.
 13 Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ' ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκού-
 σιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν 5
 πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδὲν δὲ δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ τῇ πράξει,
 ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ᾔδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ
 λυπούμενός γε. Τοῦ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ
 ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω
 οὐχ' ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον. 10
 14 Ἐτερον δ' εἴοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνο-

12 credit for their good ones. We therefore define a compulsory act to be one caused by some external force to which the agent himself contributes nothing.

- 13 ii. The other cause of involuntary actions was said to be *ignorance*. This statement must be guarded by two conditions:—(1) First there must be *subsequent sorrow* for the act done in ignorance: else it cannot be considered as really involuntary. Still as we cannot exactly say that it was voluntary, we shall for convenience sake describe such actions 5 as *non-voluntary*. (2) Ignorance must not extend to the

ii. Involuntary acts through ignorance. (§§ 18—19). Two conditions are required. 1. Subsequent regret. 2. Ignorance must be of facts, not of principles.

5. ἐπίλυπον] Compare Jean Paul, 'Joyful remembrances of wrong actions are their half repetitions, as repentant remembrances of good ones are their half abolitions.'

10. As another illustration of the difference between involuntary and non-voluntary, Aristotle elsewhere states that the action of the heart is involuntary, that of respiration non-voluntary: the former is entirely beyond our control, the latter not so.

11. Observe that the expres-

sions, ἄγνοια τοῦ συμφέροντος, ἢ καθόλου ἄγνοια, ἄγνοια ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει, ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν, are all equivalent, and are opposed to ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα ἄγνοια and to δι' ἄγνοιαν ποιεῖν. The former is ignorance in the major premiss, or the general principle; the latter ignorance in the minor premiss, or the particular application of the general principle. The drift of the passage seems to be to show that ignorance does not make an action involuntary unless the ignorance itself is in-

- οὐντα ποιεῖν ὁ γὰρ μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος οὐ δοκεῖ δι' ἄγνοϊαν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν. Ἀγνοεῖ μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ μοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁμαρτίαν
- 15 ἄδικοι καὶ ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην) ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν
- 16 ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτὰ, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστὶ, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος,

principles of conduct, but only to the *details*, or *acts*: else a drunkard or a passionate man, or indeed any one who does wrong, might plead ignorance in some sense, and hence involuntariness. Therefore, for the sake of distinction again, we shall say that one who acts in ignorance of the general principles of conduct, or of what is befitting, or in ignorance affecting the deliberate choice of his actions, acts '*ignorantly*,'

16 but not '*through ignorance*,' nor involuntarily. But one who acts in ignorance of some of the details or circumstances accompanying his action, we shall say acts '*through ignorance*,' and involuntarily. *e.g.* Ignorance of 'fact' or of

voluntary. If the ignorance could have been avoided at the outset, the agent is fully responsible for it, and also for all and any consequences that it may lead to.

2. διὰ τι τῶν εἰρημένων] *i.e.* μέθη or ὀργή understood from μεθύων ἢ ὀργιζόμενος.

12. περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι refers to the object upon which or whom the act takes place, *e.g.* a man

slaying his son or his father in battle unwittingly. The murder of Laius in ignorance did not make Œdipus, morally speaking, a parricide.

13. ἔνεκα τίνος (like οὐδ' ἔνεκα in § 18) has not its usual meaning of 'motive' (of which ignorance would be out of the question), but that of 'tendency,' as the examples show.

- 17 οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα. "Απαντα
 μὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσκει μὴ μαινόμενος, δῆλον
 δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν πράττοντα πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτὸν γε; Ὁ δὲ
 πράττει, ἀγνοήσκειν ἂν τις, οἷον λέγοντές φασιν ἐκ-
 πεσεῖν αὐτοὺς, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ 5
 Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά, ἢ δείξαι βουλόμενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς
 ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. Οἰηθείη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέ-
 μιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη, καὶ ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογ-
 χωμένον δόρυ, ἢ τὸν λίθον κίσσηριν εἶναι καὶ ἐπὶ
 σωτηρίᾳ πίσας ἀποκτείνειν ἂν καὶ θίξαι βουλόμενος, 10
 18 ὥσπερ οἱ ἀκροχειριζόμενοι, πατάξουσιν ἂν. Περὶ πάντα
 δὴ ταῦτα τῆς ἀγνοίας οὔσης ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις, ὁ τοῦτων
 τι ἀγνοήσας ἄκων δοκεῖ πεπραχέναι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν
 τοῖς κυριωτάτοις· κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ

- 'detail' may apply to the agent, the act itself, the object,
 17 the instrument, the tendency, or the manner of the act. Of
 all of these at once, and especially of the first, none but a
 18 maniac could be ignorant. But ignorance of one or more of
 such details, and especially of the object or of the tendency
 of the act, may well occur, and cause the act to be an in-

4. οἷον κ.τ.λ.] 'as men in con-
 versation say that they made a
 slip ('let the cat out of the bag'),
 or else that they did not know
 that it was any secret.' These are
 of course two different excuses,
 either of which would illustrate
 what is meant by ignorance of
 the act itself. So also would the
 other case mentioned, viz. when
 a gun goes off accidentally and
 kills some one.

8. ἐσφαιρῶσθαι τὸ λελογχω-
 μένον δόρυ] 'believing the spear
 to be rounded at the end when

it was actually pointed,' i.e. like
 a foil with a button for fencing.

9. κίσσηριν] pumice-stone,
 and therefore not likely to hurt
 any one. This illustrates ignor-
 ance of the instrument.

ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ] 'with a view to
 save;' e.g. if William Tell had hit
 his son, when aiming at the apple.
 (In ref. to ἐνεκα τίνος above.)

11. ἀκροχειριζόμενοι] 'spar-
 ring.' This example explains
 ignorance of the manner or de-
 gree of force of an act (πῶς, οἷον
 ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα, § 16).

- 19 *πρᾶξις καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα. Τοῦ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἄγνοιαν ἀκουσίου λεγομένου ἔτι δεῖ τὴν πρᾶξιν λυπηρὰν εἶναι καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.*
- 20 *Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότει τὰ καθ' 5*
- 21 *ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἢ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται*
- 22 *ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράξει,*
- 23 *οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως 10*
- τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ἀκουσίως; ἢ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος;*
- 24 *ἄτοπον δὲ ἴσως τὸ ἀκούσια φάναι ὧν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι*

19 voluntary one 'through ignorance'; provided always that subsequent sorrow attends the discovery of what has been thus done through ignorance.

ntary
acts defined.

- 20 Having now explained the nature of both kinds of involuntary actions, we may define Voluntary acts conversely to be 'those originating from the agent himself, he having a full knowledge of the circumstances under which he is acting.'
- 21 This definition must be defended against the false view (which it in fact condemns) that acts done from anger or desire are involuntary, though originating in the agent himself. (1) They
- 22 are not so, because all the acts of the lower animals and
- 23 even children would then be involuntary. (2) Take this dilemma:—*Either* it is meant that *all* acts of anger and desire are involuntary, *or* that the bad ones are involuntary and the good voluntary. The latter supposition is absurd, because the motive cause (anger and desire) is the same in both cases.
- 24 The former is absurd because there are occasions when we

arguments
to prove
that acts
done
through
anger or
strong
desire are
voluntary.

6. *Ἴσως γὰρ*] The force of *γὰρ* is to indicate that the following class of actions (viz. τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν), which are intentionally excluded by the Definition just given from

involuntary actions, are rightly so excluded. (See *Suppl. Notes.*)

12. *δεῖ* is of course the emphatic word. The sense of 'duty' excludes the notion of involuntariness. If we 'ought' to do

δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐπὶ τισι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν τινῶν, οἷον
 25 ὑγείας καὶ μαθήσεως. Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ
 26 εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἡδέα. Ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει
 τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ θυμὸν ἀμαρτη-
 27 θέντα; φευκτὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄμφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον 5
 ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη. Αἱ δὲ πράξεις τοῦ
 ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας. Ἀτοπον δὴ τὸ
 τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

1 II. Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου,

ought to feel anger and desire, and there can be no 'ought' in
 25 the case if we are then involuntary agents. (3) The actions
 we are considering are done with pleasure, whereas involun-
 26 tariness necessarily involves pain. (4) If wrong acts
 done deliberately are voluntary, and those done through anger
 and desire involuntary, how is it that, making no difference,
 we feel that we are to avoid the one as well as the other?
 27 And passion and reason being equally essential parts of human
 nature, and springs of human action, it is absurd to attempt
 this distinction between the acts which result from them.

CHAP. II.—*Deliberate Choice (προαίρεσις) is compounded of an
 element of impulse and an element of judgment.*

1 This explanation of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' clears Discussion
 2 the way for the discussion of Deliberate Choice, which obvi- of προαίρεσις
 introduced.

anything it is clearly a voluntary
 act to do it.

3. τί διαφέρει κ.τ.λ.] The
 words τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι belong in
 sense to 'τὰ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀμαρτη-
 θέντα' only. What difference is
 there between deliberate errors
 and errors of passion from the
 fact of the latter being (as it is
 argued) involuntary, since we

ought to avoid both kinds of
 error? If one class were volun-
 tary and the other involuntary,
 we should not have the same
 feeling about avoiding them
 both.

6. τὰ ἄλογα πάθη] i.e. τὰ κατὰ
 θυμὸν ἢ ἐπιθυμίαν, as opposed to
 τὰ κατὰ λογισμόν.

CHAP. II.—The object of this

περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι
 δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων.
 2 Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταυτόν δέ,
 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλεον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ
 παῖδες καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ 5
 τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ'
 3 οὐ. Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βού-
 λησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκόασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ

1. It is not
 merely an
 impulse,
 because—

(1) It is not
 the same as
 Desire.

3 ously is a particular case of voluntary action. i. Some consider deliberate choice to be a matter of impulse. If so, it must be either Desire, Spirit, or Wish, this being admitted as a complete list of our Impulses. (1) It is not the same as Desire, because—(a) Irrational animals have desires but do

chapter is to establish the compound character of προαίρεσις or deliberate choice, as consisting of an element of impulse and an element of judgment. This is done by proving that it is not identical with any sort of impulse singly, or of judgment singly. If it were identical with impulse, it must be either desire, spirit, or wish (these being assumed as an exhaustive classification of impulse (ὄρεξις), as Aristotle elsewhere (*De An.* II. iii. 2) explains). That it is not any of these, is shown in §§ 3—9. If it were identical with judgment (δόξα), or the expression of an opinion merely, it must be either judgment generally (δόξα ἀπλῶς), or judgment when exercised in a certain sphere, viz. matters of practical interest (δόξα τις). That this is not so is

shewn in §§ 10—15. It is then affirmed to be a choice resulting from deliberation, thus combining both impulse and judgment.

1. οἰκειότατον γὰρ] 'It (viz. προαίρεσις) appears to be very closely connected with Virtue, and to be a better test of moral character than actions.' The question whether the intention or the outward act is more important in morals is again referred to, X. viii. 5.

6. τὰ ἐξαίφνης] Acts done 'on the spur of the moment.'

7. The principal difference between ἐπιθυμία (for which 'desire' is too wide, and 'appetite' too narrow) and βούλησις, or 'wish,' is that ἐπιθυμία is in connexion with a body, while βούλησις is not. A spirit could experience βούλησις, but not ἐπιθυμία.

κοινὸν ἢ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ
 4 θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκράτης ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαι-
 ρούμενος δ' οὐ. ὁ ἐγκρατής δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος
 5 μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαίρεσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία
 ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπι- 5
 θυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ
 6 οὔθ' ἡδέος. Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυ-
 7 μὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ
 βούλησις γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον προαίρεσις
 μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φάινηται προαι- 10
 ρεῖσθαι, δοκοῖν αὖ ἡλίθιος εἶναι βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν

not act with deliberate choice. (This argument applies to
 4 Spirit also.) (b) The incontinent act in accordance with
 their desires, but against their deliberate choice; the con-
 5 tinent, *vice versâ*. (c) Desire is not opposed to desire, but
 to something else, viz. deliberate choice, which checks or
 resists it. (d) Desire is limited to what is pleasurable and
 6 painful, but deliberate choice is not. (2) Still less can it be (2) nor
 Spirit, for impetuous actions are the very last we should
 7 describe as done through deliberate choice. (3) It is not the (3) nor
 same as Wish, though not very dissimilar to it. (a) We may Wish.
 wish for impossibilities, but we cannot deliberately choose

4. The third argument seems to rest on the notion (found also in Plato) that conflict or opposition can only occur between two different parts of our constitution, e.g. between desire and reason, between impulse and resolution, etc., but that no department, whether that of reason or desire, or any other, can be 'divided against itself.' In fact, it follows from the 'law of contradiction' that nothing can do or suffer contraries at the same

time in reference to the same part of itself, etc. A similar argument was employed in I. xiii. 15, etc., to show the distinctness of the appetitive and rational parts of the soul. Also it should be remembered that ἐπιθυμία (as was explained above), like 'appetite,' implies a physical or bodily affection, such as thirst, hunger, etc., of which the statement in the text is clearly true.

7. For θυμός see *Suppl. Note*.

- 8 ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἂν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητὴν προαίρεται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὐτοῦ.
- 9 Ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει. ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τῷ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀληθεὶ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον.
- 11 Ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξη ταῦτόν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδεὶς. Ἀλλ'

8 them. (b) We may wish for things which, though not impossible, are out of our own power. (c) Wish refers to ends, deliberate choice to means. Hence deliberate choice is no sort of impulse singly. ii. Secondly, it is not judgment, or expression of opinion, merely. (a) Judgment or opinion may be on *all* subjects, whether in our power or out of it. (b) The excellence, or the reverse, of judgment consists in its being true or false to fact; that of deliberate choice in its being morally good or bad. It might however be thought to be

ii. It is not merely a judgment or opinion; either generally,

or limited to the sphere of morals and practice.

✓ 1. ἀθανασίας] 'exemption from death.' This, like vi. 6 (see note), is an allusion of too passing a kind to bear on the question of Aristotle's belief in a future state.

8. καὶ φαμέν] 'we use the expression wish to be happy;—an appeal to common language.

10. δόξα here stands for an intellectual decision, the mere pronouncing of an opinion as to a

fact, apart from any impulse or desire for action. Though it would be hardly supposed that προαίρεσις could be identical with this generally (§ 11), yet it might be thought identical with such an expression of opinion on practical or moral subjects. This is the δόξα τις or particular application of opinion referred to in §§ 11, etc.

οὐδέ τινι τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί
 12 τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν
 λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν
 ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς λαβεῖν ὃ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνν
 13 δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινέεται τῷ εἶναι οὐ 5
 δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ
 προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἂ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξά-
 14 ζομεν δὲ ἂ οὐ πάνν ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ
 προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἐνιοὶ δοξάζειν
 15 μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν ὃ αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἂ δεῖ. Εἰ 10
 δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ,
 οὐδὲν διαφέρει οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦμεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ταύτον

simply an expression of opinion *on subjects practical or moral*.

This is not the case, for (a) Character is formed by deliberate choice of good and evil, not by opinions on such subjects.

12 (b) Deliberate Choice relates to pursuing or avoiding, opinion
 13 relates to questions of fact. (c) The excellence of deliberate
 choice depends on its direction to right objects; that of
 opinion on its correctness in fact. (d) We deliberately choose
 what we know or feel sure about; we form opinions irrespec-
 14 tive of knowledge or certainty. (e) Excellence of deliberate
 choice and of opinion are not always united in the same per-
 15 sons, *e.g.* the incontinent. Whether correct opinion pre-
 cedescs or accompanies deliberate choice is unimportant, we

4. λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν] another
 appeal to the usage of language.

We do not speak of forming an
 opinion to pursue or avoid, but
 of forming a resolution or choice
 to do so.

6. ἡ is 'or,' not 'than,' as may
 be inferred from what was said
 in § 10, just above.

9. ἐνιοὶ] precisely the case of

the incontinent (ἀκρατεῖς). See
 § 4 above.

11. Aristotle here notices,
 without discussing, the interest-
 ing question whether correct
 views (δόξα) precede good reso-
 lutions (προαίρεσις), or *vice versa*;
 whether right knowledge usually
 leads to right practice, or right
 practice to right knowledge.

16 ἐστὶ δόξη τινί. Τί οὖν ἡ ποίουν τι ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν
 εἰρημένων οὐθέν; ἐκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἐκού-
 17 σιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἀλλ' ἄρά γε τὸ προβεβου-
 λευμένον; ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας.
 Ὑπόσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικε καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων
 αἰρετόν.

1 III. Βουλευόνται δὲ πρότερα περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βου-
 2 λευτόν ἐστίν, ἡ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ'
 ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος
 3 ἡ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. Περὶ δὲ τῶν
 αἰδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἡ τῆς
 4 διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ

16 only maintain that they are not identical. We have then ad-
 vanced thus far. Deliberate choice is voluntary and some-
 17 thing more. In fact, as the name indicates, it is 'a choice
 following upon deliberation.'

CHAP. III.—*The proper objects of Deliberation* (βούλευσις).

Proper
 objects
 of De-
 liberation
 determined.
 (§§ 1—11).

1, 2 We now inquire what are the proper objects for deliberation,
 which is, as we have seen, the first stage in deliberate choice.
 3 (1) *Negatively*, we do *not* deliberate about (a) Things eternal
 4 and immutable; (b) Things changeable, which change accord-

5. Thus the compound char-
 acter of deliberate choice is
 established, *choice* implying an
 element of impulse, *deliberation*
 an element of intellect or judg-
 ment.

CHAP. III.—Deliberate Choice
 having been shown in the last
 chapter to consist in choice after
 deliberation, we now inquire (1)
 what are the proper objects and
 limits of deliberation, and (2)

how its objects are related to, or
 distinguished from, those of the
 compound, deliberate choice?

12. *διαμέτρον κ.τ.λ.*] We do
 not deliberate about the incommensurability of the side and
 diameter of a square, because we
 cannot alter it. The diameter=
 the side $\times \sqrt{2}$, and as $\sqrt{2}$ can-
 not be exactly found, the dia-
 meter and side are incommensur-
 able.

περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ'
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον
 5 τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως,
 οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης,
 6 οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρω- 5
 πικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοντο
 οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν
 7 τούτων οὐθὲν δι' ἡμῶν. Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ'
 ἡμῶν πρακτῶν ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἴτια γὰρ

5 ing to a fixed law; (c) Things changeable, which change
 according to no discoverable law; (d) Things depending on
 6 pure chance where there can be no law; (e) In short anything
 whatever which is not in our own power. (2) *Positively*, we
 7 do deliberate (a) about things in our own power; and each

3. τροπῶν] 'solstices.' The
 accent shows that it comes from
 τροπή, not τρόπος.

9. αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσι κ.τ.λ.]
 This must be considered as a
 popular classification of causes
 familiar to his hearers (such
 current opinions being often
 introduced, as we have seen,
 by the verb δοκεῖν—see note
 on I. iii. 2), rather than one for
 which Aristotle would hold him-
 self responsible.

With this proviso, we may
 suppose the classification to have
 originated from the observation
 that causes naturally distin-
 guished themselves as either ir-
 rational or rational. The former
 were further divided into φύσις,
 ἀνάγκη, τύχη, perhaps on some
 such notion as the following:—

i. Some phenomena, varying

within fixed limits, seem to imply
 the existence of law, yet tem-
 pered, as it were, by some power
 behind it (φύσις), regulating and
 modifying its applications: e.g.
 The relations between seed and
 crop; the variations of hot, cold,
 wet or dry seasons, subject to
 the invariable distinction be-
 tween the seasons themselves;
 the preservation of the species in
 the reproduction of animals, not-
 withstanding endless minor dif-
 ferences in the individuals. Such
 operations would probably be as-
 signed to Nature (φύσις).

ii. Some events seem to recur
 under a law invariable and in-
 violable, as if it worked itself
 mechanically: e.g. The rising
 and setting of the sun, the suc-
 cession of summer and winter,
 day and night. Such phenomena

δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς
καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι
8 βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν. Καὶ περὶ
μὲν τὰς ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν οὐκ ἔστι
βουλὴ, οἷον περὶ γραμμάτων (οὐ γὰρ διστάζομεν πῶς 5
γραπτέον) ἀλλ' ὅσα γίνεται δι' ἡμῶν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δ'
ἂν, περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, οἷον περὶ τῶν κατὰ ἰα-
τρικὴν καὶ χρηματιστικὴν, καὶ περὶ κυβερνητικὴν μάλ-
9 λον ἢ γυμναστικὴν, ὅσῳ ἥττον διεκρίβωται, καὶ ἔτι περὶ

man about what is in *his* own power; (b) about the practical
8 arts and about some sciences, though not all (the amount of
9 deliberation being in inverse proportion to their precision), and,

would appear to be caused by
Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*).

iii. In other cases no law or
reason or method can be traced
by us in the sequence of events,
e.g. a 'windfall,' or a 'godsend,'
as we term it, or the production
of 'monsters.' Such occurrences
would be referred to Chance
(*τύχη*). Anaxagoras in fact de-
fined *τύχη* to be *ἄδηλος αἰτία*
ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ. Compare
Pope, 'All chance (is) direction
which thou canst not see.'

It is scarcely necessary to
point out that such distinctions
are unphilosophical, being liable
to disturbance upon every addi-
tion to our physical knowledge.
(For Aristotle's own view of
φύσις see Glossary p. liv.)

The class of rational causes is
subdivided into *νοῦς* and *πᾶν τὸ*
δι' ἀνθρώπου. The former appa-
rently refers to Intelligence or
Design as displayed in the physi-

cal world, which in a modern
system would be described as
Providence, or, still more per-
sonally, as God. *πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀν-*
θρώπου includes all results
brought about by human agency.
This last group alone falls within
the sphere of Deliberation.

4. *ἐπιστημῶν*] The word is used
loosely for knowledge generally,
including arts, for strictly speak-
ing it would follow from what
is said throughout the Chapter
that Deliberation is only con-
cerned with *practical* and not
theoretical subjects, and therefore
strictly speaking not with Sci-
ences but Arts only (see Glossary,
Art and Science). The instances
given by Aristotle of such *ἐπισ-*
τῆμαι as we do deliberate about,
viz. *ἰατρικὴ*, *κυβερνητικὴ*, *χρημα-*
τιστικὴ, are evidently in the strict
sense not *ἐπιστῆμαι* but *τέχναι*.

ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐταρκεῖς] *ἀκρι-*
βής means 'accurate' or 'pre-

τῶν λοιπῶν ὁμοίως, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἢ τὰς ἐπιστήμας· μᾶλλον γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰς διστάζομεν. Τὸ βουλευέσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺν, ἀδήλοις δὲ πῶς ἀποβήσεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιόριστον. Συμβούλους δὲ παραλαμβάνομεν εἰς τὰ μεγάλα, ἀπιστοῦντες ἡμῖν αὐ- 5 τοῖς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανοῖς διαγνῶναι. Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν ποιήσει, οὔδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὔδεις περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τὸ τέλος τὸ πῶς 10 καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσι, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κακεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευό- 15 μενος ἔοικε ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον

speaking generally, more in reference to arts than sciences, there being naturally more generalities and uncertainties in the former; (c) about means and not about ends. In short the process of deliberation is this:—Some end is set up which we desire to attain to. We consider the means by which it can be reached; and if there are several, which will be the easiest and best means. Having by choice or necessity settled upon some one means, we then consider how this means can be secured,

Analysis of
the process
of Delibera-
tion.

cise,' 'not subject to variations or uncertainties;' *αὐταρκής* 'independent of external circumstances or conditions.' *e.g.* The sciences of Anatomy, Harmonics, Geology are not *αὐταρκείς* in this sense, because each implies some special object-matter as the very condition of its existence as a

science. Geometry would be *αὐταρκής* as postulating nothing but the existence of space and figure; Arithmetic still more so as implying only the notions of succession and number.


14. *πρῶτον αἴτιον*] the first link in the chain of causation leading to the result desired.

- 12 ὥσπερ διάγραμμα. (Φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ, ἡ δὲ βούλευσις πᾶσα ζήτησις, καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει πρῶτον
 13 εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει.) Καὶ μὲν ἀδυνάτω ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται, οἷον εἰ χρημάτων δεῖ, ταῦτα δὲ μὴ οἷόν τε πορισθῆναι· ἐὰν δὲ δυνατόν φαίνεται, ἐγχειροῦσι πρᾶττειν. Δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν τὰ γὰρ διὰ τῶν

- and so on as long as may be necessary, until we arrive at some
 12 means in our own power. This last step in the deliberation is the first in the practical effort of securing the end desired. If some necessary means prove impossible to secure, the
 13 deliberation ceases and the project is abandoned. If on the other hand the means prove feasible, then too deliberation

1. ὥσπερ διάγραμμα] like a geometrical figure. We might take for an instance Eucl. i. 11. It is desired to draw a perpendicular to a given line from a given point in the line (θέμενοι τέλος τι).

(1) Asking ourselves what conditions will secure this (πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται), we observe that making the adjacent angles equal would do so.



(2) Next, how can we make the adjacent angles equal (πῶς διὰ τούτων ἔσται)? By causing them to be parts of two triangles

either with two sides and the included angles equal (Prop. 4), or with all three sides equal (Prop. 8).

(3) Choosing the latter as preferable (διὰ πλείονων μὲν φαινομένου διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα κ.τ.λ.), how can we secure a triangle with equal sides (κάκεινο διὰ τίνος)? We see this to be in our power by taking any points in AB, viz. D and E, equidistant from P, erecting on DE an equilateral triangle DFE (by Prop. 1) and joining FP.

The problem being thus brought back to steps within our power (ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ «πρῶτον αἷτιον»), our investigation is at an end (ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστι), and we at once proceed with the construction of the Proposition as given by Euclid, and thus 'ἔσχατον ἐν τῇ ἀναλύσει' becomes 'πρῶτον ἐν τῇ γενέσει.'

14 φίλων δι' ἡμῶν πως ἐστίν· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡμῖν. Ζητεῖ-
 ται δ' ὅτε μὲν τὰ ὄργανα, ὅτε δ' ἡ χρεία αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως
 δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ὅτε μὲν δι' οὗ, ὅτε δὲ πῶς ἢ διὰ
 15 τίνος. Ἔοικε δὴ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ἀρχὴν
 τῶν πράξεων· ἡ δὲ βουλὴ περὶ τῶν αὐτῷ πρακτῶν, αἱ 5
 16 δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη βουλευτὸν
 τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὐδὲ δὴ τὰ καθ'
 ἕκαστα, οἷον εἰ ἄρτος τοῦτο ἢ πέπεπται ὡς δεῖ· αἰσθή-
 σεως γὰρ ταῦτα. Εἰ δὲ αἰὲν βουλευσεται, εἰς ἀπειρον
 17 ἥξει. Βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτὸ, πλὴν ἀφω- 10
 ρισμένον ἤδη τὸ προαιρετόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς
 προκριθὲν προαιρετόν ἐστιν. Παύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζη-
 τῶν πῶς πράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχὴν, καὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγούμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.
 18 Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ἃς 15
 "Ομηρος ἐμμεῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ προέλοιντο ἀνήγ-

14 ceases and action begins. Sometimes deliberation seeks to
 15 discover instruments, sometimes the way to employ them (in
 all cases implying, as we have maintained before, that a man
 is the originating cause of his actions about which he delibe-
 16 rates), and it is concerned with means and not with ends; nor
 finally does it deal with questions of fact, which are matters
 of observation. Deliberation cannot of course be prolonged
 indefinitely, but must be terminated by decision or choice of
 19 means. The object of Deliberation and of Deliberate Choice

We can now
 distinguish
 Deliberation
 and Delibe-
 rate Choice.

4. ἔοικε δὴ] The process of deliberation affords another proof that man is the originating cause of his actions.

5. αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἄλλων ἕνεκα] Aristotle is of course speaking of such actions only as form subjects of deliberation.

14. προαιρούμενον is of course middle and not passive; 'that which chooses.'

16. The kings determine upon action, the people carry it out without further deliberation. So when προαίρεσις or τὸ προαιρούμενον which leads (τὸ ἡγούμενον)

- 19 γέλλον τῷ δῆμῳ. Ὀντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.
- 20 Ἡ μὲν οὖν προαίρεσις τύπῳ εἰρήσθω, καὶ περὶ ποιά ἔστι, καὶ ὅτι τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη·
- I IV. Ἡ δὲ βούλησις ὅτι μὲν τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶν εἶρηται, δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου

are therefore the same, except that the latter is already resolved upon as the *result* of the deliberation. When the choice is made, the deliberation ceases.

- 20 Thus we define deliberate choice to be 'a choice following upon deliberation of something in our power.'

CHAP. IV.—*The proper objects of Wish (βούλησις).*

The proper objects of Wish (βούλησις) have been thought to be either what is really good or whatever *pro temp.* appears good.

I As we should not deliberate about *means*, unless we had first conceived of some *end* as desirable, we next inquire into the nature of that faculty, viz. 'wish' or 'desire,' which sets

'in this little kingdom, man,' has made its decision, deliberation is over and action succeeds.

I. βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ] This recalls the compound character of προαίρεσις described in ch. ii., βουλευτοῦ indicating the intellectual, and ὀρεκτοῦ the impulsive, element of the compound process.

CHAP. IV.—In this Chapter we inquire into the nature of the faculty which sets up the *end* in the first instance as desirable, with a view to which end deliberation (βούλευσις) discusses the *means*, and deliberate choice (προαίρεσις) decides upon them.

In other words we ask what are the proper objects of wish (βούλησις)? Thus every deliberate act implies the three stages βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις. See Glossary, s.v. προαίρεσις.

This Chapter contains a criticism of the two extreme theories, (1) that the objects of wish are things really good, and so, ultimately, the Absolute or Chief Good (Plato); (2) that they are anything that appear at the time good (the Sophists), and also a solution of the question by Aristotle upon an intermediate ground, since the former theory contradicts facts, and the latter, feelings.

2 ἀγαθοῦ. Συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς μὲν τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθὸν
λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι βουλευτὸν ὃ βούλεται ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς αἰ-
ρούμενος (εἰ γὰρ ἔσται βουλευτὸν, καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἦν δ',
3 εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, κακόν), τοῖς δ' αὖ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν
τὸ βουλευτὸν λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι φύσει βουλευτὸν, ἀλλ' 5
ἐκάστω τὸ δοκοῦν· ἄλλο δ' ἄλλῳ φαίνεται, καὶ εἰ οὕτως
4 ἔτυχε, τάναντία. Εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἄρα φα-
τέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι τὰγα-
θόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίῳ
τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἶναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλῳ τὸ τυχόν, ὥσπερ 10
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς μὲν εὖ διακειμένοις ὑγιεινά
ἔστι τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιαῦτα ὄντα, τοῖς δ' ἐπινόσοις
ἕτερα. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ
βαρέα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστα· ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα

2 such ends before us. Two views present themselves:—i. That the objects of desire are really good. ii. That they are whatever may appear to each individual to be good. We object to the first, that it contradicts facts, as men obviously do desire
3 what is bad; and to the second, that it seems to deny that
4 there are objects *per se* desirable, and *vice versa*. The truth seems to be that as when we speak of things being wholesome and so on we mean wholesome to those whose *bodies* are in a healthy state, so also when we speak of things being desirable, we mean such things as are objects of desire to those whose *minds* are well regulated. Thus we escape both the above objections: we maintain that there are things naturally and *per se*

Under certain limitations the former is true.

1. τὰγαθόν] The Chief Good was, according to Plato, the ultimate object of all wish or desire, because all that was good in any lower objects was derived from, and limited to, their participation in the Chief Good. See note on I. iv. 3.

10. ὥσπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle's argument is, that all relative terms whatsoever present the same difficulty, if we are to take account of individual exceptions and abnormal circumstances.

14. σπουδαῖος] See note on I. viii. 13.

κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται.
 5 Καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ
 διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν
 ἐκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν. Τοῖς
 πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι οὐ 5
 6 γὰρ οὕσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. Αἰροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς
 ἀγαθὸν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν.
 1 V. "Οντος δὴ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ

5 desirable, and that in the midst of the aberrations and per-
 versions of individual men, who simply follow pleasure and
 6 avoid pain, the desires of the good man are an index to us of
 what is thus naturally and *per se* desirable.

CHAP. V.—*A refutation of the theory that Virtue is voluntary,
 but Vice involuntary.*

Virtue
and Vice
are equally
voluntary.

1 Now we have seen that the choice of means to a given end
 is both voluntary and a matter of deliberate choice, conse-

1. τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται] Thus the real standard is an absolute and not a relative one. The σπουδαῖος does not fix the standard, but his known conformity to the standard enables us to use him as a substitute for it. Similarly it is not the barometer but the pressure of the atmosphere which regulates the weather; the barometer is only a convenient index of the phenomena which it does not itself influence. It is in this restricted sense, therefore, that the σπουδαῖος is said in l. 4 to be κανὼν καὶ μέτρον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. Compare, 'He that is spiritual judgeth all things.'

CHAP. V.—Aristotle concludes

this part of his subject with a sort of supplementary Chapter to refute a theory which, owing to Plato's advocacy, had obtained considerable prominence, viz. that Virtue is voluntary but Vice involuntary. The theory seems to have arisen thus:—In all cases of right or wrong action where a conscious struggle takes place, the two alternatives are presented to us, present pleasure involving future pain and regret, or present pain (of self-denial) with subsequent pleasure and satisfaction. Thus it becomes a matter for calculation, Is the present pleasure so great as to counterbalance the future pain? Is it so great as to make it worth

καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μὴ, καὶ τὸ ναί' 5 ὥστ' εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὴ

quently the practice of Virtue involving (as we have seen) a deliberate choice of means must be voluntary, and so likewise we maintain must Vice be voluntary. This latter point being

while to risk the consequences? If a man decides that it is, and does wrong accordingly, he has simply (it is argued) made a mistake in his calculation, he has committed an error of judgment merely, and all wrong-doing, since it arises out of such a mistake, is therefore involuntary. No one ever deliberately chooses anything but what *at the time* appears to him the better choice (τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν as we read in i. 6), and what is more, he cannot help its so appearing to him (see § 17 of this Chapter) any more than he can help an object's appearing red or green to him. Thus when a man chooses the right he chooses knowingly and voluntarily for the best: when he chooses the wrong he chooses it still under a mistaken impression that he is choosing for the best: he acts under an illusion and therefore involuntarily.

There seem to be four main arguments in the Chapter:—

(1) §§ 2—4. An *argumentum ad*

hominem against the position of those half-necessitarians who maintain that though Vice is involuntary, Virtue is voluntary.

(2) §§ 5—16. Against the more logical and thorough-going necessitarians who argue that *all* our actions, virtuous as well as vicious, are merely the necessary result of causes and circumstances external to ourselves.

(3) §§ 17, 18. Against the principal argument by which the half-necessitarians supported their position.

(4) §§ 19, 20. Against a modified form of the same argument.

1. *περὶ ταῦτα* in l. 1 obviously refers to 'means' (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος). *περὶ ταῦτα* in l. 3 must have the same reference, and the argument is, that as the exercise of Virtue involves the choice of means, it must be voluntary. This, however, is generally admitted, and the purpose of the Chapter is rather to show that the same inference applies to Vice.

πράττειν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πρᾶτ-
 τειν καλὸν ὄν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν αἰσχρὸν ὄν ἐφ'
 3 ἡμῖν. Εἰ δ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πρᾶττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ,
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πρᾶττειν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς
 καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις
 4 εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς

οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ,

ἔοικε τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δ' ἀληθεῖ· μακάριος μὲν γὰρ
 5 οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιον. Ἡ τοῖς γε νῦν
 εἰρημένοις ἀμφισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον 10

i. 'That
 Virtue is
 voluntary
 and Vice
 involuntary'
 refuted.
 (§§ 2—4).

3, 4

disputed, we prove it as follows:—i. If it is in our own power to act, it must also be in our own power not to act (else our action was not really in our power but was compulsory), and *vice versa*. Now if acting (or not acting) in any case be right, the reverse would be wrong. Consequently if to do right is in our power, so also is to do wrong: in a word, if
 5 Virtue is voluntary, so is Vice. ii. If, in order to escape this conclusion, it be denied outright that man is himself the

ii. The more
 general posi-
 tion 'That
 our actions
 originate in
 causes be-
 yond our
 control'
 refuted
 (§§ 5—16)

4. ἦν = 'this was admitted to constitute our being good or bad.' ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς is in attraction with ἐφ' ἡμῖν. See another instance of ἦν thus used in viii. 14.

9. τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρημένοις refers to the previous conclusions about the voluntary nature of βούλευσις and προαίρεσις, with the assertion of which this Chapter opens.

Aristotle now turns to the more thorough-going and more logical position that *all* our actions, good and bad alike, are the *necessary* result of our condition and circumstances; in other

words, that we are not free and responsible agents at all. His first argument against it consists in what is called 'shifting the burden of proof.' It is not for those who *accept*, but for those who *deny*, what is *prima facie* true, to bring arguments in support of their position. The *prima facie* truth in this case is that man himself originates his own acts, and until some other origin for them can be proved, we have a right, without further argument, to maintain that he does so originate them. Hence φαίνεται is emphatic.

ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ
 6 τέκνων. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας
 ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὧν καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν
 7 ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσια. Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε
 μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν 5
 νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρώοντας
 μοχθηρὰ, ὅσοι μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἥς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι,
 τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προ-
 τρέφοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. Καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ'
 ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, 10
 ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὃν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ
 ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ
 8 ἦττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν

6 originating cause of his acts either good or bad, (1) we reply (1) by throw-
 that it rests with those who deny what is to all appearance the ing the
 case to suggest some other cause, and if they cannot, we infer burden of
 without further proof that a man does originate his acts, and proof on the
 7 if so, that they are voluntary. (2) We appeal to the universal opponents.
 practice of mankind in private and in public life, which by (2) By ap-
 rewards and punishments encourages to virtuous, and dis- pealing to,
 courages from vicious, acts. This proves at least that man- the practice
 kind generally consider both virtuous and vicious acts to be of mankind
 8 in our power. (3) So far are mankind at large from regard- in-rewarding
 ing how they punish ignorance itself
 if avoidable

4. The second and third arguments consist in an appeal to the universal practice and belief of mankind. This further strengthens the assertion made by φαίνεται as explained in the last note, and serves to show that the opponents fly in the face not only of what is *prima facie* true, but also of what is universally believed and acted upon. (See *Supplementary Notes*.)

6. *κόλασις* and *τιμωρία* differ in that *κόλασις* is punishment for the sake of him who suffers it, that he may reform: *τιμωρία* is punishment for the sake of him who inflicts it, that he may be revenged. The idea of the former is 'chastisement,' that of the latter, 'vengeance.'

13. καὶ γὰρ] 'and what is more:' introducing a still more cogent proof.

κολάζουσιν, εὖν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ κύριος γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. Καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντάς τι τῶν ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, ἃ δεῖ 9 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μὴ χαλεπά ἐστι, κολάζουσιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἀγνοεῖν δοκοῦσιν, ὥς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὃν τὸ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι 10 κύριοι. Ἄλλ' ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. Ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως, καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκους ἢ ἀκολάστους εἶναι, οἱ μὲν 11 κακουργοῦντες, οἱ δὲ ἐν πότοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις διάγοντες· αἱ γὰρ περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνέργειαι τοιούτους ποιοῦ- 12 σιν. Τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν ἢ πρᾶξιν διατελοῦσι γὰρ ἐνεργοῦντες. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις 13 γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα 14 ἀκόλαστον. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν

ing ignorance as rendering Vice involuntary and therefore excusable, that they even punish for ignorance itself, whenever it is such as could have been avoided. e.g. (a) Double penalties for offences committed in drunkenness. (b) Punishments for not knowing an offence to be forbidden by the law.

- 9, 10 (c) Or for any other sort of careless ignorance. (d) Or even for ignorance through incapacity if the incapacity be the result of previous Vice; for single acts repeated form permanent habits. Every one who is not a downright idiot *must* know 11 this much from daily experience, and it cannot avail to say 12 13 that he did not wish it to be so in his case: nor does it follow 14

1. τοῖς μεθύουσι κ.τ.λ.] a law facti non nocet.' of Pittacus of Mytilene.

12. αἱ γὰρ περὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'Actions of any kind make us similar in character.' See II. ii. 8.

ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη, οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε βού-
 ληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής. Καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχε, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρα-
 τῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. Τότε μὲν οὖν
 ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' 5
 ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατόν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως
 ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥίψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐπ' αὐτῷ.
 Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν
 ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γενέσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομέ-
 νους δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστι μὴ εἶναι. Οὐ μόνον δ' αἱ τῆς 10
 ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ
 σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν
 αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ
 ἀμέλειαν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν·
 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσκειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ 15
 πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ
 6 ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ
 σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν

that he can arrest the formation of the habit at any step after
 the first. The first steps of moral, as often of physical, disease
 are voluntary, and though its progress soon passes out of our
 power, yet as we are responsible for its beginning, we are also
 15 answerable for all that it afterwards becomes. (e) The same
 remarks apply to bodily defects, which we pity if of natural
 or accidental growth, but visit with reproach if traceable to
 16 neglect, excess, or any other avoidable causes, and we may
 reasonably suppose that defects of body and of soul are blamed
 on the same principle, viz. when men believe them to be

1. οὐ μὴν εἰάν γε κ.τ.λ.] 'It does not however follow that if,'
 etc. προιέσθαι is the word used for
 squandering money in IV. i.,
 etc.

5. προεμένῳ] 'When he has
 etc.

οὐ. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν
 17 κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν. Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες
 ἐφείνται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ
 κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ
 τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς 5
 ἑξέως ἐστὶ πῶς αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πῶς
 αὐτὸς αἷτιος· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐθεὶς αὐτῷ αἷτιος τοῦ κακὰ
 ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοίαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ
 τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσσεσθαι· ἢ δὲ τοῦ

iii. The argu- 17
 ment 'that
 we are not re-
 sponsible for
 the impressions
 which external
 objects make
 upon us, nor
 therefore for
 acting accord-
 ingly, is re-
 futed
 (1) by denying
 its truth;
 (2) by showing
 that it proves
 too much, as
 it applies to
 Virtue as well
 as Vice.

voluntary. iii. It is sometimes argued, 'We all desire what appears to us good, and we are not responsible for the appearance presented, or impression made upon us, by external objects.' To this we reply (1) that if we are responsible for our general condition, we must be so in some sense for the impression which things make upon us, for this depends upon our condition to a great extent; (2) if we are not so responsible, then all that our opponents say is true: we are not

2. εἰ δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] The argument now returns to the first class of opponents who maintain that Virtue is voluntary and Vice involuntary, and it attacks the favourite argument on which they mainly relied. This was explained in the note at the commencement of this Chapter.

3. φαντασία here has its original signification of 'appearance,' and is little more than a repetition of φαινομένου just before.

5. Observe the alternatives εἰ μὲν οὖν . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ. The consequences following on the latter supposition are enumerated as far as the end of § 17, and the results of those consequences as

bearing on the argument in hand are introduced by εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθὴ in § 18.

6. ἕξις has the simple meaning of 'state' or 'condition.' The impression which things make on us, morally as well as physically, depends very much on our condition, and for this we are in some degree (πῶς) responsible. Compare Butler: 'When we say that men are misled by external circumstances of temptation, it cannot but be understood that there is somewhat within themselves to render those circumstances temptations, or to render them susceptible of impressions from them' (Anal. p. 78. ed. Angus).

τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ
 ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἣ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγα-
 θὸν αἰρήσεται· καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ὧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυ-
 κεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ' ἐτέρου
 μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφν, τοιοῦτον 5
 ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία
 8 καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ,
 τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν
 γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ
 ὅπως δῆποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' 10
 9 ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὅπως δῆποτε. Εἴτε δὲ τὸ τέλος
 μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω φαίνεται οἷον δῆποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ'

responsible if we do wrong; the choice of the ends at which
 we aim depends on our nature and constitution, not on our-
 selves; and a right tendency in this respect will constitute the
 8 highest perfection of natural gifts. But all this applies just
 as much to the choice of good ends as of bad ones. It removes
 the credit of our good acts as well as the blame of our bad
 acts. In a word, it proves Virtue to be as involuntary as Vice.

9 iv. It is a slight modification of the last argument to maintain

iv. The argu-
 ment that
 Virtue is

1. φύναι is emphatic. 'One must be born with, as it were, a sense of sight by which,' etc. If a man is born colour-blind he cannot help seeing things differently from other people; he is not master of the appearance presented to him (τῆς φαντασίας οὐ κύριος). So, it is argued by the opponents, moral, like physical, impressions depend on purely natural causes beyond our control.

4. τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον κ.τ.λ.] Understand ἐστὶ. 'For it is that which is greatest and noblest, and that which none can (μὴ?)

receive or learn from another, but as it is born with him so he will always have it.' We might also understand ἔχει or ἔξει before τὸ μέγιστον, and so avoid the change of nominative in the above rendering.

11. Εἴτε δὲ introduces Aristotle's own view; εἴτε τὸ μὲν (in l. 1, p. 144) that of the opponents, which he proceeds to refute; οὐθὲν ἦττον, the apodosis to both suppositions.

12. παρ' αὐτὸν] 'depending on himself.' Arnold (note on Thuc. i. 141. 9) compares the English

- αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ
 πράττειν ἐκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴν ἐκούσιον
 ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἥττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως
 γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
 20 καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκού- 5
 σιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως
 αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε
 τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.
 21 Κοινῇ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν εἴρηται ἡμῖν τό τε
 γένος τύπῳ, ὅτι μεσότητές εἰσιν, καὶ ὅτι ἕξεις, ὑφ' ὧν 10
 τε γίνονται, ὅτι τούτων πρακτικαὶ καὶ καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ
 ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἂν ὁ ὀρθὸς
 22 λόγος προστάξῃ. Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί

voluntary in
 the choice of
 means even
 if we are not
 responsible
 for the end,
 is shown , 20
 to apply
 equally
 to Vice.

that while the *end* (or the appearance of things to us as desir-
 able) is fixed for us by natural causes, whether it be good or
 bad, yet that there is scope for the voluntariness of Virtue in
 the right choice of the *means*. To this we reply at once that
 20 the wrong choice of means, which would constitute Vice, is
 equally voluntary. Our position is now proved, that if Virtue
 is voluntary so also is Vice voluntary.

Recapitula-
 tion.

- 21 The point we have now reached is this:—We have asserted
 Virtues to be mean states; we have shown how they are
 formed, and that they are in our own power and voluntary,
 22 and under the guidance of reason. The states or habits it is

vulgarism 'along of himself.'
 Cf. vi. 11. παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν
 'depending on their experience.'

1. φυσικόν] 'fixed by nature.'
 τὰ λοιπὰ 'all the rest,' i.e. the
 means to the end.

6. συναίτιοι] 'partly responsible
 for.' Notice that Aristotle ad-
 mits that our habits are to
 some extent the result of causes
 over which we have no control.

7. τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι κ.τ.λ.]
 'The condition in which we are
 regulates the character of the
 end which we set before us.'

8. ὁμοίως γάρ] sc. ἔχουσι,
 'they are on the same footing.'

10. ὑφ' ὧν τε γίνονται] This
 refers to such passages as II. i. 6,
 II. ii. 8, etc.

11. τούτων πρακτικὰ καθ' αὐ-
 τὰς] Explained by II. ii. 8.

εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἢν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτω χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι. 5

1 VI. Ἀναλαβόντες δὴ περὶ ἐκάστης, εἰπώμεν τίνες εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ποῖα καὶ πῶς· ἅμα δ' ἔσται δῆλον καὶ πόσαι
2 εἰσὶν. Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἥδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὴ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς 10 ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσ-

true are not voluntary in the same sense as the single acts which form them. As however their beginnings, though not the subsequent stages of their growth, are in our own power, the habits themselves are really in our own power.

CHAP. VI.—*The proper sphere and objects of Courage.*

1 Proceeding now to the consideration of the Virtues in
2 detail, we commence with Courage. This we have already described as a mean state in regard to Fear and Confidence. Fear may be defined as the anticipation of Evil of any kind,

Courage, though it is, speaking generally, a due moderation of fear, does not relate to *all* objects of fear,

CHAP. VI.—We now return to a discussion of the Virtues in detail as given in the (presumed) exhaustive Catalogue of II. vii., in order to show how the law of the relative mean is applicable to every Virtue in detail, and so to justify its prominent position in our Definition of Virtue as a whole.

The discussion of Courage occupies four Chapters, of which the subjects are as follows:—

vi. The proper sphere and objects of Courage.

vii. Courage considered as a mean state, and in reference to its motive, together with the related Excess and Defect.

viii. The distinction between genuine and spurious Courage, of which latter five types are described.

ix. Courage, though involving pain and loss, is no exception to the rule that all Virtue has pleasure in itself.

- 3 *δοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακὰ, οἷον*
ἀδοξίαν, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον· ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ
πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἓνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖ-
σθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὸν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν
γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβού- 5
4 *μενος ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ*
μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρεῖ· ἄφοβος
γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δ' ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖ-
σθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι'
αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. Λέ- 10
γομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς
πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ
5 *πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ*
εἰ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον
ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων 15
6 *μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν*
ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα ; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετι-
κώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας

- 3 but we speak of Courage in reference to *some* only of the
4 objects of fear. *e.g.* We do not call a man courageous for
5 having no fear of disgrace, poverty, sickness, insults to
himself or his friends, envy, or even bodily chastisement.
6 Though the term Courage may sometimes be applied to
these cases, yet, strictly speaking, it has reference only to the

16. *μαστιγοῦσθαι*] Probably in allusion to slaves or criminals making a show of indifference when about to be flogged. This Aristotle would regard not as bravery but bravado. It would not involve *ἀλκή* or *καλόν*. (§ 12.)

17. After *ὑπομενετικώτερος* supply *ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἄφοβος*.

18. *πέρας γὰρ*] This passage is

sometimes quoted as a proof that Aristotle had no belief in any sort of life after death. He seems however here to be speaking popularly in reference to the circumstances and prospects of ordinary life, and therefore the passage cannot fairly be pressed into the above controversy.

γὰρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὐτ' ἀγαθὸν οὔτε
7 κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν
παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος εἶναι, οἷον εἰ ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ ἐν νόσοις.
8 Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ
ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. 5
9 Ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
10 καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὲ λέγοντ' ἂν ἀνδρείος
ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεῆς, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπι-
φέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλε-
11 μων. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεῆς 10
ὁ ἀνδρείος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀπεγνώκασιν τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον
δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.
12 Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀπο-
θανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει. 15

greatest of dangers, and such, from its absolute finality, is
7 Death. But we limit Courage still further to death of a noble
8 kind (excluding, *e.g.* death in shipwreck or disease), in fact, but only to
10 strictly speaking, to death (and circumstances which threaten the greatest,
death) *in war*, for this is admitted to be the noblest of all viz. Death,
11 deaths. Of course the brave man will be brave in all the and especi-
other cases that we have mentioned, but in its strict applica- ally to death
tion Courage is limited to death and danger in war, and cases in battle.
where there is some service or some glory to be gained by death.

9. ὑπόγυιος is literally 'under the hand' (γυῖον), and so 'handy,' or 'near at hand.' It is otherwise explained as = 'sudden.' In that case comp. viii. 15. (See *Suppl. Notes*.)

11. οἱ μὲν = οἱ ἀνδρείοι, οἱ δὲ = οἱ θαλάττιοι. The courage of sailors is often due to the familiarity of experience. On this kind of courage see further viii.

6, 9. The courage of the truly brave man is shown in that, though he despairs of safety and hates the notion of such an inglorious death, still he will meet it without flinching.

14. ἀνδρίζονται] 'they also play the man,' or 'actively display courage.' On the force of the middle voice cf. note on ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι in X. viii. 6. There seems

- 1 VII. Τὸ δὲ φοβερὸν οὐ πᾶσι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ, λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν παντὶ φοβερὸν τῷ γε νοῦν ἔχοντι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄνθρωπον διαφέρει μεγέθει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.
- 2 'Ο δὲ ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Φοβήσεται μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὡς δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγος ὑπομενεῖ, τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.
- 3 Ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ ἔτι 4 τὰ μὴ φοβερά ὡς τοιαῦτα φοβεῖσθαι. Γίνεται δὲ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ 10 ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ 5 θαρραλέα. 'Ο μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ καὶ οὐ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν,

CHAP. VII.—*Courage considered as a mean state, with its related excess and defect.*

Courage in its objects, degrees, and occasions is regulated by Reason and stimulated by desire for the ideally noble (τὸ καλόν). §§ 1—6.)

- 1 The objects of terror and its degree differ with different individuals, though some things there are which no human being 2 in his right senses could regard without terror. Within these limits of human endurance the truly brave man is unshaken; 3, 4 his confidence as well as his fears, in respect of their objects, degrees, and occasions (in all of which points error is possible), being regulated by Reason, and his motive being always (as in 5 all the other virtues) the ideally noble. Such are the charac-

to be a sort of *a fortiori* comparison of καὶ ἀνδρίζονται with the more passive condition ἀδεής ἐστι in the last section. Observe also that some force is due to the connexion both in etymology and thought between ἀνδρίζομαι and ἀνδρεία.

ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκή] Either 'where there is opportunity for the display of prowess:' or (as

in the analysis) 'some defence or security for others,' which is the case in war when a man dies to defend his country: in fact = βοήθεια, as elsewhere in Aristotle.

5. ὡς ἄνθρωπος] i.e. within human limits, as far as a man can be. Cf. μακαρίους δὲ ἀνθρώπους in I. x. 16, and the note on ὡς ἀλαζῶν in IV. vii. 11.

ἀνδρείος· κατ' ἀξίαν γὰρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πᾶσχει
 6 καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρείος. Τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ
 τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν. Καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν.
 Τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ τέλος· (ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ
 τέλει). Καλοῦ δὲ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρείος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει 5
 7 τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ
 ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρότερον ὅτι
 πολλά ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), εἷη δ' ἂν τις μαινόμενος ἢ ἀνάλ-
 γητος, εἰ μὴθὲν φοβοῖτο, μήτε σεισμὸν μήτε τὰ κύματα,

6 teristics of Courage. And not only the formed habit, but also
 each individual act of Courage, will be guided by this one
 motive, the attainment of the ideally noble.

7 Now both confidence and fear admit of excess. Excess of fear-
 lessness (if we may so speak) *i.e.* a total absence of fear under

The Excess
 and Defect
 are Rash-
 ness and
 Cowardice.
 (§§ 7—12.)

2. The following points should be noticed in explaining this difficult section. (1) There is a marked opposition between ἐνέργεια (act) and ἔξις (habit) on which the argument turns. Compare IV. ii. 6 for a similar antithesis and somewhat similar argument. (2) ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει is a parenthetical argument (or prosyllogism) supporting one of the premisses of the main syllogism. The main argument is:—

{ The end of the formed habit (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν (τέλος)) is also the end of each individual act (πάσης ἐνεργείας). τὸ καλόν is the end of the formed habit of Courage (τοιοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὸ τέλος). Therefore it is the end of each act of Courage (καλοῦ δὲ ἕνεκα κ.τ.λ.).

The parenthesis supports the minor premiss thus:—

{ That which characterizes anything is its end (ὀρίζεται ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει). τὸ καλόν characterizes the habit of Courage (τῷ ἀνδρείῳ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν). Therefore τὸ καλόν is the end of the habit of Courage (τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ τέλος).

6. The complication of the extremes here is rather confusing. In *theory* four (*viz.* Excess of Confidence, Defect of Confidence, Excess of Timidity, Defect of Timidity), in *fact* they reduce to two. For Excess of Confidence and Defect of Timidity are the same, and constitute Rashness; while Defect of Confidence and Excess of Timidity are also identical, and constitute Cowardice. See further, note on II. vii. 2.

- καθάπερ φασὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. Ὁ δὲ τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερ-
 8 βάλλων περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ θρασύς. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν
 εἶναι ὁ θρασὺς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. Ὡς οὖν
 ἐκεῖνος περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει, οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται
 9 φαίνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμεῖται. Διὸ καὶ εἰσὶν 5
 οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν θρασυδείλοι· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ θρασυνό-
 10 μενοι τὰ φοβερὰ οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν. Ὁ δὲ τῷ φοβεῖσθαι
 ὑπερβάλλων δειλός· καὶ γὰρ ἂ μὴ δεῖ καὶ ὥς οὐ δεῖ,
 καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτῷ. Ἐλλείπει δὲ
 καὶ τῷ θαρρεῖν ἄλλ' ἐν ταῖς λύπαις ὑπερβάλλων μάλ- 10
 11 λον καταφανής ἐστιν. Δύσελπις δὴ τις ὁ δειλός· πάντα
 γὰρ φοβεῖται. Ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἐναντίως· τὸ γὰρ θαρ-
 12 ρεῖν εὐέλπιδος. Περὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὃ τε δειλὸς
 καὶ ὁ θρασὺς καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος, διαφόρως δ' ἔχουσι πρὸς
 αὐτά· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν, ὁ δὲ 15

- all circumstances, exists rather in idea than in fact. Excess of
 8 confidence gives rise to the extreme of Rashness. The Rash
 man has also a tendency to swagger, and he makes an ostenta-
 tion of Courage. To secure the reputation of Courage, for which
 he is anxious, he imitates its external signs as far as he can.
 9 In real danger however such characters are often found want-
 10 ing. Excess of timidity (which implies defect of confidence)
 gives rise to the other extreme of Cowardice, which is mani-
 11 fested by over-sensitiveness to pain and by despondency.
 12 Thus Rashness, Cowardice, and Courage relate to the same
 objects and circumstances; but Rashness and Cowardice
 manifest excess and defect, while Courage is a mean state,
 respecting them. We might add that *before* the danger comes

4. ἐκεῖνος, i.e. ἀνδρείος. οὗτος, i.e. ὁ θρασύς.

6. θρασυδείλοι] Falstaff would be a familiar example. See especially *Henry IV.*, Part I. Act ii. Sc. 4; Act v. Sc. 4, etc.

ἐν τούτοις] i.e. ἐν οἷς δύναται.

9. 'The coward is also deficient in confidence, but his character is more usually displayed by an excessive sensibility to pain.' Cf. x. 1 (fin.), xi. 5.

μέσως ἔχει καὶ ὥς δεῖ καὶ οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων, ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι.

13 Καθάπερ οὖν εἴρηται, ἡ ἀνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, ἐν οἷς εἴρηται, καὶ ὅτι καλὸν αἰρεῖται 5 καὶ ὑπομένει, ἢ ὅτι αἰσχροὺς τὸ μή. Τὸ δ' ἀποθνήσκειν

the Rash are eager, the Brave are calm; in the danger the Brave are full of energy, the Rash fall away altogether.

13 It will follow from what we have said that Suicide is an act of Cowardice rather than of Courage. For the Suicide

Suicide is rather a case of Cowardice than of Courage.

1. Tacitus (*Hist.* i. 68) describes the Helvetii in very similar words as being 'ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidī,' and (in *Hist.* i. 84) he generalizes, as Aristotle does in this passage, 'Fortissimus in ipso discrimine exercitus qui ante discrimen quietissimus.' Compare the well-known description in Homer, *Il.* iii. 1-9, of the Greek host advancing in silence to the battle.

5. ἐν οἷς εἴρηται] in reference to the limitations introduced in ch. vi.

καὶ ὅτι καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'And it chooses and endures them (viz. φοβερά), because it is honourable to do so.' On this point see § 6.

6. The views of the ancients on Suicide (mixed up as the question must be with that of the nature of the Soul, Death, and a Future State) were very different from our own. It was allowed and even advocated by men of the highest moral character, and of great philosophical reputation, especially by the Stoics.

Those who condemned it did so generally on one or other of these three grounds:—

(1) On political grounds. Suicide deprived the state of services which it had a right to claim. Aristotle urges this in *V. xi.* 1-3. The Stoics admitted that Suicide was wrong when this result could be shown to be involved in it. Hadrian regarded the suicide of a Roman soldier as equivalent to desertion.

(2) On the ground that it was an act of cowardice, as Aristotle argues in this passage. So Seneca, 'It is folly to die for fear of death,' and Ovid:—

Rebus in adversis facile est contemnere vitam;

Fortiter ille facit qui miser esse potest.

(3) Less seldom on the usual modern ground that it amounts to an abandonment of a post of duty in which God has placed us. This was the point of view of Plato (see *Phædo*, etc.) and his successors, also of Pythagoras (*Cic. de Senect.* xx. § 73), who

φεύγοντα πενίαν ἢ ἔρωτα ἢ τι λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἀνδρείου, ἀλλὰ μάλλον δειλοῦ· μαλακία γὰρ τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπί-
ποννα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι καλὸν ὑπομένει, ἀλλὰ φεύγων κακόν.

- I VIII. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀνδρεία τοιούτων τι, λέγονται
δὲ καὶ ἕτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ πολι- 5
τική· μάλιστα γὰρ ἔοικεν δοκοῦσι γὰρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς
κινδύνους οἱ πολῖται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ
2 τὰ ὀνειδέη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνδρεϊότατοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι παρ' οἷς οἱ δειλοὶ ἄτιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι
ἔντιμοι. Τοιούτους δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, οἷον τὸν Διο- 10
μήδην καὶ τὸν Ἑκτορα.

Πουλυδάμας μοι πρῶτος ἐλεγχέην ἀναθήσει·
καὶ Διομήδης,

Ἐκτωρ γάρ ποτε φήσκει ἐνὶ Τρώεσσ' ἀγορεύων
"Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμείο."

15

faces death not because it is noble, but because he regards death as a less evil than that from which he seeks to escape.

CHAP. VIII.—*Spurious forms of Courage described.*

Five spuri-
ous forms
of Courage
arise sever-
ally from
i. Fear of
society.
This may be
due to either
moral com-
pulsion,

- I In contrast with genuine Courage now described, there
are five spurious forms which must be distinguished from it.
1. *The courage of compulsion*, which may perhaps be called
2 'Social' courage, because it arises from fear of society. Its
nobler type is that which is due to fear of loss of character,
or of the good opinion of those among whom we live, or even
3 to the influence of the rewards and punishments by which

'forbids a man to desert his post without the order of his commander, who is God.'

(Several other quotations from ancient moralists will be found in Lecky, *Hist. Eur. Morals*, i. p. 223, etc.)

3. ὑπομένει] Understand θάνατον from the general sense of the context. See vi. 12.

15. The whole line runs, Π. viii. 149 :

Τυδείδης ὑπ' ἐμείο φοβεύμενος ἔκετο νῆας.

Thus the Courage of Dio-

3 Ὡμοίωται δ' αὕτη μάλιστα τῇ πρότερον εἰρημένῃ, ὅτι
 δι' ἀρετὴν γίνεται δι' αἰδῶ γὰρ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν
 4 (τιμῆς γὰρ) καὶ φυγὴν ὀνειδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος. Τάξαι
 δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀναγκάζομένους
 εἰς ταυτό· χεῖρους δ' ὅσῳ οὐ δι' αἰδῶ ἀλλὰ διὰ φόβον 5
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυ-
 πηρόν· ἀναγκάζουσι γὰρ οἱ κύριοι, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἐκτωρ

ὃν δέ κ' ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε μάχης πτόσσοντα νοήσω,
 οὗ οἱ ἄρκιον ἐσσεῖται φυγέειν κύνας.

5 Καὶ οἱ προστάττοντες καὶ ἀναχωρῶσι τύπτοντες τὸ 10
 αὐτὸ δρῶσι, καὶ οἱ πρὸ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων
 παρατάττοντες· πάντες γὰρ ἀναγκάζουσιν. Δεῖ δ' οὐ δι'
 6 ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι καλόν. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ

3 civil society encourages Bravery, and thus, the motive being
 noble, in some cases this type approximates very nearly to
 4 the genuine virtue. A baser form may be seen in the courage or physical
 5 of troops who are driven to battle with the lash, or drawn up compulsion.
 6 in positions where retreat is impossible. 2. The courage of ii. Experi-
 ence.

mede is represented as due to the fear that Hector would triumph over him, if defeated. Conversely to the case in the text it has been said, 'Perfect Courage is doing without witnesses all that one could do if the world were spectators' (La Rochefoucauld, *Max.* 216).

1. Aristotle here touches upon a question of the greatest interest in moral science, How far does a system of rewards and punishments destroy the character of Virtue by reducing it to a calculation of self-interest? It depends greatly on the character of the rewards and punishments

themselves. If they consist in physical pleasure or pain, no true virtue can be developed by them. If however they be themselves moral (e.g. testimony of a good conscience, dread of shame or self-reproach, etc.), the stimulus to action which they afford is but a form of the love of Virtue and hatred of Vice in themselves. The case described in § 3 would illustrate the latter case, that in §§ 4 and 5 the former.

10. τύπτοντες] e.g. as Herodotus (vii. 223) says was the case with the Persian soldiers at the invasion of Greece.



ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα ἀνδρεία τις εἶναι ὅθεν καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ᾤθη ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Τοιούτοι δὲ ἄλλοι μὲν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς δ' οἱ στρατιῶται δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ἃ μάλιστα συνεωράκασιν οὔτοι φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι, 5
7 ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν. Εἵτα ποιῆσαι καὶ μὴ παθεῖν μάλιστα δύνανται ἐκ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, δυνάμενοι

experience, which Socrates thought the truest type of Courage. Experience enables soldiers, for example, so to estimate the real danger that they are not alarmed by circumstances that 7, 8 would terrify the inexperienced. Thus experience as it were

1. ἡ ἐμπειρία ἢ περὶ ἕκαστα] 'Experience in any special subjects.' This is further explained by τοιούτοι (i.e. ἐμπειροὶ) ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλοις in l. 3. Aristotle shows that experience cannot constitute courage—for if the danger be *unreal*, experience, which tells us that it is so, takes away the sphere for the exercise of courage (§§ 7, 8); while if the danger be *real*, experience, which reveals this, tends to make cowards of those who know it (§ 9).

2. Socrates defines Courage (in Plat. *Rep.* p. 429) as 'the power of preserving in danger the *right opinion* as to what is to be feared and what is not.' Or again in the *Protagoras*, 'Courage is the knowledge of what is terrible and what is not,' ἡ σοφία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀνδρεία ἐστίν.

4. πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου] i.e. many dangers in war are unreal, e.g. the ferocious aspect and

savage cries of barbarians, which are most alarming to the inexperienced, but which make no impression on the veteran. It was said that at the commencement of the war between France and Prussia, there were served out to the young German troops pictures of the Turcos and their mode of fighting, in order to give them that ἐμπειρία which would render them proof against such terrors. Another reading is *καὶνὰ*, i.e. there are many 'surprises' in war; but this evidently spoils the sense.

5. φαίνονται δὴ ἀνδρεῖοι κ.τ.λ.] This would be further illustrated by the example introduced in vi. 11. The indifference of sailors in an ordinary gale is regarded by a landsman as courage (ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασιν οἱ ἄλλοι οἷά ἐστιν), whereas in truth their ἐμπειρία reveals that there is no danger, and therefore no occasion for courage.

χρησθαι τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ὅποια ἂν εἴη
καὶ πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν κράτιστά.
Ὡς περ οὖν ἀνόπλοις ὥπλισμένοι μάχονται καὶ ἀθληταὶ
ἰδιώταις· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀγῶσιν οὐχ οἱ ἀν-
δρειότατοι μαχιμώτατοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ μάλιστα ἰσχύον- 5
τες καὶ τὰ σώματα ἄριστα ἔχοντες. Οἱ στρατιῶται δὲ
δειλοὶ γίνονται, ὅταν ὑπερτείνῃ ὁ κίνδυνος καὶ λείπωνται
τοῖς πλήθεσι καὶ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς· πρῶτοι γὰρ φεύ-
γουσι, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ μένοντα ἀποθνήσκει, ὅπερ καὶ πὶ
τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ αἰσχροῦν τὸ φεῦγειν 10
καὶ ὁ θάνατος τῆς τοιαύτης σωτηρίας αἰρετώτερος· οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκινδύνουν ὥς κρείττους ὄντες, γνόντες δὲ
φεύγουσι, τὸν θάνατον μᾶλλον τοῦ αἰσχροῦ φοβούμενοι

puts a weapon into their hands which others have not, and hence their courage. There is however another aspect of this. Experience sometimes points out the real magnitude of a danger which makes little impression on those who are inexperienced, and so sometimes veterans shrink back when raw levies press on. Thus courage which rests on the knowledge that the danger is small becomes cowardice when the danger is known to be great. This therefore is not true

9. τὰ πολιτικὰ nearly resembled our militia as distinguished from regular troops. It is not quite clear to what event reference is made in the text. It is easy, however, to suppose that veterans would be much more sensitive (say) to a flank movement on the part of the enemy, or to a threatening of their communications, than inexperienced troops would be, and would thus be more likely to be disorganized

by it. It is experience which makes doctors proverbially the most desponding patients, because they understand what symptoms portend.

The following recent occurrence seems in point: 'The troops who behaved worst in this affair (a skirmish near Paris) were the regulars, Zouaves, who fled like deer. The Gardes Mobiles stood their ground' (Paris letter, Sept. 23, 1870).

10 ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος οὐ τοιοῦτος. Καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν· ἀνδρείοι γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦσι καὶ οἱ διὰ θυμὸν ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία ἐπὶ τοὺς τρώσαντας φερόμενοι, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θυμοειδεῖς ἰτητικώτατον γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, ὅθεν καὶ Ὀμηρος

σθένος ἔμβαλε θυμῷ

καὶ

μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἔγειρε

καὶ

δριμὺ δ' ἀνὰ ῥίνας μένος

καὶ

ἔξεσεν αἷμα·

πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔοικε σημαίνειν τὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ
11 ἔγερσιν καὶ ὀρμήν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείοι διὰ τὸ καλὸν πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτοῖς· τὰ θηρία δὲ
12 διὰ λύπην· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πληγῆναι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ εἴαν γε ἐν ὕλῃ ἢ ἐν ἔλει ἢ, οὐ προσέρχονται. Οὐ δὲ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἀλγηδόνης καὶ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον ὀρμᾶν, οὐθὲν τῶν δεινῶν προορῶντα, ἐπεὶ οὕτω γε καὶ οἱ ὄνοι ἀνδρείοι εἶεν πεινῶντες· τυπ-
τόμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἀφίστανται τῆς νομῆς· καὶ οἱ μοιχοὶ
12 δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τολμηρὰ πολλὰ δρῶσιν. Οὐ δὲ ἔστιν ἀνδρεία τὰ δι' ἀλγηδόνης ἢ θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον. Φυσικωτάτη δ' ἔοικεν ἡ διὰ τὸν

iii.
High
Spirit.

10, 11 Courage. 3. *The courage of high spirit.*—It is true that the courageous are high-spirited, and that the outward signs of courage and high spirit are similar, and also that high spirit
12 is a stimulus to courage. But they are not identical, else

4. ἰτητικὸς] 'apt to advance,'
connected with εἶμι (*ibo*) through
the verbal ἰτέον.

24. φυσικωτάτη] 'more purely
physical than other sorts of
Courage.'

θυμὸν εἶναι, καὶ προσλαβοῦσα προαίρεσιν καὶ τὸ οὐ
 ἕνεκα ἀνδρεία εἶναι. Καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι
 μὲν ἀλγούσι, τιμωρούμενοι δ' ἡδονταί· οἱ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα
 μαχόμενοι μάχιμοι μὲν, οὐκ ἀνδρεῖοι δέ· οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ
 καλὸν οὐδ' ὥς ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πάθος· παραπλή- 5
 σιον δ' ἔχουσί τι. Οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀν-
 δρεῖοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλάκις καὶ πολλοὺς νενικηκέναι
 θαρροῦσιν ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις. Παρόμοιοι δὲ, ὅτι ἄμφω
 θαρραλέοι· ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι διὰ τὰ προειρημένα
 θαρραλέοι, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὸ οἶεσθαι κρείττους εἶναι καὶ 10
 μηθὲν ἂν παθεῖν. Τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι καὶ οἱ μεθυσκό-
 μενοι· εὐέλπιδες γὰρ γίνονται. "Οταν δὲ αὐτοῖς μὴ
 συμβῇ τοιαῦτα, φεύγουσιν· ἀνδρείου δ' ἦν τὰ φοβερά
 ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντα καὶ φαινόμενα ὑπομένειν, ὅτι καλὸν καὶ
 αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ. Διὸ καὶ ἀνδρειότερου δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ 15
 ἐν τοῖς αἰφνιδίοις φόβοις ἄφοβον καὶ ἀτάραχον εἶναι
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς προδήλοις· ἀπὸ ἕξεως γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦν, ὅτι
 ἦττον ἐκ παρασκευῆς· τὰ προφανῇ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ

some of the lower animals, or men of violent passions, would afford the highest examples of courage. High spirit appears to be the natural *substratum* of courage, and requires only deliberate choice and a right motive to transform it from mere pugnacity to true courage. 4. *The courage of a sanguine disposition*.—This results from a confident belief in success; in other words, from a belief that there is no serious danger to fear. A drunken man exhibits this sort of courage. It fails when danger appears contrary to expectation. Hence

iv. Sanguine disposition.

11. τοιοῦτον δὲ ποιοῦσι κ.τ.λ.] This would be an instance of what is sometimes called 'Dutch courage.' Falstaff's encomium on 'Sherris' as the source of Courage in *Henry IV*.

Part II. Act iv. Sc. 3, may be quoted, under the influence of which 'the heart great and puffed up . . . doth any deed of courage; and this valour comes of sherris.'

- λογισμοῦ καὶ λόγου τις προέλοιτο, τὰ δ' ἐξαίφνης κατὰ
 16 τὴν ἔξιν. Ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες,
 καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ πόρρω τῶν εὐελπίδων, χείρους δ' ὅσῳ
 ἀξίωμα οὐδὲν ἔχουσιν, ἐκεῖνοι δέ. Διὸ καὶ μένουσί
 τινα χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἠπατημένοι, εἰάν γινώσιν ὅτι ἕτερον
 ἢ ὑποπτεύσωσι, φεύγουσιν ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἔπαθον
 17 περιπεσόντες τοῖς Λάκωσιν ὡς Σικυνωνίοις. Οἳ τε δὴ
 ἀνδρείοι εἴρηνται ποιοί τινες, καὶ οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀνδρείοι.
 1 IX. Περὶ θάρρη δὲ καὶ φόβους ἡ ἀνδρεία οὐσα οὐχ
 ὁμοίως περὶ ἄμφω ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον περὶ τὰ φοβερά·
 ὁ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἀτάραχος καὶ περὶ ταύτ' ὡς δεῖ
 ἔχων ἀνδρείος μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Τῷ δὴ
 τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ὡς εἴρηται, ἀνδρείοι λέγονται.

v. Ignorance.

16, 17

sudden dangers are a better test of real courage than those which are foreseen. 5. *The courage of ignorance.*—This form, which results from ignorance of the existence of danger, is not unlike the last mentioned, but is inferior to it as not implying any self-reliance. Such courage vanishes at once if the ignorance on which it depends is dispelled.

CHAP. IX.—*How can the exercise of Courage, which involves pain and loss, have a 'pleasure in itself'?*

Courage
relates to
objects of

1 Thus Courage is a due regulation of confidence and fear, but more especially of the latter, because Courage implies

4. ἀξίωμα] 'self-reliance,' literally 'estimate of themselves.' The sanguine rely so strongly upon, the estimate which they have formed of their own prowess or good fortune, that they can face danger in the strength which it gives them.

6. ὅπερ οἱ Ἀργεῖοι κ.τ.λ.] This

incident is described by Xenophon (*Hell.* iv. 10). The Argives attacked with contemptuous boldness certain Spartans whom they mistook for Sicyonians owing to the Spartans having assumed some Sicyonian armour. The Argives fled at once on the discovery of their mistake.

2 Διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ λυπον ἢ ἀνδρεία, καὶ δικαίως ἐπαινεῖται
χαλεπώτερον γὰρ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν, ἢ τῶν ἡδέων
ἀπέχεσθαι. Οὐ μὲν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι τὸ κατα
τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδὺ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι,
οἷον κὰν τοῖς γυμνικοῖς ἀγῶσι γίνεται τοῖς γὰρ πύκταις 5
τὸ μὲν τέλος ἡδὺ, οὐ ἔνεκα, ὁ στέφανος καὶ αἱ τιμαί,
τὸ δὲ τύπτεσθαι ἀλγεινόν, εἴπερ σάρκινοι, καὶ λυπηρόν,
καὶ πᾶς ὁ πόνος· διὰ δὲ τὸ πολλὰ ταῦτ' εἶναι, μικρὸν ὅν
3 τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα οὐδὲν ἡδὺ φαίνεται ἔχειν. Εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτόν
ἔστι καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ὁ μὲν θάνατος καὶ τὰ 10
τραύματα λυπηρὰ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ καὶ ἄκοντι ἔσται, ὑπομένει
4 δὲ αὐτὰ, ὅτι καλὸν ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρὸν τὸ μῆ. Καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μᾶλλον τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχῃ πᾶσαν καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερος

2 the endurance of things painful. Courage indeed cannot be
exercised without pain, and hence it is difficult and propor-
tionately praiseworthy. It may be asked, How is this recon-
cileable with our repeated assertion that the practice of any
virtue has pleasure in itself? We reply, As in training men
endure hardship and pain willingly for the sake of the superior
3 pleasure of the end they have in view, so the brave man
4 endures the loss of life (a greater loss to him by reason of its
superior happiness and virtue than it would be to any ordi-

fear rather
than of con-
fidence, and
therefore
cannot be
exercised
without
pain and
loss.

Still the
joy of the
noble end
gained over-
balances
this pain

2. χαλεπώτερον κ.τ.λ.] The
regulation of fear implies enduring
pain (λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν), the
regulation of confidence re-
sembles checking pleasure (ἡδέων
ἀπέχεσθαι), and the former is
more difficult, and therefore
more virtuous, as we have seen
before (II. iii. 10, etc.).

8. μικρὸν ὅν] i.e. insignificant
in comparison with the numerous
and palpable circumstances of
pain and terror. Comp. S. Paul

in reference to the same γυμνικοὶ
ἀγῶνες, 'they do it to obtain a
corruptible crown,' etc.

11. ὑπομένει δὲ κ.τ.λ.]
Though he loves life much, he
loves honour more: and though
the loss of life is painful, the loss
of honour would be yet more
painful, and therefore he chooses
that course which after all secures
for him the greatest and highest
pleasure.

12. καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.]

ἢ, μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ λυπηθήσεται· τῷ τοιούτῳ γὰρ
 μάλιστα ζῆν ἄξιον, καὶ οὗτος μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν ἀποστε-
 5 ρεῖται εἰδώς· λυπηρὸν δὲ τοῦτο. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον
 ἀνδρείος, ἴσως δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
 καλὸν αὐτ' ἐκείνων αἰρεῖται. Οὐ δὲ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς
 ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦ
 6 τέλους ἐφάπτεται. Στρατιώτας δ' οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει μὴ

nary man), deliberately preferring to it the glory of death in
 5 battle. In such cases then pleasure is possible only so far
 as the attainment of the end and ideal of his being is felt and
 6 realized. Nor need we deny that a more reckless, though less
 brave, man might perhaps make a better rank-and-file soldier.

Jeremy Taylor says 'A great man is *naturally* a coward, as indeed most men are, knowing the value of life; but the power of reason enables him when required to conduct himself with uniform courage and hardihood.' This passage like that in the text would go far to excluding mere animal spirit (*θυμὸς* ch. viii.) from the highest form of courage. The recent successes of the civilian soldiers of Germany over the professional soldiers of France, with the further supposed advantage of natural *elan* on the part of the latter, would support Aristotle in assigning more importance than is popularly allowed to the rational or calculating element in true Courage.

4. μᾶλλον] i.e. because the sacrifice is greater and more difficult. See note on § 2. Grant quotes Wordsworth, whose 'Happy Warrior' is

'More brave for this, that he hath much to lose.'

6. τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται] To understand this we must recall what was said in I. i. about the 'final end' of all human efforts and aspirations, and its identification with 'Happiness.' So far as the brave man secures for himself a result so ideally noble (compare vii. 6), he 'attains to something of the final end' (τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται) of human existence, and therefore to Happiness; but *only* so far, because the accompanying circumstances of his actions are otherwise painful. He has what a modern religious writer would call 'a foretaste of heaven,' in this supreme act of self-sacrifice. We may even compare the language of the Apostle of a yet higher Ideal 'who for the joy set before Him endured the cross, despising the shame.'

7. Observe the emphatic position of *στρατιώτας*, 'As mere rank-and-file soldiers the most

τοὺς τοιούτους κρατίστους εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἦττον μὲν ἀνδρείους, ἄλλο δ' ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν ἔχοντας· ἔτοιμοι γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς τοὺς κινδύνους, καὶ τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

7 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσούτον εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 5
ἐστὶν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

1 X. Μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν· δοκού-

CHAP. X.—*The proper objects of the Virtue of Temperance.*

1 The other Virtue of our lower and irrational nature is Temperance. Theoretically, it is a mean state in reference

Temperance consists in the due regulation of our pleasures.

truly brave may not be so good as those who have little or nothing to lose by death.' Mere recklessness of life is not courage. The savage Turcos may be the most serviceable soldiers in a bloody war, or for certain operations of war, but no one would say that they were therefore the bravest men.

CHAP. X.—The discussion of the Virtue of Temperance, with its related vices, occupies three Chapters (x—xii).

In ch. x. the proper objects of Temperance are determined by a method precisely similar to that employed in the case of Courage in ch. vi. It is first broadly stated that Temperance deals with Pleasures, and then by successive limitations we arrive at the precise class of Pleasures to which it properly refers.

In ch. xi. the excess and de-

fect are described and contrasted with the mean state.

In ch. xii. the comparative voluntariness of Cowardice and Intemperance is discussed; and some supplementary remarks added concerning the nature of Intemperance as illustrated by its etymology.

7. σωφροσύνη is usually, though inadequately, translated by 'temperance.' 'Self-control' or 'self-mastery' would perhaps be nearer to it. The derivation of σῶφρων, or σαφῶρων, from σῶς (σῴος) and φρήν, shows that the original idea of the word was that of a man who never 'loses his head,' but keeps his mind clear and calm, however assaulted by pleasure or passion. Conversely the ἀκόλαστος is one subject to no restraint: κολασις (see note on v. 7) being the technical word for chastisement, or punishment for the purpose of

- σι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. "Οτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν ἥττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας·
- 2 ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρῆσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία, φιλομάθεια· ἐκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστίν οὐθὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σῶφρονες
- 3 οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται. Ὅμοίως δ' οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν· τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκόλαστους δ' οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ
- 4 τοὺς λυπουμενούς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς αὐτάς· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον

- to pleasures and pains (as we have already said); but, practically, its operation is limited to pleasures. Next, we limit it further to certain kinds of pleasures. First, pleasures being either *mental* or *bodily*, we exclude the whole of the former
- 3 from the sphere of Temperance, as well as certain others, such as love of gossip, idling, love of money or friends, which, though not exactly mental, are not at any rate bodily pleasures.
- 4 Secondly, among bodily pleasures, it is not concerned with

Not however
of mental
pleasures.

Nor all
bodily
pleasures.

reformation. The derivation of the word ἀκολασία is discussed by Aristotle in xii. 5, etc.

1. τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν] This (as was remarked in II. vii.) is almost the only hint as to the principle of arrangement in the Catalogue of Virtues.

3. ἥττον] This was noticed by

Aristotle in passing in II. vii. 3. οὐχ ὁμοίως will be found explained in the next Chapter, § 5. Intemperance is shown not so much in avoiding pain, as in feeling pain at the loss of pleasure, or in excessive sensibility to pain.

7. ἐκάτερος γὰρ] i.e. both ὁ φιλότιμος and ὁ φιλομαθής.

χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε
 ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὥς
 δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλ-
 5 λειψιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς
 γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει 5
 οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὥς δεῖ σώφρονας.
 6 Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμὴν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·
 τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μῆλων ἢ ρόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων
 ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς
 μύρων καὶ ὀψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, 10
 ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυ-
 7 μητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πει-
 νῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς. Τὸ δὲ
 τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ
 8 ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας 15
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐδὲ γὰρ
 ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ
 βρώσει· τὴν δ' αἰσθησιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν. Οὐδ' ὁ λέων
 τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοῦς, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ· ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι,
 διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἦσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται. 20

(α) pleasures of *sight*, such as love of painting, colour, etc.; Nor those
 5 (β) nor pleasures of *hearing*, such as love of music; (γ) nor of Sight,
 6 pleasures of *smell*, except indirectly as they may suggest or or Hearing
 8 recall gluttonous or luxurious desires, just as the scent of the or Smell,
 lower animals gives them pleasure only by its suggestion of

7. κατὰ συμβεβηκός] 'by a co-
 incidence,' i.e. by the same occa-
 sion which excites the sense of
 taste exciting that of smell
 also.

14. τοιούτοις] i.e. such as
 μύρα καὶ ὀψα (l. 10) in contrast

with the ordinary βρώματα last
 mentioned.

15. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κ.τ.λ.] The
 truth of this assertion is made
 very doubtful by well-known
 facts, at least as regards smell
 and hearing.

- Ὅμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἢ εὐρὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα,
 9 ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἢ
 σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα
 κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται.
 10 αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἀφή καὶ γεύσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ 5
 γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως
 ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους
 δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πᾶν δὲ χαί-
 ρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ' οἳ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπο-
 λαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν 10
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἡϋ-
 ξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὧν τὸν φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον
 11 γεράνου γενέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ. Κοινοτάτη δὲ
 τῶν αἰσθήσεων καθ' ἣν ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ δόξειεν ἂν
 δικαίως ἐπονεέδιστος εἶναι, ὅτι οὐχ' ἢ ἄνθρωποι ἐσμεν 15
 ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ' ἢ ζῶα. Τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ
- 9, 10 prey; (δ) nor pleasures of *taste*, except to a slight extent,
 viz. so far as by prolonged or artificially-stimulated contact of
 the food with the throat the sense of Touch is excited. (ε)
 11 The sense of *touch* alone remains. We have thus limited
 Temperance to the regulation, and Intemperance to the in-
 dulgence, of the pleasures of the sense of Touch, and we must
 12 further and finally limit it to the commonest and most ignoble

or Taste
 except
 slightly),
 but only
 those of
 Touch,
 and the
 lower
 types even
 of these.

6. Aristotle regards the primary function of taste (as of the other senses) to be the discrimination of objects; the transmission of information to the mind concerning things external to it, rather than the communication of pleasure:—in a word, he looks at their powers of *perception* rather than their powers of *sensation*. Hence to judge of wine (as a trader), or of seasoned

dishes (as a cook), would be the most proper function of the sense of taste as such; but it is not in such an exercise of it that pleasure is conveyed. That depends, according to Aristotle, upon the prolonged contact of the thing tasted with the throat; i.e. upon a particular application of the sense of Touch. It is of course true (though not quite in the sense intended by Aristotle) that

12 *μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται τῶν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς ἡδονῶν ἀφήρηνται, οἷον αἱ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις διὰ τρίψεως καὶ τῆς θερμασίας γινόμεναι· οὐ γὰρ περὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ τοῦ ἀκολάστου ἀφῆ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τινα μέρος.*

5

1 XI. Τῶν δ' ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι· οἷον ἡ μὲν τῆς τροφῆς φυσικὴ· πᾶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ ἐνδεὴς ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς, ὅτε δ' ἀμφοῖν, καὶ εὐνῆς, φησὶν Ὁμηρος, ὁ νέος καὶ ἀκμάζων τὸ δὲ τοιαῦδε ἢ τοιαῦδε, οὐκέτι πᾶς, οὐδὲ 10
2 τῶν αὐτῶν. Διὸ φαίνεται ἡμέτερον εἶναι. Οὐ μὲν ἄλλ'

kinds of pleasures even of this, which is itself the lowest and most animal of all our senses.

CHAP. XI.—*The excess and defect related to the Virtue of Temperance.*

1 The pleasures spoken of in the last chapter admit of a further division into those which are common and natural, such as the desire of food generally; and those which are peculiar and acquired, such as the desire of some particular 1
2 kind of food; the latter depending (within certain broad

These pleasures are further divided into Natural and Acquired.

the sense of Taste depends upon Touch, but such is also the case with all the other senses.

1. ἐλευθεριώταται] 'the noblest pleasures,' a converse metaphor to ἀνδραποδώδεις in § 3 and elsewhere.

CHAP. XI.—This Chapter treats of (1) the Excess of Intemperance (α) in reference to natural and artificial Desires (§§ 1-4); (β) in reference to Pleasure and Pain generally (§§ 5, 6); (2) The Defect of Insensitiveness

(§ 7); and (3) adds a few words on the Mean of Temperance in contrast with both.

6. τῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμιῶν] Plato (*Rep.* p. 558) makes a similar distinction of ἐπιθυμίαι, and adds that the gratification of the natural or necessary desires is always beneficial, that of the artificial desires not generally so.

7. ἐπίθετοι] 'acquired' or 'artificial'

8. ξηρᾶς ἢ ὑγρᾶς τροφῆς] 'either solid or liquid food.'

- ἔχει γέ τι καὶ φυσικόν· ἕτερα γὰρ ἑτέροις ἐστὶν ἡδέα,
 3 καὶ ἓνα πᾶσιν ἡδίω τῶν τυχόντων. Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς
 φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἀμαρτάνουσι καὶ ἐφ' ἓν,
 ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον· τὸ γὰρ ἐσθίειν τὰ τυχόντα ἢ πίνειν ἕως
 5 ἂν ὑπερπλησθῇ, ὑπερβάλλειν ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν τῷ
 πλήθει· ἀναπλήρωσις γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας ἢ φυσικὴ ἐπι-
 θυμία. Διὸ λέγονται οὗτοι γαστρίμαργοι, ὥς παρὰ τὸ
 4 δέον πληροῦντες αὐτήν. Τοιοῦτοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ λίαν
 ἀνδραποδώδεις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας τῶν ἡδονῶν πολλοὶ
 καὶ πολλαχῶς ἀμαρτάνουσιν· τῶν γὰρ φιλοτοιοῦτων 10
 λεγομένων ἢ τῷ χαίρειν οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ τῷ μᾶλλον, ἢ ὥς
 οἱ πολλοὶ, ἢ μὴ ὥς δεῖ, κατὰ πάντα δ' οἱ ἀκόλαστοι

Errors in the former are rare, and always in the direction of excess; in the latter, common and various in character.

- 3 natural limits) upon individual taste. Now in *natural* desires error is rare, and must always take the form of supplying in excess what is in itself a natural want; and this, when it is
 4 found, indicates a degraded and almost brutish nature. In the case of *acquired* desires, error is very common and multi-
 form, extending to the object, manner, degree, etc., of the

2. ἓνα πᾶσιν] 'Some things there are which give every one more pleasure than things ordinary and indifferent.' i.e. However much individual tastes differ, there are still some things naturally more pleasant than others to every one.

3. ὀλίγοι κ.τ.λ.] e.g. Excessive eating is not likely to occur in regard to bread, or any simple food which is desired merely to supply a natural appetite, and not for any special pleasure to be derived from eating it, but rather in regard to some particular viand or favourite

'Gluttony on oatmeal porridge' οὐ πᾶν γίνεται.

9. ἀνδραποδώδεις] 'degraded,' a metaphor converse to ἐλευθέριος, both words having passed from a *social* to a *moral* signification. See last Ch. § 12, note.

11. ἢ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ] In some editions ὥς is omitted, and if so, ἢ = 'than,' after the comparative μᾶλλον. If ὥς be retained, the sense may be explained by what is said in I. v. 3 about the excessive and exclusive devotion of οἱ πολλοὶ to Pleasure. See also the concluding words of this section.

- ὑπερβάλλουσιν· καὶ γὰρ χαίρουσιν ἐνίοις οἷς οὐ δεῖ
(μισητὰ γὰρ), καὶ εἴ τισι δεῖ χαίρειν τῶν τοιούτων,
5 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν
περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτὸν,
δηλον· περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας 5
τῷ ὑπομένειν λέγεται σῶφρων ἀκόλαστος δὲ τῷ μὴ,
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος τῷ λυπεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ ὅτι
τῶν ἡδέων οὐ τυγχάνει (καὶ τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιεῖ αὐτῷ ἡ
ἡδονή), ὁ δὲ σῶφρων τῷ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ
τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος.
- 6 Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ 10
τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἰρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀπο-
τυγχάνων καὶ ἐπιθυμῶν μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία·
7 ἀτόπῳ δ' ἔοικε τὸ δι' ἡδονὴν λυπεῖσθαι. Ἐλλείποντες 15
δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἥττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ
γίνονται· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία·

- indulged desire. It is clear then that in this ill-regulated
5 pursuit of pleasure consists the Excess in reference to the
Virtue of Temperance, viz., Intemperance. In its rela-
tion to pain, however, it does not consist (like cowardice)
in shrinking from it, so much as in feeling pain at the
absence of pleasure. This is not the case with
6 the temperate man. Thus the intemperate man in his
excessive devotion to pleasure paradoxically makes it to
7 be a source of pain. The Defect, or absence of proper sensi-

The Excess has reference both to pleasure and pain, though in a different sense.

The Defect does not occur in fact.

15. Asceticism was evidently a conception wholly unintelligible to the Greek mind. In explanation of this we might quote the apology of Erasmus for Ecclus. xxv. 13 (where the wickedness of women is denounced as ex-

ceeding all other), 'Il faut remarquer qu'il n'y avait pas encore des moines.'

17. ἀναισθησία] 'insensitive-ness,' the word being as unusual as the condition indicated by it. Indeed if it did occur, it would

καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς
 μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῃ μηθέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ
 διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου
 εἶναι· οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος ὀνόματος διὰ τὸ μὴ
 8 πᾶν γίνεσθαι. Ὁ δὲ σώφρων μέσως περὶ ταυτ' ἔχει 5
 οὔτε γὰρ ἡδεται οἷς μάλιστα ὁ ἀκόλαστος, ἀλλὰ μάλ-
 λον δυσχεραίνει, οὔθ' ὅλως οἷς μὴ δεῖ οὔτε σφόδρα
 τοιούτῳ οὔδενι, οὔτ' ἀπόντων λυπείται οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ,
 ἢ μετρίως, οὐδὲ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ'
 ὅλως τῶν τοιούτων οὔθ' ὅσα δὲ πρὸς ὑγίειάν ἐστιν 10
 ἢ πρὸς εὐεξίαν ἡδέα ὄντα, τούτων ὀρέξεται μετρίως καὶ
 ὡς δεῖ, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδέων μὴ ἐμποδίων τούτοις ὄντων
 ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν. Ὁ γὰρ οὕτως
 ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς τῆς ἀξίας· ὁ
 δὲ σώφρων οὐ τοιοῦτος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος. 15

bility to pleasure, is only imaginary, for not only all men, but even all animals, must have *some* tastes and preferences.

The mean
 stands in
 contrast
 with both.

8 The Temperate man, as we have seen, holds a mean position between excessive devotion and utter insensibility to pleasures. He enjoys them in moderation, and with due regard to the various considerations as to objects, degree, occasions, and consequences which right reason suggests.

be rather a physical than a moral defect. The practical non-existence of ἀναισθησία and of ἀφοβία (see vii. 7) is a comment on the statement of x. 1, that the virtues of Courage and Temperance relate to feelings which are purely animal and instinctive (belonging to ἀλογον μέρος). In the case of all the other virtues of the catalogue (except perhaps to some extent ὀργή—see the simi-

lar difficulty about ἀοργησία in IV. v. 5), it is perhaps conceivable that a man might be without the feelings, or be altogether removed from the circumstances, in which the sphere of the exercise of the virtues lies. In sensibility to fear and to pleasure a man could hardly be wanting without ceasing to be human.

13. οὕτως] i.e. ἢ παρὰ τὸ καλὸν ἢ ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν.

- 1 XII. Ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δει-
 λίας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ διὰ λύπην, ὧν τὸ μὲν
 2 αἰρετὸν, τὸ δὲ φευκτὸν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν λύπη ἐξίστησι καὶ
 φθείρει τὴν τοῦ ἔχοντος φύσιν, ἡ δὲ ἡδονὴ οὐδὲν τοι-
 οὔτον ποιεῖ, μᾶλλον δ' ἐκούσιον διὸ καὶ ἐπονειδιστό- 5
 τερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐθισθῆναι ῥᾶον πρὸς αὐτά· πολλὰ γὰρ
 ἐν τῷ βίῳ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ οἱ ἐθισμοὶ ἀκίνδυνοι. Ἐπὶ
 3 δὲ τῶν φοβερῶν ἀνάπαλιν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως

CHAP. XII.—(a) *Is the external compulsion stronger in Cowardice or in Intemperance?*

(β) *The nature of ἀκολασία is illustrated by its etymology.*

- 1 The question may be asked, Which is more voluntary (and therefore more blameable), Intemperance or Cowardice? We
 reply, Intemperance:—(1) because the pressure arises from
 2 pleasure, whereas in Cowardice it arises from pain; (2) be-
 cause it is both easy and safe to practise resistance against
 temptations to Intemperance; while the reverse is the case
 3 with temptations to Cowardice. A distinction however must be
- Intemper-
ance is more
voluntary
than Coward-
ice, if we
consider
single acts,
though per-
haps the re-
verse is the
case if we
regard the
settled ha-
bits.

CHAP. XII.—We have seen in ch. v. that no vice is really involuntary, still the degree of external pressure, though it never amounts to compulsion, varies in different cases. It is naturally greatest in regard to these two Virtues which relate to those feelings of our *animal* nature (x. 1) which are ever present, and *must* be excited under given external circumstances whenever they arise. The object of this Chapter is to determine in which of these two cases there is more external

pressure, and, so far, less of voluntary action.

6. καὶ γὰρ] 'and what is more,' introducing, as usual, a fresh argument.

αὐτὰ from the context, though it has no grammatical antecedent, evidently refers to pleasurable objects, or temptations to Intemperance.

8. δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.] e.g. A man may resolve that he will give up his property, and offer himself as a prisoner, or indeed do anything, rather than face the enemy in fight. That would

- ἐκούσιον ἢ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτὴ μὲν γὰρ ἄλυπος, ταῦτα δὲ διὰ λύπην ἐξίστησιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ ὅπλα ρίπτειν καὶ τὰλλα ἀσχημονεῖν διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ
 4 βίαια εἶναι. Τῷ δ' ἀκολάστῳ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐκούσια, ἐπιθυμοῦντι γὰρ καὶ ὀρεγομένῳ, τὸ δ' ὅλον ἡττον· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.
 5 Τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρτίας φέρομεν· ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα. Πότερον δ' ἀπὸ ποτέρου καλεῖται, οὐθὲν πρὸς τὰ νῦν διαφέρει, δῆλον
 6 δ' ὅτι τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου. Οὐ κακῶς δ' εἴοικε 10 μετενηνέχθαι· κεκολάσθαι γὰρ δεῖ τὸ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ὀρε-

drawn according as we regard the *single acts*, or *general habits*. In the case of *acts* of Cowardice the violence of the present pain (of which there is none in Intemperance) is often such that a man hardly knows what he is doing. But looking at these Vices as *habits*, no man has an
 4 actual desire to be habitually intemperate, as he does sometimes to be an habitual coward. Thus in Cowardice the general habit is more voluntary than the single acts,
 5 but in Intemperance the reverse is the case.

The Greek term for Intemperance (*ἀκολασία*), or, as we might translate it, Wantonness, involves the idea of absence of restraint, and it is also familiarly applied to the errors of childhood. Without deciding which is the primary meaning of the term, we may assert that its application is in both cases appropriate.
 6 No things need restraint more than desires of pleasure, and

imply a deliberate and voluntary *habit* of cowardice. Another may resolve to fight to the last, but when he sees actual bloodshed be overpowered with horror and throw down his arms. That would be the half-involuntary cowardice of *particular acts*. (See *Supplementary Notes*.)

1. αὐτῇ] i.e. δειλία 'Cowardice

in itself.' ταῦτα δὲ, i.e. τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον 'the surroundings.'

10. τὸ ὕστερον ἀπὸ τοῦ προτέρου] not 'the latter from the former,' but 'the later in conception from the earlier.'

11. Two conditions are noted as requiring *κόλασις*, viz. tendency to what is vicious, and capacity for rapid growth. Both

The etymology of the Greek word *ἀκολασία* throws light upon the nature of the vice.

γόμενον καὶ πολλὴν αὐξησιν ἔχον, τοιοῦτον δὲ μάλιστα
 ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ παῖς· κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ
 7 παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. Εἰ
 οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἥξει·
 ἀπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ 5
 ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὐξεῖ τὸ συγγενές,
 καὶ μὲν μεγάλα καὶ σφοδρὰ ὧσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρού-
 ουσιν. Διὸ δὲ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ
 8 λόγῳ μῆθὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι. Τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέ-
 γομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ 10
 τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπι-
 9 θυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Διὸ δὲ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ

children; and moreover in children desires of pleasure are in pre-
 7 eminent force. Such desires grow prodigiously by indulgence,
 are insatiable, and if unrestrained choke reason altogether.
 8 They ought never therefore to be allowed to resist reason,
 9 any more than a child to resist his master. When the habit

these conditions are found most strikingly in each of the two ob-
 jects to which 'Wantonness' is attributed, viz. Desire of Plea-
 sure, and Children.

5. πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ] 'assails the weak man from every quarter.'

6. ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια] 'the exercise (or gratification) of desire strengthens that which is kindred to it in our nature,' i.e. strengthens τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν until it altogether overpowers the rival part of our nature τὸ λογισ-
 τικόν. (See I. xiii.) This seems to be the idea of εὐπερίστατος ἀμαρ-
 τία in Heb. xii. 1, 'paraphrased by Chryst. 'παντόθεν ἰσταμένη.'

11. It must be remembered that the παιδαγωγός was not the teacher, but the servant who conducted the boy to school, and was responsible for his conduct when *not* in the hands of the teacher. His office somewhat resembled that of the 'governor,' as contrasted with the 'tutor' of our royal princes. This adds point to the illustration, since moral and not intellectual discipline is in question in the text.

12. διὸ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] This is illustrated by the often recurring distinction between σώφρων and ἐγκρατής (see notes on I. iii. 7 and I. xiii. 17). The σώφρων has no bad desires left to contend with.

ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν
τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ καὶ
10 ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἡμῖν εἰ-
ρήσθω περὶ σωφροσύνης.

of self-control is formed, reason and desire are in harmony,
10 and both tend towards one goal, the ideally noble. So much
then for the Virtue of Temperance or Self-control.

IV.

- 1 I. Λέγωμεν δ' ἐξῆς περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος, δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι
 ἡ περὶ χρήματα μεσότης· ἐπαινεῖται γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος
 οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, οὐδ' ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων, οὐδ'
 αὖ ἐν ταῖς κρίσεσιν, ἀλλὰ περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ
 2 λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει. Χρήματα δὲ λέγωμεν 5
 3 πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ
 ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευθερία περὶ χρήματα ὑπερβολαὶ

CHAP. I.—On *Liberality*.

- 1 Our next subject is the Virtue of Liberality. Prodigality, Use of terms
 Liberality, and Sordidness relate simply to the giving and defined.
 2 taking of property, but chiefly the former. By 'property'
 3 we understand whatever can be exchanged for money. The
 term 'sordid' is generally restricted to the sense just indi-

CHAP. I.—The discussion of the Virtues in detail proceeds as in the order given in II. vii. Liberality occupies the next place. Refer to note on II. vii. for the principle of this arrangement.

This Chapter falls under three heads:—

1—5. Preliminary—The use of terms explained.

6—27. Liberality described in its various practical details.

28—45. Prodigality and Sordidness described.

4. κρίσεσιν] 'decisions,' in reference apparently to the Virtue of δικαιοσύνη discussed afterwards, as the words ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς and ἐν οἷς ὁ σώφρων refer to the two Virtues already treated of in the last Book.

7. ἀνελευθερία] I have, after some hesitation, adopted 'Sordidness' rather than 'Illiberality' for ἀνελευθερία, as being more applicable to the various types of ἀνελευθερία distinguished in §§ 38-45.

καὶ ἐλλείψεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀνελευθερίαν προσάπτομεν
 αἰ τοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζουσι, τὴν
 δ' ἄσωτίαν ἐπιφέρομεν ἐνίοτε συμπλέκοντες· τοὺς γὰρ
 ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἄσώτους καλοῦ-
 4 μεν. Διὸ καὶ φαυλότατοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι· πολλὰς γὰρ 5
 5 ἅμα κακίας ἔχουσιν. Οὐ δὲ οἰκείως προσαγορεύονται·
 βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων, τὸ φθεί-
 ρειν τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄσωτος γὰρ ὁ δὲ αὐτὸν ἀπολλύμενος,
 δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά,
 ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος. Οὕτω δὲ τὴν ἄσωτίαν 10
 6 ἐκδεχόμεθα. Ὡν δ' ἐστὶ χρεία, ἔστι τούτοις χρῆσθαι
 καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς· ὁ πλοῦτος δ' ἐστὶ τῶν χρησίμων

cated; but 'prodigal' is often used in a wider sense, and
 applied to the intemperate generally, who do in fact spend
 4 money upon their lusts. Hence it is a comprehensive term
 5 of reproach. We prefer however to use the word in its strict
 6 and limited sense. Now whatever admits of being used may
 be used well or ill, and a virtue related to any such object

Liberality
 has more
 to do with
 giving than
 taking.

4. 'Prodigal' is commonly
 so applied in English (e.g. The
 Prodigal Son), but scarcely the
 abstract term 'prodigality.' Rea-
 sons are given for this con-
 nexion between ἀκολασία and
 ἄσωτία in § 35 of this Chapter.
 'Profligate' has a similar double
 meaning.

7. βούλεται] 'means'; like
 the French 'veut dire.' Much of
 the force of this section depends
 on the etymological connexion
 of ἄσωτος and ἄσωτία with
 σῶζειν, and is consequently diffi-
 cult to reproduce in a transla-
 tion.

12. 'The very essence of pro-
 perty is its use.' This would be

explained by what is said in I. v.
 8, or by Plato's remark in *Rep.*
 p. 333 B, that money laid by is
 as useless as a pilot on shore or
 a physician in health. Wealth
 is an instrument as much as a
 spade or any other tool, and in
 like manner, when not being
 used is for the time useless.
 The following passage from
 Bacon's Essay on Riches offers
 several points of comparison with
 this and the following Chapter:
 'Riches are for spending, and
 spending for Honour and Good
 Actions (τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, § 12).
 Therefore extraordinary expense
 must be limited by the worth of
 the occasion (ii. 11, 15, etc.), but

ἐκάστω δ' ἄριστα χρήται ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τοῦτο ἀρετὴν
καὶ πλούτῳ δὴ χρήσεται ἄριστα ὁ ἔχων τὴν περὶ τὰ
7 χρήματα ἀρετὴν. Οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος. Χρήσις
δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ χρημάτων δαπάνη καὶ δόσις· ἡ δὲ λήψις
καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ κτήσις μᾶλλον. Διὸ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ τοῦ 5
ἐλευθερίου τὸ δίδοναι οἷς δεῖ ἢ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ
8 μὴ λαμβάνειν ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον
τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν, καὶ τὰ καλὰ πράττειν
μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ αἰσχροῖα μὴ πράττειν· οὐκ ἄδηλον δ' ὅτι τῇ
μὲν δόσει ἔπεται τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ καλὰ πράττειν, 10
τῇ δὲ λήψει τὸ εὖ πάσχειν ἢ μὴ αἰσχροπραγεῖν. Καὶ
ἡ χάρις τῷ διδόντι, οὗ τῷ μὴ λαμβάνοντι καὶ ὁ ἔπαινος
9 δὲ μᾶλλον. Καὶ ῥᾶον δὲ τὸ μὴ λαβεῖν τοῦ δοῦναι· τὸ
γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἥττον προτείνεται μᾶλλον ἢ οὐ λαμβάνουσι

is displayed in its being used well. Property is evidently a
thing to be used: Liberality therefore is that quality or virtue
which enables us to make the best possible use of property.
7 Again that use consists in spending and giving: taking and
keeping resemble acquisition rather than use. Hence, as we
have already hinted, liberality relates to giving more than to
8 taking. This appears also from the following considerations:
—(α) Virtue is always active and positive rather than passive
and negative. Giving is the former, taking is the latter.
9 (β) It is harder, and so more thankworthy, to give rightly

ordinary expense ought to be limited by a man's Estate, and governed by such regard that it be within his compass' (i. 19, ii. 12).

12. χάρις] Exactly in the sense found in 1 Pet. ii. 19, 20, τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις, 'for this is thankworthy'; and in Luke vi. 32, 'If ye love them which love

you, what thank have ye?' ποία ὑμῖν χάρις ἐστίν;

13. καὶ ῥᾶον δέ] Compare the dictum in II. iii. 10, περὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον αἰεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίγνεται καὶ ἀρετή.

14. ἥττον-μᾶλλον] a redundant comparative, and = ἥττον simply. Cf. μᾶλλον εὐτυχέστερον, etc., and Shakespeare's 'most un-

- 10 τὸ ἀλλότριον. Καὶ ἐλευθέριοι δὲ λέγονται οἱ διδόντες
οἱ δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντες οὐκ εἰς ἐλευθεριότητα ἐπαινοῦν-
ται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἥττον εἰς δικαιοσύνην· οἱ δὲ λαμβάνοντες
11 οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνν. Φιλοῦνται δὲ σχεδὸν μάλιστα
οἱ ἐλευθέριοι τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς· ὠφέλιμοι γάρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν 5
12 τῇ δόσει. Αἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις καλαὶ καὶ τοῦ
καλοῦ ἔνεκα. Καὶ ὁ ἐλευθέριος οὖν δώσει τοῦ καλοῦ
ἔνεκα καὶ ὀρθῶς· οἷς γὰρ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα καὶ ὅτε, καὶ
13 τὰλλα ὅσα ἔπεται τῇ ὀρθῇ δόσει. Καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως

- 10 than to decline to take wrongly. Those who give rightly are
called liberal; those who refrain from taking wrongly are
called honest and just, but not liberal; while those who merely
11 take or receive rightly are scarcely praised at all. (γ) Liber-
ality is one of the most popular of virtues, and that because
of its usefulness, and this consists in giving, not in taking.
12 However, as all virtue has a noble end in view, mere giving
freely is not enough to constitute Liberality. Regard must
be had to certain conditions, of which we specify three:—
1. A noble motive. 2. Due consideration of the recipients,
13 the amount, and the occasion of the gift. 3. Cheerfulness on

kindest cut of all.' Translate,
'Men are less inclined to spend
their own money, than merely
to refrain from taking that which
belongs to others.' In other
words, 'it is easier to be honest
than to be generous.' Many
men who are very reluctant to
part with their money, and
anxious to hoard, would yet
scorn to gain anything by dis-
honest or suspicious means.
Avarice is not necessarily accom-
panied by dishonesty.

4. οὐδ' ἐπαινοῦνται πάνν] The
virtue is in fact too common and

easy to deserve commendation.
Praise on such grounds would be
almost derogatory (φορτικὸς ὁ
ἔπαινος, as Aristotle says in X.
viii. 7).

8. οἷς γὰρ δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] These
words are explanatory of ὀρθῶς.

9. ἡδέως ἢ ἀλύπως] This con-
dition is explained by such pas-
sages as I. viii. 10-12 (No one is
virtuous unless he takes plea-
sure in virtuous actions); II. iii.
1 (The test of the formation of
any habit (ἔξις) is that the
actions to which it is related are
done with pleasure); or by the

Yet liberal
giving must
fulfil certain
conditions.

ἢ ἀλύπως· τὸ γὰρ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢδὺν ἢ ἄλυπον, ἥκιστα
 14 δὲ λυπηρόν. Ὁ δὲ διδοὺς οἷς μὴ δεῖ, ἢ μὴ τοῦ καλοῦ
 ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ διὰ τιν' ἄλλην αἰτίαν, οὐκ ἐλευθέριος ἀλλ'
 ἄλλος τις ῥηθήσεται. Οὐδ' ὁ λυπηρῶς μᾶλλον γὰρ
 5 ἔλοιτ' ἂν τὰ χρήματα τῆς καλῆς πράξεως, τοῦτο δ' οὐκ
 15 ἐλευθερίου. Οὐδὲ λήψεται δὲ ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ· οὐδὲ γάρ
 ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ τιμώντος τὰ χρήματα ἢ τοιαύτη λήψις.
 16 Οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός· οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ τοῦ εὖ
 17 ποιοῦντος εὐχερῶς εὐεργετῆσθαι. Ὅθεν δὲ δεῖ, λήψε-
 ται, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ιδίων κτημάτων, οὐχ ὥς καλὸν ἀλλ'
 10 ὥς ἀναγκαῖον, ὅπως ἔχῃ διδόναι. Οὐδ' ἀμελήσει τῶν
 ιδίων, βουλόμενός γε διὰ τούτων τισὶν ἐπαρκεῖν. Οὐδὲ
 τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει, ἵνα ἔχῃ διδόναι οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ

the part of the giver. There is no grudging or hesitation in
 4 true liberality. The absence of any of these conditions would
 5 destroy the liberality of the act. *Taking* however as well as *So also*
giving is subject to certain conditions: for—(1) The truly must be
 liberal man does not care so much for money as to be indif- liberal
 6 ferent to the *source* from which it comes. (2) He will taking of
 17 be *reluctant to ask* for this as for other favours. (3) His *money.*
motive in taking is to secure not the money itself but the
 means of giving. Hence he will *not neglect his own affairs,*

distinction regularly drawn be-
 tween ἐγκράτεια and σωφροσύνη,
 the outward acts of which are
 the same; for this see note on
 I. iii. 7.

4. ὁ λυπηρῶς] Understand
 διδοὺς.

8. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.] See
 ch. iii. 24-26 for this trait in the
 character of the μεγαλόψυχος.

10. οὐχ ὥς καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] Cf.
 § 20 just below. There is no-

thing noble in taking or re-
 ceiving, but it is none the less
 necessary with a view to giving;
 for liberality is one of those
 virtues which cannot be exer-
 cised without appliances, 'ἀχο-
 ρήγητον ὄντα,' as we read in
 I. viii. 15. (See further on this
 point X. viii. 4.) With the
 statement in the text compare,
 'It is more blessed to give than
 to receive.'

- 18 οὐ καλόν. Ἐλευθερίου δ' ἐστὶ σφόδρα καὶ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν ἐν τῇ δόσει, ὥστε καταλείπειν ἑαυτῷ ἐλάττω.
- 19 τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἑλευθερίου. Κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἑλευθεριότης λέγεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἑλευθέριον, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ τοῦ διδόντος ἕξει, αὕτη δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δίδωσιν. Οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει ἑλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττω διδόντα,
- 20 εἰάν ἀπ' ἐλαττόνων διδῶ. Ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν· ἄπειροί τε γὰρ τῆς ἐνδείας, καὶ πάντες ἀγαπῶσι μᾶλλον τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα, ὥσπερ οἱ γονεῖς καὶ οἱ ποιηταί. Πλουτεῖν δ' οὐ ῥάδιον τὸν ἑλευθέριον, μήτε ληπτικὸν ὄντα μήτε φυλακτικὸν, προετικὸν δὲ καὶ μὴ τιμῶντα δι

- 18 nor scatter his gifts indiscriminately (though his *tendency* would be rather in this direction than the opposite), for thus he would cut himself off from the power of giving on proper occasions. Liberality is always to be measured, not by the absolute amount given, but by the proportion which it bears to the means of the giver. We conclude this part of our subject with some general considerations upon Liberality.
- 20 Liberality is more often found in those who have inherited, than in those who have made, their money. This is partly because the former do not know what it is to want money, and partly because they have not that sort of parental love to it which men feel for anything which they have themselves

The relative not the absolute amount given is to be considered.

Sundry practical points of detail about Liberality (§§ 20—27).

Liberality is more common with inherited than with acquired wealth.

3. κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν] 'in proportion to one's means.'

6. ἕξει] 'the disposition of the giver.' Cf. 'Non donum sed dantis animum.'

οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει κ.τ.λ.] The 'widow's mite' affords a familiar illustration of this.

11. ἔργα is used in the sense of 'productions.' So Bacon speaks of the children of men who have first founded a family, as being 'both Children and Creatures' (*ἔργα*), a continuation not only of their kind, but of their *work*.'

- 21 αὐτὰ τὰ χρήματα ἀλλ' ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως. Διὸ καὶ ἐγκα-
λείται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα
πλουτοῦσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' οὐκ ἀλόγως τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ
οἶόν τε χρήματ' ἔχειν μὴ ἐπιμελούμενον ὅπως ἔχη
22 ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Οὐ μὴν δώσει γε οἷς οὐ 5
δεῖ οὐδ' ὅτε μὴ δεῖ, οὐδ' ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· οὐ γὰρ
ἂν ἔτι πράττοι κατὰ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, καὶ εἰς ταῦτα
23 ἀναλώσας οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι εἰς ἃ δεῖ ἀναλίσκειν. Ὡσπερ
γὰρ εἴρηται, ἐλευθερίος ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δα-
πανῶν καὶ εἰς ἃ δεῖ· ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων ἄσωτος. Διὸ 10
τοὺς τυράννους οὐ λέγομεν ἄσώτους· τὸ γὰρ πλήθος
τῆς κτήσεως οὐ δοκεῖ ῥάδιον εἶναι ταῖς δόσεσι καὶ ταῖς
24 δαπάναις ὑπερβάλλειν. | Τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος δὲ μεσό-

- 21 produced. Again the liberal seldom grow rich, and it is
unreasonable to complain of this, for no one can expect to
22 have what he takes no pains to obtain or to keep. This
tendency to spend however will always be checked (as we
have said already) by careful consideration of the objects
23 and occasions of expenditure, and also of the amount out of
which it is taken. (Hence, we may note in passing, princes,
whose wealth is all but boundless, can scarcely be called
24 prodigal for disregard of this last point at least.) Moreover

The liberal
seldom
grow rich.
Liberality
is regulated
by various
considera-
tions of
propriety,

1. *ἔνεκα τῆς δόσεως*] see note
above on § 17.

2. *ἐγκαλείται τῇ τύχῃ*] This
is like the familiar reproach
against Providence: Why do the
unworthy prosper in the world?
The answer to this (as Aris-
totle says) is obvious; 'a man
reaps what he sows.' The har-
vest of success which such men
reap is not that which worthier
men spend any pains upon, and
therefore, naturally, do not ob-

tain it. So in the case before
us, the liberal do not devote
themselves to making money,
and naturally therefore do not
make it.

5. *οὐ μὴν* guards against a
misinterpretation of what pre-
cedes. Though the liberal man
does not care about keeping his
money, it does not follow that
he is indifferent how it goes.
For similar use of *οὐ μὴν* cf. I. x.
14, III. vi. 11, etc.

- τητος οὔσης περὶ χρημάτων δόσιν καὶ λήψιν, ἐλευθέ-
 ριος καὶ δώσει καὶ δαπανήσῃ εἰς ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ,
 ὁμοίως ἐν μικροῖς καὶ μεγάλοις, καὶ ταῦτα ἡδέως· καὶ
 λήψεται δ' ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὅσα δεῖ. Τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ περὶ
 ἄμφω οὔσης μεσότητος, ποιήσει ἀμφοτέρω ὡς δεῖ. ἔπε-
 ται γὰρ τῇ ἐπιεικείᾳ δόσει ἢ τοιαύτῃ λήψει, ἢ δὲ μὴ
 τοιαύτῃ ἐναντία ἐστίν. Αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐπόμεναι γίνονται
 25 ἅμα ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἱ δ' ἐναντία δῆλον ὡς οὔ. Ἐὰν δὲ
 παρὰ τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἔχον συμβαίνει αὐτῷ ἀνα-
 λίσκειν, λυπήσεται, μετρίως δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ· τῆς ἀρετῆς 10
 γὰρ καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ.
 26 Καὶ εὐκοινώνητος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλευθέριος εἰς χρήματα·
 27 δύναται γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι, μὴ τιμῶν γε τὰ χρήματα, καὶ
 μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος εἴ τι δέον μὴ ἀνάλωσεν ἢ λυπού-

and that
 both in
 giving and
 taking.

The liberal
 man may
 make oc-
 casional
 mistakes,
 especially
 as he is
 not keen in
 driving a
 bargain or
 in measur-
 ing the
 precise
 amount
 he spends.

such proprieties must not be disregarded either in giving or
 taking, in great matters or in small: and though we have
 admitted propriety in giving to be the more important, yet
 25 the two habits will naturally be found together. If the liberal
 man should have made a mistake in any of these points, he
 will feel regret in due measure and moderation. And such
 26 mistakes may occur, for the liberal man will not be hard to
 27 deal with in money matters, nor is he by any means proof
 against fraud, partly on account of his low esteem for money,
 and partly because he will always regret more keenly having

5. ἔπεται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Libe-
 rality, though mainly concerned
 with giving, cannot exist com-
 bined with dishonesty in taking.
 If money were gained unfairly,
 it would not be liberality to
 spend a part, or even the whole
 of it, in charity.

7. ἐπόμεναι] sc. ἔξεις or ἀρεταί.

11. καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι]
 For this see II. iii.

12. εὐκοινώνητος] 'an easy
 man to have dealings with.'

14. μᾶλλον ἀχθόμενος κ.τ.λ.]
 Hence he will rather cheat him-
 self than cheat others even in-
 voluntarily. Or again, he would
 rather find that he has given
 money to an impostor than that
 he has turned a deaf ear to a
 case of real distress. This of
 course might arise from a true

μενος εἰ μὴ δέον τι ἀνάλωσε, καὶ τῷ Σιμωνίδῃ οὐκ
 28 ἀρεσκόμενος. Ὁ δ' ἄσωτος καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαμαρτάνει
 οὔτε γὰρ ἤδεται ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, οὐδὲ ὡς δεῖ, οὔτε λυπεῖται
 29 ἔσται δὲ προῖοῦσι φανερώτερον. Εἴρηται δ' ἡμῖν ὅτι
 ὑπερβολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις εἰσὶν ἡ ἀσωτία καὶ ἡ ἀνελευ- 5
 θερία, καὶ ἐν δυσὶν, ἐν δόσει καὶ λήψει καὶ τὴν δαπά-
 νην γὰρ εἰς τὴν δόσιν τίθεμεν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀσωτία τῷ

28 spent too little than having spent too much. This and other
 characteristics of the liberal man are wanting in the prodigal.
 29 Both in giving and in taking he will err, and so will the
 sordid man. Strictly speaking, the former exceeds in spend-

Prodigality
 under two
 types (§§ 28-
 36).

The first
 type unites
 excess in
 spending
 with defect
 in taking
 (§§ 29-32).

feeling of benevolence, but the
 assertion in the text probably
 has reference to the same sort of
 feeling which makes the mag-
 nanimous man prefer giving to
 accepting benefits (iii. 24). The
 error on the side spoken of has
 more of τὸ καλὸν in it. It
 accords better with that self-
 esteem, not to say pride, which
 forms so large an element in an
 ideal Greek character. Bene-
 volence occupies a very subordi-
 nate place in the character of
 Aristotle's liberal man. There
 is a strong vein of self-conscious-
 ness running through all the
 manifestations of this strictly
 speaking unselfish virtue.

1. Simonides was the type of
 a courtly poet, a sort of embodi-
 ment of common-sense worldly
 wisdom. He figures thus in the
 introduction to Plato's *Republic*.
 Among his recorded sayings we
 find one that 'it is better to
 be rich than to be wise, because

philosophers are dependent upon
 the patronage of the rich, and
 not *vice versa*.'

7. Two types of prodigals are
 described. One exceeds in giving
 and falls short in taking; the
 other exceeds both in giving and
 in taking. The former perhaps
 may be styled the liberal prodigal,
 and the latter the mean prodigal.
 The former is an indolent *laissez-faire*
 sort of character, who spends
 freely, but is either too careless or
 thoughtless to trouble himself
 about replenishing his wasting
 resources: e.g. the typical Irish
 landlord of the close of the last
 century. The latter is a selfish
 and unprincipled man who
 cares not how or whence the
 money comes so long as he has
 it to spend. This is said in § 33
 to be the commoner type, be-
 cause indiscriminate giving
 soon necessitates unscrupulous
 receiving.

- διδόναι καὶ μὴ λαμβάνειν ὑπερβάλλει, τῷ δὲ λαμβάνειν ἑλλείπει, ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία τῷ διδόναι μὲν ἑλλείπει, τῷ
 30 λαμβάνειν δ' ὑπερβάλλει, πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνν συνδνάζεται (οὐ γὰρ ῥάδιον μηδαμόθεν λαμβάνοντα πᾶσι διδόναι ταχέως γὰρ ἐπι- 5 λείπει ἡ οὐσία τοὺς ἰδιώτας διδόντας, οἵπερ καὶ δοκοῦσιν ἄσωτοι εἶναι) ἐπεὶ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ
 31 βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου. Εὐιάτος τε γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀπορίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον δύναται ἐλθεῖν. Ἐχει γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου 10 καὶ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ οὐ λαμβάνει, οὐδέτερον δ' ὥς δεῖ οὐδ' εὔ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἐθισθεῖη, ἢ πῶς ἄλλως μεταβάλοι.

- ing (i.e. giving) and falls short in taking, the latter exceeds
 30 in taking and falls short in spending. True, both these conditions are not generally united in prodigality. Should they be so, prodigality under this type becomes vastly superior to sordidness, for (1) it tends to work its own cure as life advances and means fail; and (2) its outward actions resemble those of liberality, and judicious training may complete the resem-

3. πλὴν ἐπὶ μικροῖς] 'only in reference to small matters.' Similar conduct on a large scale is otherwise characterized; see § 42.

4. The first γὰρ explains οὐ πάνν συνδνάζεται, the second γὰρ (in line 5) explains οὐ ῥάδιον. ἐπεὶ γε (l. 7) appeals to the consideration that such prodigality as should unite both characteristics would be vastly superior to the opposite vice of sordidness, and that it would be a very little way removed from liberality itself. This, however, is not usually the case in actual

life. See § 33, etc. Consequently the statement οὐ πάνν συνδνάζεται κ.τ.λ. holds good of prodigality generally speaking.

6. οἵπερ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'who (i.e. ἰδιῶται) are in point of fact prodigal.' This is explained by the exclusion of τύραννοι from the class, for which see § 23.

9. ἡλικίας] It is a matter of common observation that avarice (i.e. the reverse of prodigality) is the characteristic vice (or as Simonides is said to have called it, 'the proper pleasure') of old age.

εἴη ἂν ἐλευθέριος· δώσει γὰρ οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οὐ λήψεται
 ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ. Διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ οὐκ εἶναι φαῦλος τὸ ἦθος·
 οὐ γὰρ μοχθηροῦ οὐδ' ἀγεινοῦς τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν διδόντα
 32 καὶ μὴ λαμβάνοντα, ἡλιθίου δέ. Ὁ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρό-
 πον ἄσωτος πολὺ δοκεῖ βελτίων τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου εἶναι 5
 διὰ τε τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ ὅτι ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς, ὁ δὲ
 33 οὐθένα, ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτόν. Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἄσώτων,
 καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ λαμβάνουσιν ὅθεν μὴ δεῖ, καὶ εἰσὶ
 34 κατὰ τοῦτο ἀνελεύθεροι. Δηπτικοὶ δὲ γίνονται διὰ τὸ
 βούλεσθαι μὲν ἀναλίσκειν, εὐχερῶς δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν μὴ 10
 δύνασθαι· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐπιλείπει αὐτοὺς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.
 Ἀναγκάζονται οὖν ἐτέρωθεν πορίζειν. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ διὰ

blance by supplying the proper motive and consideration as
 32 to the circumstances of the expenditure. Again (3) a prodigal
 of this type, a weak rather than a vicious man, benefits others,
 33 the sordid no one, not even himself. Most prodigals however
 err more actively on the side of taking. They take whence they
 34 ought not. They must take in order to keep going, and they

The second
 type is
 marked by
 excess both
 in giving and
 in taking
 (§§ 33—36).

6. ὁ μὲν ὠφελεῖ πολλοὺς]
 This unqualified statement would
 not be universally accepted. *e.g.*
 Lecky (*Eur. Morals*, i. p. 38)
 maintains the direct contrary.
 'The selfish interest which leads
 men to accumulate confers ulti-
 mately more advantage upon the
 world than the generous instinct
 which leads men to give.' Indeed
 it is generally acknowledged now
 that indiscriminate spending,
 even if it be with a directly
benevolent intention, is most mis-
 chievous to society. Though it
 is true that 'the folly of one man
 may be the fortune of another'
 (as Bacon says), yet before we

infer therefrom that 'private
 vices are public benefits,' we
 ought to strike a balance between
 the advantages and disadvan-
 tages resulting from each vice:
e.g. in this particular case we
 must not forget that both hoard-
 ing and squandering have some
 good and some bad effects. Each
 is a perversion or exaggeration
 of a good tendency. Hence both
 good and bad results may be
 traced in each case. Aristotle
 excludes from his comparison (a
 passing one it is true) the favour-
 able aspect of the former and
 the unfavourable aspect of the
 latter.

- τὸ μὴθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν ὀλιγώρως καὶ πάντοθεν λαμβάνουσιν· διδόναι γὰρ ἐπιθυμοῦσι, τὸ δε πῶς ἢ 5
 35 πόθεν οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς διαφέρει. Διόπερ οὐδ' ἐλευθέριοι αἱ δόσεις αὐτῶν εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ καλαί, οὐδὲ τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ ὥς δεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε οὓς δεῖ πένεσθαι, 5
 τούτους πλουσίους ποιοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη οὐδὲν ἂν δοίεν, τοῖς δὲ κόλαξιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλην ἡδονὴν πορίζουσι πολλά. Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· εὐχερῶς γὰρ ἀναλίσκοντες καὶ εἰς τὰς ἀκολασίας 10
 36 τὰς ἡδονὰς ἀποκλίνουνσιν. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄσωτος ἀπαιδαγώγητος γενόμενος εἰς ταῦτα μεταβαίνει, τυχὼν δ' ἐπι-
 37 μελείας εἰς τὸ μέσον καὶ τὸ δέον ἀφίκοιτ' ἄν. Ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός ἐστιν· δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελευθέρους ποιεῖν. Καὶ συμφυέστερον τοῖς 15

- concern themselves as little where the money comes from as
 35 they do where it goes to. They are neither honest nor generous; for money spent at hazard or squandered on pleasures, flatterers, and other unworthy objects, may be spent lavishly, but not liberally. Hence it is not difficult to see how a prodigal in the proper and limited sense of the word becomes a prodigal in the wider sense noted at the beginning of the
 36 chapter. This in fact is what prodigality comes to if it runs its course unchecked, though, as we have pointed out, it is a
 37 condition admitting of remedy and guidance. The condition of Sordidness however is incurable: for—(1) Age and want of means, so far from curing the habit, tend to produce it; (2) It seems in some way a more natural vice among men

Sordidness
under three
types
(§§ 37—45).

1. ὀλιγώρως] thoughtlessly, indifferently, unscrupulously.

6. τοῖς μετρίοις τὰ ἥθη] this being opposed to κόλαξιν appa-

rently means 'persons of a fair disposition.'

15. ἀδυναμία corresponds to ἀπορία in the converse case of the prodigal (see § 31).

ἀνθρώποις τῆς ἀσωτίας· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ φιλοχρήματοι
 38 μᾶλλον ἢ δοτικοί. Καὶ διατείνει δ' ἐπὶ πολλὸν, καὶ πο-
 λυειδές ἐστιν· πολλοὶ γὰρ τρόποι δοκοῦσι τῆς ἀνελευ-
 θερίας εἶναι. Ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς
 δόσεως καὶ τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως, οὐ πᾶσιν ὁλό- 5
 κληρος παραγίνεται, ἀλλ' ἐνίοτε χωρίζεται, καὶ οἱ μὲν
 τῇ λήψει ὑπερβάλλουσιν, οἱ δὲ τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσιν.]
 39 Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προσηγορίαις οἷον φειδω-
 λοὶ, γλίσχροι, κίμβικες, πάντες τῇ δόσει ἐλλείπουσι,
 τῶν δ' ἄλλοτρίων οὐκ ἐφίενται οὐδὲ βούλονται λαμ- 10

38 than prodigality; (3) It is also widespread, and has many
 forms. (a) Its complete development implies (as in the case (a) Excess in
 of prodigality) error both in giving and taking. In taking it taking and
 39 exceeds, in giving it falls short. But besides this perfect defect in
 growth of the vice, we have two other forms of it. (b) We giving both
 find Sordid men who are niggardly in spending, without being combined.
 (b) Defect in giving only.

5. ὁλόκληρος] 'in complete-
 ness.' The same expression
 occurs in v. 7 in reference to
 various types of Anger. Cf.
 James i. 4, τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι
 'perfect and complete.' Add 1
 Thess. v. 23.

8. Οἱ μὲν corresponds to οἱ
 δὲ in the first line of § 40. The
 class introduced by this οἱ μὲν is
 subdivided (and the subdivision
 marked by another οἱ μὲν and οἱ
 δὲ in l. 1 and l. 6, p. 186)

before we come to the οἱ δὲ be-
 longing to it. The sentence is
 further complicated by an ex-
 planatory parenthesis attached
 to the first of these subdivi-
 sions, Δοκοῦσι . . . ἂν δοῦναι.
 The following analysis may be
 found useful:—

Full-blown Sordidness (ὁλό-
 κληρος) implies both (a) falling
 short in giving and (β) excess in
 taking. There are two imper-
 fectly developed types:

(a) only is found in	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{φειδωλοὶ} \\ \text{γλίσχροι} \\ \text{κίμβικες} \\ \text{κυμνοπρίσται} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{who do not neces-} \\ \text{sarily err in respect} \\ \text{of (β)} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{some from natural} \\ \text{shame, others from} \\ \text{fear of reprisals,} \\ \text{§ 39.} \end{array} \right\}$
(β) only is found in	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{πορνοβοσκοὶ} \\ \text{τοκισταί, etc.} \\ \text{add also} \\ \text{λησταί} \\ \text{κυβενταί} \\ \text{λαποδύται} \end{array} \right\}$	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{who do not necessarily err in respect of} \\ \text{(a). Such people are in fact often ex-} \\ \text{travagant, and their 'ill-gotten gains'} \\ \text{fly apace.} \end{array} \right\}$	

βάνειν, οἱ μὲν διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν καὶ εὐλάβειαν τῶν
 αἰσχυρῶν (δοκοῦσι γὰρ ἔνιοι ἢ φασί γε διὰ τοῦτο
 φυλάττειν, ἵνα μή ποτ' ἀναγκασθῶσιν αἰσχυρόν τι πρᾶ-
 ξαι. Τούτων δὲ καὶ ὁ κυμινοπρίστης καὶ πᾶς ὁ τοιοῦτος·
 ὠνόμασται δ' ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς τοῦ μηθεὶν ἂν δοῦναι). 5
 οἱ δ' αὖ διὰ φόβον ἀπέχονται τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ὥς οὐ
 ῥάδιον τὸ αὐτὸν μὲν τὰ ἐτέρων λαμβάνειν, τὰ δ' αὐτοῦ
 ἐτέρους μή· ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ μήτε λαμβάνειν μήτε
 40 δίδόναι. Οἱ δ' αὖ κατὰ τὴν λήψιν ὑπερβάλλουσι τῷ
 πάντοθεν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν, οἷον οἱ τὰς ἀνελευθέρους 10
 ἐργασίας ἐργαζόμενοι, πορνοβοσκοὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιού-
 τοι, καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Πάντες γὰρ
 41 οὔτοι ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνουσι, καὶ ὅπόσον οὐ δεῖ. Κοι-
 νὸν δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἡ αἰσχυροκέρδεια φαίνεται πάντες γὰρ
 ἕνεκα κέρδους, καὶ τούτου μικροῦ, ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν. 15

unprincipled in taking, money :—some from a natural sense of
 shame, others from fear of reprisals. This class we charac-
 terize as stingy, close, niggards, cheeseparers, and by other
 similar appellations. (c) We have again another class of
 sordid men, utterly unprincipled in the source from which

40, 41
 (c) Excess in
 taking only.

1. διὰ τινὰ ἐπιείκειαν κ.τ.λ.] A
 sort of honesty may accompany
 meanness and excessive devotion
 to money. See note on § 9.

4. κυμινοπρίστης] i.e. a man
 so stingy that he would split a
 cummin seed. Compare our
 metaphors 'skinflint,' 'cheese-
 parer,' and Juvenal's 'one who
 counts the fibres of a leek' (*Sat.*
xiv. 133).

6. διὰ φόβον κ.τ.λ.] This
 according to the Sophists was
 the sole ground and principle of

Justice between man and man,
 and the cause of the very exist-
 ence of society. See Plato, *Rep.*
p. 358, πλέονι κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν
 τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.

12. τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐπὶ
 πολλῷ] 'Money-lenders in small
 sums at a large rate'; ἐπὶ with
 dative expressing the conditions
 of the act.

15. μικροῦ is no contradiction
 to ἐπὶ πολλῷ above, for though
 the rate of interest is very large,
 yet the absolute amount is small.

- 42 Τους γὰρ τὰ μεγάλα μὴ ὅθεν δέ δεῖ λαμβάνοντας, μηδὲ
 ἃ δεῖ, οὐ λέγομεν ἀνελευθέρους, οἷον τοὺς τυράννους
 πόλεις πορθοῦντας καὶ ἱερὰ συλῶντας, ἀλλὰ πονηροὺς
 43 μᾶλλον καὶ ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀδίκους. Ὁ μέντοι κυβευτῆς
 καὶ ὁ λωποδύτης καὶ ὁ ληστὴς τῶν ἀνελευθέρων εἰσὶν 5
 αἰσχροκερδεῖς γάρ. Κέρδους γὰρ ἕνεκεν ἀμφοτέροι πραγ-
 ματεύονται καὶ ὀνειδῆ ὑπομένουσιν, καὶ οἱ μὲν κινδύνους
 τοὺς μεγίστους ἕνεκα τοῦ λήμματος, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων
 κερδαίνουσιν, οἷς δεῖ διδόναι. Ἀμφοτέροι δὲ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ
 κερδαίνειν βουλόμενοι αἰσχροκερδεῖς, καὶ πᾶσαι δὲ αἱ 10
 44 τοιαῦται λήφεις ἀνελεύθεροι. Εἰκότως δὲ τῇ ἐλευθερί-
 οῦ ἀνελευθερία ἐναντίον λέγεται μείζον τε γάρ ἐστι

- they take money, and at the same time open-handed in spend-
 ing it; e.g. panders, usurers, and those who follow any such
 42 base and illegal traffic. Still, as before, we are speaking of
 gain on a small scale; we reserve other and stronger terms
 43 for those who plunder wholesale. We ought however to add
 to our list gamblers, pickpockets, and thieves, who all agree
 in their indifference as to the source from which they take,
 and are therefore described as sordid, no matter what subse-
 44 quent use they make of the money thus unfairly taken. We
 conclude by remarking that Sordidness is more opposed to
- Sordidness
 is the worse
 extreme of
 the two.

4. μέντοι (= 'however') implies that those following are to be included among the sordid, though the somewhat similar characters just mentioned are excluded on account of the large scale on which their villanies are practised.

6. ἀμφοτέροι] i.e. κυβευτῆς in one class, and λωποδύτης and ληστὴς together in the other. The distinction between the latter corresponds nearly with that

between 'picking and stealing' respectively. λωποδύτης is literally one who slips into other people's clothes, a clothes-stealer, and hence a thief on a small scale. The words οἱ μὲν obviously refer to λωποδύται and λησταί, and οἱ δὲ το κυβευταί.

12. ἐναντίον] 'the opposite to' —explained by II. viii. 7.

μείζον κακόν] The reasons for this have been given in §§ 32, 37, 38.

κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην ἀμαρτάνουσιν ἢ κατὰ τὴν λεχθεῖσαν ἀσωτίαν.

45 Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων κακιῶν τοσαύτ' εἰρήσθω.

1 Π. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον εἶναι καὶ περὶ μεγαλοπρε- 5
πείας διελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ περὶ χρήματά τις
ἀρετὴ εἶναι. Οὐχ ὥσπερ δ' ἡ ἐλευθεριότης διατείνει
περὶ πάσας τὰς ἐν χρήμασι πράξεις, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὰς
δαπανηρὰς μόνον· ἐν τούτοις δ' ὑπερέχει τῆς ἐλευθεριό-
τητος μεγέθει. Καθάπερ γὰρ τοῦνομα αὐτὸ ὑποσημαίνει, 10

2 ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν. Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς
τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δαπάνημα τριηράρχω καὶ ἀρχιθεωρῷ.

3 Τὸ πρέπον δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ. Ὁ δ'

Liberality than Prodigality is, as being both more mischievous
45 and more common. So much then for the Virtue of Liberality.

CHAP. II. — *On the Virtue of Magnificence.*

Use of terms
explained
(§§ 1—4).

1 Magnificence, as the name implies, differs from Liberality
2 in the largeness of the sums with which it deals. Its general
3 characteristic is magnitude, but this must be in relation

1. μᾶλλον ἐπὶ ταύτην] Obviously men in general are more ready to take than to give.

8. τὰς δαπανηρὰς μόνον] 'only the expensive ones,' i.e. those in which the expenditure is *grand*: this being the point of difference between μεγαλοπρέπεια and ἐλευθεριότης. Here and elsewhere throughout the Chapter the argument turns upon the etymology of the word μεγαλοπρέπεια, which implies a combination of greatness and propriety. (See *Supplementary Note*.)

12. τριηράρχω] The duty of equipping a trireme, and (as was usual) commanding it in person, was the most important of the λειτουργίαι at Athens. Cf. note on § 11 below.

ἀρχιθεωρῷ] θεωρία was a state embassy or deputation to a festival or public games. ἀρχιθεωρὸς was the head of such an embassy, who defrayed its expenses. This duty was another of the λειτουργίαι, and often a very costly one.

13. ἐν ᾧ perhaps refers to the oc-

ἐν μικροῖς ἢ ἐν μετρίοις κατ' ἀξίαν δαπανῶν οὐ λέγεται
 μεγαλοπρεπῆς, οἷον τὸ "πολλάκι δόσκον ἀλήτην" ἀλλ'
 ὁ ἐν μεγάλοις οὕτως. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπῆς ἐλευ-
 θέριος, ὁ δ' ἐλευθέριος οὐθὲν μᾶλλον μεγαλοπρεπῆς.
 4 Τῆς τοιαύτης δ' ἕξεως ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις μικροπρέπεια 5
 καλεῖται, ἡ δ' ὑπερβολή βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ
 ὅσαι τοιαῦται, οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσαι τῷ μεγέθει περὶ ἃ
 δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι
 5 ὕστερον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπῆς
 ἐπιστήμονι ἔοικεν τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ 10
 6 δαπανῆσαι μέγала ἐμμελῶς. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἴ-
 πομεν, ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζεται, καὶ ὧν ἐστίν.

to three things :—the person who gives, the circumstances of
 the gift, and its object. Hence every magnificent man is
 4 liberal, but not every liberal man is magnificent. The vice
 of defect is Paltriness. The vice of excess, which we describe
 as Bad Taste and Vulgarity, errs not in the greatness of the
 amount spent, but in the inappropriateness in different ways
 5 of the expenditure. But of these hereafter. There is a sort
 of scientific skill implied in Magnificence. This is needed to
 6 decide under what various circumstances, as they actually

Conditions
 required for
 the exercise
 of Magnifi-
 cence
 (§§ 5—9).

casation and accompanying circum-
 stances, περὶ ἃ the objects ; but
 the distinction is not very marked
 in itself, nor carefully retained
 in the text. Another reading is
 ἃ instead of περὶ ἃ, i.e. the
 amount spent.

1. The widow's mite was an
 act of liberality but not of magni-
 ficence, Mr. Peabody's donations
 an example of both. The Vice-
 roy of Egypt's gift of a doll, with
 dress, jewels, etc., valued at
 £2000, to the Sultan's child,

was neither one nor the other,
 for the reasons explained in § 11,
 etc.

6. βαναυσία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία]
 see note on II. vii. 6.

11. ἐμμελῶς] 'harmoniously,'
 literally 'in tune' (ἐν, μέλος),
 just as πλημμελὲς (πλήν, μέλος)
 is what is out of tune (cf. I. ix.
 6, etc.).

12. ἡ ἕξις ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ὀρίζε-
 ται] 'The habit is determined by
 its outward acts, and by the ob-
 jects on which it is exercised.'

Αἱ δὲ τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς δαπάναι μεγάλαι καὶ πρέ-
 πουσαι. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔργα· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα
 δαπάνημα καὶ πρέπον τῷ ἔργῳ. Ὡστε τὸ μὲν ἔργον τῆς
 δαπάνης ἄξιον δεῖ εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δαπάνην τοῦ ἔργου, ἥ
 7 καὶ ὑπερβάλλειν. Δαπανήσει δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁ μεγαλο- 5
 πρεπὴς τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα· κοινὸν γὰρ τοῦτο ταῖς ἀρεταῖς.
 8 Καὶ ἔτι ἡδέως καὶ προετικῶς· ἡ γὰρ ἀκριβολογία μι-
 9 κροπρεπές. Καὶ πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον,

There must be
 a scientific
 appreciation
 of the just
 relation
 between
 expense and
 its object;
 the motive
 must be
 noble;
 and the
 action ready
 and cheerful.

occur (for action is the only real test of disposition in this as in other Virtues), great expenditure is befitting and appropriate. The occasion must be worthy of the expenditure, and the expenditure of the occasion. There must also be the same motive as in all the other virtues, viz. the desire for what is noble. Again the magnificent act must be done cheerfully and ungrudgingly: there must be no close calculations; no considerations of 'How much, or how little, will it cost?'

In the following sentence the δαπάναι correspond to the ἐνέργειαι, and the ἔργα to the ὧν ἐστὶ (which = περὶ ᾧ of § 2) in the particular case under consideration, viz. Magnificence. Compare a similar passage in III. vii. 6 (and note there); and in explanation of the necessity of action (ἐνέργεια) for the perfect determination of a moral habit (ἔξις) see further X. viii. 4, 5. The δὲ in l. 1 and l. 2 marks the application of the general principle to the particular case. Divested of technical language the passage in §§ 5 and 6 means: 'Magnificence, to be determined and recognised as such, must be actually put in practice on certain definite occasions. It con-

sists, as we have seen, in large expenditure on a befitting occasion. Hence there must actually occur both the expenditure and the occasion: and to form a correct judgment of these in practice implies a sort of scientific skill.'

2. ἔργα] the 'works' or 'results.'

5. We had similar conditions insisted on in the case of liberality, i. 12-14.

6. Here, as in the case of liberality, we miss any recognition of benevolence or the desire to do good. See note on i. 27.

7. ἀκριβολογία μικροπρεπές] as is explained in § 21. σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον κ.τ.λ.

σκέψαιτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ἢ πόσου καὶ πῶς ἐλαχίστου.
 10 Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλευθέριον τὸν μεγαλοπρεπῆ εἶναι
 καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἐλευθέριος δαπανήσει ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ. Ἐν
 τούτοις δὲ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς (οἷον μέγεθος),

but rather, 'What will be the grandest and the most appropri-
 10 ate way of doing it?' And hence the magnificent man will
 necessarily be liberal also: but besides the mere grandeur of
 the amount spent, there is a grandeur of manner which im-

Magnificence
differs in
kind as well
as in degree
from Liber-
ality. It al-
ways makes
the most of
what it
spends.

3. ἐν τούτοις . . . μεγαλοπρε-
 πέστερον] The object of this
 passage is to explain that magni-
 ficence differs from liberality not
 in degree only (which it com-
 monly does, οἷον μέγεθος), but in
 kind also. It involves a sort of
 scientific instinct (so to speak,
 see § 5), which, even without add-
 ing to the cost, disposes of it to
 the best advantage. Whatever it
 spends it makes the very most of.

As to the translation:—οἷον
 μέγεθος is parenthetical and ex-
 plains that τὸ μέγα may be, and
 commonly is, literal greatness of
 amount (μέγεθος). Translate,
 'which may take the form of
 greatness of amount.' ἐν τούτοις
 δὲ, literally 'but in these things,'
 and so nearly = 'still,' 'notwith-
 standing.' καὶ (l. 1, p. 192) is
 'even.'

In illustration of the paren-
 thesis οἷον μέγεθος, cf. §§ 17, 18
 (καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων κ.τ.λ.),
 where we have an instance of
 μέγα, which is not μέγεθος, i.e.
 of appropriate greatness which
 is not greatness of bulk. With
 the statement involved in καὶ

ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης κ.τ.λ.,
 compare Bacon's *Essays* (on Ex-
 pense), 'Ordinary Expense . . .
 should be so ordered that the
 bills be less than the estimation
 abroad.' Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 80)
 attributes a gift of this kind to
 Mucianus, 'Omnium quae dice-
 ret atque ageret arte quâdam
 (cf. ἐπιστήμονι § 5) ostentator.'
 It is a familiar fact that some
 people spend profusely and yet
 'have nothing to show for it,'
 while others contrive to do a
 surprising amount with slender
 means. The former lack, and
 the latter on a small scale pos-
 sess, that peculiar skill which
 Aristotle in the text ascribes to
 the μεγαλοπρέπης, of making the
 most display from a given expen-
 diture. Speaking generally, the
 French have this gift much
 more than ourselves. We notice
 again how the scientific or intel-
 lectual rather than the moral
 side of Magnificence is insisted on
 (See Introduction p. xxxiv.).

It should be added that the
 passage is also sometimes written
 with a parenthesis enclosing the

περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ἐλευθεριότητος οὕσης, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης τὸ ἔργον ποιήσῃ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου· κτήμα μὲν γὰρ τὸ πλείστου ἄξιον τιμιώτατον, οἷον χρυσὸς, ἔργον δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ καλόν. Τοῦ γὰρ τοιούτου ἡ θεωρία θαυμαστὴ, τὸ δὲ μεγαλοπρεπὲς θαυμαστόν. Καὶ ἔστιν ἔργον ἀρετὴ μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐν μεγέθει.

- 11 Ἔστι δὲ τῶν δαπανημάτων οἷα λέγομεν τὰ τίμια, οἷον τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἀναθήματα καὶ κατασκευαὶ καὶ θυσίαι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὅσα περὶ πᾶν το δαιμόνιον, καὶ ὅσα πρὸς 1

parts a special lustre to the acts of a magnificent man beyond what would be achieved by mere liberality even with the same expenditure. For a work and a possession are not to be estimated in the same way. In the latter case there is only a question of intrinsic value; in the former we must take into consideration the grandeur and the moral effect produced on the beholders. The perfection of any work or action is its magnificence, and that must be exhibited on a grand scale.

- 12 We pass on now to the occasions which are fitting for the display of Magnificence. We notice first, the service of re-

words οἷον μέγεθος . . . οὕσης. The sense will then be, 'The greatness of the magnificent man, being a sort of greatness of Liberality (or Liberality on a large scale),—Liberality having reference to the same objects,—even from an equal expenditure,' etc.

This however seems rather to mar the force of καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπάνης. It is probable that there is some corruption in the text. οἷον μέγεθος looks like a gloss.

7. μεγαλοπρέπεια combines the ideas of 'magnificence' indicated in its etymology, and

'munificence' implied by its technical limitation to money matters in this Chapter. As we have no one word exactly co-extensive with this, we may adopt 'munificence' or 'magnificence,' according to the idea most prominent in the context, but see Suppl. Notes, p. 289.

9. κατασκευαί probably refers to the adornment and permanent furniture of the temples. κατασκευη denotes permanent, and παρασκευη temporary and moveable, decorations. Compare κατασκευάσασθαι just below, § 16.

τὸ κοινὸν εὐφιλοτίμητά ἐστιν, οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν
οἷονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραρχεῖν ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν
12 πόλιν. Ἐν ἅπασιν δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρὸς τὸν πρᾶτ-
τοντα ἀναφέρεται τὸ τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων ὑπαρχόντων ἄξια
γὰρ δεῖ τούτων εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον τῷ ἔργῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ 5
13 τῷ ποιῶντι πρέπειν. Διὸ πένης μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεγαλο-
πρεπής· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀφ' ὧν πολλὰ δαπανήσει πρεπόν-
τως· ὁ δ' ἐπιχειρῶν ἡλίθιος· παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ καὶ
14 τὸ δέον· κατ' ἀρετὴν δὲ τὸ ὀρθῶς. Πρέπει δὲ καὶ οἷς
τὰ τοιαῦτα προϋπάρχει δι' αὐτῶν ἢ διὰ τῶν προγόνων 10
ἢ ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν, καὶ τοῖς εὐγενέσι καὶ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις
καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ
15 ἀξίωμα. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτος ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δαπανήμασιν ἡ μεγαλοπρέπεια,

2 ligion, and next, great public or patriotic services. In all Occasions appropriate for Magnificence (§§ 11—19) are chiefly public, such as the service of Religion or of the State;
these cases however regard must be had to the social position, and to the means, of the doer, as well as to the work done.
13 It would be out of place for a man of small or moderate means
14 to aspire to be magnificent. It is a virtue reserved for those
of great wealth, inherited or acquired, good birth, high station,
15 and so forth. To these cases we may add great and rare

1. εὐφιλοτίμητα] 'objects of laudable ambition.'

χορηγεῖν . . . τριηραρχεῖν . . . ἐστιᾶν] These λειτουργίαι at Athens resembled High Sheriffs' duties among ourselves, being imposed without remuneration on the rich citizens. καὶ joined with ἐστιᾶν implies that this office of providing a feast for the citizens was less costly than the others. See § 2 for other references to these offices, and note there.

4. τὸ groups the words that follow into one idea forming grammatically a sort of nominative to ἀναφέρεται. (Compare τὸ τί-ἦν-εἶναι in II. vi., etc.) 'There is also a reference made to the agent, viz. who he is, and what are his means.'

11. ὧν αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν] 'their relations or connexions.'

12. μέγεθος καὶ ἀξίωμα] 'grandeur and dignity.'

14. τοιούτοις] i.e. the two classes of objects already men-

- ὥσπερ εἴρηται· μέγιστα γὰρ καὶ ἐντιμότατα· τῶν δὲ
 ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον,
 καὶ εἰ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις σπουδάζει ἢ οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι,
 καὶ περὶ ξένων δὲ ὑποδοχὰς καὶ ἀποστολὰς, καὶ δωρεὰς
 καὶ ἀντιδωρεάς· οὐ γὰρ εἰς ἑαυτὸν δαπανηρὸς ὁ μεγαλο-
 16 πρεπής, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ κοινά· τὰ δὲ δῶρα τοῖς ἀναθήμασιν
 ἔχει τι ὅμοιον. Μεγαλοπρεποὺς δὲ καὶ οἶκον κατα-
 σκευάσασθαι πρεπόντως τῷ πλούτῳ· κόσμος γάρ τις καὶ
 οὗτος. Καὶ περὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον δαπανᾶν ὅσα πολυχρόνια
 17 τῶν ἔργων· κάλλιστα γὰρ ταῦτα. Καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις
 τὸ πρέπον· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀρμόζει θεοῖς καὶ ἀνθρώποις,
 οὐδ' ἐν ἱερῷ καὶ τάφῳ· καὶ ἐπεὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων
 ἕκαστον μέγα ἐν τῷ γένει, καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατον μὲν
 τὸ ἐν μεγάλῳ μέγα, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν τούτοις μέγα.

but also
 some occur
 in private
 life.

- occasions in private life, such as a wedding, works of public
 or general interest, entertaining strangers, making and return-
 16 ing presents, and so on: or again, the furnishing and orna-
 ments of one's house, and generally, permanent, rather than
 17 perishable, objects. In all cases however the expenditure
 must be fitting to the occasion, whatever it be. There is a
 greatness in any work when it is perfect of its kind, even in

tioned, viz. the service of Religion
 and the service of the State, as
 contrasted with the less striking
 cases which follow, viz. great
 and rare occasions in private life.

2. ὅσα εἰσάπαξ] Compare
 'A man ought warily to begin
 charges, which, once begun, will
 continue; but in matters that
 return not he may be more mag-
 nificent' (Bacon).

3. εἰ δὲ περί τι πᾶσα ἡ πόλις]
 The entertainment of the Vice-
 roy of Egypt by Lord Dudley in

1867 would be an instance in
 point.

οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι] 'the leading
 men in it.'

6. τὰ δὲ δῶρα] 'presents have
 something of the nature of offer-
 ings,' which have been specified
 already in § 11 as occasions fit-
 ting for Magnificence.

14. ἐνταῦθα δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'It is
 possible to do a thing hand-
 somely though it be no great
 matter in itself: but the hand-
 somest actions are naturally those

- 18 Καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι
σφαίρα μὲν γὰρ ἢ λήκυθος ἢ καλλίστη ἔχει μεγαλοπρέ-
πειαν παιδικοῦ δώρου, ἢ δὲ τούτου τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνε-
19 λεύθερον. Διὰ τοῦτό ἐστι τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς, ἐν ᾧ ἂν
ποιῇ γένει, μεγαλοπρεπῶς ποιεῖν τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον οὐκ 5
εὐνπέρβλητον, καὶ ἔχον κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦ δαπανήματος.
20 Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλοπρεπής, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων καὶ
βάνανσος τῷ παρὰ τὸ δέον ἀναλίσκειν ὑπερβάλλει ὥσπερ
εἴρηται. Ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ
ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς 10
γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κωμῳδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ

- 18 toy-presents to children, but not such greatness as to consti-
tute magnificence in its proper sense. This is strictly speaking
19 a grand outlay on a grand occasion. Still even in the smallest
matters the Magnificent man will act magnificently, and strive
20 if possible never to be outdone. In contrast with all this note
the character of the Vulgar man. On small occasions he will
spend large sums, and make a vulgar show, and that not from
any noble motive, but simply to display his riches, and to draw

The Excess
is Vulgar
display.

which are on the largest scale, and next come those which are handsome in matters of smaller degree.' This seems from the context to be the meaning of ἐν τούτοις.

3. τιμὴ μικρὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον] 'The cost is small and not a matter for liberality.' Thus the condition ἐν ἐκάστοις τὸ πρέπον (§ 17) would be violated.

4. διὰ τοῦτο] i.e. because there is a 'great' even in small matters.

10. παρὰ μέλος] 'in bad taste.' Contrast ἐμμελῶς in § 5. ἐρανισ-
ται are persons associated for

festive purposes on condition of each bearing his share of the expense, or of each entertaining the rest in turn, as is here supposed. It would be vulgar display and not magnificence for any one, when his turn came, to furnish the club dinner with the splendour of a marriage feast.

11. πάροδος] literally 'a coming forward' or 'appearance;' technically applied to the first entrance of the Chorus in a Greek play (the Chorus usually not being on the stage from the commencement), and then to the song which accompanied that

πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς. Καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλούτου ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ οὐ μὲν δεῖ πολλὰ ἀναλῶσαι, ὀλίγα δαπανῶν, οὐ δ' 21 ὀλίγα, πολλά. Ὁ δὲ μικροπρεπὴς περὶ πάντα ἐλλείπει, 5 καὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεί, καὶ ὃ τι ἂν ποιῇ μέλλων, καὶ σκοπῶν πῶς ἂν ἐλάχιστον ἀναλῶσαι, καὶ ταῦτ' ὀδυρόμενος, καὶ πάντ' οἰόμενος

attention to himself. When he ought to spend much, he will spend little; and when he ought to spend little, he will spend much. On the other hand, the Paltry man always spends too little. If ever he does spend largely, he will spoil everything by some petty economy. He will be always hesitating and calculating how cheaply he can get off, and will be continually

The Defect, 21
Paltriness.

entrance. The emphatic word here is *κωμωδοῖς*, comedy naturally requiring less splendour than tragedy.

4. οὐ μὲν δεῖ κ.τ.λ.] This follows naturally, because his only object being to display *himself* and his riches, he pays no regard to the proprieties of circumstances and expense, which it needs a careful scientific discernment (§ 5) to observe properly. Consequently if a proper occasion for great expense happens to be one for little personal display, the *βάνανσος* holds aloof.

6. τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας] This is a point of difference between *ἀνελευθερία* and *μικροπρέπεια*. The latter being the defect where great expenditure is in question, the Paltry man is one who tries to combine cheap-

ness and display. He wishes to make a show and yet hates to part with his money. The Sordid (*ἀνελεύθερος*) cares only for keeping his money on any terms.

ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ] *e.g.* If a man should make a handsome donation to a Charity and send in the bill for the carriage and packing. Or, as Theophrastus says, 'He will give a grand feast and stint the supply of wine, and the dishes will hardly go round; or 'when he is celebrating a marriage feast, he will hire the waiters on condition that they find their own food,' and so on. He is the sort of man who cannot feel that in reference to such cases it is better 'to do the thing well, or not at all.'

7. μέλλων] 'with hesitation or reluctance.'

22 μείζω ποιεῖν ἢ δεῖ. Εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν αἱ ἕξεις αὗται κακίαι, οὐ μὴν ὀνειδίη γ' ἐπιφέρουσι διὰ τὸ μήτε βλαβεραὶ τῷ πέλας εἶναι, μήτε λίαν ἀσχήμονες.

1 III. Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λά- 5
2 βωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν
3 ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγας

22 grumbling that whatever he does spend is excessive. Still, vices as these are, they are not of the worst dye, for they are neither very injurious, nor very offensive, to society.

CHAP. III.—On the Virtue of Highmindedness or Self-Esteem.

1 The very name Highmindedness, which we give to the virtue of well-grounded Self-esteem, implies that there is
2 something great about it—(whether we consider the habit in the abstract or portray an individual character in the concrete
3 is indifferent)—and that greatness may be described as great

Highmindedness, Vaingloriousness, and Little-mindedness are concerned with the relation between a man's merits and his own estimate of them:

CHAP. III.—μεγαλοψυχία is another very difficult word to translate. The exact etymological equivalent 'Magnanimity' has by the usage of language acquired too restricted a sense. Perhaps we must content ourselves with the awkward compound, 'Highmindedness.' On the inadequacy of this and the related terms see further the Supplementary Note at the end of this Book.

The groundwork of this and the related types of character described in this Chapter is the amount of, and the relation between, a man's merits and his own estimate of them. A

more tangible and practically applicable test is substituted in § 10, viz. his relation to Honour (τιμὴ).

The Chapter falls under the following divisions:—

§§ 1—8. Terminology explained.

§§ 9—17. Highmindedness described generally as the desire to deserve, and to secure, Honour.

§§ 18—34. The characteristics of Highmindedness in reference to sundry practical details of life.

§§ 35—37. The related vices of Excess and Defect.

6. διαφέρει δὲ κ.τ.λ.] In this case the latter method is con-

αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν
 ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐδεὶς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος.
 4 Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. Ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σῶφρων, μεγαλόψυχος
 5 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ
 κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ
 6 σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ. Ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν
 ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος· ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς
 7 χαῦνος. Ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, εἴαν
 τε μεγάλων εἴαν τε μετρίων, εἴαν τε καὶ μικρῶν
 ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Καὶ μάλιστα
 αὖ δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ αὖ ἐποίει, εἰ

self-esteem based upon great merits. In the absence of great
 1, 5 merits such self-esteem would be mere folly: and in such a
 case an adequate estimate of ourself, being necessarily a low
 6 one, is not Highmindedness, but rather sober judgment. A
 too high estimate of self is Vaingloriousness, provided it be
 7 not only too high but also high absolutely. Conversely a
 lower estimate than facts would warrant, be it small or great
 in itself, is Littlemindedness, and above all when a man's
 merits are really great, because then the contrast is more

spicuously adopted. We have almost an individual portraiture of a *μεγαλόψυχος* in this Chapter. Pericles has even been suggested as the original.

6. According to the Greek estimate beauty implied bulk. Perhaps our word 'handsome,' as used in contrast with 'beautiful,' conveys the same idea. *Comp. Pol. IV. iv. 8, τὸ καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἶωθε γίνεσθαι.*

8. ὁ δὲ μειζόνων κ.τ.λ.] A man may estimate himself at a

low rate and yet more highly than he deserves, in which case he would hardly be called 'vain.' *e.g.* Whately says of his tutor at College that 'he would be generally described as an eminently modest man. He never rated himself high either in abilities or attainments, and yet he overrated himself to a great degree, else he never would have undertaken the office of a College tutor.' This is just the case described in the text. See

- 8 μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος; ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος
τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος· τοῦ γὰρ
κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ. Οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλ-
9 λείπουσιν. Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὢν,
καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. 5
10 Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ. Μέγιστον δὲ
τοῦτ' ἂν θεήμεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ'
ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις
ἄθλον. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγα- 10
11 λόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται
οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι τιμῆς γὰρ μάλισθ'
12 οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιούσιν ἑαυτοὺς, κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ

8 striking. In perfect Highmindedness self-esteem is in a sense extreme, because it is always in proportion to merit, which is in that case extreme. It is in the observance of that *proportion* that the familiar law of the mean is exhibited; while its violation gives rise to the related Vices of Vaingloriousness and Littlemindedness. So much for the phraseology which
10 we propose to employ. Now how is merit estimated or recompensed by men? Chiefly by Honour. Honour therefore
11 is the aim of the Highminded; to obtain Honour on condition
12 of deserving it. The Little-minded man falls short in his

further note at the end of this Book.

1. He is *extreme* in the *greatness* of his self-estimate, *moderate* in the *propriety* of it. A similar paradox was explained in regard to Virtue generally in II. vi. 17.

6. Ἡ δ' ἀξία] i.e. the expression, 'worth' or 'worthy of,' has reference to some external good as the standard by which it is measured. The index of merit,

in other words, is something external; it is in fact the honour or estimation of others (τιμὴ). Hence, practically, we may describe this as the object and aim of Highmindedness, and the related excess and defect. See further I. v. 5 and note. Hence in the Catalogue of Virtues in II. vii. τιμὴ and ἀτιμία were taken at once as the groundwork of μεγαλοψυχία with its related Vices.

and the three characters may be judged by the amount of Honour they deem to be their due.

- μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ
 13 μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῖνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν
 14 ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον. Ὁ δὲ μεγα-
 λόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη·
 μείζονος γὰρ αἰὲς ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄρι-
 στος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν
 εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειε δ' ἂν εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη
 15 ἀρετῇ μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ
 φεύγειν παρασείσαντι, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα
 πράξει αἰσχρὰ, ᾧ οὐθέν μέγα; καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκο- 10
 ποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ
 ἀγαθὸς ὢν. Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος
 ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἢ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς
 16 ἀγαθοῖς. Ἐοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος

- estimate of himself both in reference to his own merits and
 13 also in reference to the standard of the Highminded. In
 reference to that standard the Vainglorious man on the other
 hand cannot exceed, but in reference to his own merits he
 14 does so. Highmindedness, being based upon merit, implies
 the possession of the other virtues, and that in the highest
 15 degree. Undignified flight, for example, or injustice of any
 kind, would be utterly incompatible with a well-merited self-
 16 respect. True Highmindedness is, as it were, 'the head and

High-
 mindedness
 implies all
 other virtues
 in the high-
 est degree.

2. ἀξίωμα] The vainglorious man's estimate of himself cannot of course exceed the highminded man's estimate of himself, but it does exceed the estimate which his own merits warrant.

7. Καὶ δόξειε κ.τ.λ.] He not only possesses every Virtue, but every one on a grand scale, just as the μεγαλοπρεπὴς was explained (in ii. 10) to possess the particular virtue of Liberality on a grand scale.

9. παρασείσαντι] understand τὰς χεῖρας, i.e. 'swinging the hands in precipitate flight.'

οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.] His high sense of the dignity of his moral nature is such (πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνεται μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν) that he scorns to do an unjust or base action. This has sometimes been censured as if it was mere pride, but we should not forget that *mutatis mutandis* Christianity

τις εἶναι τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

17 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστι, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων 5 μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμῇ· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν. Τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει· οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος. 10

18 Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν. Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλούτου

crown' of all the virtues. Need we wonder that it is rare and difficult to attain to? The Highminded man, when he receives high honour from good men, will feel pleasure, though in a moderate degree, for he knows that he is obtaining his due, or rather, less than his due, but still the best it is in their power to give, and as such he is willing to accept it. The paltry homage of ordinary men he will despise as unworthy of him, and so he will also their contempt, which he knows is undeserved. With the same dignified attitude will

The High-minded man is sober and discriminating in regard to the honour paid him by others.

Minor practical characteristics of

appeals to a somewhat similar motive, e.g. Rom. vi. 2, 11, 21, etc. etc. So Plat. Rep. p. 486 A.

1. μείζους . . . ποιεῖ] High-mindedness is not so much a separate virtue as a combination of all virtues in one perfect character, each and all being enhanced by the full consciousness of their possession, or (as a modern might phrase it) 'the testimony of a good conscience' in respect of them. (See Suppl. Note.)

3. καλοκαγαθίας] 'Nobility' seems to hit the double significance of this word. καλοκάγαθος, if it has not (like 'optimates' in Latin) passed from a moral to a social significance, yet implies the latter in combination with the former.

5. ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων] He only cares 'laudari a laudatis viris.' Comp. I. v. 5.

10. ἐπὶ μικροῖς] 'on trivial grounds.'

καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὐτ' εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται, οὐτ' ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὄν. Αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἔστιν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες 5 αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται. Ὡς δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστι, τούτῳ καὶ τᾶλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν 19 εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ

the High-minded man (§§ 18—24). His estimate of riches, power, prosperity, etc. Conversely the influence of these on High-mindedness.

he regard riches, power, and prosperity and adversity generally. Riches and power are but means to honour, and he who estimates *it* so soberly will not be dazzled by *them*. Hence 19 men think him supercilious. Indeed these very advantages are thought to tend to High-mindedness because they secure

8. Men expect to receive, and do receive, honour in respect of riches, power, or good birth. Hence the possession of these advantages will in fact help the High-minded man to that honour which is his due, though he deserves it on higher grounds. Hence too, as honour intensifies self-respect, High-mindedness itself is thought to be fostered by any of those external advantages which in the opinion and practice of mankind entitle their possessor to honour. In strict truth, however, goodness, and goodness alone, is the proper ground for self-respect, or for the esteem of others. In § 21 it is added that superciliousness, which is an external accompaniment of High-mindedness, is also a result of the

possession of such advantages as these.

It is interesting to notice that the Greek words for moral excellence are generally derived from those which express outward beauty, good birth, strength, ability, etc. The primitive import of such words is generally found in Homer, and their ethical meaning can scarcely be said to be fixed before Socrates. *e.g.* καλὸς and αἰσχροὺς (cf. ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν παναίσχους, I. viii. 16), γενναῖος, ἐσθλὸς (i.e. ἔθλός = 'edél', 'noble') χρηστός. This bears witness to the confusion noticed in the text between material prosperity and moral worth. The other side of the picture appears in the dictum of Tennyson's Farmer, 'The poor in a loomp is bad.'

δυναστεύοντες ἢ οἱ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ, τὸ
 δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ
 τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπο-
 τινῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· ὃ δ'
 ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρε-
 τῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες, οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς
 μεγάλων ἀξιούσιν, οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται·
 ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα. Ὑπερόπται
 δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίγ-
 νονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ράδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ
 εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
 ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ-
 τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλό-
 ψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύναν-
 ται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι, καταφρονοῦσι
 δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ
 (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως. Οὐκ

honour among men to their possessor. In truth, merit alone
 deserves honour, but when merit and these advantages are
 united, honour is accorded more freely. Without merit they
 cannot form the ground of that self-esteem which constitutes
 Highmindedness, nor again can they justify the supercilious-
 ness in which their possessors ape the Highminded. Unlike
 him, they have no superior merit to warrant that feeling, nor
 discrimination in its exercise. The Highminded man will

His courage
in danger.

1. ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γὰρ] 'For they
are in a position of superiority.'

13. ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν]
is explained by the words τὰ μὲν
οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσι just
below.

Μιμοῦνται γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] The
μεγαλόψυχος is imitated by in-
ferior characters,

'Who stand aloof from other men
In impotence of fancied power.'
(Tennyson.)

He stands aloof in a well-founded
consciousness of superiority.

14. δικαίως καταφρονεῖ] 'A
due contempt for inferiors' is
not regarded by Aristotle as in
itself objectionable. It is per-

- ἔστι δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα
 τιμᾶν, μεγαλοκίνδυνος δὲ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς
 24 τοῦ βίου, ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν. Καὶ οἷος εὖ
 ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ
 ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντεvergετικὸς
 πλειόνων οὕτω γὰρ οἱ προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται
 25 εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιή-

not court danger, but if it be great and worthy of him he will face it without regard to his life, which he does not think

- 24 worth preserving at the cost of honour. He loves to confer and is ashamed to receive benefits, and he hastens to requite
 25 them with increase. In fact men are apt to remember those

His be-
 haviour in
 respect of
 conferring
 or accepting
 benefits

happens a corollary to the somewhat over-conscious self-respect inculcated as the basis of the Virtue under consideration. The following passage from an Essay of Archbishop Whately on 'Generosity' perhaps exhibits this trait in the more favourable aspect in which it appeared to Aristotle:—"If a man who feels himself capable of generous and exalted conduct, measures others by his own standard, he must be first disappointed, and then dissatisfied" (from which 'contempt' would be an easy step) 'with almost all the world: for very few have even any conception of real heroic generosity. As a celebrated ancient once said, "As he never excused a fault in himself, he could not tolerate any in others."' "

6. προσοφλήσει ὁ ὑπάρξας] 'the one who began it will be left in his debt besides'; and so

debtor and creditor will change places.

7. Δοκοῦσι used thus impersonally seems to refer to mankind generally, not to the *μεγαλόψυχος* in particular, though he so far shares the feeling as to hasten to requite benefits received, and so to wipe out the feeling of obligation.

So remarks Thucydides, II. xi. § 7, 'He who has conferred a benefit is glad to keep alive the obligation by renewed acts of kindness: while he who has received one is less keen about it, knowing that any service he may render will be regarded as payment of a debt, and not as an act of favour.' The point is further worked out by Aristotle himself in IX. vii. In the same spirit remarks La Rochefoucauld (*Maximes* 238), 'It is not so dangerous to do harm to the majority of men, as to go too far in doing

σωσιν εὖ, ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐκ ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν
 εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν
 ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν
 τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διὶ οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς
 6 Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ 5
 καὶ τὸ μηθενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγισ, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως,
 καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν
 εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερ-

whom they have benefited, but when they have received a
 benefit they are glad to forget it, because such a position is
 6 one of dependence and inferiority. He is reluctant to ask a
 favour, though ready to confer one. With great men he
 carries his head high, while with ordinary men he is unaffected,

His com-
 portment
 towards
 others.

them good.' 'There is scarcely
 any one who is not ungrateful
 for great benefits' (*Max.* 299).
 An Eastern despot is said to
 have beheaded a man who had
 saved his life in order to avoid
 remaining under an obligation
 which nothing could ever re-
 pay.

Again notice the absence of
 the recognition of Benevolence,
 or any desire to benefit *others*.
 (See Introduction, p. xxxv.) Both
 Aristotle and Thucydides look
 mainly at the pleasurable sense
 of superiority on the part of one
 who confers a benefit.

3. διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Passing
 illustrations of this sort are ap-
 parently introduced by Aristotle
 from memory, and are not un-
 frequently incorrect. This would
 not be unnatural if they occurred
 to the author during an extem-
 pore Lecture. (See Introduction,

p. xxxvii.) Thetis (Homer, *Il.*
 i. 503) seems to do the reverse—

Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἴποτε δὴ σε μετ' ἀθανά-
 τοισιν ὄνησα
 *Ἥ ἐπει ἡ ἔργω.

(See *Supplementary Note*.)

The reference in the case of
 the Lacedæmonians is uncertain.
 A case is related by Xen. *Hell.*
 VI. v. 33, in which however
 benefits conferred as well as re-
 ceived by themselves are men-
 tioned by the Spartans.

6. δεῖσθαι here means, 'to
 ask for,' not 'to stand in need
 of,' as we judge from the High-
 minded man being said to do so
 reluctantly (μόγισ) and also from
 the natural contrast between
 seeking and conferring favours
 (ὑπηρετεῖν). Compare *δεητικὸς* in
 § 32.

7. τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι] 'men of
 repute.' See § 15 of the last
 Chapter.

- ἔχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνὸν, τῶν δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνοις
 μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορ-
 27 τικὸν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς
 τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι, ἣ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν
 εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν, ἀλλ' ἣ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον.
 Καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών.
 28 Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερομισῇ εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον
 (τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενου, καὶ ἀμελεῖν τῆς ἀληθείας
 μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης), καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς
 (παρρησιαστῆς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονητικὸς εἶναι, καὶ
 ἀληθευτικὸς, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν [εἰρωνεία δὲ]
 29 πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς), καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν
 ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γὰρ διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες
 θητικοὶ καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός·

for there is nothing grand in giving one's-self airs before them.

He is only
 roused to
 action on
 great occa-
 sions.

- 27 He is not roused to exertion by any but the greatest objects
 of ambition, and is therefore generally in a state of dignified
 28 inaction. He is open in his hatreds and his friendships, cares
 for truth more than the opinion of men, scorns concealment
 in words or actions, and speaks the plain truth except when
 he shrinks from asserting his full rights, as he does in fact
 29 with the majority of people. He cannot conform himself to

His plain-
 spokenness.

His inde-
 pendence,
 undemon-
 strativeness,

4. *ἔντιμα*] 'objects of com-
 mon esteem.' ἀργὸν καὶ μελλη-
 τὴν = 'inactive and hesitating.'

11. *εἰρωνεία* is explained after-
 wards in ch. vii. to be a consci-
 ous depreciation of one's own
 merits or powers, and must not
 be mistaken here for 'irony.' A
 man of such pre-eminent dignity
 and merit as the *μεγαλόψυχος*
 must 'let himself down' with the
 majority of those he meets. He
 therefore consciously lowers his

own pretensions on most occa-
 sions, and this would be *εἰρώ-
 νεια*. The word ἀληθευτικὸς is of
 course to be supplied again after
 ὅσα μὴ.

14. *θητικοὶ*] 'slavish' (θήs),
ταπεινοὶ = 'mean' or 'grovelling.'
 The word (as has been noted
 elsewhere) has a bad meaning in
 classical Greek, though no better
 word could be found by Christian
 writers to express the new idea
 of 'humility' as a virtue.

30 οὐθὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησικάκος· οὐ γὰρ
 μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακὰ,
 31 ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος· οὔτε γὰρ
 περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇ-
 ται μέλει αὐτῷ, οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται· οὐδ' αὖ 5
 ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν
 32 ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν
 ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικὸς· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ
 33 οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οἷος κεκτηῖσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ
 καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπύμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρ- 10
 34 κους γὰρ μᾶλλον. Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλο-
 ψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξεις στάσι-
 μος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων,
 οὐδὲ σύντομος ὁ μὴθὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία

another's mode of life though he will do so for a friend. He forgetful-
 30 is not apt to express astonishment, nor to remember injuries. ness of in-
 31 He is no gossip: he is a man of few words, sparing alike in jury, and
 32 his praise and in his reproaches. He will not be anxious His indif-
 33 about trifles: he will prefer to possess what is grand and ference to
 34 unproductive rather than what is merely useful. His gait, trifles, and
 general
 dignity of
 manner.

1. οὐ γὰρ . . . ἀπομνημονεύ-
 ει] He is not apt to bear any-
 thing long in mind, good or ill,
 but especially (ἄλλως τε καὶ) the
 latter. For the former see § 25.

7. δι' ὕβριν] He is not abusive
 except when he wishes to express
 his disdain. If he does speak ill
 of people, he will do it to their
 face, and in order deliberately
 to brand *them* with contempt,
 not because he cannot control
 his own feelings, and still less to
 gratify any personal impulse of
 malignity or revenge. Our Lord's
 withering denunciations of the

Pharisees might come under this
 head. In fact νέμεσις (see II. vii.
 15) would sometimes find ex-
 pression in ὕβρις or Scorn. (See
Supplementary Note.)

ἀναγκαίων] 'things which can-
 not be helped.'

8. ὀλοφυρτικὸς] 'querulous.'

12. στάσιμος] 'stately.' Com-
 pare La Rochefoucauld (*Max.*
 142), 'C'est le caractère des
 grands esprits de faire entendre
 en peu de paroles, beaucoup de
 choses, les petits esprits au con-
 traire ont le don de beaucoup
 parler et de rien dire.'

καὶ ἡ ταχυτῆς διὰ τούτων. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μεγαλό-
 ψυχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων μικρόψυχος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων
 35 χαῖνος. Οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι· οὐ
 γὰρ κακοποιοὶ εἰσιν· ἡμαρτημένοι δέ. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 μικρόψυχος, ἄξιος ὢν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν
 ἄξιός ἐστι, καὶ ἔοικε κακὸν ἔχειν τι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἄξιον
 ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν δ' ἑαυτόν· ὠρέγετο γὰρ
 ἂν ὢν ἄξιος ἦν, ἀγαθῶν γε ὄντων. Οὐ μὲν ἡλίθιοί γε
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀκηροί. Ἡ
 τοιαύτη δὲ δόξα δοκεῖ καὶ χείρους ποιεῖν· ἕκαστοι γὰρ

his voice, and his manner of speech will be grave, dignified,
 35 and deliberate. Such is the Highminded man. The related
 characters who are in excess and defect in the matter of self-
 estimation are, as we have seen, the Vainglorious and the Little-
 minded. They are misguided, rather than actively vicious.

The related
 Vices are—
 Little-
 minded-
 ness,

4. There is an obvious contrast between κακοποιοὶ (actively vicious) and κακὸν ἔχειν τι (having something wrong about them). Aristotle means to say that men would hardly form so low an estimate of themselves unless there was something to partially justify it. 'There cannot be so much smoke without some fire.'

9. ὀκηροί] 'wanting in energy,' 'diffident.'

10. ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα κ.τ.λ.] In other words, the absence of moral aspiration is most injurious. The moral influence of a man's estimate of himself is very important. Witness the elevating effect of a conscious feeling that a man has powers beyond the perhaps humble sphere in which he finds himself placed, and con-

versely the depressing effect of the feeling (whether due to constitutional indolence, despondency, etc.), that one will never accomplish the task in hand. Many thus fail, simply because they have made up their minds that they cannot succeed. It is remarked by Nassau Senior in his Notes on Turkey, that the general spread of corruption among Turkish officials seems to date from the time when an oath of office was first imposed, in which the strictest integrity was promised; and he accounts for this by the supposition that the officials, unable to keep the oath completely, became reckless when they had once broken it. In other words, the conscious degradation of perjury (leading

ἐφίενται τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν, ἀφίστανται δὲ καὶ τῶν πράξεων
 τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὡς ἀνάξιοι ὄντες,
 36 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. Οἱ δὲ χαῦνοι ἡλίθιοι
 καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀγνοοῦντες, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐπιφανῶς· οὐ γὰρ
 ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἴτα ἐξελέγχονται· 5
 καὶ ἐσθῆτι κοσμοῦνται καὶ σχήματι καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις,
 καὶ βούλονται τὰ εὐτυχήματα φανερά εἶναι αὐτῶν, καὶ
 λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς διὰ τούτων τιμηθησόμενοι.
 37 Ἀντιτίθεται δὲ τῇ μεγαλοψυχίᾳ ἡ μικροψυχία μᾶλλον
 τῆς χαυνότητος· καὶ γὰρ γίγνεται μᾶλλον καὶ χεῖρον 10
 ἐστίν.

We note however that there is probably some ground at the bottom of even undue self-depreciation; and also that such characters have a tendency to sink to their own standard.

36 The Vainglorious man is conspicuous by his ignorance of himself, and seeks by a vulgar display of such external advantages as he does possess to secure for himself that admiration to
 37 which his merits do not entitle him. Littlemindedness is more opposed to Highmindedness than Vaingloriousness is. It is a worse error, and also a commoner one.

and Vain-
glorious-
ness.

Little-
mindedness
is the worse
extreme.

το μικροψυχία, or a low moral estimation of one's-self), extinguished all scruples as to minor offences, and all desire to avoid them, and so the whole character settled down to the level of the estimate of itself already formed. We may extend the remark to the moral influence of the estimation of society on the character of individuals. Recovery from some sins is rendered all but hopeless, out of all proportion to their relative guilt, simply by the arbitrary ban of society upon them. The offender in fact

acquiesces himself in this estimate of his degradation and soon comes to deserve it. Thus ἡ τοιαύτη δόξα χείρους ποιεῖ. This is familiarly expressed in the proverb, 'Give a dog a bad name,' etc.

5. τοῖς ἐντίμοις] See note on § 27.

10. χεῖρον ἐστίν] Though Aristotle gives no reasons for this statement, we may suggest, (1) Its tendency to make men grow worse (§ 35), and (2) Its outward aspect being the reverse of that of Highmindedness. Both

- 1 IV. Ἡ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμὴν ἐστὶ μεγάλην,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἔοικε δὲ καὶ περὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἀρετή τις,
καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐλέχθη, ἢ δόξειεν ἂν παρα-
πλησίως ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ
ἐλευθεριότης πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν. Ἀμφω γὰρ 5
αὗται τοῦ μὲν μεγάλου ἀφεστᾶσι, περὶ δὲ τὰ μέτρια καὶ
2 τὰ μικρὰ διατιθέασιν ἡμᾶς ὡς δεῖ. Ὡσπερ δ' ἐν λήψει

CHAP. IV.—On Ambition.

The proper
objects of
Ambition
and its
relation to
High-
minded-
ness.

- 1 We may now descend to the level of ordinary life, and
describe another Virtue which, with its related Vices, has for
2 its object Honour on a moderate scale, just as we before dis-

these reasons were given in ch. i. for preferring Prodigality to Sordidness.

Further, *χαυνότης* and *μικροψυχία* must be carefully distinguished from *ἀλαζόνεια* and *εἰρώνεια* which are discussed in ch. vii. *Inter alia*, note that while *μικροψυχία* is here said to be worse than *χαυνότης*, Aristotle regards *εἰρώνεια* as a less evil than *ἀλαζόνεια*. See vii. 17. Hence too we must not confuse *μικροψυχία* with Humility, though it is true that the character of Highmindedness as described in this chapter shows that Humility would find no place as a Virtue in Aristotle's system.

γίγνεται μᾶλλον] The deficiency of moral aspiration is much more common than vaingloriousness. The dignity of our moral nature, the worth (*ἀξία*) that belongs to man as man, and the motive for moral action supplied by such a reflection, is totally unrecognised

by the majority of mankind. [See further a Supplementary Note, too long to be introduced here, on the character of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, p. 234.]

CHAP. IV.—In this Chapter habits are discussed differing from those in the last chapter in degree rather than in kind; just as Liberality was related to, and yet differed from, Munificence. We must recollect that the *real* subject-matter to which Highmindedness refers was explained to be 'Self-Esteem in relation to merits' (last ch. § 3); but that *practically* it might be viewed as concerned with the pursuit of honour on a grand scale (§ 10). In this chapter Aristotle takes the latter point of view at once as his starting-point, with the proviso that only honour on a moderate and ordinary scale is now in consideration.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις] Referring (as in § 4 below) to II. vii. 8.

καὶ δώσει χρημάτων μεσότης ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπερβολὴ τε καὶ
 ἔλλειψις, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τιμῇ ὀρέξει τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ
 3 ἦττον, καὶ τὸ ὅθεν δεῖ καὶ ὥς δεῖ. Τὸν τε γὰρ φιλότι-
 μον ψέγομεν ὥς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ ὅθεν οὐ δεῖ, τῆς
 τιμῆς ἐφιεμένον, τὸν τε ἀφιλότιμον, ὥς οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῖς 5
 4 καλοῖς προαιρούμενον τιμᾶσθαι. Ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν φι-
 λότιμον ἐπαινοῦμεν ὥς ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον, τὸν δὲ
 ἀφιλότιμον ὥς μέτριον καὶ σώφρονα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
 πρώτοις εἶπομεν. Δῆλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλο-
 τοιούτου λεγομένου, οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ φέρομεν τὸν 10
 φιλότιμον, ἀλλ' ἐπαινοῦντες μὲν, ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ
 πολλοὶ, ψέγοντες δ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ. Ἀνωνύμου
 δ' οὔσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὥς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν ἀμφισβητεῖν
 τὰ ἅκρα· ἐν οἷς δ' ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις, καὶ τὸ
 5 μέσον. Ὀρέγονται δὲ τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ 15
 ἦττον, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ ὥς δεῖ ἐπαινεῖται γοῦν ἢ ἕξις

tinguished the Liberality of moderate means from the Munifi-
 3 cence appropriate to vast wealth. The term 'Ambition,' by
 which this habit is sometimes described, is not definitely re-
 stricted to it, being sometimes employed also to denote an
 4 excessive pursuit of Honour. 'Ambitious' and 'Unambi-
 5 tious' may either of them be terms of praise or of blame. The
 point to notice however is that there is a right and a wrong

The phraseology in reference to this Virtue is unsettled but its existence is r.c. less certain.

6. It so happens that in our words 'ambition,' 'ambitious,' 'unambitious,' we have terms of similar ambiguity. As Aristotle says in the text, 'ambitious' is sometimes equivalent to 'manly and of noble spirit' (ἀνδρώδη καὶ φιλόκαλον), and yet 'unambitious' is likewise a term of praise reserved for 'men of moderation and self-control' (μέτριον καὶ

σώφρονα). When we praise an 'ambitious' spirit we do so from its favourable contrast with the complacent indifference to 'rise above themselves' found in the majority of men, when we blame it we do so in reference to the standard of propriety, which it transgresses in its excessive eagerness for honour. Cf. σώφρων as used in the last Ch. § 4.

αὕτη, μεσότης οὖσα περὶ τιμὴν ἀνώνυμος. Φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἀφιλοτιμία, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀφιλοτιμίαν φιλοτιμία, πρὸς ἀμφοτέρα δὲ ἀμφοτέρᾳ πως.
 6 Ἐοικε δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. Ἀντικείμενοι δ' ἐνταῦθ' οἱ ἄκροι φαίνονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ὠνομάσθαι τὸν μέσον.

1 V. Πραότης δ' ἐστὶ μὲν μεσότης περὶ ὀργὰς, ἀνωνύμου δ' ὄντος τοῦ μέσου, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν, πρὸς τὴν ἑλβεῖαν ἀποκλίνουσιν, ἀνωνύμου οὖσαν. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ ὀργιλότης 10 τις λέγεται ἂν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἐστὶ ὀργή, τὰ δ'

(and the latter in both directions) *in fact*, though our phraseology may not sufficiently indicate it; and this defect of language is the sole cause that we have apparently in this case the opposition of two extreme habits *inter se*, without a settled mean state in contrast with both of them.

CHAP. V.—On the regulation of the Temper.

No settled phraseology exists in regard to this Virtue. 1 Due moderation in the regulation of the Temper may be termed Meekness. There is no one term in settled use to describe this virtue, nor indeed the related vices. We may perhaps employ the term 'Meekness,' though it suggests rather a 2 deficiency in this respect. The excess we may describe as a

CHAP. V.—See what was said in the note on the Catalogue of Virtues, at the end of B. II. on the position occupied in the list by *πραότης*, as being intermediate between the *personal* virtues that precede and the *social* virtues which follow it.

10. *ὀργιλότης τις* ['Passionateness' and 'impassionateness' seem to express the ideas re-

quired, and their somewhat uncouth character reproduces that of the Greek originals for which Aristotle apologizes by adding *τις* here and in § 5.

11. τὸ μὲν πάθος ἐστὶν ὀργή] It will be remembered that all Virtue and Vice are held by Aristotle to consist in the moderate, excessive, or defective indulgence of some feeling in

3 ἐμποιοῦντα πολλὰ καὶ διαφέροντα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἐφ' οἷς
 δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ, ὀργιζόμενος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε,
 καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινείται· πρᾶος δὲ οὗτος ἂν εἴη,
 εἴπερ ἡ πραότης ἐπαινείται. Βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶος
 ἀτάραχος εἶναι, καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ' 5
 ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦ-
 4 τον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν. Ἀμαρτάνειν δὲ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὐ γὰρ τιμωρητικὸς ὁ πρᾶος, ἀλλὰ
 5 μᾶλλον συγγνωμονικός. Ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις, εἴτ' ἀοργησία
 τίς ἐστίν, εἴθ' ὅ τι δή ποτε, ψέγεται. Οἱ γὰρ μὴ ὀργιζό- 10
 μνοι ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ ἡλίθιοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ οἱ μὴ ὡς δεῖ,
 6 μῆδ' ὅτε, μῆδ' οἷς δεῖ· δοκεῖ γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὐδὲ
 λυπεῖσθαι, μὴ ὀργιζόμενός τε οὐκ εἶναι ἀμυντικός. Τὸ δὲ
 προπηλακιζόμενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν

sort of Passionateness, Anger being the feeling in itself morally
 3 indifferent in which the excess or defect takes place. We
 shall then apply the term 'Meek' to a man who, though he
 is roused to anger on right occasions and in due measure,
 is naturally of a tranquil disposition, and never allows his
 4 anger to get the better of his reason. His leaning is towards
 a deficiency in the feeling of anger, and forgiveness of injuries
 5 comes more naturally to him than revenge. That deficiency,
 impassionateness (if we may venture so to call it), is a fault.
 6 It leads to a neglect of self-defence, and a submission to insult

General character-
 istics how-
 ever may
 be given of
 Meekness,
 which tends
 towards de-
 fect rather
 than excess
 in Anger.
 The defect
 itself is a
 sort of im-
 passionate-
 ness.

itself morally indifferent, neither
 good nor bad. See note on II.
 vii. 2. That feeling is in this
 case Anger. We are accustomed
 to give a bad sense to 'Anger,'
 and to describe the nobler forms
 of the passion by 'Indignation.'
 That 'Anger' had not always
 this restricted sense in English
 may be seen from such passages

as 'Be ye angry and sin not,'
 and S. Mark. iii. 5, where 'anger'
 is attributed to our Lord.

1. ἐφ' οἷς] 'on right occasions'
 (ἐπὶ with dative as usual ex-
 pressing the conditions of the
 action).

2. οἷς δεῖ] 'with right persons'
 (dative of reference).

- 7 ἀνδραποδῶδες. Ἡ δ' ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται καὶ γὰρ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ θάττον, καὶ πλείω χρόνον· οὐ μὴν ἅπαντά γε τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύναται εἶναι τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ἢ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται. 5
- 8 Οἱ μὲν οὖν ὀργίλοι ταχέως μὲν ὀργίζονται, καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, παύονται δὲ ταχέως· ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν. Συμβαίνει δ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ κατέχουσι τὴν ὀργὴν ἀλλ' ἀνταποδιδόσιν ἢ φανεροί· εἰσι διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα, εἰτ' ἀποπαύονται. 10
- 9 Ὑπερβολὴ δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἀκρόχοιοι ὀξεῖς καὶ πρὸς πᾶν ὀργί-
10 λοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦνομα. Οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσ-

directed against one's-self or one's friends, which is slavish.

The excess falls under four types (§§ 7—11):

The passionate.

The quick-tempered.

The sulky.

- 7 The vice of excess is exhibited in every variety of detail, *e.g.* in the objects, the occasions, the degree, the amount of provocation, the endurance of the feeling, etc. Errors in all these respects would scarcely be united in one instance, and if so, would be intolerable. Hence we have several types of the
- 8 excess in question. (1) The *passionate*, who are soon angry, without due cause, and in too violent a degree, but soon come round. Their passion, being utterly unrestrained, speedily exhausts its force. (2) The *quick-tempered*, who are angry in a moment and at anything and everything—hence their name.
- 9 (3) The *sulky*, who are hard to appease; and their anger,

5. ὁλόκληρον] see note above on i. 38.

6. The four classes described in §§ 8—11 have naturally many points in common. Their characteristic features seem to be respectively, (1) Violence and ungovernableness of temper (ὀργίλοι)—(2) Extreme irritability and touchiness (ἀκρόχοιοι), —(3) A sulky and irreconcilable temper (πικροί)—(4) General ill-

nature and revengefulness (χαλεποί).

8. ὃ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν] 'and that is the best point about them.'

10. ἢ φανεροί· εἰσι] 'in a way that one may see,' i.e. 'openly;' as opposed to διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανές in § 10.

11. ὑπερβολὴ . . . ὀξεῖς] 'The quick-tempered are also excessive in their irritability:' taking ὑπερβολὴ as qualifying ὀξεῖς.

διάλυτοι, καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὀργίζονται· κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. Παῦλα δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ· ἢ γὰρ τιμωρία παύει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἡδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμποιοῦσα. Τούτου δὲ μὴ γινομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς εἶναι οὐδὲ συμπίθεται αὐτοὺς οὐδεὶς, 5 ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνον δεῖ. Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἑαυτοῖς ὀχληρότατοι καὶ τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις.

- 1 Χαλεποὺς δὲ λέγομεν τοὺς ἐφ' οἷς τε μὴ δεῖ χαλεπαίνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, καὶ πλείω χρόνον, καὶ μὴ διαλ-
12 λαττομένους ἄνευ τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως. Τῇ πραότητι 10 δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἀντιτίθεμεν· καὶ γὰρ μᾶλλον γίνεται· ἀνθρωπικώτερον γὰρ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι. Καὶ
13 πρὸς τὸ συμβιοῦν οἱ χαλεποὶ χεῖρους. Ὁ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς

being suppressed, lasts long, and is only removed by revenge. Its concealment prevents any attempts on the part of others to appease it, and makes its subjects a curse to themselves as

- 11 well as to their best friends. (4) The *ill-tempered*, whose The ill-tempered
12 anger is generally ill-directed, unrestrained in degree and
13 duration, and seldom to be appeased without revenge. Excess Excess is the worse extreme.
and it is also more practically inconvenient. It is impossible Precise practical rules are impossible

5. τὸ μὴ ἐπιφανὲς] Compare what Tacitus says of Mucianus (*Hist.* iii. 53, fin.), 'callide eoque implacabilis.'

6. πέψαι] literally 'to digest' ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. without the external aid of 'smoothing down' (συμπείθειν) mentioned in the previous line.

8. χαλεποὶ] literally 'harsh and hard to deal with,' nearly what we mean by 'a thoroughly nasty temper.' It will be noticed by referring to § 8, that the point in

which χαλεποὶ are distinguished from ὀργίλοι, is that the former retain anger πλείω χρόνον.

10. τιμωρίας ἢ κολάσεως] For the distinction see note on III. v. 7. There is no emphasis however on the distinction here, the former only being really applicable.

13. οἱ χαλεποὶ is here used as a generic term for all the four different forms of excess just described.

ὁ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.] See II. ix. 7,

πρότερον εἴρηται, καὶ ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ
 ῥάδιον διορίσαι τὸ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ
 πόσον χρόνον ὀργιστέον, καὶ τὸ μέχρι τίνος ὀρθῶς ποιεῖ
 τις ἢ ἀμαρτάνει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρὸν παρεκβαίνων οὐ
 ψέγεται, οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὐτ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἥττον· ἐνίοτε 5
 γὰρ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν, καὶ
 τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνδρώδεις ὡς δυναμένους ἄρχειν. Ὁ
 δὴ πόσον καὶ πῶς παρεκβαίνων ψεκτὸς, οὐ ῥάδιον τῷ
 λόγῳ ἀποδοῦναι· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ τῇ αἰσ-
 14 θήσει ἢ κρίσει. Ἀλλὰ τό γε τοσοῦτον δῆλον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν 10
 μέση ἕξις ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ ἐφ'
 οἷς δεῖ, καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, αἱ δ' ὑπερ-
 βολαὶ καὶ ἐλλείψεις ψεκταὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ μικρὸν μὲν γινόμε-
 ναι ἡρέμα, ἐπὶ πλεόν δὲ μᾶλλον, ἐπὶ πολὺ δὲ σφόδρα.
 Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τῆς μέσης ἕξεως ἀνθεκτέον. Αἱ μὲν οὖν 15
 περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ἕξεις εἰρήσθωσαν.

to lay down precise rules as to the right objects, degree, dura-
 tion, etc., of anger. Small errors on either side are not
 serious, and indeed often gain our approbation on account of
 14 the element of good which may be traced in them. That there
 however is a virtue to be cultivated and that there are vices
 to be avoided in the regulation of temper is abundantly clear.
 The practical details must be left to individual feeling and
 judgment.

where nearly the same words occur. ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων, 'from what we are now saying.'

8. τῷ λόγῳ] see note II. ix. 7, 8.

9. αἰσθήσει] 'individual feeling.' Questions of casuistry such as these cannot be determined by scientific rules. So much depends upon the infinite variety of circumstances bearing upon

any given action, and even granting all such circumstances could be taken into accurate account, so much still depends on the physical and moral constitution of the agent, that individual feeling (αἰσθήσει) or, as a modern writer might say, 'each man's conscience,' must in the last resort decide such points.

- 1 VI. Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν καὶ λόγων καὶ
πραγμάτων κοινωνεῖν οἱ μὲν ἄρεσκοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ
πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οὐθὲν ἀντιτείνοντες,
2 ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλυποι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι· οἱ δ'
ἐξ ἐναντίας τούτοις πρὸς πάντα ἀντιτείνοντες καὶ τοῦ 5
λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ δυσέριδες
3 καλοῦνται. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ εἰρημέναι ἕξεις ψεκταὶ εἰσιν,
οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ἡ μέση τούτων ἐπαινετὴ, καθ' ἣν
ἀποδέχεται ἃ δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δυσχερανεῖ.
4 Ὅνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα 10
φιλία· τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν μέσην ἕξιν οἶον
βουλόμεθα λέγειν τὸν ἐπικικῆ φίλον, τὸ στέργειν προσ-

CHAP. VI.—*On Friendliness, or Amiability.*

- 1 In their conduct and deportment in society some men, whom
we may perhaps describe as 'obsequious,' shrink under any
circumstances from making things unpleasant; they would
rather sacrifice a principle than say or do anything disagree-
2 able. Others again seem to enjoy running counter to every
one and every thing, and care not how much pain they cause.
3 These we may call 'cross-grained and quarrelsome.' In an
intermediate position are those whose approbation and dis-
approbation are regulated upon principle, who love to give
pleasure, though they do not shrink from inflicting pain when
4 it is needful: characters whom we may describe as 'friendly,'

Phraseology
and general
nature of
the habit
explained
(§§ 1—5).

CHAP. VI.—We now come to the group of Virtues, three in number, which relate to our conduct in and towards society. The order of the Catalogue in II. vii. is departed from. There it was ἀλήθεια — εὐτραπεία — φιλία. Here it is φιλία—ἀλήθεια—εὐτραπεία. The order is not of much importance, but it seems

unnatural to separate εὐτραπεία and φιλία (both dealing with τὸ ἡδύ), by interposing between them ἀλήθεια (dealing with τὸ ἀληθές). This would appear from Aristotle's own summary in viii. 12, below.

9. ἀποδέχεται] 'to approve.'
See note on I. iii. 4.

11. τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.]

- 5 λαβόντα. Διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ τῷ φιλεῖν ἢ ἐχθαίρειν ἀποδέχεται ἕκαστα ὡς δεῖ, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι. Ὅμοιως γὰρ πρὸς ἀγνώτας καὶ γνωρίμους καὶ συνήθεις καὶ ἀσυνήθεις αὐτὸ ποιήσει, πλὴν καὶ ἐν ἐκάστοις ὡς 5 ἀρμόζει· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὀθνείων
6 φροντίζειν, οὐδ' αὖ λυπεῖν. Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται ὅτι ὡς δεῖ ὁμιλήσει, ἀναφέρων δὲ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον στοχάζεται τοῦ μὴ λυπεῖν ἢ συνηδύνειν.
7 Ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας εἶναι τὰς ἐν ταῖς 10

- 5 and their disposition as 'friendliness.' That disposition differs from 'friendship,' because it has not its root in affection, but in a *natural inclination* to give pleasure and avoid giving pain: and moreover because it is not limited to particular persons, but is felt towards all in due measure and proportion.
6 This natural tendency to please is controlled however by
7 several considerations, such as the following:—(1) Can it be

For he that holds the mean position is just such a man as we should describe as 'a good friend,' if the element of affection were superadded. Friendliness + Affection = Friendship. In Greek, however, there are no two words exactly corresponding to this distinction between 'friendliness' and 'friendship,' and so *φιλία* has to be employed for both.

3. τῷ τοιοῦτος εἶναι] 'because it is his nature to do so.' He makes himself generally pleasant and agreeable (or if necessary the reverse), not because he likes (or dislikes) you, but because it comes naturally to him under certain circumstances, and it

makes no difference whether he knows you personally or not, except so far as acquaintanceship introduces some element of feeling (see § 8 below, and cf. § vii. of next Chapter, τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι). See also Bacon's Essay on 'Good Nature' throughout, and especially 'Neither is there only a habit of goodness directed by right reason (cf. *ἐξίς* . . . κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), but there is in some men, even in *Nature*, a *disposition towards it*: as on the other side there is a *Natural Malignity*. The lighter sort of malignity turneth to a crossness or frowardness' (cf. *δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος*).

9. συνηδύνειν] 'to contribute

ὁμιλίαις γινομένης, τούτων δ' ὅσας μὲν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ μὴ καλὸν ἢ βλαβερὸν συνηδύνειν, δυσχερανεῖ, καὶ προαιρήσεται λυπεῖν. Κἂν τῷ ποιῶντι δ' ἀσχημοσύνην φέρῃ, καὶ ταύτην μὴ μικρὰν, ἢ βλάβην, ἣ δ' ἐναντίωσις μικρὰν 8 λύπην, οὐκ ἀποδέξεται, ἀλλὰ δυσχερανεῖ. Διαφερόντως 5 δ' ὁμιλήσει τοῖς ἐν ἀξιώμασι καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἥττον γνωρίμοις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας διαφορὰς, ἐκάστοις ἀπονέμων τὸ πρέπον, καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ

exercised with propriety and with advantage? *e.g.* it is better to give pain than to sacrifice a principle, as we have said; nor again should we hesitate to stand in a man's way to save him at the cost of small present annoyance from bringing 8 great future disgrace or injury upon himself. (2) Regard must be had to the social position of those with whom we are associating, our degree of acquaintance with them, and so on.

Friendliness may be described as the desire to please subject to due consideration of circumstances, results, etc.

to pleasure'; to 'rejoice with them that do rejoice.'

1. τούτων δ' ὅσας] this must refer to ἡδονὰς only and not to λυπὰς. 'Such pleasures as he cannot conscientiously join in he will frown upon.' He will not only not 'do such things, but he will have no pleasure in those that do them.' Cf. viii. 8, ἀ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.

Notice the combination of natural kindness of disposition with a stern and uncompromising hatred of moral wrong. There is nothing weak and effeminate about this natural friendliness (φιλία). It is in the best sense of the word a manly feeling. Moreover, the combination spoken of is quite true to human

nature. The 'Apostle of Love' was also one of the 'Sons of Thunder,' and some of the most vehement denunciations in Scripture occur in his writings. Even persecution (to take an extreme case) has been conscientiously sanctioned and practised by men otherwise conspicuous for their kindness and benevolence of nature. Witness M. Aurelius, S. Louis of France, etc.

2. The student will notice the usual distinction between μὴ καλὸν, 'morally wrong,' and βλαβερὸν 'materially harmful,' corresponding to the distinction between καλὸν and συμφέρον in the preceding section.

5. διαφερόντως δ' ὁμιλήσει] Cf. iii. 26.

μὲν αἰρούμενος τὸ συνηδύνειν, λυπεῖν δ' εὐλαβούμενος, τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ μείζω, συνεπόμενος, λέγω δὲ τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι. Καὶ ἡδονῆς δ' ἕνεκα τῆς εἰσ-
 9 αὐθις μεγάλης μικρὰ λυπήσει. Ὁ μὲν οὖν μέσος τοιού-
 τός ἐστιν, οὐκ ὠνόμασται δὲ, τοῦ δὲ συνηδύνοντος ὁ μὲν 5
 τοῦ ἡδὺς εἶναι στοχαζόμενος μὴ δι' ἄλλο τι ἄρεσκος, ὁ
 δ' ὅπως ὠφέλειά τις αὐτῷ γίγνηται εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα
 διὰ χρημάτων, κόλαξ· ὁ δὲ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων εἴρηται

(3) Ulterior consequences must always be taken into consideration. Great subsequent pleasure or profit may some-
 9 times be secured by slight momentary pain. The Excess has
 two types, distinguished by their motives. If it be merely
 an exaggerated and disinterested desire to please, we call it
 'Obsequiousness.' If it be adopted from motives of self-
 interest, we term it 'Flattery.' The Defect has been suffi-
 ciently characterized already. Owing to the want of a definite

The Excess
and Defect.
Of the
former
there are
two types,
Obsequious-
ness and
Flattery.

2. τοῖς δ' ἀποβαίνουσιν κ.τ.λ.] 'but regulating his conduct by the consequences if they be on a larger scale,' as compared, that is, with the present circumstances (see Analysis).

3. ἡδονῆς . . . τῆς εἰσαυθις μεγάλης] 'for the sake of a pleasure that will presently be a considerable one.'

6. ἄρεσκος] The ἄρεσκος is what we should call an *insincere* or *unreal* man: one who professes to take the greatest interest in you, and uses the most friendly and even affectionate language, when he really cares nothing about you. Theophrastus graphically describes him as 'a man who when he enters a house at once asks to see the

babies; the moment he sees them he declares that they are the very image of their father, and kisses and fondles them, though he cares nothing about them.'

8. κόλαξ] The ancient 'Parasite' and the Mediæval Courtier would be typical instances. e.g. Polonius and Osric in *Hamlet*, Act III. Sc. ii. (l. 393), and Act V. Sc. ii. (l. 98, etc.). It is recorded that one of the courtiers of Philip of Macedon wore a shade over his left eye and walked lame, because the king had lost the sight of his left eye and been wounded in the leg. The modern servility of 'the Alexandra limp' shows that the race is not extinct.

ὅτι δύσκολος καὶ δύσερις. Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται τὰ ἄκρα ἑαυτοῖς διὰ τὸ ἀνώνυμον εἶναι τὸ μέσον.

- I VII. Περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ σχεδὸν ἔστι καὶ ἡ τῆς ἀλαζονείας μεσότης· ἀνώνυμος δὲ καὶ αὐτή. Οὐ χεῖρον δὲ καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπελθεῖν μᾶλλον τε γὰρ ἂν εἰδείημεν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦθος, καθ' ἕκαστον διελθόντες, καὶ μεσότητος εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς πιστεύσασιν ἂν, ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχουσιν συνιδόντες. Ἐν δὲ τῷ συζῆν οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀληθευόντων τε καὶ ψευδομένων εἴπωμεν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσι 10

and recognised name for the mean state, the excess and defect sometimes appear to be opposed to one another immediately.

CHAP. VII.—On Straightforwardness or Truthfulness.

- I Turning now to the behaviour of men in regard to the pre-

General explanation of the Habits in question and their phraseology (§§ 1—6).

1. Ἀντικεῖσθαι δὲ φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.] So it was also in the case of φιλοτιμία, iv. 6.

CHAP. VII.*—We next proceed to consider the virtue of Truthfulness or Straightforwardness in words and actions considered out of any relation to the pleasure or pain caused to others.

The excess and defect here must not be confused with χαννότης and μικροψυχία in ch. iii. See further note on iii. 37 and also that on μεγαλόψυχος, p. 235.

4. ἀνώνυμος κ.τ.λ.] otherwise Aristotle would hardly have had recourse to the strange description ἀλαζονείας μεσότης, 'mode-

ration in respect of boastfulness.' In II. vii. 12 ἀλήθεια and ἀληθής τις were suggested (the 'τις' showing some doubtfulness about the application of the word). ἀλήθεια, however, is 'truth' rather than 'truthfulness.' ἀληθινός, i.e. 'genuine,' 'real,' would more nearly express what we want in the adjectival form at any rate, but there is no abstract substantive to correspond.

Οὐ χεῖρον κ.τ.λ.] This is because the habits described are none the less real and definite, though language may not supply words to mark their distinctions. (See note on II. vii. 2.)

* See Supplementary Notes on this Chapter, passim.

2 καὶ τῷ προσποιήματι. Δοκεῖ δὴ ὁ μὲν ἀλαζῶν προσποι-
 ητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων καὶ μειζό-
 3 νων ἢ ὑπάρχει, ὁ δὲ εἴρων ἀνάπαλιν ἀρνεῖσθαι τὰ ὑπάρ-
 4 χοντα ἢ ἐλάττω ποιεῖν, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνθέκαστος τις ὢν
 ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα 5
 ὁμολογῶν εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὔτε μείζω οὔτε ἐλάττω.
 5 Ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα καὶ ἐνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ μηθε-
 νός. Ἐκαστος δ' οἷος ἔστι, τοιαῦτα λέγει καὶ πράττει

2 tensions which they make in society, we observe that the
 Braggart lays claim to qualities which he does not possess at
 3 all, or possesses in a degree below his claims; the Dissembler
 4 disclaims or depreciates his own merits; the Truthful man, with
 a genuineness that embraces his whole life and conversation,
 5 represents himself just as he is, neither more nor less. The
 Simulation or Dissimulation thus described may be practised
 with or without a special motive; but, generally speaking,
 men's words, acts, and lives are a true reflex of their charac-
 ter and disposition, unless there be some special motive for

1. προσποιήμα] 'pretensions.'

3. εἴρων is a very difficult word to translate. As ἀλαζῶν is one who boastfully lays claim to qualities that do not belong to him, so εἴρων is the reverse of this, and εἰρώνεια therefore is a conscious and intentional concealment or disclaiming of good qualities that really belong to one. 'Irony' is too wide, it may take this form among others. 'False Modesty' and 'Reserve' are too unconscious and often unintentional. 'Dissembler' and 'Dissimulation' are too closely allied with deceit, at least in modern English, though it does not seem that they were always used with this bad connotation:

e.g. in Bacon's Essay on 'Simulation and Dissimulation.' Perhaps on the whole either 'Dissimulation' or 'Self-Depreciation' come nearest to what we want: but the word in Greek itself is used in different senses, as we see from § 14-16 of this Chapter.

7. This distinction is further discussed in § 10, etc. With some persons the habits of bragging or of self-depreciation are so ingrained that they are exhibited even when it is impossible to imagine a motive, and where detection seems inevitable, and, as Aristotle proceeds to remark, except there be a definite motive such conduct is a true index of a character corresponding.

6 καὶ οὕτω ζῇ, ἔαν μή τινος ἕνεκα πράττη. Καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ
 τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτὸν, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς καλὸν
 καὶ ἐπαινετόν. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀληθευτικὸς μέσος
 ὧν ἐπαινετός, οἱ δὲ ψευδόμενοι ἀμφοτέρω μὲν ψεκτοὶ,
 μᾶλλον δ' ὁ ἀλαζών. Περὶ ἐκατέρου δ' εἵπωμεν, πρότε- 5
 7 ρον δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθευτικοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς
 ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ
 δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἴη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς),
 ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ
 8 καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιούτος εἶναι. Δόξειε 10
 δ' ἂν ὁ τοιούτος ἐπικεικὴς εἶναι. Ὁ γὰρ φιλαλήθης, καὶ
 ἐν οἷς μὴ διαφέρει ἀληθεύων, ἀληθεύσει καὶ ἐν οἷς δια-
 φέρεται ἔτι μᾶλλον ὥς γὰρ αἰσχρὸν τὸ ψεῦδος εὐλαβή-
 9 σεται, ὅ γε καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ ἠὲ λαβεῖτο. ὁ δὲ τοιούτος
 ἀποκλίνει. Ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς 15
 10 τὰς ὑπερβολὰς εἶναι. Ὁ δὲ μείζω τῶν ὑπαρχόντων

6 the contrary. And seeing that any falsehood is in itself
 reprehensible, we have no hesitation in according praise to
 Truthfulness and censure both to Boastfulness and Dissimula-
 7 tion, but especially to the former. Now to speak of each
 character in order. The Truthful man is not only truthful in
 his dealings, or where his interest is involved, but all his life
 and conversation are truthful, from the natural love which he
 8 has of truth in itself: and similarly he shuns falsehood even
 in matters indifferent, and therefore much more in all other
 9 cases. This habit is evidently in itself a virtue. If however
 such a man should err, it will be on the side of depreciating,
 10 rather than exaggerating, his own merits. Boastfulness has
 several types. (a) It may be without a definite motive,

'Truthful-
ness' per-
vades the
whole char-
acter in
which it
is found
(§§ 7-10).

The Excess,
Boastful-
ness, under
various
types

13. ὡς αἰσχρὸν is in contrast with καθ' αὐτό. Falsehood under circumstances involving disgrace, contrasted with falsehood *per se*. (§§ 10-18).

προσποιούμενος μηθεὺς ἔνεκα φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικεν (οὐ γὰρ
 ἂν ἔχαιρε τῷ ψεύδει), μάταιος δὲ φαίνεται μάλλον ἢ
 11 κακός. Εἰ δ' ἔνεκά τινος, ὁ μὲν δόξης ἢ τιμῆς οὐ λίαν
 ψεκτός, ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών, ὁ δὲ ἀργυρίου, ἢ ὅσα εἰς ἀργύ-
 12 ριον, ἀσχημονέστερος. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ 5

coming naturally as it were to a man. In that case it is
 11 rather foolish than actually vicious. (β) It may be assumed
 with a view to secure honour, or with a view to make gain;
 12 the latter being the worse form. And observe that Boast-
 fulness is a moral state, the character of which is deter-
 mined mainly by its motive or purpose. For the force of

1. φαύλῳ μὲν ἔοικε] 'is a bad man in some sense.' This is in natural contrast with the statement in § 8, δόξειε δ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.

4. ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών] As the ἀλαζών is the character whose different types Aristotle is now distinguishing, it seems out of place to give as an example of one of them 'ὁ ἀλαζών.' Two other readings are proposed (α) ὡς ἀλαζών (omitting ὁ), i.e. 'he is not very much to be blamed, for a braggart' (= considering that he is a braggart): (β) ὁ ἀλαζών (omitting ὡς), i.e. 'He who does it for the sake of honour is not very much to be blamed—he who boasts, I mean.' Thus the words supply the place of the participle *προσποιούμενος* which must be understood with ὁ, and if the sentence were written in full would follow *τιμῆς*. It is most probable however that the words ὡς ὁ ἀλαζών represent a marginal gloss that has crept into the text.

5. Οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει κ.τ.λ.] Boastfulness as a reprehensible habit consists not so much in the mere capacity (*δύναμις*) or propensity to boast. That may arise in a manner from natural constitution (τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι—with which compare a similar statement as regards Friendliness, vi. 5, τῷ τοιούτου εἶναι κ.τ.λ.), or from force of habit (κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν—with which again compare τῷ τὴν ἔξιν τοιούτου εἶναι in § 7 above). The moral depravity of Boastfulness depends rather upon the motives for which it is adopted (*προαίρεσις*), the distinction between some of which motives has just been pointed out. The distinction is in fact the same as that which discriminates *ἄρεσκος* and *κόλαξ* in the last Chapter.

The remark is introduced in the text to show that the classification just made of boasters according to their motive indicates a real moral difference.

- ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν γὰρ καὶ τῷ τοιόσδε εἶναι ἀλαζών ἐστιν ὥσπερ καὶ ψεύστης ὁ μὲν τῷ ψεύδει αὐτῷ χαίρων, ὁ δὲ δόξης ὀρεγόμενος ἢ
- 13 κέρδους. Οἱ μὲν οὖν δόξης χάριν ἀλαζονευόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα προσποιούνται ἐφ' οἷς ἔπαινος ἢ εὐδαιμονισμός, 5 οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστι τοῖς πέλας καὶ ἀ διαλαθεῖν ἐστι μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἰατρόν. Διὰ τοῦτο οἱ πλείστοι προσποιούνται τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ
- 14 ἀλαζονεύονται· ἐστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα. Οἱ δ' εἴρωνες ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον λέγοντες χαριέστεροι μὲν τὰ 10 ἦθη φαίνονται οὐ γὰρ κέρδους ἕνεκα δοκοῦσι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν· μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ
- 15 ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνούνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐποίει. Οἱ δὲ

- habit or natural disposition may make a man boastful, just as some men have a natural propensity for lying, and others adopt it for a special purpose. In the case of Boastfulness the special purpose is the main point by which we judge the
- 13 habit. To return to the two last-mentioned types of Boastfulness. The manner in which they are displayed varies with the difference of motive. If the motive be honour, pretension is made to qualities which are praised or envied by men. If it be gain, pretension is made to qualities that are useful, and the absence of which is not likely to be detected; *e.g.* quackery
- 14 and fortune-telling. This is the commoner type. The Dissemblers, on the other hand, disclaim their own merits, and this in moderation is not altogether unattractive, as in the
- 15 case of Socrates. The same habit in an extreme form is very

The Defect, Dissimulation, falls under the two types of Self-Depreciation and Affectation.

7. οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν κ.τ.λ.] *e.g.*, weather-prophets, fortune-tellers, quack-doctors, etc.

12. φεύγοντες τὸ ὀγκηρόν] 'wishing to avoid (the appearance of) giving themselves airs.' ὀγκηρός means literally 'bulky' or

'swollen,' and thence 'pompous' (L. and S.).

13. The εἰρωνεία of Socrates is well known. It consisted in a profession of ignorance, doubt, and a desire to be instructed, by which unwary opponents were

- καὶ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ φανερὰ προσποιούμενοι βαυκοπανούργοι λέγονται καὶ εὐκαταφρόνητοί εἰσιν. Καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἢ τῶν Λακώνων ἐσθής· καὶ
 16 γὰρ ἢ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἢ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικόν. Οἱ δὲ μετρίως χρώμενοι τῇ εἰρωνείᾳ καὶ περὶ τὰ μὴ λίαν ἐμποδῶν καὶ φανερὰ εἰρωνευόμενοι χαριέντες φαίνονται.
 17 Ἀντικεῖσθαι δ' ὁ ἀλαζὼν φαίνεται τῷ ἀληθευτικῷ· χείρων γάρ.
 1 VIII. Οὔσης δὲ καὶ ἀναπαύσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ διαγωγῇ μετὰ παιδιᾶς, δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἶναι 10 ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελῆς, καὶ οἷα δεῖ λέγειν καὶ ὧς, ὁμοίως δὲ

- contemptible, and is often nothing but Boastfulness in disguise, in short 'the pride that apes humility.' In moderation
 16 however it is not (as we said) offensive, and in any case is preferable to the other extreme of Boastfulness.
 17

CHAP. VIII.—*On Geniality.*

Explan-
 ation of
 terms.

1 Some part of life being necessarily spent in recreation, there must be in that part also a propriety of conduct, and this will apply, though in different degrees, both to speakers

lured on to discomfiture in argument.

1. προσποιούμενοι] This clause stands in contrast with τὰ ἐνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, and therefore we may understand some such words as μὴ δύνασθαι to complete the sense. 'Those who disclaim small merits, and such as they obviously possess.'

Thus we have two types of εἰρωνεία distinguished :—(1) the more favourable type of 'Self-

Depreciation,' of which Socrates is an instance, and which is exhibited also by the μεγαλό-ψυχος (see iv. 28, note); and (2) the more unfavourable type of 'affectation,' which often is a mere disguise of 'Boastfulness.'

βαυκοπανούργοι] 'affected knaves.' βαῦκος='prudish or affected.'

11. ὁμιλία τις ἐμμελῆς] 'a graceful way of conducting one's-self in society.'

καὶ ἀκούειν. Διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ
 2 τοιούτων ἀκούειν. Δῆλον δ' ὡς καὶ περὶ ταυτ' ἔστιν
 3 ὑπερβολή τε καὶ ἔλλειψις τοῦ μέσου. Οἱ μὲν οὖν τῷ
 γελοίῳ ὑπερβάλλοντες βωμολόχοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ
 φορτικοὶ, γλιχόμενοι πάντως τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ μᾶλλον 5
 στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ γέλωτα ποιῆσαι ἢ τοῦ λέγειν εὐσχή-
 μονα καὶ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν σκωπτόμενον· οἱ δὲ μήτ' αὐτοὶ
 ἂν εἰπόντες μὴθὲν γελοῖον τοῖς τε λέγουσι δυσχεραίνον-
 τες ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Οἱ δ' ἐμμελῶς
 παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποι 10
 τοῦ γὰρ ἥθους αἱ τοιαῦται δοκοῦσι κινήσεις εἶναι, ὥς-
 περ δὲ τὰ σώματα ἐκ τῶν κινήσεων κρίνεται, οὕτω καὶ
 4 τὰ ἥθη. Ἐπιπολάζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείσ-
 των χαιρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ
 δεῖ, καὶ οἱ βωμολόχοι εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται ὡς 15
 χαρίεντες. Ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐ μικρὸν, ἐκ τῶν
 5 εἰρημένων δηλον. Τῇ μέσῃ δ' ἔξει οἰκεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐπι-

2 and listeners in such scenes: and here too the law of the
 3 mean holds good. In the one extreme we have the Buffoon,
 who can never resist a laugh however ill-timed, however pain-
 ful to the feelings of others. In the other we have the Boor,
 who neither jokes himself, nor tolerates it in others. The
 mean state (1) is characterized by quickness and versatility
 4 of Wit, though, as nothing is easier than to raise a laugh, the
 5 Buffoon often gets credit for such versatility. (2) Tact again

Character-
istics of the
Mean state
are
(1) Versa-
tility and
readiness
of wit.

1. διοίσει κ.τ.λ.] The same
 difference in fact as exists in
 other cases between the doer of
 an act and one who is only an
 accessory.

10. Observe the play on words
 between εὐτράπελοι and εὐτροποι,
 both having the same derivation,

but the former having gained a
 metaphorical sense like 'versatile,'
 while the latter retains its literal
 meaning. The notion is that
 they are called 'quick-witted'
 because their wits move quickly.

13. ἐπιπολάζοντος] See note
 on I. iv. 4.

(2) Tact in
 the choice of
 subjects of
 ridicule.

δεξιότης ἐστίν· τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οἷα τῷ ἐπιεικεί καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει· ἔστι γάρ τινα πρέποντα τῷ τοιούτῳ λέγειν ἐν παιδιᾷς μέρει καὶ ἀκούειν, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐλευθερίου παιδιὰ διαφέρει τῆς τοῦ ἀνδραποδώδους, καὶ αὖ τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου καὶ ἀπαιδευ- 5
6 του. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τῶν κωμωδιῶν τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ τῶν καινῶν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ αἰσχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια· διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ταῦτα 7 πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην. Πότερον οὖν τὸν εὐ σκώπτοντα ὀριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἃ πρέπει ἐλευθερίῳ, ἢ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν 10 τὸν ἀκούοντα, ἢ καὶ τέρπειν; ἢ καὶ τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀόρι- 8 στον; ἄλλο γὰρ ἄλλῳ μισητόν τε καὶ ἡδύ. Τοιαῦτα δὲ καὶ ἀκούσεται ἃ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν 9 δοκεῖ. Οὐ δὲ πᾶν ποιήσῃ· τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι

is another characteristic, which insures that its possessor, whether speaking or listening, shall never forget what it is becoming for a gentleman and a man of refinement, even in the way of recreation, to speak or to listen to. As an 6 obvious instance of the application of such 'tact,' we note what a difference there is between coarseness and innuendo. 7 Whether then he draws the line at what is becoming to a gentleman, or at what will give pleasure, or at least no pain, 8 to his hearers, is perhaps not easy to define. But in any case he will not willingly listen to anything which he would shrink 9 from saying himself. For though law does not restrain ridi-

2. ἐλευθέριος here means 'a gentleman,' just as conversely ἀνδραποδώδης means 'a low and vulgar man.'

7. αἰσχρολογία] 'outspoken obscenity,' ὑπόνοια 'innuendo.' The difference would be well illustrated by the contrast between Rabelais and Sterne, or

between the coarseness of Aristophanes and the 'intrigue' of a modern French play.

9. εὐσχημοσύνην] 'decency.'

13. ποιεῖν . . . ποιήσῃ] in the sense of σκώπτειν or λέγειν. As there are certain jokes which he would not himself make, so he will also refuse to listen to them.

ἐστὶν, οἱ δὲ νομοθέται ἔνια λαιδορεῖν κωλύουσιν· ἔδει δ' ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν. Ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως
 10 ἔξει, οἷον νόμος ὦν ἑαυτῷ. Τοιοῦτος μὲν οὖν ὁ μέσος
 ἐστὶν, εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιός ἐστ' εὐτράπελος λέγεται· ὁ δὲ βωμο-
 λόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν 5
 ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος, εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων
 ὦν οὔθεν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι. Ὁ
 δ' ἄγριος εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας ὁμιλίας ἀχρεῖος· οὔθεν γὰρ
 11 συμβαλλόμενος πᾶσι δυσχεραίνει. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ἀνάπαν-
 12 σις καὶ ἡ παιδιὰ ἐν τῷ βίῳ εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον. Τρεῖς οὖν 10
 αἱ εἰρημέναι ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεσότητες, εἰσὶ δὲ πᾶσαι περὶ

cule as it does personal abuse, yet a true gentleman is a law
 10 to himself in such matters. The Buffoon however can never
 resist a joke. No consideration for persons or regard for
 proprieties ever restrains him. The Boor on the other hand
 is quite useless in social intercourse. He contributes nothing
 11 to it himself, and acts as a continual damper: and yet some
 rest and recreation is a real necessity in life.

The Excess
is Buf-
foonery.

The Defect,
Boorishness

12 This concludes our account of the three Social Virtues.

2. σκώπτειν] Understand 'ἔνια κωλύειν' from the preceding.

οὕτως] i.e. as if actually re-
 strained by law.

4. εἴτ' ἐπιδέξιός ἐστ' εὐτρά-
 πελος λέγεται] There being no
 settled name for this Virtue,
 Aristotle hesitates by which of
 its two principal characteristics
 (see §§ 3—5) he shall describe it.

7. Observe the emphatic con-
 trast between οὔθεν and ἔνια,
 because there are *some* things
 which a man of refinement
 (χαρίεις) would not say himself,
 which however he would not
 think it necessary to protest

against if he heard them (see § 1
 διοίσει δὲ κ.τ.λ.)

8. ἄγριος corresponds with
 ἀγροῖκος in the Catalogue of II.
 vii. It describes a man who
 is deficient in humour and the
 sense of the ludicrous, and one who
 acts as a sort of kill-joy in convivial
 society. In the former aspect
 he resembles Sydney Smith's
 Scotchman who needed a surgical
 operation to get a joke into his
 head; and in the latter he recalls
 Thackeray's description of the
 'usual English expression of
 suppressed agony and intense
 gloom.'

λόγων τινῶν καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν. Διαφέρουσι δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν περὶ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡ μὲν ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς, ἡ δ' ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἄλλον βίον ὁμιλίας.

- 1 IX. Περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὥς τινος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν 5
 2 πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει. Ὅρίζεται γοῦν φόβος
 τις ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ
 παραπλήσιον ἐρυθραίνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυρόμενοι, οἱ δὲ
 τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενοι ὠχρῶσιν. Σωματικὰ δὲ φαί-
 νεται πῶς εἶναι ἀμφοτέρα, ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ 10
 3 ἔξεως εἶναι. Οὐ πάσῃ δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ
 τῇ νέᾳ οἴομεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδόμενας
 εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς
 αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. Καὶ ἐπαινοῦμεν τῶν μὲν νέων

CHAP. IX.—*On the quasi-virtue, 'Sense of Shame.'*

The 'Sense
 of Shame' is
 not properly
 a Virtue
 for several
 reasons.

- Shame cannot strictly be called a Virtue, for (1) it is an
 occasional feeling rather than a permanent state. It may be
 defined as 'a fear of disgrace,' and its outward marks resemble
 those of fear. Shame makes us blush, Fear makes us pale,
 3 and these are similar physical and transient effects. (2) It

CHAP. IX.—The subject of this concluding Chapter is the Sense of Shame. The Chapter is evidently fragmentary, for we hear nothing of the Excess of the feeling, the embodiment of which was described as ὁ καταπλήξ in II. vii. 14. In fact the discussion ends abruptly at the words ἀλλὰ τις μικτή in § 8, after which a few words have been added to connect this Book with the Books that follow.

which are thought to be not Aristotle's, or at any rate not to belong to this treatise.

6. πάθει μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξει] If so, not properly a Virtue. See II. v.

φόβος τις ἀδοξίας] αἰδῶς has a variety of meanings in Homer, but in all cases it is 'a sentiment which has ultimate reference to the standard of public opinion' (Gladstone, *Juv. Mundi*, p. 384). In *Odyss.* ii.

τοὺς αἰδήμονας, πρέσβύτερον δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπαινέσειεν
 ὅτι αἰσχυνηλός· οὐθὲν γὰρ οἴομεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πρᾶτ-
 4 τειν ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν αἰσχύνη. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐπιεικοὺς ἐστὶν
 ἡ αἰσχύνη, εἴπερ γίγνεται ἐπὶ τοῖς φαύλοις· οὐ γὰρ
 5 πρακτέον τὰ τοιαῦτα. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν 5
 αἰσχρὰ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει· οὐδέτερα
 γὰρ πρακτέα, ὥστ' οὐκ αἰσχυντέον. Φαῦλον δὲ καὶ τὸ
 6 εἶναι τοιοῦτον οἷον πράττειν τι τῶν αἰσchrῶν. Τὸ δ'
 οὕτως ἔχειν ὥστ' εἰ πράξειέ τι τῶν τοιούτων αἰσχύνεσ-
 θαι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οἴεσθαι ἐπιεικὴ εἶναι, ἄτοπον· ἐπὶ 10
 τοῖς ἐκουσίοις γὰρ ἡ αἰδῶς, ἐκῶν δὲ ὁ ἐπιεικὴς οὐδέποτε
 7 πράξει τὰ φαῦλα. Εἴη δ' ἂν ἡ αἰδῶς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
 ἐπιεικής· εἰ γὰρ πράξαι, αἰσχύνοιτ' ἂν οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 τοῦτο περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Εἰ δ' ἡ ἀναισχυντία φαῦλον
 καὶ τὸ μὴ αἰδέισθαι τὰ αἰσchrὰ πράττειν, οὐθὲν μᾶλλον 15

is not even a becoming feeling, except in youth : in mature
 4 age we certainly should not praise it. (3) It has no place in
 good men as such, because it is felt only when wrong has
 5 been done. If it be urged that some of the occasions for
 shame are only conventionally wrong, we reply that a good
 6 man will avoid even these. If it be said that a good man
 ought to retain the capacity for feeling shame in case he
 should do wrong, we reply that as all wrong-doing to which
 shame is appropriate is voluntary, such occasions will not
 7 arise. Thus shame would be only virtuous provisionally ; pro-
 vided, that is, that wrong has been done. Hence it is not
 strictly a Virtue. We need not however therefore hesitate

Shameless-
 ness how-
 ever is
 certainly
 a Vice.

64-5, both αἰδῶς and νέμεσις are
 appealed to as distinct motives
 against wrong-doing.

12. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως 'subject to
 a condition,' the condition being
 that if wrong has been done

shame will be a virtuous feeling,
 not otherwise. No virtue pro-
 perly so called is subject to such
 a limitation as this. Aristotle
 is ready to admit that 'the man
 that blushes is not quite a brute,'

8 τὸ τοιαῦτα πράττοντα αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπιεικές. Οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτὴ δειχθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον. Νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰπόμεν.

8 to call Shamelessness a Vice. We do not describe even Continence as a Virtue, because of the mixture of bad desires which it necessarily implies. But of this hereafter. We now proceed to discuss Justice.

though he will not regard him as virtuous on the strength of this. To do so would be to encourage 'doing evil that good may come,' or 'continuing in sin that grace may abound.'

2. οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια] For an explanation of ἐγκράτεια see note on I. iii. 7. The point here is that as not even ἐγκράτεια is called a Virtue because it implies strong bad desires, though they

are successfully combated, *a fortiori* Shame cannot be called a virtue, which presupposes actual wrong-doing.

3. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον] viz. in B. VII.

νῦν δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης] Thus not only is the subject of αἰδώς unfinished, but that of νέμεσις and ἐπιχαιρεκακία, of which we had so confused an account in II. vii. 15, is not even alluded to.

NOTE ON CHAPTER III.

THE CHARACTER OF THE μεγαλόψυχος.

SEVERAL questions arise in reference to this important character, some of which are inserted here to avoid making the notes too bulky. We have in this chapter Aristotle's conception of a perfect and ideal character (see especially § 16), combining the full social and moral conditions of καλοκάγαθία.

The definition from which the whole discussion starts is that the Virtue of μεγαλόψυχία consists in 'a well-grounded self-esteem' (ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος εἶναι, § 3), and hence the whole character is, according to our modern ideas, somewhat disfigured by self-consciousness. It may be worth while to state some of the principal objections which are commonly made against it.

(1) The pervading selfishness of the character. He has no thought for others (§ 29): even his Benevolence is referred to himself and resolved into a desire for superiority (§ 24). (Compare Hobbes's celebrated theory that Benevolence is simply the love of power and the desire to exercise it.) His courage is based upon a somewhat selfish calculation likewise (§ 23). His love of Truth is similarly quali-

fied (§ 28): so also is his forgiveness of injuries (§ 30).

(2) The conspicuous pride of his character, and the total absence, not to say of humility (on which see note § 37), but even of modesty (§§ 18, 22, 28).

(3) That such a man would be practically an offensive, unamiable, unsociable character (§§ 27, 29, 31).

Such are some of the criticisms commonly made on the character before us. We may feel sure however, after making all allowance for the difference between the ancient Greek and the modern Christian point of view, that a character so palpably defective and repulsive could never have appeared to Aristotle, not to say admirable, but ideally perfect. Hence, without attempting a defence of all its details, it may be worth while to endeavour to arrive at a somewhat more sympathetic view of this ideal character.

1. The first point would seem to be, as we have already hinted, that it is an ideal character. It implies the combination of all the virtues in such perfection as never is actually found (τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ μέγα, § 14). Just as Plato and others have con-

structed ideal States, so Aristotle has here delineated an ideal Man. In both cases alike some allowance must be made for the difference between theory and fact in a world where things, as they are, are not ideal. Within certain limits we may say, '*tant pis pour les faits.*'

2. Aristotle had a strong sense of the dignity of Human Nature; of the grandeur and worth of Man as Man, in contrast with all the rest of animate and inanimate creation. He felt something of what a modern writer has called 'the Enthusiasm of Humanity.' (See further, *Ecce Homo*, 3d ed. p. 162, etc.) This seems to be the key to his conception of the *μεγαλόψυχος*. The *μεγαλόψυχος* is one who is deeply conscious of the dignity of his Human Nature, and penetrated by this consciousness is elevated thereby to live a life in all respects worthy of such an ideal. 'He becomes a law unto himself' (*ὥσπερ νόμος ὦν ἑαυτῷ*, as we read in viii. 10). Doubtless this intense self-reliance of the *μεγαλόψυχος* appears from our modern Christian point of view an inadequate foundation on which to build the whole structure of the moral character. But it may well be asked whether, apart from revelation, any nobler or more effective stimulus to Virtue can be suggested than the feeling that any other conduct is unworthy of the dignity of human nature. We may also remember that S. Paul

appeals in a very similar manner to the feeling that sin is unworthy of, and inconsistent with, our Christian profession and renewed nature, and argues that we should therefore scorn to commit it. A well-known saying of Goethe's recognises the value of this self-estimate: 'If you would improve a man, it is best to begin by persuading him that he is already what you would have him to be.'

In contrast with the character we have described, the *χαύνος* is one who unworthily lays claim to such a dignity. He desires 'the loaves and fishes' of virtue and worth. So long as he can secure the honour and glory accorded to merit, he is more or less indifferent to the grounds on which he obtains it (§ 36), since it is obvious that it can be obtained from men on secondary and morally indifferent grounds (see §§ 19, 20). The *μικρόψυχος* on the other hand is one who has no noble aspirations at all. He is quite content with low and grovelling aims, and has therefore no chance of moral elevation. Hence Aristotle declares Little-mindedness to be a worse type of character than Vaingloriousness. The Vainglorious man does not shrink from grand and difficult tasks, he rather courts them, and his unbounded self-confidence may sometimes even carry him through (e.g. Cleon at Sphacteria, if we accept the estimate of him in Thucydides and Aristophanes).

At any rate he will probably be elevated by actual contact with them, even as Dante says, when he has met the great Poets, 'che di vederli in me stesso m'esalto.' Compare also Tennyson, *Queen Mary*, Act II. Sc. ii.:

Yet thoroughly to believe in one's
own self,
So one's own self be thorough, were
to do
Great things, my lord.

But the Littleminded or Pusillanimous man can never rise to any great effort; and this is precisely the character which Dante brands in the well-known line, 'Che fece per villate il gran rifiuto' (*Inf.* iii. 60).

We may account thus for the strong denunciation of the *χλιαροί* in *Rev.* iii. 15, 16, and for the supreme contempt of Dante, in *Inf.* iii. 36-51, for those 'Che visser senza infamia e senza lodo.' In *Rhet.* I. ix. 11 *μεγαλοψυχία* is described as *ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία δὲ τοῦναντίον*. Compare also La Rochefoucauld (*Max.* 41), 'Ceux qui s'appliquent trop aux petites choses deviennent ordinairement incapables des grandes.'

Two further points call for a few words of explanation:

(1) The distinction between *χαυνότης* and *ἀλαζονεία*.

(2) The apparent and real repugnance between Highmindedness and Humility.

(1) (a) It must be remembered that *ἀλαζονεία* is the Excess in

relation to one of the three *Social Virtues* (viz. *ἀλήθεια*) i.e. it has reference to a man's bearing in and towards society. (See note on Catalogue of Virtues at the end of Bk. II.) *Χαυνότης* has no such reference necessarily. We see from its position in the Catalogue that it is more of a personal Vice, even though its exercise must be more or less public. It relates rather to a moral *state* or *condition* of character, whereas *ἀλαζονεία*, though based upon this, relates especially to an *outward manifestation* of character. Hence Aristotle says, in IV. vii. 12, the moral estimate of *ἀλαζονεία* depends much more on the purpose for which it is practised than on the mere fact of the tendency to, or capacity for, such conduct existing in the person himself.

(β) Another distinction would seem to be this. The *ἀλαζων* lays claim to the possession of anything which can be the subject of admiration (*προσποιητικὸς τῶν ἐνδόξων*, IV. vii. 2), especially personal qualities, such as strength, cleverness, skill, etc. etc., and (as we judge from the opposition to *ἀληθευτικὸς*, and also from the *consciousness* involved in the Vice of Defect, *εἰρωνεία*), generally speaking, he is a *conscious* deceiver: his Boastfulness has its root in a vice of Untruthfulness. He knows that he is an impostor. The *χαῦνος*, on the other hand, is most frequently himself deceived. His Vaingloriousness springs from the

root of personal Vanity, by which he is so blinded in his estimate of things, so 'clouded with his own conceit,' that he regards all occasions merely as opportunities for self-display; and this of course especially applies to great occasions—these being a preliminary condition of *χαυνότης*, *μεγαλοψυχία* and *μικροψυχία*.

It should be further observed that Aristotle attributes *frequent εἰρωνεία* to the *μεγαλόψυχος* (IV. iii. 28), which plainly shows that *εἰρωνεία* is widely different from *μικροψυχία*.

2. It has sometimes been argued (e.g. by Aquinas and others) that *μεγαλοψυχία* is not inconsistent with Christian Humility. Without going so far as this, we ought at any rate to take into consideration the following points:

(a) *μικροψυχία* must on no account be confounded with Humility, which has nothing in common with it, as has been already sufficiently explained. See note on IV. iii. 37.

(β) The modern popular notion of Humility is a very false one, in two ways especially:—

(i) Humility is generally thought to consist in a conscious (not to say, often insincere) self-depreciation. In that sense it somewhat resembles *εἰρωνεία* both in its better and worse phases (see note on IV. vii. 15). Now the Humility of true greatness is a *just* estimate of its power, not a depreciatory one. If it be consciously depreciatory,

it is simply the 'pride of modesty' (see IV. vii. 15). It only appears depreciatory to those who are lost in admiration of a standard above their own reach or aspirations. When Sir Isaac Newton said that in his highest efforts he felt as if he were only a child picking up pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge, that was a humble and yet a just estimate of the powers of human genius, though to an ordinary man it might seem unduly depreciatory. The Greeks, on the other hand, not having yet learnt how limited are man's powers in the universe, could not understand how a low estimate of unusual powers could still be a just one.

(ii) The popular notions of Conceit and Humility are simply a high or a low self-estimate, without any regard to the relation between the estimate and the merits: just as Liberality and the reverse are often popularly judged by the amount spent, without regard to the relation which it bears to the means of the giver.

At the same time, looking at several expressions in the chapter under consideration, we must admit that the modern notion of Humility as a Virtue was foreign, and perhaps necessarily so, to the Greek mind. As we have said, a low estimate, which is also a genuine and sincere one, of human power and human virtue, can come only from the consciousness of defeat and failure; and it would be as much out of

place amidst the first daring flights and as yet unbaffled efforts of the Greek mind, as melancholy would be in the sanguine years of childhood, which have not yet been sobered by disappointment.¹

At the same time some sort of recognition of a feeling akin to humility occurs in the commendation allowed to the better type of εἰρωνεία in IV. vii. 14.

It is interesting to contrast with this picture what has not inaptly been described as S. Paul's delineation of an ideal character in 1 Cor. xiii., especially vv. 4, 5, and 7. Also the total divergence of the ancient and modern conceptions of a perfect character is curiously illustrated by the following statement of a recent moralist, whether we accept it or not:— 'Were the perfect man to exist, he himself would be the last to know it; for the highest stage in advancement is the lowest descent in humility' (Archer Butler).

It may be worth while to compare with Aristotle's ideal sketch an actual instance of a character embodying many of the traits here depicted. Lord Macaulay in his Life of Pitt, p. 181 (*Bio-*

graphies, edition 1867), observes that Pitt may be considered as in many respects a noble embodiment of Aristotle's conception of the μεγαλόψυχος. We may compare the following traits or incidents with the portraiture in this chapter:

'No person could hear Pitt without perceiving him to be a man of high, intrepid, and commanding spirit, proudly conscious of his own rectitude and of his own intellectual superiority, incapable of the low vices of fear and envy, but too prone to feel and show disdain (§§ 18, 22). Pride pervaded the whole man, . . . was marked by the way in which he walked, in which he sat, in which he stood, and above all, in which he bowed (§ 34). Several men of note (§§ 26, 28) who had been partial to Pitt . . . were so much irritated by the contempt with which he treated them that they complained in print of their wrongs. . . . His ambition had no mixture of low cupidity. There was something noble in the cynical disdain with which the mighty minister scattered riches and titles to right and left among those who valued them, while he spurned them out of his own way' (§§ 18 fin., 33, etc.). At the age of twenty-two he was offered 'one of the easiest and most highly paid places in the service of the Crown. The offer was at once declined, for the young statesman had resolved to accept no post which did not entitle him

¹ Compare the grounds on which Arist. (*Ethet.* II. xii. 11) states that the young are μεγαλόψυχοι, — οὐτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου οὐπω τεταπεινῶνται ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπειροὶ εἰσιν, and the old are μικρόψυχοι for the converse reason (II. xiii. 5). Also Mansel (*Gnostics*, pp. 22-24) notes the little attention paid in Greek Philosophies to the problem of Evil, and accounts for the fact somewhat similarly.

to a seat in the Cabinet, and announced that resolution in the House of Commons,' and that at a time when the Cabinet was usually restricted to about seven members, and even Burke was not included in it (εἰς τὰ ἐντιμα μὴ ἰέναι ἢ οὐδὲν πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι, §§ 27, 33).

Lastly, it should be noted (and this perhaps increases our difficulty in taking an appreciative view of Aristotle's sketch in this chapter), that now-a-days the habit of mind indicated by μεγαλοψυχία is far less common than formerly, and even in comparatively recent times, and that anything approaching to self-assertion is viewed with increasing repugnance. Mr. Mill in his Essay on Liberty protests against the English dislike for eccentricity or conspicuousness of any kind, and deplores the tendency to a dull and dead level of mediocrity which society at present fosters. But be the cause what it may, the fact is undeniable. What would be thought now-a-days of such a title-page to a book, once so common, as 'A most learned and edifying discourse by . . .'? The late Lord Dalling writes, 'One of the absurdities of the English character of the present day, is that no one has an estimate of his intrinsic value.' Yet it may well be doubted whether any great reform, religious or political, has been effected, or any deep impression left in the world's history or literature, by any one who did not display the

self-confidence and even self-assertion of Aristotle's μεγαλόψυχος in a considerable, and often, to our modern notion, a somewhat distasteful degree. There is no more remarkable instance of this than that of Dante. This spirit breathes throughout the whole of his Divine Poem. He promises immortal fame to those who are named by him in it: to be mentioned there, even for censure, is no small argument of distinction: he fears lest a timid statement of truth, though perhaps increasing his present fame, should injure it with those 'who shall call these days ancient': he boldly ranks himself among the six great poets of the world; and so on in innumerable other passages. Nor was this bold self-reliance limited to mere flights of poetry. Boccaccio relates that when appointed to go from Florence on an embassy to Boniface VIII., Dante hesitated, and assigned as his reason, 'If I go, who remains? and if I remain, who goes?' So in the *Convito* (I. x.) he does not shrink from saying, 'fidandomi di me più ched'un altro.' Whatever may have been thought of this self-reliance at the time, the verdict of posterity has fully justified it; and may we not apply the reflection of Aristotle in a similar case, and ask, If this be so, πῶς οὐκ ἀτοπον εἰ δὲ ἔστιν . . . μὴ ἀληθεύεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπαρχον; (I. x. 7.) 'There was a time' (says Dean Church) when great men dared to claim their great-

ness . . . in the consciousness of a strong and noble purpose and of strength to fulfil it.' To take an instance of a more recent date, Wordsworth, in his Preface to his own Poems, undeterred by the storm of unpopularity and ridicule by which he was then assailed, confidently asserts the immortality of his work, and this, writes Professor Shairp, 'is not vanity, but the calm confidence of a man who feels the rock under his feet, and who knows that he is in harmony with the everlasting truth of things.' Merely to suggest other cases, without entering into details, the same self-reliance is conspicuous

in men so different as Mohammed, Savonarola (Milman's *Essays*, p. 9), Angelo Politiano (Roscoe's *Life of Lorenzo de' Medici*, p. 92, etc.), and in almost all 'self-made men,' as they are styled in modern times. Certain it is that whether society likes or dislikes the habit, the *μεγαλόψυχοι*, and often even the *χαῦνοι*, are those who chiefly advance themselves, and arrive at distinction, more or less lasting: so true to life is the reflection of Goethe—

Und wenn ihr euch nur selbst vertraut,
Vertrauen euch die andern Seelen;

and again—

So bald du dir vertraust, so bald weisst
du zu leben.

APPENDIX.

BOOK X. CHAPTERS VI—IX.

ARISTOTLE now reverts to the subject of Happiness, the various questions arising out of the Definition in I. vii. having been disposed of. In two respects especially the following discussion differs from that in B. I. (1) The object now is not so much to give a formal Definition of Happiness, as to prove its general character to be contemplative (*θεωρητική*). (2) Happiness is here considered in the abstract and in its highest ideal development, as it is found in the life of the gods, and no longer under the practical limitations by which it is modified in the life of man (vii. 8). Thus in B. I. we were frequently reminded that it was not ideal Happiness and ideal Virtue but human Happiness and human Virtue that we were in search of. (See especially I. vi. 13 and xiii. 5, 6.) Now however it is argued that human Happiness is not the highest form of Happiness (viii. 1—3, etc.). Hence while Happiness is still affirmed to consist in an active state of Excellence (*ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις*, vi. 8), yet, since Excellence (*ἀρετὴ*) may be either Moral or Intellectual, it is proved (ch. vii. and viii.) that the latter is superior to the former on various grounds, and especially because Moral Excellence (implying, as it does, imperfection and the liability to evil) cannot be attributed to the gods (viii. 7). Consequently the Happiness of the gods, which is naturally the highest and most perfect, must depend on Intellectual activity. Hence we conclude generally that the perfection of Happiness consists in Intellectual activity (*θεωρία*—for which see Glossary, p. xli.). Practically none but the best of men, and these only

imperfectly, can ever approach to such perfection of Happiness. Most men can never rise above that which constitutes peculiarly *human* Happiness (εὐδαιμονία ἀνθρωπινή, I. xiii. 5), viz. the Excellence not of the higher portion (τὸ λόγον ἔχον) of the Soul, but of the subordinate part (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν).

Let this distinction then be borne in mind in reading these Supplementary Chapters. Aristotle has shown in the previous Books that man's Happiness in this world consists in the due regulation of his actions and passions under the control of Reason. His purpose now is to show that the most perfect Happiness consists in the full development and activity of Reason itself, unfettered by the necessity of exercising any such control over the lower nature. In a word, if we might venture on such a modernism, we might say that hitherto he has discussed the Happiness of earth; now he is describing the Happiness of heaven. (See *Supplementary Notes*.)

1 VI. Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονὰς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἔπειδῃ

CHAP. VI.—*Happiness does not consist in Amusement, but in Active Excellence.*

Happi- 1, 2
ness is
a condi-
tion which
is
(1) active,

We have before proved (1) that Happiness is not a passive but an active condition; and (2) that it is a condition which

CHAP. VI.—The following is a brief outline of the argument in the next three Chapters. (Ch. vi.) Happiness having been already shown (I. vii.) to be something sought for its own sake, and it being conceivable that either Amusement or active Virtue might be alleged as answering to that description, ch. vi. is devoted to proving that not Amusement, but Active Virtue, constitutes Happiness. (Ch. vii.)

This Active Virtue, or rather Excellence, being either Moral or Intellectual, Happiness is shown to belong to the latter. (Ch. viii.) Several reasons are given for thus asserting the superiority of Intellectual over Moral Excellence; and the Chapter concludes with some remarks of practical detail.

1. ἀρετὰς, viz. Books II—VI. φιλίας, Books VIII. and IX. ἡδονὰς, Appendix to Book VII.

τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ
 2 τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἵπομεν
 δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου
 ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ
 μέγιστα. Εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέρ- 5
 γειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν
 δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί,
 αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δηλὸν ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ'
 αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς
 3 γὰρ ἐνδεὲς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὐτάς δ' 10
 εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
 Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ
 γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτὰ αἰρετῶν.
 Καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδέιαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰ-

is complete in itself, and is sought for its own sake only. (2) Desired
 3 Now it might be thought that both Virtuous Actions and Amusements fulfil these conditions:—the former for obvious for its own sake.
 reasons; the latter, partly because their *results* are not neces- Such are—
 (i) Active
 Virtue;
 (ii) Amuse-
 ments.

2. εἵπομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔξις] viz. in I. viii. 9. He adds here the consideration introduced by καὶ γὰρ, viz., that if Happiness were a mere state or condition (ἕξις) it would not be inconsistent with a life of lethargy, and even of misery. The same argument was used in I. v. 6, to prove that Virtue (which is a ἕξις, and therefore may be inactive) is not identical with Happiness.

6. ἐν τοῖς πρότερον] Especially in the Definition of Happiness in I. vii.

7. ἀναγκαῖαι has the same meaning as βίαιοι (according to

the usual explanation) in I. v. 8 (note). Actions chosen only as means to obtain a further result (δι' ἕτερα αἰρεταί) are 'necessary' or 'compulsory,' if we wish to secure that result.

10. αὐτάρκης] If any further result is sought by an action, that action is not αὐτάρκης. Consequently if Happiness were not sought for its own sake it would not be αὐτάρκης, as it was shown to be in I. vii. 6, etc.

14. τῶν παιδιῶν αἱ ἡδέιαι] 'those amusements from which we derive pleasure.' Conceivably some recreations may be prac-

ροῦνται· βλάπτονται γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελοῦνται, ἀμελοῦντες τῶν σωματίων καὶ τῆς κτήσεως. Καταφεύγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τὰς τοιαύτας διαγωγὰς τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοὶ, διὸ παρὰ τοῖς τυράννοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς εὐτράπελοι· ὧν γὰρ ἐφίενται, ἐν τούτοις παρέχουσι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἡδεῖς· δέονται δὲ τοιούτων. Δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν εὐδαιμονικὰ ταῦτα εἶναι διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐν δυναστείαις ἐν τούτοις ἀποσχολάζειν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως σημεῖον οἱ τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς, ἀφ' ὧν αἱ σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι· οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοὺς καὶ ἐλευθερίου ἐπὶ τὰς σωματικὰς καταφεύγουσιν, διὰ τοῦτο ταύ-

But Happiness cannot consist in Amusement, because—
(a) Those who say so are incompetent judges, knowing no higher pleasure than Amusement.

sarily, or even usually, beneficial; and partly because princes and their associates, whose happiness the world envies, devote their lives to amusement. Our first object then must be to show that Happiness cannot consist in Amusement. (a) First, those who, as we have said, find their happiness in Amusement have no experience of any higher pleasure. They are no more fit to judge therefore what pleasures are the highest than children are, who for the very same reason prefer Amuse-

tised merely as a duty, e.g. because necessary to health, as when they are prescribed to an overworked student by physicians, in which case there is an ulterior result in view and the remarks which follow would not apply. (See *Supplementary Note*.)

3. τῶν εὐδαιμονιζομένων οἱ πολλοί] 'The majority of those who are commonly reputed happy.' This was noticed also in I. v. 3.

5. οἱ ἐν ταῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'Those who are skilful in such pastimes,'

i.e. those who have the art of ministering to their amusement, e.g. courtiers, poets, musicians, court-fools, or worse characters.

5, 6. Το ἐφίενται and δέονται the nominative is οἱ τύραννοι. Το παρέχουσι the nominative is οἱ εὐτράπελοι.

10. σπουδαῖαι ἐνέργειαι] 'active states of excellence,' which may be either Moral or Intellectual (as we have often seen before). ἀρετὴ is here named as the source of the former, νοῦς as that of the latter, condition of activity.

τας οἰητέον αἰρετωτέρας εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ οἱ παῖδες τὰ παρ'
 5 αὐτοῖς τιμώμενα κράτιστα οἴονται εἶναι. Εὐλογον δὴ,
 ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω
 καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. Καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρη-
 ται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα 5
 ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δὴ ἢ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔξιν αἰρετωτάτῃ ἐν-
 6 ἔργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. Οὐκ ἐν
 παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία· καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι
 παιδιᾶν, καὶ πραγματεύεσθαι καὶ κακοπαθεῖν τὸν βίον
 ἅπαντα τοῦ παίζειν χάριν. Ἄπαντα γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐτέρου 10
 ἔνεκα αἰρούμεθα πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὕτη.
 Σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται
 καὶ λῖαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνά-
 χαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ· ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παι-
 διὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. 15

ment to anything else. And as there is a difference between
 the objects held in esteem by childhood and manhood, so there
 is naturally a difference between the objects held in esteem by
 5 good and bad men. The decision of good men (to whom, as
 often before, we appeal) is, that Happiness depends not on
 Amusement, but on Virtuous Action, and therefore we con-
 6 clude that it does so depend. (β) Besides, is it not absurd to
 say that we labour and toil all life long for the sake of Amuse-
 ment, as would be the case if Amusement were Happiness (or
 the Chief Good)? It is far more rational to regard Amuse-
 ment as existing for the sake of work (relaxation being some-
 times necessary) than work as existing for the sake of Amuse-

(β) Amuse-
 ment is with
 a view to
 work, not
 work with
 a view to
 Amusement

4. πολλάκις εἴρηται] e.g. I.
 viii. 13, and passages quoted in
 note there.

10. Ἄπαντα γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] Since
 we may say that Happiness only
 is desired for its own sake, and
 everything else ultimately for the

sake of Happiness, it will follow
 that if Happiness and Amuse-
 ment are identical, everything we
 do is with a view to Amusement,
 which seems a *reductio ad ab-*
surdum.

Οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας. Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος αἰεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἥδη. Ἀπολαύσειέ τ' ἂν τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν

(γ) Amusement has no necessary connexion with what is most noble in man.

7 (γ) Again Happiness has been shown to be dependent on Virtue. Now Virtue is a matter not of Amusement but of Earnestness, and every one admits that what is earnest is better than what is amusing, and if it be better, its practice must be nobler and more likely to lead to Happiness. This applies not only to our better, as distinguished from our lower, nature, but also to the better natures among men as distinguished from the inferior. It is clear however that if
8 Happiness should consist in Amusement, the lowest of man-

1. οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις] Thus Amusement is in fact after all not even an end desired for its own sake. Recreation is needed for the sake of work, and (as Aristotle says elsewhere) the busier we are the more we need amusement.

ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας] 'in order that we may be able to work.'

3. μετὰ σπουδῆς=σπουδαῖος, in its literal sense, i.e. 'serious,' or 'earnest'; see note on I. viii. 13. Compare Archbp. Whately:— 'Happiness is no laughing matter, gay spirits and love of amusement (παιδιὰ) are commonly spoken of as if a proof of Happiness, whereas the reverse is very often, perhaps generally, the case.' They

are in fact rather an indication of the absence of repose either of Body or Mind, for which, as Aristotle has just pointed out, Amusement acts as a sort of compensation. This does not apply to the case of children, to whom παιδιὰ is natural, as is admirably expressed by the etymology of the word. Compare also Addison in the *Spectator* (No. 381): 'I have always preferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The latter I consider as an *act*, the former a *habit*, of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, Cheerfulness fixed and permanent.' (Cf. note on βίος τέλειος, I. vii. 16.)

7. ἥδη here almost=*ipso facto*.

ὁ τυχὼν καὶ ἀνδράποδον οὐχ ἥττον τοῦ ἀρίστου· εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις διαγωγαῖς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, ἀλλ' ἐν ταῖς κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργείαις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται.

5

I VII. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου.

kind would be (to say the least) equally capable of it with the noblest, and this is obviously absurd, and inconsistent with what has already been proved. Hence we conclude as before that active Virtue and that alone can form the groundwork of Happiness.

CHAP. VII.—*Pre-eminence of Intellectual (θεωρητικὴ) over Moral Excellence.*

I Happiness, being dependent on Virtue or Excellence, is naturally dependent on the highest form of Excellence, viz.

Intellectual Excellence is the highest type of Excellence, for—

2. εἰ μὴ καὶ βίου] Ζωὴ is mere animal life, in which all, slaves and free, have an equal share. Βίος is life viewed in relation to its duties, occupations, and pursuits, and nearly = (as Grant translates) 'career.' This latter, according to Aristotle's notion, a slave could not have. He is merely a passive, though living, instrument in his master's hands. Compare 'A slave is a living machine, a machine is an inanimate slave' (VIII. xi. 6.) 'A slave is a part of his master, he is like a living portion of his body, though separated from the rest' (Pol. I. vi.).

Such passages enable us to

see how Aristotle denied to a slave any independent career (βίος) and consequently any share in Happiness, as defined by his theory. Similarly, it will be remembered, in I. ix. 9, 10, he pronounces children and the lower animals to be incapable of Happiness (see note there). Recollect also that Aristotle maintained that man was formed by nature to be a member of a community (φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος), and therefore life severed from the community (as that of a slave was) was necessarily imperfect, and consequently could not be happy (see note on I. vii. 6, *fin.*).

- Εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο, εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θείον ὃν καὶ αὐτὸ, εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. "Οτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται. 5
- 2 'Ομολογούμενον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι καὶ τοῖς πρότερον καὶ τῷ ἀληθεῖ. Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ

Excellence of the noblest part of our nature in its highest developement, whether we call it Intellect or whatever else it be which is most divine in man. Hence to prove that the highest Happiness consists in Intellectual activity we have the following arguments:—(a) Intellect is the *noblest* part of our

(a) It is the excellence of the noblest part of man (κρατίστη).

4. κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν] As Aristotle said in I. vii. 14, *fin.* ἕκαστον εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται.

5. θεωρητικὴ] The student must endeavour to form a clear conception of what Aristotle means by θεωρία, θεωρητικὴ, θεωρεῖν, etc., before proceeding further. No one word in English adequately represents the idea. See Glossary under θεωρία, p. xli.

εἴρηται] The nominative is ἡ τούτου (τοῦ νοῦ) ἐνέργεια. The reference is very doubtful. Possibly, speaking from memory, Aristotle may be referring to B. VI., where the functions of νοῦς and of Intellectual Excellence generally are described.

6. καὶ τοῖς πρότερον perhaps refers to I. v. 7, where βίος θεωρητικός is mentioned as one of the chief types of life to which Happiness has been held to be-

long. Though Aristotle does not there assert that this is true, and in fact expressly reserves the consideration of the question, yet as he proves in that chapter that Happiness cannot belong to any of the other types of life enumerated, it may by implication be assigned to this type, viz. βίος θεωρητικός. At any rate it is only said that the statement in the text is 'consistent with' (ὁμολογούμενον) what was said before.

8. νοῦς has been explained in B. VI. to be the faculty by which we are capable of seeing intuitively the truth of Axioms or General Principles. These are the principles from which all demonstrative proof starts, and they are the foundations upon which all scientific knowledge rests. Thus νοῦς is the highest of our intellectual faculties, because it deals with the highest

3 ἀ ὁ νοῦς. "Ἐτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν, οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμίχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολογουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν 5 καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὖλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν

3 nature, and its objects are also the noblest. (β) Intellectual activity is able to be more *continuous* than any other form of activity. (γ) *Pleasure* is confessedly an ingredient of Happiness, and the palm among pleasures, for purity and perma-

(β) It is most continuous in its activity (συνεχεστάτη).

(γ) It has the purest and most lasting pleasure (ἡδίστη).

and most important of all truths. Moreover it does not *discover* or prove them, but it *recognizes* them, it *sees into* them (θεωρεῖ). Hence the statement made above (see the note on εἶρηται, § 1) that the operation of νοῦς is θεωρητική.

1, 2. θεωρεῖν and πράττειν are emphatic and in contrast.

3. παραμεμίχθαι] It was explained in I. viii. 10—14 in what sense Aristotle considers pleasure to be an ingredient in Happiness.

ἡδίστη δὲ κ.τ.λ.] Observe the contrast between σοφία and φιλοσοφία. The pleasures of philosophy, or the *pursuit* of Truth, are commonly thought (δοκεῖ) to be of a very high order: confessedly, therefore, the pleasure of the *possession* of Truth (σοφία) must be higher still; for possession (as he proceeds) must be better than pursuit; fruition better than aspiration. Φιλόσοφος was a title first assumed by Pythagoras

as being a more modest one than σοφός. He would not call himself 'a wise man,' but a 'lover of wisdom.'

6. εὖλογον τοῖς εἰδόσι κ.τ.λ.] 'It is reasonable to suppose that those who have attained knowledge pass their time more pleasantly than those who are still seeking it.' This, however, is a point much disputed, and the balance of general opinion is perhaps the other way. The saying of Lessing is well known: 'Did the Almighty, holding in his right hand, Truth, and in his left, Search after Truth, offer me the choice, I should prefer in all humility, but without hesitation, Search after Truth.' Pascal (*Pensées*, I. ix. 34) compares the pleasures of the acquisition and the pursuit of knowledge to the pleasures of having won a game, and of actually playing the game. Similarly Butler, (*Sermons*, xv.), 'Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gain-

- 4 ζητούντων ἡδίων τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι. "Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, 5 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συν- 5 εργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος. Δόξαι τ' ἂν

nence, is allowed to belong to the pleasure of the *pursuit of knowledge*. Still greater then must be the pleasure of the *conscious possession of knowledge*. (δ) Intellectual activity is most *self-sufficient* and independent of external appliances.

- 5 (ε) This is the only sort of activity which can be truly said to

ing, not the having of it (knowledge), which is the entertainment of the mind.' Shakespeare again,—

'All things that are,
Are with more pleasure chased than enjoyed.'

Superior as the pleasures of knowledge are, it may perhaps be true of them as of lower pleasures, that 'pleasure unattained is like the hare we hold in chase, . . . pleasure attained is the same hare hanging up in the sportsman's larder, disregarded, despised, dead' (Horace Smith). Or, once more, in the familiar words of Pope,

'Man never is, but always to be, blest.'

It should, however, be remembered that Aristotle uses the words 'possession of knowledge' here in reference to his own doc-

trine of θεωρία, i.e. an *active* fruition not a *passive* possession of it. See this fully explained in the Glossary under θεωρία.

3. σοφὸς is taken as the type of διανοητικὴ ἀρετὴ, δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ represent ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ.

4. κεχορηγημένων] See note on I. viii. 15, ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.

6. The cases of σώφρων and ἀνδρεῖος are further explained in § 4 of next chapter.

7. σοφὸς is not 'wise' in the popular sense, but one who has attained σοφία in the technical sense of the last section, one who has reached the goal of philosophy. The full fruition of σοφία is that θεωρία already explained.

9. In §§ 5-8 Aristotle in the last place argues the superiority of intellectual activity to all

(δ) It is most 4
independent
of circum-
stances
5 (αὐταρκε-
στία).

αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτῶν ἢ πλείον 6 ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. Τῶν 5 μὲν οὖν πρακτικῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἡ ἐνέργεια· αἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις δοκοῦσιν ἀσχολοὶ εἶναι, αἱ μὲν πολεμικαὶ καὶ παντελῶς οὐδεὶς γὰρ αἰρεῖται τὸ πολεμεῖν τοῦ πολεμεῖν ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ παρασκευάζει πόλεμον· δόξαι γὰρ ἂν παντελῶς μαιφόνος 10 τις εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς φίλους πολεμίους ποιοῦτο, ἵνα μάχαι καὶ φόνοι γίγνοιντο. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ἀσχολος, καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι περιποιουμένην

be desired entirely for its own sake : the only sort of activity in (e) It is the only form of activity in which we can absolutely repose (σχολαστική) 6 which we can repose, and this rest or repose is an essential characteristic of Happiness. Take the most striking developments of practical (as distinguished from intellectual) activity, viz. War and Statesmanship. War is utterly inconsistent with repose, and it is inconceivable that it should be desirable *per se* : it can only be so for its results. To Statesmanship the same remarks apply. It excludes the idea of repose, and its pursuit always implies the ulterior aim of securing for one's-

other activity, because in it, and in it alone, we can absolutely repose and be satisfied (ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶστίν). That this cannot be said of any kind of *action* is proved by taking what are considered the noblest types of action (see beginning of § 7), viz. War and Statesmanship. They are essentially ἀσχολοὶ (l. 8). We cannot rest in *them*. *A fortiori* we cannot do so in any inferior type of practical activity.

4. ἐν τῇ σχολῇ] Happiness implies repose. This idea is well expressed by Wordsworth :

Craving peace,
The central feeling of all happiness,
Not as a refuge from distress or pain,
A breathing time, vacation, or a truce,
But for its absolute self ; a life of peace,
Stability without regret or fear,
That hath been, is, and shall be evermore.

12. ἡ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ] Understand from the preceding sentence either πρᾶξις or ἐνέργεια.

δυναστείας καὶ τιμὰς ἢ τὴν γε εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς
 πολίταις, ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν
 7 δῆλον ὡς ἑτέραν οὖσαν. Εἰ δὲ τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς
 πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει
 προέχουσιν, αὗται δ' ἄσχολοι καὶ τέλους τινὸς ἐφίενται 5
 καὶ οὐ δι' αὐτὰς αἱρεταί εἰσιν, ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια
 σπουδῇ τε διαφέρειν δοκεῖ θεωρητικὴ οὖσα, καὶ παρ'
 αὐτὴν οὐδενὸς ἐφίεσθαι τέλους, ἔχειν τε ἡδονὴν οἰ-
 κείαν (αὕτη δὲ συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν), καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες
 δὴ καὶ σχολαστικὸν καὶ ἄτρυτον ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ὅσα 10
 ἄλλα τῷ μακαρίῳ ἀπονέμεται, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐνέργειαν
 φαίνεται ὄντα. Ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀν-

self or one's country power, honour, or in short Happiness.
 Happiness then, if an ulterior aim of political life, cannot be
 7 identified with it. Intellectual activity then unites all the
 qualities now enumerated, and, if it be life-long, is the perfect

1. γε draws attention to τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. If Happiness itself is an ulterior end of the Statesman's activity, we have the clearest proof that it is not identical with it.

2. ἑτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς] explained by παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι in I. 13, p. 249. The prosperity which is secured by Statesmanship is obviously something different from the practice of Statesmanship itself: even as peace, the object of war, is different from war. In θεωρία or intellectual activity there is no such result separate from the activity itself.

3. § 7 is a recapitulation. Εἰ δὴ must be understood with each

clause up to that which commences with καὶ τὸ αὐταρκες δὴ, which is the apodosis of the sentence.

7. σπουδῇ] 'earnestness,' or 'intensity.'

9. αὕτη συναύξει τὴν ἐνέργειαν] 'This (i.e. the pleasure of it) helps to intensify the activity itself.'

10. σχολαστικὸν] 'capability of affording repose,' in reference to § 6; ἄτρυτον (from τρύω, to wear) 'freedom from weariness.' See § 3 (*init.*) and last chapter § 6 (*fin.*). ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ, 'so far as is possible for man.' Compare the limitation at the end of I. x. μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους, 'happy as men.'

θρώπου, λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀτελές
 8 ἔστι τῶν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος
 κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οὐ-
 τω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεϊόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δε
 διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτ' καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια 5
 τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς
 τὸν ἀνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν
 ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας
 ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνη-
 τὸν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν, καὶ πάντα 10
 ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ
 γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺν
 9 μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκασ-

8 ideal of Happiness. True, such a life is beyond man's reach. Such a life
 It is as much beyond such Happiness as he can attain to, as is divine
 pure Intellect is beyond our composite and imperfect human rather than
 nature. Still we must strive after that perfection which we human.
 can never hope fully to reach, for the life of the Intellect is
 the life of that which is not only most divine in man, but
 9 which also constitutes each man's true and proper self. From

1. μῆκος βίου τέλειον] See note on I. vii. 16.

5. τοῦ συνθέτου] 'the whole compound nature of man,'—including not only the divine element of intellect, but the animal body, with its passions, appetites, etc. See next chapter § 3, where this argument is more fully worked out.

8. A favourite maxim of Greek writers: among others Cf. Eur. Alc. 799: ὄντας δὲ θνητοὺς θνητὰ καὶ φρονεῖν χρεών.

10. ἀθανατίζειν] 'to act the immortal.' The termination -ίζω

often has the force of acting or imitating, without becoming, what the root of the verb implies, e.g. Μηδίζω, 'to take the side of the Medes'; Φιλιππίζω, 'to join Philip's party'; σοφίζω, 'to set up to be σοφός.'

12. τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν] literally 'small in its bulk.' This need not necessarily imply that Aristotle believed the intellect (νοῦς) to have 'bulk' at all, i.e. to be material, any more than Horace's 'divinæ particula auræ.' It is a popular way of speaking.

13. εἶναι ἕκαστος] i.e. 'to be

Still it is most truly human.

τος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον ἄτοπον οὖν γί-
 νουτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.
 Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον
 ἐκάστω τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστω.
 Καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο 5
 μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. Οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

- 1 VIII. Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν· αἱ γὰρ
 κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεία
 καὶ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν
 ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίοις ἐν 10
 τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστω. Ταῦτα δ'
 2 εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά. Ἐνια δὲ καὶ συμβαί-
 νειν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος δοκεῖ, καὶ πολλὰ συνφκειῶσθαι

this point of view no other life could be so truly natural to
 man, nor, by consequence, so truly happy.

CHAP. VIII.—*Secondary position of Moral Excellence.*

Conversely, I
 we may show
 that Moral
 Excellence
 holds a
 secondary
 place, for—
 (i) It is
 essentially
 human, and
 never can
 be more
 than this.

- Thus far we have shown how Intellectual Excellence holds
 the first place. We can also bring positive arguments to
 prove that Moral Excellence as compared with it holds a
 secondary place in regard to Happiness. (i) First, it is
 essentially human, and bound up with all the imperfections
 of man's composite nature. In proof of this—(α) Justice,
 Courage, and other Moral Virtues in detail, have for the
 sphere of their action the circumstances of ordinary human
 2 life. (β) Some Moral Virtues would have no meaning apart

each man's self,' 'to constitute
 personality.' Not a man's fea-
 tures, or his body, or his appetites,
 or his passions, but his intellect,
 is his proper self, which distin-
 guishes him from all other men,
 and all other beings whatsoever.
 τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος in l. 5
 has the same meaning.

2. τινος ἄλλου is neuter, 'of
 something else.'

3. τὸ λεχθέν πρότερον] viz.
 I. ix. 5.

7. Δευτέρως δὲ . . . ἀρετὴν]
 Understand βίος εὐδαίμων ἐστίν.

13. πολλὰ συνφκειῶσθαι τοῖς
 πάθεσι] 'has many points of
 connexion with the feelings,'

3 τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετή. Συνέζευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, εἴ-
περ αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρχαὶ κατὰ τὰς ἠθικὰς εἰσιν
ἀρετὰς, τὸ δ' ὀρθὸν τῶν ἠθικῶν κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν.
Συνηρητὴ μέναι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον 5
ἂν εἶεν· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί. Καὶ ὁ
βίος δὲ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. Ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ

3 from the existence of a body and bodily appetites. (γ) Prac-
tical Wisdom, though a sort of crown to all the Moral Virtues,
is, together with them, concerned with our passions, and there-
fore with the imperfections of our composite nature. Hence
we conclude that any Happiness depending on Moral Excel-

and therefore with our bodily nature.

2. φρόνησις here as elsewhere is opposed to σοφία, as practical wisdom is opposed to speculative or theoretical. See note on II. vi. 15.

In B. VI. it has been shown that there can be no virtue without this practical wisdom (φρόνησις), which is the guiding principle or intellectual side of all the Moral Virtues, and conversely that the possession of this practical wisdom implies the possession of all the Moral Virtues in detail, for, if practical, it must proceed to action. Hence the intimate connexion now asserted in the text between φρόνησις and ἠθικαὶ ἀρεταί, and of both together with the passions and appetites of our nature, which it is their whole aim to regulate. The purpose of the argument is to show the inferiority of practical wisdom (φρόνησις), whose activity is ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, to intel-

lectual wisdom (σοφία), whose activity is θεωρία. Φρόνησις being (in the sense explained) the crown of all Moral Excellences, as σοφία is of all Intellectual, the two classes are fitly contrasted under their highest types. Hence καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, 'even practical wisdom.'

5. συνηρητὴ μέναι] literally, 'And these being linked also with the feelings concern our composite nature.' Practical wisdom, and with it all Moral Excellence, are bound up with the affections (see II. iii. 3, etc. etc.), and therefore imply the imperfections of the lower part of our composite human nature, and thus never can be more than human.

7. ἡ εὐδαιμονία] understand ἡ κατ' αὐτάς.

ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ] sc. εὐδαιμονία. κεχωρισμένη sc. τῶν παθέων from the preceding sentence, κεχωρισμένη being opposed to συνηρητὴ μέναι.

κεχωρισμένη· τοσοῦτον γὰρ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰρήσθω· διακρι-
 4 βῶσαι γὰρ μείζον τοῦ προκειμένου ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν
 καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι
 τῆς ἡθικῆς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ
 5 ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπνεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ
 πολιτικὸς, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρου
 πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευ-
 θερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια,
 καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλή-
 σεις ἄδελφοι, προσποιούνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσ-
 10 θαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπι-
 τελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας·
 5 πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις ; ἀμφισ-
 βητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις

lence can never be more than merely human Happiness.

(ii) It is more or less dependent on external circumstances.

- 4 ii. While under no circumstances can the body and its well-
 fare be wholly neglected, yet Moral, as compared with Intel-
 lectual, Excellence has much greater need of external cir-
 cumstances, regarding at any rate the active exercise of each.
 Moral Virtue cannot be practised, nor Moral Character mani-
 5 fested, without favourable circumstances ; and the more ex-

2. This is the converse aspect of the argument in § 4 of the last ch.

7. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας] 'for their respective activities, there will be a great difference,' viz. for those of Moral and Intellectual Excellence.

11. δυνάμεως] 'power' or 'strength,' e.g. a cripple or paralytic could not display active courage (ἐπιτελεῖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν).

12. ἐξουσία] 'opportunity' or 'license to indulge.' There would be no outward difference

between the teetotaller and the drunkard if there were nothing but water to be had.

14. ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κ.τ.λ.] The importance of intention (προαίρεσις) was insisted on in III. ii. 1, μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. '(Intention) is a greater test of character than actions are.' So also in II. iv. 3, where the conditions necessary to a virtuous act were enumerated ; and among them is a deliberate resolution arising from pure motives, etc.

ἡ αἱ πράξεις, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὐσης. Τὸ δὲ τέλειον δῆλον
 ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἂν εἴη. Πρὸς δὲ τὰς πράξεις πολλῶν δεῖ-
 ται καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μείζους ὦσι καὶ καλλίους, πλειόνων.
 6 Τῷ δὲ θεωροῦντι οὐδενὸς τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς γε τὴν
 ἐνέργειαν χρεία, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐμπόδιά ἐστι πρὸς 5
 γε τὴν θεωρίαν ἢ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ καὶ πλείοσι συζῆ,
 αἰρεῖται τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράττειν δεῖσεται οὖν τῶν
 7 τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαι-
 μονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τις ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν
 φανείη. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφμεν μακα- 10
 ρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονείμει
 χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ἢ γελοῖοι φανούν-

cellent the Virtue, the more numerous are the circumstances
 6 required for its full development. All such circumstances
 are to Contemplation only hindrances, even when they cannot
 7 be dispensed with. iii. Finally, only Intellectual Excellence (iii) It can-
 can be attributed to the gods: for—(a) There are no circum- not be
 stances under which they could exercise some of the Moral attributed
 to the gods.

4. Observe the limiting and emphasizing force of γε here and in l. 6.

6. ἢ δ' ἀνθρωπὸς κ.τ.λ.] In actual human life intellectual activity cannot rightly be severed from moral practice. So that the philosopher, like others, stands in need of these external appliances for the exercise of Virtue. He does not however need them as a philosopher, but as a man among men, nor with a view to his peculiar work, intellectual activity. On the contrary, though otherwise necessary, to it they are only impediments.

8. ἀνθρωπεύειν 'to be a man,'

ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι 'to act one's part as a man.' The same difference exists between the active and middle of many similar words, e.g. δουλεύω, πρεσβεύω, πολιτεύω, etc. So in III. vi. 12 ἀνδρίζεσθαι 'to play the man.'

9. ἐντεῦθεν] The outline of the argument is—All activity must be either πρακτικὴ, or ποιητικὴ, or θεωρητικὴ. The two former cannot be assigned to the gods who are supremely happy, and yet they live, and live actively too. Hence their activity must be θεωρητικὴ, an intellectual or contemplative activity.

ται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ; ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν ; ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους ; τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν ; ἄτοπον δ' εἶ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν ; ἢ φορτικὸς 5 ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας ; διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ

Virtues: (β) They have none of those moral imperfections which others presuppose: (γ) If moral activity, and *a fortiori* productive activity, be excluded, there is only intellectual activity left. Therefore the activity of the gods, whose life is essentially a most blessed one, is contemplative or intellectual.

5. φορτικὸς] 'gross,' or 'degrading'; see note on I. v. 1.

6. διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα κ.τ.λ.] Of the precise sense in which these Virtues are exercised in our experience the statement in the text is obviously true, Virtue being, as has been said, 'goodness in a state of warfare.' Whether there may not be a higher sense and a different sphere of action in which analogous Moral Virtues may be attributed to the Deity is another question, which the argument here leaves untouched. After all it is to some extent a question depending (1) on the precise meaning of the Greek words δίκαιος, σώφρων, etc., as was the case in reference to ἔπαινος being inapplicable to the gods—see I. xii. 3. Also (2) still

more on the Greek conception of the Divine nature, for which see Glossary s.v. θεός and φύσις. We may well compare Butler's argument, Anal. i. c. v. (p. 97, Angus's edition). 'Nor is our ignorance what will be the employments of that happy community, nor our consequent ignorance what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity amongst the members of it with regard to each other any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind or character which is formed by the practice of those particular virtues and which is a result of it,' etc.

τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρου
 μένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεω-
 ρία; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα,
 θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ἡ ταύτη
 8 συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη. Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ 5
 μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνε-
 ργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ
 βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι
 τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων
 οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπεὶδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. Ἐφ' 10
 ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς
 μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ
 συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὐτὴ γὰρ καθ'
 αὐτὴν τιμία. Ὡστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

Hence we infer that as men approach to this ideal their
 8 Happiness is highest. Indeed we find a complete scale of
 corresponding degrees between Happiness and the capacity
 for intellectual activity. In the lower animals both are totally
 absent. In the gods, both are present in perfection. Among
 men, both exist imperfectly, but in exact proportion to each
 other: and we affirm that this correspondence is not acci-
 dental, but that it implies an essential connexion between

1. τοῦ πράττειν 'moral action,'
 τοῦ ποιεῖν 'productive, or crea-
 tive, action.' (See Glossary s.v.
 πράξις, ποιήσις.) The former
 has been excluded by the argu-
 ments in § 7. As to the latter,
 it is clear from this passage as
 well as many others that Aris-
 totle did not believe in God as a
 Creator in our sense of the word.
 He would consider such work as
 unworthy of him (φορτικόν), in-
 consistent with the perfection of

His nature and mode of exist-
 ence. See further Glossary s.v.
 θεός—φύσις.

10. οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ] See note
 on I. ix. 9.

The argument of § 8 closely
 resembles the process of Modern
 Induction called by Bacon 'The
 Scale of Degrees,' 'Tabula grad-
 uum,' or by Mill, 'The Method
 of Concomitant Variations.'

13. αὐτὴ γὰρ] 'For this in it-
 self (i.e. θεωρία) is essentially ad-

- 9 Δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπῳ ὄντι· οὐ γὰρ αὐτάρκης ἡ φύσις πρὸς τὸ θεωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τροφήν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν ὑπάρχειν. Οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεή-
σεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν 5
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐτάρκες οὐδ' ἡ πράξις, δυνατόν δὲ καὶ μὴ ἄρχοντα γῆς
10 καὶ θαλάττης πράττειν τὰ καλὰ· καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ μετρίων δύναιτ' ἄν τις πράττειν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς· οἱ γὰρ ἰδιῶται τῶν δυναστῶν οὐχ ἥττον 10
δοκοῦσι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ πράττειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον. Ἰκα-
νὸν δὲ τοσαύτ' ὑπάρχειν, ἔσται γὰρ ὁ βίος εὐδαίμων τοῦ
11 κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργοῦντος. Καὶ Σόλων δὲ τοὺς εὐδαί-
μονας ἴσως ἀπεφαίνετο καλῶς, εἰπὼν μετρίως τοῖς ἐκτὸς
κεχορηγημένους, πεπραγότας δὲ τὰ κάλλισθ', ὡς ᾤετο, 15

Happiness and Intellectual activity. And therefore again we assert that the highest Happiness is Intellectual.

- 9 To descend once more to practical details. For man this continuous activity of Intellect only is a practical impossibility. He cannot be independent of some amount of external advantages. That that amount, however, is not excessive, but mode-
10 rate, theory, experience, and the teaching of the wisest among

mirable,' a characteristic proved to belong to Happiness also in I. xii.

§§ 9-13. The concluding Sections recur to some practical questions connected with the conclusion now reached: the relation of Happiness to external circumstances; the concurrence of Aristotle's theory with those of previous philosophers, and, what is still more important, with facts; the superiority of

Happiness as now defined, owing to the good-will of heaven favouring that life which is 'likeliest God's.'

3. τὴν λοιπὴν θεραπείαν = 'the other care that the body needs,' besides the securing of mere health and sustenance. μὴν in the next sentence is corrective. We must not take this 'θεραπεία' to include too much.

6. ὑπερβολῇ] Understand τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.

Human Happiness cannot dispense with a moderate degree of external prosperity.

- καὶ βεβιωκότας σωφρόνως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μέτρια κεκτη-
 μένους πράττειν ἃ δεῖ. Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ
 πλούσιον οὐδὲ δυνάστην ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰπὼν
 ὅτι οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειεν εἴ τις ἄτοπος φανείη τοῖς πολλοῖς·
 οὗτοι γὰρ κρίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς, τούτων αἰσθανόμενοι μό- 5
 12 νον. Συμφωνεῖν δὴ τοῖς λόγοις εἰκόασιν αἱ τῶν σοφῶν
 δόξαι. Πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινα, τὸ δ'
 ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρι-
 νεται· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ τὸ κύριον. Σκοπεῖν δὴ τὰ προει-
 ρημένα χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὸν βίον ἐπιφέροντας, καὶ 10
 συναδόντων μὲν τοῖς ἔργοις ἀποδεκτέον, διαφωνούντων δὲ
 13 λόγους ὑποληπτέον. Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦ-
 τον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος
 ἔοικεν εἶναι· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ
 θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε 15

- 12 men, combine to show. Still whatever weight we may assign
 to the authority of the wise, the last appeal must be to facts,
 and to the practical experience of life. To this tribunal we
 would refer all that has been asserted in the course of this
 13 treatise. One more practical consideration we subjoin. If,
 as is generally believed, the gods regard the affairs of men,
 they will naturally love and favour those who are most like

Those whom
 the gods love
 best, viz.
 the wise, are
 naturally
 the happiest

2. Ἀναξαγόρας οὐ πλούσιον] An-
 axagoras of Clazomenæ, in Ionia,
 resigned all his property to his
 relations and gave himself up to
 philosophical study for some
 thirty years at Athens.

6. τοῖς λόγοις = our defini-
 tions or theories.

7. μὲν οὖν, as usual, fixes a
 strong emphasis on the preceding
 word, and thus marks a contrast
 between πίστιν and τὸ ἀληθές.

‘Some ground for belief may be
 afforded by such a *consensus*, but
 the test of *actual truth* is to be
 derived in practical subjects from
 facts and from life.’ Cf. Shake-
 speare, *Henry V.* Act. I. Sc. i.:

So that the art and practic part of life
 Must be the mistress to this theoric.

12. λόγους ὑποληπτέον] ‘we
 must take them to be mere
 theories.’

αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντενποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. "Οτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος 5 ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἶη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαιμόνων.

- I IX. Ἐρ' οὖν εἰ περὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονῆς ἱκανῶς εἴρηται τοῖς τύποις, τέλος ἔχειν οἰκτεόν τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἣ καθάπερ λέγεται, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν 10 τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι, ἀλ-

themselves. Such are those in whom Intellect and Wisdom are most developed. And all will admit that the greatest Happiness will be found in those whom the gods love best. Therefore from this practical point of view also, the highest Happiness is linked with Wisdom or Intellectual Activity.

CHAP. IX.—*Conclusion of the Treatise on Ethics, and transition to the Complementary Science of Politics.*

In conclu-
sion we
must apply
our theories
to practice.

- I This sketch of Virtue and subjects akin to it might now be concluded, except that no theory on such matters can be con-

CHAP. IX.—This Chapter forms a general conclusion to the whole treatise. When we turn from theory to practice, Ethics must look for some authority to enforce its injunctions on those who will not hear. Failing the intervention of the State, Parental authority must take its place. In either case a scientific study of Politics or of the principles of Statesmanship is a necessary sequel to that of Ethics, if theory is to be carried on to practice

at all. In the absence of any accessible means for such a study Aristotle proposes to write a treatise on the subject himself, and the concluding words of the Book lead us at once to the commencement of his treatise on Politics.

10. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] Compare I. iii. 6, τὸ τέλος οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις: also II. ii. 1, and many other passages.

- 2 *λὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πράττειν αὐτά ; οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἰκα-*
νὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἴ
3 *πὼς ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι*
αὐτάρκεις πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἐπιεικεῖς, πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς
καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεόγνιν, καὶ ἔδει 5
ἂν τούτους πορίσασθαι· νῦν δὲ φαίνονται προτρέψασθαι
μὲν καὶ παρορμῆσαι τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους ἰσχύειν,
ἡθὸς τ' εὐγενὲς καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόκαλον ποιῆσαι ἂν κα-
τοκώχιμον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς ἀδυνατεῖν πρὸς
4 *καλοκαγαθίαν προτρέψασθαι· οὐ γὰρ πεφύκασιν αἰδοῖ* 10
πειθαρχεῖν ἀλλὰ φόβῳ, οὐδ' ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν φαύλων διὰ
τὸ αἰσχροὺς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰς τιμωρίας· πάθει γὰρ ζῶντες
τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι καὶ δι' ὧν αὐταὶ ἔσονται,
φεύγουσι δὲ τὰς ἀντικειμένας λύπας, τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ καὶ
ὡς ἀληθῶς ἡδέος οὐδ' ἔννοιαν ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες. 15
5 *Τοὺς δὲ τοιούτους τίς ἂν λόγος μεταρρυθμίσαι ; οὐ γὰρ*
οἶόν τε ἢ οὐ ράδιον τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημ-

- 2 sidered complete until it is connected with practice. Mere
3 theories of Virtue can never make men good, unless they are
previously disposed to goodness. On the majority of man-
4 kind such theories have no effect whatever. With them we
must appeal not to shame but to the fear of punishment :
pleasure is all they seek, pain the only thing they avoid :
these therefore are the only feelings through which we can
5 influence them. Virtue is in truth hard enough to attain to,
even when all circumstances are favourable ; if they are other-
wise, the voice of the teacher is powerless.

Moral theo-
ries have no
influence
except on
those al-
ready fitted
to receive
them.

2. *ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως* 'or by any other means that there may be'—other, that is, than *ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι*.

5. Theognis made this remark in reference to the dignity of the physician's calling, if only the gods

should have enabled him to heal the minds and characters of men as well as their bodies.

8. *κατοκώχιμον* (*κατέχω*) = 'capable of being influenced or restrained by.'

17. *τοῖς ἡθεσι κατειλημμένα*]

μένα λόγῳ μεταστῆσαι. Ἀγαπητὸν δ' ἴσως ἐστὶν εἰ
 πάντων ὑπαρχόντων δι' ὧν ἐπιεικεῖς δοκοῦμεν γίνεσθαι,
 6 μεταλάβοιμεν τῆς ἀρετῆς. Γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται,
 οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς
 φύσεως δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινος
 θείας αἰτίας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν ὑπάρχει· ὁ δὲ
 λόγος καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ μή ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν ἰσχύη, ἀλλὰ
 δέη προδιειργάσθαι τοῖς ἔθεσι τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ ψυχὴν
 πρὸς τὸ καλῶς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥσπερ γῆν τὴν θρέ-
 7 ψουσιν τὸ σπέρμα. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκούσειε λόγον ἀποτρέ- 10
 ποντος οὐδ' αὖ συνείη ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν· τὸν δ' οὕτως

The acquisi-
 tion of Vir-
 tue depends
 on
 Disposition,
 Training,
 Teaching.

6 Now there are three courses, as it is commonly held, by which men arrive at Virtue. (1) Natural disposition; (2) Moral training; (3) Intellectual teaching. The first is clearly beyond our control. As to the last, its influence varies in different cases, and depends on the hearer's mind having been previously prepared,
 7 like soil for the seed. Passion when supreme will not hear, and indeed cannot understand, any argument but that of force.

'firmly fixed in the character.' For a similar statement cf. II. iii. 8, χαλεπὸν ἀποτρέψασθαι πάθος ἐγκεχωρωμένον τῷ βίῳ. Also compare the expression συνελημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος in II. vi. 18.

4. φύσει . . . ἔθει . . . διδαχῇ] We might compare the various causes suggested in I. ix. for the acquisition of Happiness: πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν (= διδάχῃ), ἡ ἔθιστόν ἢ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητὸν (= ἔθει), ἡ κατὰ τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἡ καὶ διὰ τύχην (= φύσει).

6. τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς εὐτυχέσιν] 'those who are in the truest sense fortunate.' Compare III.

v. 17, τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἶη εὐφυνία.

7. ἡ διδαχὴ] Aristotle is perhaps led to lay stress on the inadequacy of mere intellectual teaching in Morals, on account of the undue prominence given to it by Plato, who held all Virtue to be (1) intellectual, (2) διδακτόν. The words μή ποτ' οὐ introduce the statement in a suggestive form, and almost = 'perhaps,' or 'it would seem that.'

8. προδιειργάσθαι] διεργάζομαι is similarly used by Theophrastus for the 'tilling' of land.

11. οὐδ' αὖ συνείη] 'he could

ἔχοντα πῶς οἶόν τε μεταπεῖσαι ; ὅλως τ' οὐ δοκεῖ λόγῳ
 8 ὑπείκειν τὸ πάθος ἀλλὰ βία. Δεῖ δὴ τὸ ἦθος προῦ-
 πάρχειν πῶς οἰκείον τῆς ἀρετῆς, στέργον τὸ καλὸν καὶ
 δυσχεραῖνον τὸ αἰσχρόν. Ἐκ νέου δ' ἀγωγῆς ὀρθῆς
 τυχεῖν πρὸς ἀρετὴν χαλεπὸν μὴ ὑπὸ τοιούτοις τραφέν- 5
 τα νόμοις· τὸ γὰρ σωφρόνως καὶ καρτερικῶς ζῆν οὐχ
 ἡδὺ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἄλλως τε καὶ νέοις. Διὸ νόμοις
 δεῖ τετάχθαι τὴν τροφήν καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα· οὐκ
 9 ἔσται γὰρ λυπηρὰ συνήθη γινόμενα. Οὐχ ἱκανὸν δ'
 ἴσως νέους ὄντας τροφῆς καὶ ἐπιμελείας τυχεῖν ὀρθῆς, 10
 ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀνδρωθέντας δεῖ ἐπιτηδεύειν αὐτὰ καὶ
 ἐθίζεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα δεοίμεθ' ἂν νόμων, καὶ ὅλως
 δὴ περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ ἀνάγκῃ μᾶλλον
 10 ἢ λόγῳ πειθαρχοῦσι καὶ ζημίαις ἢ τῷ καλῷ. Διόπερ
 οἷονταί τινες τοὺς νομοθετοῦντας δεῖν μὲν παρακαλεῖν 15
 ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ χάριν, ὥς

8 The second of the courses above named therefore alone re-
 mains : Moral training is our necessary starting-point in the
 formation of moral character ; such training moreover must
 begin in childhood, and it can only be secured by the authority
 of Law ; for it must always be a painful process till we become
 9 accustomed to it, and especially so in youth. Moreover the
 majority of men (who yield only to force and to the fear of
 punishment) need to have their conduct and occupations thus
 regulated for them not in youth only but all through life.
 10 Hence it has been thought to be the duty of a legislator to

We must
 begin with
 Moral train-
 ing, and that
 must be
 enforced by
 external
 authority.

not even understand.' See note
 on I. iv. 6 (διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν
 ἡχθαι κ.τ.λ.), and cf. οὐδ' ἔννοιαν
 ἔχουσιν, ἄγευστοι ὄντες, in § 4 of
 this Chapter.

13. περὶ πάντα τὸν βίον] For,
 as Aristotle says in I. iii. 7, δια-
 φέρεῖ δ' οὐθὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ

τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν
 χρόνον ἢ ἑλλειψίς.

14. διόπερ οἷονταί τινες κ.τ.λ.]
 Ancient and modern views of
 legislation are in marked con-
 trast in this respect. See note
 on I. xiii. 3, and cf. V. xi. 1,
 ὁ νόμος ἂ μὴ κελεύει ἀπιγο-

- ὑπακουσομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶς τοῖς ἔθεσι προηγμένων, ἀπει-
 θοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἀφυστέρους οὔσι κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας
 ἐπιτιθέναι, τοὺς δ' ἀνιάτους ὅλως ἐξορίζειν· τὸν μὲν γὰρ
 ἐπεικῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντα τῷ λόγῳ πειθαρχήσιν,
 τὸν δὲ φαῦλον ἡδονῆς ὀρεγόμενον λύπῃ κολάζεσθαι ὥς- 5
 περ ὑποζύγιον. Διὸ καὶ φασὶ δεῖν τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι τὰς
 λύπας αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται ταῖς ἀγαπωμέναις ἡδοναῖς.
- 11 Εἰ δ' οὖν, καθάπερ εἴρηται, τὸν ἐσόμενον ἀγαθὸν τραφῆ-
 ναι καλῶς δεῖ καὶ ἐθισθῆναι, εἰθ' οὕτως ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν
 ἐπεικέσι ζῆν καὶ μήτ' ἄκοντα μήθ' ἐκόντα πράττειν τὰ 10
 φαῦλα, ταῦτα δὲ γίγνεται ἂν βιουμένοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν
- 12 καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ
 πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, οὐδὲ
 δὴ ὅλως ἢ ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς, μὴ βασιλέως ὄντος ἢ τινος τοι-
 ούτου· ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν 15

appeal to the nobler instincts of those in whom nature or good training has implanted such instincts, but to compel obedience from all others by pains and penalties, and, speaking generally, by inflicting such pains as are most opposed to the

- 11 offending pleasures. All this implies a guiding Intellect, with power to enforce its decrees. Where then is this to be
- 12 found? Parental authority, and indeed that of any single individual, except he be an absolute monarch, lacks that

Parental authority cannot adequately enforce it.

ρεύει, i.e. 'quod lex non jubet vetat.'

2. κολάσεις τε καὶ τιμωρίας] For this distinction see note on III. v. 7.

7. αἱ μάλιστα ἐναντιοῦνται κ.τ.λ.] Compare the argument in II. iii. 4, αἱ δὲ ἱατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

11. ταῦτα δὲ γίγνεται ἂν] δὲ marks the apodosis or conclusion of the sentence.

15. λόγος ὢν κ.τ.λ.] 'being a declaration proceeding as it were from wisdom and intelligence.' i.e. Law expresses in an impersonal form the conclusions of human wisdom. As expressing such conclusions, it commands our obedience, as doing so impersonally and in the abstract, it does not excite our resentment. Aristotle in the *Politics* describes Law as νοῦς ἀνευ ὀρέξεως.

ἀπό τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων
 ἐχθαίρουσι τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους ταῖς ὀρμαῖς, καὶ ὀρθῶς
 αὐτὸ δρῶσιν· ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαχθῆς τάττων τὸ
 ἐπιεικές. Ἐν μόνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλι-
 γων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμέλειαν δοκεῖ πεποιῆσθαι τροφῆς 5
 τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων· ἐν δὲ ταῖς πλείσταις τῶν πόλεων
 ἐξημέλῃται περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ζῇ ἕκαστος ὡς βούλε-
 ται, κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου. Κρά-
 τιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν
 καὶ δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι· κοινῇ δ' ἐξαμελουμένων ἐκάστῳ 10
 δόξειεν ἂν προσήκειν τοῖς σφετέροις τέκνοις καὶ φίλοις
 εἰς ἀρετὴν συμβάλλεσθαι, ἢ προαιρεῖσθαι γε. Μάλιστα
 δ' ἂν τοῦτο δύνασθαι δόξειεν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων νομοθετι-
 κὸς γενόμενος· αἱ μὲν γὰρ κοιναὶ ἐπιμέλειαὶ δῆλον ὅτι
 διὰ νόμων γίνονται, ἐπιεικεῖς δ' αἱ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων. 15
 Γεγραμμένων δ' ἢ ἀγράφων, οὐδὲν ἂν δόξειε διαφέρειν,
 οὐδὲ δι' ὧν εἰς ἣ πολλοὶ παιδευθήσονται, ὥσπερ οὐδ'

power. Law however possesses it, and its interference is not
 3 resented as that of a fellow-man would be. Practically how-
 4 ever Law seldom even attempts such an aim; and, failing
 that, the duty devolves upon each individual in his own
 sphere. It is clear however that he will best perform it by
 becoming acquainted with the principles of Legislation, seeing

The State
 could do so
 but seldom
 attempts it.
 Individuals
 must there-
 fore do the
 best they
 can, and
 they must

4. Λακεδαιμονίων] See note on
 I. xiii. 3.

8. κυκλωπικῶς θεμιστεύων] In
 allusion to the often-quoted patri-
 archal society of the Cyclops de-
 scribed by Homer, *Od.* ix. 114-5:

θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
 παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέ-
 γουσιν.

10. δρᾶν αὐτὸ δύνασθαι] 'that
 there be power to carry it out.'

This is explained by ἔχουσιν
 ἰσχύν in § 11 above.

13. νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος]
 Legislation is naturally the high-
 est branch of πολιτική. See § 20,
fin. of this chapter. At the very
 outset (in I. ii. 8) Aristotle de-
 scribed Ethics as πολιτική τις, and
 this concluding chapter brings
 out the connexion still more
 forcibly.

- ἐπὶ μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδεύ-
μάτων. Ὡς περ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐνισχύει τὰ νόμιμα
καὶ τὰ ἔθνη, οὕτω καὶ ἐν οἰκίαις οἱ πατρικοὶ λόγοι καὶ τὰ
ἔθνη, καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ τὰς εὐεργε-
σίας· προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ εὐπειθεῖς τῇ
15 φύσει. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ καθ' ἕκαστον παιδεῖαι
τῶν κοινῶν, ὥς περ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς· καθόλου μὲν γὰρ τῷ
πυρέττοντι συμφέρεи ἡσυχία καὶ ἀσιτία, τινὲ δ' ἴσως οὐ,
ὅ τε πυκτικὸς ἴσως οὐ πᾶσι τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτίθη-
σιν. Ἐξακριβοῦσθαι δὴ δόξειεν ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ καθ' ἕκασ-
τον ἰδίας τῆς ἐπιμελείας γινομένης· μᾶλλον γὰρ τοῦ
προσφόρου τυγχάνει ἕκαστος. Ἄλλ' ἐπιμεληθεῖν μὲν ἂν
ἄριστα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἰατρὸς καὶ γυμναστὴς καὶ πᾶς ἄλλος
ὁ τὸ καθόλου εἰδὼς, ὅτι πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε· τοῦ κοι-
16 νοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονταί τε καὶ εἰσίν. Οὐ μὴν
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνός τινος οὐδὲν ἴσως κωλύει καλῶς ἐπιμελη-
θῆναι καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονα ὄντα, τεθεαμένον δ' ἀκριβῶς τὰ
συμβαίνοντα ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, καθάπερ καὶ
ἰατροὶ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν ἑαυτῶν ἄριστοι εἶναι, ἐτέρῳ οὐδὲν

act on the
same prin-
ciples as
those which
should guide
State legis-
lation.

The special
advantages
sometimes
claimed for
private in-
struction do
not super-
sede the use
of such
general
knowledge.

- that the moral training of society—the main object of all good
legislation—and that of individuals must be guided by the
same principles, and also that parental authority is to the
family what laws are to the State. The former has indeed
the advantage of resting upon natural affection and mutual
15 good-will; and this home-training has the further merit that
it can adapt its treatment better to the special circumstances
of individuals, and that it can enter into minuter details. But
even so it is best dealt with by those who have studied the pro-
blem in its general form; just as the scientific physician sur-
16 passes the empiric, although the latter may occasionally effect

9. οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν μάχην περιτί-
θῃσι] 'does not impart the same
style of fighting.' Περιτίθεναι is

similarly used in the sense of
'conferring' or 'imparting,' with
κράτος, τιμὴν, ἐλευθερίαν, etc.

ἂν δυνάμενοι ἐπαρκέσαι. Οὐδὲν δ' ἤττον ἴσως τῷ γε βου-
 λομένῳ τεχνικῶ γενέσθαι καὶ θεωρητικῶ ἐπὶ τὸ καθόλου
 βαδιστέον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν, κακείνο γνωριστέον ὡς ἐνδέ-
 χεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦθ' αἱ ἐπιστήμαι. Τάχα
 δὲ καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ δι' ἐπιμελείας βελτίους ποιεῖν, εἴτε 5
 πολλοὺς, εἴτ' ὀλίγους, νομοθετικῶ πειρατέον γενέσθαι, εἰ
 διὰ νόμων ἀγαθοὶ γενοίμεθ' ἂν. Ὅντινα γὰρ οὖν καὶ τὸν
 προτεθέντα διαθεῖναι καλῶς οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ τυχόντος, ἀλλ'
 εἴπερ τινός, τοῦ εἰδότος, ὥσπερ ἐπ' ἱατρικῆς καὶ τῶν
 λοιπῶν ὧν ἔστιν ἐπιμέλειά τις καὶ φρόνησις. Ἄρ' οὖν 10
 μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ'
 ἂν τις; ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν;
 μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. Ἡ οὐχ ὅμοιον
 φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπιστημῶν τε
 καὶ δυνάμεων; ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἱ αὐτοὶ φαίνονται 15

7 startling cures. On the same principle then we maintain that
 the best educator in private life is he who understands the
 8 general principles of legislation. Next we ask—How is such
 knowledge to be acquired? At first we should be inclined
 to answer—From Statesmen: but strange to say in Politics
 theory and practice are dissevered. Those profess to teach
 who do not practise, viz. the Sophists: others practise but do

These prin-
 ciples can-
 not be learn-
 ed at present
 either from
 Statesmen,
 who are
 empirics,

7. τὸν προτεθέντα] 'any given
 case that may be put before you.'
 This is the great point of differ-
 ence between scientific and em-
 piric knowledge. The latter may
 chance to achieve great success
 in one or two single cases (see
 § 16 *init.*), the former alone can
 deal with *any* case.

10. ἐπιμέλεια] 'attention' or
 'practice.' See I. ix. 4, διὰ
 τίνος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας.

Φρόνησις also is specially *prac-*
tical wisdom. See note on II.
 vi. 15 and B. VI. c. v. through-
 out.

13. ἐδόκει] The nominative ap-
 parently is νομοθεσία understood
 from νομοθετικός, and the refer-
 ence is probably (as Grant sug-
 gests) to I. ii. 7, or it may be to
 VI. viii. 2.

14. ἐπιστημῶν καὶ δυνάμεων]
 See note on I. i. 4.

- τάς τε δυνάμεις παραδιδόντες καὶ ἐνεργοῦντες ἀπ' αὐτῶν, οἷον ἰατροὶ καὶ γραφεῖς· τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτευόμενοι, οἱ δόξαιεν ἂν δυνάμει τινὶ τοῦτο πράττειν καὶ ἐμπειρία μάλλον ἢ διανοία· οὔτε γὰρ γράφοντες, οὔτε λέγοντες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φαίνονται (καίτοι κάλλιον ἦν ἴσως ἢ λόγους δικανικούς τε καὶ δημηγορικούς), οὐδ' αὖ πολιτικούς πεποιηκότες τοὺς σφετέρους
- 19 *υἱεῖς ἢ τινας ἄλλους τῶν φίλων.* Εὐλογον δ' ἦν, εἴπερ ἐδύναντο· οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄμεινον οὐδὲν κατέλιπον ἂν, οὔθ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρξαι προέλουντ' ἂν μάλλον τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, οὐδὲ δὴ τοῖς φιλτάτοις. Οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε ἔοικεν ἡ ἐμπειρία συμβάλλεσθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐγίγνοντ' ἂν διὰ τῆς πολιτικῆς συνηθείας πολιτικοί· διὸ τοῖς ἐφιεμένοις περὶ πολιτικῆς εἰδέναι προσδεῖν ἔοικεν
- 20 *ἐμπειρίας.* Τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν

- not profess to teach, viz. Statesmen. As to the latter, they seem to act by a sort of instinct and from experience rather than on fixed principles; they never write or speculate upon Politics; they cannot even train their children and their
- 19 friends in their own profession, as they doubtless would if they could. Still we would not depreciate the value of experience, which is an essential condition of the knowledge of
- 20 Statesmanship. As to the former (viz. the Sophists), they

or from
professed
teachers (the
Sophists),
who are
charlatans.

4. After οἱ πολιτευόμενοι understand πράττουσιν.

6. καίτοι κάλλιον κ.τ.λ.] Not improbably a sneer at the statesman and orator Demosthenes, all of whose writings are oratorical and not political.

12. οὐ μὴν μικρόν γε κ.τ.λ.] This is to correct the apparent depreciation of the value of experience involved in the above

censure of practical statesmen.

14. πολιτικῆς συνηθείας] 'familiarity with political life.' The fact that this, apart from a body of fixed and conscious principles (l. 4), makes men statesmen, is a proof of the importance of practical experience.

15. προσδεῖν] On the force of this compound see note on I. x. 9.

φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν ἢ περὶ ποῖα ἴσασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ ῥητορικῇ οὐδὲ χεῖρῳ ἐτίθεσαν, οὐδ' ἂν ᾤοντο ῥάδιον εἶναι τὸ νομοθετῆσαι συναγαγόντι τοὺς εὐδοκιμοῦντας τῶν νόμων· ἐκλέξασθαι γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς ἀρίστους, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὔσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι ὀρθῶς μέγιστον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μουσικὴν· οἱ γὰρ ἔμπειροι περὶ ἕκαστα κρίνουσιν ὀρθῶς τὰ ἔργα, καὶ δι' ὧν ἢ πῶς ἐπιτελεῖται συνιᾶσιν, καὶ ποῖα ποίοις συνάδει τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις ἀγαπητὸν τὸ μὴ διαλαν- 10 θάνειν εἰ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πεποιήται τὸ ἔργον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ γραφικῆς. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι τῆς πολιτικῆς ἔργοις εἰκόασιν· πῶς οὖν ἐκ τούτων νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις, ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους κρίναι; οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν

know nothing about the subject they profess to teach: else they would not confuse it with, or even rank it below, the Art of Rhetoric, nor absurdly fancy that a mere selection of the best laws from various systems constitutes Statesmanship, forgetting that the whole pith of the matter lies in the principle on which the selection is made. Experience and practice alone, in this as in other arts, can qualify a man to form any but a very rough judgment of results, and still more of the means which lead to them. The mere study of collections of

6. ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν κ.τ.λ.] In what is called a system of 'Eclecticism,' the real system is the principle on which the selection is made. The fact that the selected details form parts of other systems is a secondary and accidental consideration.

10. τοῖς δ' ἀπείροις κ.τ.λ.] The practical results of a system when at work is a matter that any one living under it can form some opinion about. The means best adapted to secure any given results, their compatibility with other conditions (δι' ὧν . . . συνάδει), and so forth, can only be estimated by those who have special training and experience. From the latter consideration Bacon says that popularity is a positive objection against any system of a philosophical character, and from the former he makes an exception in favour of 'Politics and Theology.'

συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. Καίτοι πειρῶνται γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἐκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις. Ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. Ἴσως οὖν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ συναγωγαὶ τοῖς μὲν δυναμένοις θεωρῆσαι καὶ κρίναι τί καλῶς ἢ τούναντίον καὶ ποῖα ποίοις ἀρμόττει, εὐχρηστ' ἂν εἴη τοῖς δ' ἄνευ ἕξεως τὰ τοιαῦτα διεξιούσι τὸ μὲν κρίνειν καλῶς οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρχοι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα αὐτόματον, εὐσυνετώτεροι δ' εἰς ταῦτα τάχ' ἂν γέ- 10
 ροιυντο.

- 22 Παραλιπόντων οὖν τῶν προτέρων ἀνερεύνητον τὸ περὶ τῆς νομοθεσίας, αὐτοὺς ἐπισκέψασθαι μᾶλλον βέλτιον ἴσως, καὶ ὅλως δὴ περὶ πολιτείας, ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ 15
 23 περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία τελειωθῇ. Πρῶτον μὲν

laws can never make a man a Statesman. The most we can say is that such a study may be useful to those who have already gained something of the Statesman's mind.

Hence we propose to investigate the subject of Politics for ourselves.

- 22 The field then is still open: a fresh and independent investigation of the true principles of Statesmanship is called for to complete the subject of the Science of Human Life. We propose therefore to undertake such an investigation,
 23 availing ourselves of the labours of our predecessors in that

1. συγγραμμάτων] 'treatises,'—not, as it is sometimes translated, 'prescriptions'—as is clear from what follows.

10. εὐσυνετώτεροι] 'more intelligent.' Though the study of medical treatises, or of collections of laws, can never make men physicians or statesmen, it may make them more intelligent and 'appreciative' in such subjects respectively.

15. ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία] This term was considered by Aristotle to include Ethics, Economics, and Politics—three practical Sciences dealing with the life and conduct of man in reference to himself, to his family, and to society respectively. The subject of Economics, though not mentioned here, occupies the first Book of the so-called 'Politics' of Aristotle.

οὖν εἴ τι κατὰ μέρος εἴρηται καλῶς ὑπὸ τῶν προγενε-
 στέρων πειραθῶμεν ἐπελθεῖν, εἴτα ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων
 πολιτειῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰ ποῖα σώζει καὶ φθείρει τὰς
 πόλεις καὶ τὰ ποῖα ἐκάστας τῶν πολιτειῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
 αἰτίας αἱ μὲν καλῶς, αἱ δὲ τοῦναντίον πολιτεύονται. 5
 θεωρηθέντων γὰρ τούτων τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον συνίδοιμεν καὶ
 ποῖα πολιτεία ἀρίστη, καὶ πῶς ἐκάστη ταχθεῖσα, καὶ
 τίσι νόμοις καὶ ἔθεσι χρωμένη. Δέγωμεν οὖν ἀρξά-
 μενοι.

field, as well as of the experience supplied by constitutions that have already existed. Hence we may perhaps gather what is the most perfect form of government, and also what laws and customs are best suited to each particular form.

2. συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν] 'collections of constitutions;' in reference to such *συναγωγαὶ* as are mentioned above in § 21; or else, as some suppose, in reference to a collection framed by Aristotle himself. Fragments said to belong to such a work still exist.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

P. 1, I. i. 1. μέθοδος] See further Mansel's note on Aristotle's use of this word in Aldrich's *Logic*, Ch. vi. '*De Methodo*.' Its use in the text may be illustrated by *Poet.* xix. 1, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς κείσθω τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον μᾶλλον ἐκείνης τῆς μεθόδου.

P. 9, I. iii. 7. διαφέρει δ' οὐθέν, κ.τ.λ.] Compare *Ant. and Cleop.* Act 1. Sc. iv.—

'As we rate boys, who, being mature in knowledge,
Pawn their experience to their present pleasure,
And so rebel to judgment.'

Also see further the discussion on the etymology of ἀκολασία, in III. xii. 5-8.

ἀκρατέω] The following extracts will illustrate, from a modern point of view, the difference between ἐγκρατής and σώφρων: 'He who refrains from gratifying a wish on some ground of *reason* (ἐγκρατής), at the same time feels the wish as strongly as if he gratified it. The object seems to him desirable; he cannot think of it without wishing for it. . . . On the other hand, when a *stronger passion* controls the weaker (σώφρων), the weaker altogether ceases to be felt. For example, let us suppose a bribe offered to two such men to betray their country. Neither will take the bribe. But the former may feel his fingers itch as he handles the gold. . . . The other will have no such feelings; the gold will not make his fingers itch with desire, but, perhaps, rather seem to scorch them. . . . The difference between the two men is briefly this, that the one has his anarchic or lower desires under control, the other feels no such desires; the one, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of crime; the other, so far as he is virtuous, is incapable of temptation. . . . Or again, while a *virtuous* man is one who controls and coerces the anarchic passions within him, so as to conform his actions to law (ἐγκρατής), a *holy* man is one in whom a passionate enthusiasm absorbs and annuls the anarchic passions altogether, so that *no internal struggle takes place* (σώφρων), and the lawful action is that which presents itself first, and seems the one most natural and most easy to be done.'—(*Ecce Homo*, pp. 148-150.)

Hence in IV. ix. 8 Aristotle denies that ἐγκράτεια is, strictly speaking, a Virtue, but only ἀρετὴ τις μικτή.

The distinction given in the Notes between ἀκόλαστος and ἀκρατής may be further illustrated by the statement in VII. viii. 1, ὁ μὲν ἀκόλαστος οὐ μεταμελητικός . . . ὁ δὲ ἀκρατής μεταμελητικός πᾶς. Also ἀκολασία is described as συνεχὴς πονηρία like consumption, etc., ἀκрасία as οὐ συνεχὴς like epilepsy, etc.

P. 12, I. iv. 4. ἐπιπολαζούσας] The former of the two explanations given in the Notes seems preferable, viz., that which is 'obvious,' or 'on the surface,' = Latin '*in promptu esse*.' This suits the two other places where the expression occurs in the *Ethics*, viz., I. v. 4, IV. viii. 4. Also the phrase ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι occurs in *Rhet.*, etc., in the sense of 'to be obvious.'

— 5. What is stated in the note on γνωρίμων . . . διττῶς is not only true of 'a being of more perfect knowledge,' but also of ourselves in the higher and more advanced stages of our knowledge. As Grote says, 'Even facts are then employed, directed, modified, by an acquired intellectual capital, and by the permanent machinery of universal significant terms in which that capital is invested.' Compare the distinction in the text with that drawn by Pope, *Essay on Man*, iv. 361-2, between Human and Divine Love:—

'God loves from whole to parts: but human soul
Must rise from individual to the whole.'

P. 13, I. iv. 6. As a further illustration of the necessity of personal experience for the appreciation of Moral facts or ideas, add John vii. 17, 'If a man *will do* (θέλη ποιεῖν) his will he shall *know* of the doctrine.'

P. 15, I. iv. 7. Ὡς δὲ μηδέτερον, i.e. neither the *ὅτι* nor the *διότι*. The lines from Hesiod which follow are embodied by Livy (xxii. 29), in a speech of Minucius when acknowledging his bad treatment of Fabius.

P. 16, I. v. 3. βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι] Compare *Hamlet*, Act iv. Sc. iv.—

'What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed?—a beast, no more.'

P. 17, I. vi. 5. θέσιν διαφυλάττων] Perhaps it would be more correct to give θέσις h.l. the more technical sense of a 'paradox,' which is assigned to it by the Definition in *Topics*, I. ii., θέσις ἐστὶν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

— 7. ἐγκυκλίοις] Cf. *Pol.* I. vii. 2, where ἐγκύκλια διακονήματα are the ordinary daily duties of slaves.

P. 37, I. vii. 20. The explanation of 'ἀρχαὶ derived from experience'

given in the notes, is different from that adopted in the earlier edition, and, I believe, more correct. Under any circumstances, *ἐπαγωγή* *h.l.* is not to be confused with the logical process of Induction, which (1) itself starts from *ἀρχαί*, and does not give them; and (2) is a process to which *θεωροῦνται* (denoting immediate apprehension) would not apply. *Ἀρχή* here is simply 'what one starts with,' not necessarily (as in I. iv. 5) 'a general principle' (see Glossary, *s.v.* *ἀρχή*). It *may* be 'a general principle,' as in Mathematics, which a reference to (sometimes) a single fact of experience is sufficient to establish without further or formal proof. Such a reference to experience would be *ἐπαγωγή* in the sense of this passage. Or it *may* be a simple fact, as the facts of observation in Physics and other *a posteriori* sciences, where again no further proof is required, *e.g.* 'This body falls with a definite accelerating velocity;' or as in Morals (so this passage asserts), *e.g.* 'This action is right,' or 'This approves itself to me,' or *vice versa*.

P. 37, I. vii. 21. *Μερίναι δὲ κ.τ.λ.*] Observe the generality and vagueness of this word (lit. 'to go after'), as also of *θεωρεῖν* ('viewed' or 'perceived'), and of *ἅλλαι δ' ἅλλως*. Aristotle's object here is not to enter upon the thorny subject of the nature of the evidence on which *ἀρχαί* rest, but only to insist on the *negative* point, that at any rate there is never *demonstrative* proof or a direct establishment of the *διδόναι*. Grote (*Fragments*, p. 131) translates, 'We ought in all our investigations to look after the *ἀρχή* in the way which the special nature of the subject requires, and be very careful to define it well.'

P. 42, I. viii. 12. It may be worth while to quote at length the passage in *Ecce Homo* referred to in the note:—'Those who think that we should not make pleasure our chief object, yet commonly maintain that he who lives best will actually attain the greatest amount and the best kind of pleasure. . . . The practical objection to Epicureanism is not so much that it makes pleasure the *summum bonum*, as that it recommends us to keep this *summum bonum* always in view. For it is far from being universally true that to get a thing you must aim at it. There are some things which can only be gained by renouncing them. . . . Now a practical survey of life seems to show that pleasure in its largest sense—a true and deep enjoyment of life—is also not to be gained artificially. . . .' So Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 142: 'Those only are happy (I thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness. . . . Aiming at something else, they find happiness by the way. . . . Ask yourself whether you are happy and you cease to be so.' [The same is true of *bodily* health, etc.]

P. 54, I. x. 11. τὰς τύχας ὁσεὶ . . . τετράγωνος] Cf. Dante, *Par.* xvii. 24, 'Ben tetragono ai colpi di ventura.'

— 12. διαλάμπει τὸ καλὸν] Cf. a similar metaphor in Shakespeare's *Taming of the Shrew*, Act iv. Sc. iii.—

'And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honour peereth in the meanest habit.'

P. 58, I. xi. 4. προὔπαρχειν . . . ἢ πράττεσθαι] This corresponds with the distinction in Hor. *A. P.* 179, 'Aut agitur res in scenis aut acta refertur.' Compare the use of προὔπαρχειν in IV. ii. 14, also in *Rhet.* I. ii. 2. Aristotle describes unartificial proofs as being ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπóρισται ἀλλὰ προὔπηρχεν. In the *Poetics* Aristotle several times refers to incidents which are ἔξω τῆς τραγωδίας, or ἔξω τοῦ δράματος (cf. esp. the phrase ὅσα πρὸ τοῦ γέγονεν, in xv. 7), and gives precepts for the management of such incidents, which rest on the fact noticed in this passage, viz., that they make a less distinct impression upon us; e.g. in reference to such incidents, a *deus ex machina* is less objectionable (xv. 7): improbability generally is more admissible, e.g. the circumstances connected with the murder of Laius and the marriage of Jocasta by Œdipus (xv. 7; cf. xiv. 6).

— 5. συλλογιστέον] Owing to the almost invariably technical use of this word in Aristotle for a logical conclusion or inference, this passage is frequently translated, 'we must conclude.' This does not however suit the general context, or the combination of particles δὴ καὶ. It should be rather, 'we must take into our calculation then this difference also,' viz., the difference resulting from our being present to, or absent from, the scene of action, as well as the difference in weight among troubles themselves, even when we *are* present. On this latter difference cf. x. 12. This sense of συλλογίζεσθαι occurs in Hdt. ii. 148, and in a passage still more closely parallel in Dem. *de Fals. Leg.* p. 356, ἐπειδὴν τοὺς καιροὺς συλλογίσθηται τις ἐφ' ὧν ἐγράφη, καὶ τὰς ὑποσχέσεις, κ.τ.λ.

P. 59, I. xii. 1. Thus these three classes of Goods correspond to those in vii. 4, δυνάμεις being good as means; τίμια good always *per se* as ends; ἐπαινετὰ good *per se* as ends, and also good as means. In § 2, τὸ ποῖόν τι εἶναι refers to the former condition of ἐπαινετὰ, and τὸ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχειν to the latter.

P. 62, I. xiii. 8. ἐξωτερικὸς] Besides the explanations of this word given in the note two others deserve notice—(1) It has been thought to mean simply any discourse or treatise *other than* that in hand. (2) Grote (*Aristotle*, i. 69) maintains the view that it means *outside* the regular method of Philosophy; i.e. discussion conducted in the method

of Dialectic (in the technical Aristotelian sense). With the explanation given in the note compare that of ἐγκύκλιος λόγοι in v. 7.

P. 69, II. xiii. 20. It should be particularly noted that φρόνησις, in spite of its constant connexion with Moral Virtue (συνέζευκται ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἡθους ἀρετῇ καὶ αὕτη τῇ φρονήσει, X. viii. 3), is itself an intellectual quality. Dante (*Conv.* iv. 17) thinks it necessary to bring Aristotle's authority against the opinion 'held by many' that it was a Moral Virtue. In proof of this (besides the distinct statement in the text)—(1) It is discussed by Aristotle in B. VI. among the διανοητικὰ ἀρετὰ; (2) In X. viii. θεωρία is shown to be superior to ἐνέργειαι κατ' ἀρετὴν on the ground of its superiority to the kindred intellectual excellence of φρόνησις which is allied to them; (3) φρόνησις is described in *Rhet.* I. ix. 13 as ἀρετὴ διανοίας καθ' ἣν εὖ βουλευέσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

P. 77, II. ii. 6. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act. i. Sc. ii., 'They are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing. It is no mean happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean.'

P. 79, II. iii. 2. ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν] Probably in reference to *Laws*, B. ii.

P. 84, II. iv. 3. Add to the note on ταῦτα δὲ, κ.τ.λ.—The 'motive' which led to the execution of some of Michelagnolo's great works was (if we may believe tradition) mean and spiteful, but this, if true, does not affect our estimate of their artistic merit; nor do we think less of Benvenuto Cellini's Perseus because he consoles himself, on failing to kill an enemy, with the reflection, that, if God would permit him to complete that work, he would thereby crush his hated rivals more effectually than if he killed them with the sword.

Again, as to the condition βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως. If an artist wishes to destroy his work, being dissatisfied with it, and regrets having executed it, neither does this affect its artistic worth. In fact, artists are frequently bad judges of the relative merits of their own works (cf. Plato, *Phædo*, p. 274, *fin.*), and poets (among others notably Wordsworth) have frequently altered for the worse some of their finest passages. The artistic merit of such works or passages remains the same notwithstanding.

P. 94, II. vi. 15. Illustrate further the necessity for adding the qualification ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσκειν (as explained in the Notes), by the reflection of Pope, *Essay on Man*, II. 169, etc. :—

'Let pow'r or knowledge, gold or glory, please,
Or (oft more strong than all) the love of ease;

Thro' life 'tis followed, ev'n at life's expence;
 The merchant's toil, the sage's indolence;
 The monk's humility, the hero's pride;
 All, all alike, find reason on their side.'

Also by La Rochefoucauld (quoted by Pattison, *l.c.*), 'Il n'y a pas de violente passion qui n'ait sa raison pour s'autoriser.' Again, the 'so-called dictates of conscience and reason are sometimes only passions in the form of a syllogism' (Ugo Foscolo). In B. VII. c. iii. Aristotle explains at length how Reason may help a man to go wrong *selon les règles*.

P. 95, II. vi. 17, etc. The refutation of the misconceptions of Aristotle's theory contained in these sections affords an answer also to another objection sometimes brought against it, that it makes the difference between Virtue and Vice to be *quantitative* only, and not *qualitative*; a question of *degree* merely, and not of *kind*; so that Virtue is a little more or less of Vice, and Vice a little more or less of Virtue; or, as it has also been put, that 'Virtue is only Vice a little exaggerated or a little controlled.' Take the following illustration:—Excess or defect of temperature will (so to speak) destroy Water by converting it either into Steam or Ice; a moderate degree (though within considerable limits) will preserve it in the form of Water: but Water is not a little more Ice or a little less Steam. The difference, though *quantitative* in respect of temperature, is *qualitative* in respect of the resulting material. So Virtue differs from Vice *qualitatively*, and is not Vice increased or Vice diminished, though in respect of the *πάθη* and *πράξεις*, with which they deal, the difference may be mainly, or even wholly, *quantitative*.

P. 97, II. vii. This proof of the Definition of Virtue (as explained in the Notes) is a good instance of 'Inductio per Enumerationem Simplicem,' or (as it is sometimes called) 'Perfect Induction': since if the Catalogue of Virtues is complete, all the possible cases to which the Conclusion can refer have been examined in the Premisses. By the same method, any general proposition relating to a *limited and ascertainable* number of cases may be established, as, *e.g.*, 'all the Popes (until the present) have reigned less than twenty-five years.'

P. 99, II. vii. 3. Ἑλλησποντες δέ] In VII. ix. 5 it is stated that ἀκρασία and ἐγκράτεια, like ἀκολασία and σωφροσύνη, are defective in a third related term, and for a similar reason.

P. 101, II. vii. 8. ἐπιδικάζονται] A legal term, relating to a double claim for some disputed object. Similarly, in IV. iv. 4, ὡς ἐρήμης εἶκεν ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἀκρα. Still it is clear that if there is Excess and Defect there *must* be a Mean, else how could the transition occur from the one

AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

to the other of these extremes? If the balance has turned, there must have been a point when it was even. This is admirably put by Pope (*Essay on Man*, ii. 207, etc.), when, speaking of 'extremes,' he says—

'Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade,
As in some well-wrought picture light and shade,
And oft so mix, the difference is too nice,
Where ends the virtue or begins the vice.
Fools! who from hence into the notion fall,
That vice or virtue there is none at all.'

P. 104, II. vii. 15. ὁ δὲ ἐπιχαιρέκακος, κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that Aristotle corrects himself on this point in *Rhet.* II. ix. 5, 'Ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός. In fact, they are (to borrow his illustration in c. xiii.) like the convex and concave sides of a circumference, τῷ λόγῳ δύο ἀχώριστα πεφυκότες. The true defect of the feeling of *νέμεσις* would be a sort of moral indifference, such as is typified in the popular (though perverted) conception of 'a Gallio.' Also we might illustrate the feeling implied in *νέμεσις* by Ps. lxxiii. 3, etc., 'I was grieved at the wicked; I do also see the ungodly in such prosperity.' In the present day the recognition of the virtuous side of Resentment (*νέμεσις*), as well as that of Anger, Self-Esteem, and perhaps Ambition, has rather fallen into the background. (See further, note p. 238.) The following passage from Dr. Abbott's most suggestive *Bible Lessons* (p. 175), on the Virtue of Resentment, is worth quoting:—'Anger is indifferent, being sometimes right and sometimes wrong; vindictiveness gives a selfish character to anger, and is always wrong. But there is an anger that is always right, such as one feels at the sight of cruelty, injustice, and oppression, a moral recoil of sentiment from evil.' After pointing out the etymological significance of Resentment as 'recoil of sentiment,' he proceeds, 'Resentment then is a Virtue, and a man who feels no resentment at the sight of injustice is destitute of a true sense of sin. There is almost as great a deficiency of resentment in the world as there is an excess of vindictiveness.'

It may be worth while to compare the *νέμεσις* of Aristotle with Resentment as depicted by Bishop Butler, and to contrast both with Anger in its legitimate manifestation by the *πρᾶος*, as in *Eth.* IV. c. v.

Νέμεσις, both in *Eth.* and *Rhet.*, is emphatically connected with the undeserved *prosperity* of the wicked, rather than with the mere *fact* of their turpitude. See esp. *Rhet.* II. ix. 1, 7. Hence (1) it 'marches with' Envy; (2) it is in some sense the converse to Pity, which is aroused by undeserved *adversity* (*Rhet.* II. ix. 1).

Resentment is (according to Butler) of two kinds, 'Sudden Anger,' and 'Settled Resentment.' The latter is Resentment proper, and in that aspect it is aroused 'not by natural but moral evil,' not by suffering, pain, or loss, but by injury; 'it is never occasioned by harm as distinct from injury.' So again, 'its natural object is one who has been in a *moral* sense injurious to oneself or others.'

Anger, on the other hand, (1) may be aroused (as Butler says) by mere harm as distinct from injury; [though no doubt the 'harm' is often spontaneously assumed to be also 'injury.' Cf. *Eth.* V. viii. 10, ἐπὶ φαινόμενη ἀδικία ἢ ὀργή ἐστίν, also VII. vi. 1, ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία, ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία, ἐδήλωσεν ὁ δὲ [θυμὸς] ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς]; (2) it is more of a *personal* feeling [Aristotle's *Rhet.* II. ii. 1, ἔστω ἡ ὀργή βρεξίς μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινόμενης διὰ φαινόμενην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ εἰς αὐτοῦ τινα μὴ προσηκόντως. So, *ib.* II. iv. 30, Ὀργή ἐστίν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Compare Butler, Sermon viii. p. 437, ed. Angus]; (3) 'its reason and end (says Butler) is to prevent and resist sudden force, violence, and opposition, considered merely as such.' Similarly, Aristotle (*Eth.* IV. v. 6) notes that in its absence a man is not ἀμυντικός.

In *Rhet.* II. iv. 31, etc., Aristotle describes the feeling of μῖσος, in contrast with ὀργή, in terms which bring it into close resemblance to Butler's Resentment, e.g. ὀργή περὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, . . . τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἅπας καὶ τὸ μὲν λατὸν χρόνῳ (cf. *Eth.* IV. v. 8, etc.) τὸ δ' ἀνάτονον—καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ—Ὁ μὲν ὀργιζόμενος λυπεῖται· ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὐ, κ.τ.λ.

P. 106, II. viii. 2. ἀνδρείος . . . πρὸς τὸν θρασὺν δειλός] *As*, for instance, Fabius in the estimate of Minucius: 'Pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat' (*Livy*, xxii. 12 *fin.*)

P. 107, II. viii. 7. Speaking generally, we may say that the *Excess* is better when the Virtue mostly relates to the *encouragement* of the Feeling with which it is concerned, and the *Defect* when the Virtue mostly relates to its *repression*.

P. 110, II. ix. 4. We might illustrate εὐκατάφοροι *h.l.* by an expression applied in Athenæus to Chæremon, that he was ἐπικατάφορος ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνθη, i.e. 'fond of dwelling on descriptions of flowers.'

P. 111, II. ix. 8. ὁ μὲν μικρὸν, κ.τ.λ.] Hence it follows that the *Virtuous* mean is not like a straight line without breadth, but a moderately wide path, not to be too closely defined, although after all—

‘Sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.’

P. 113. It has been suggested that the same *social* principle probably underlies Dante’s classification of vices, in respect of their moral turpitude. (There is of course no such gradation intended in Aristotle’s classification here.) ‘Dante’s moral standard is wholly social. The worst crime is fraud, because it strikes at the root of society by undermining confidence [cf. *Inf.* xi. 55]. . . . Next in the scale of evil is violence, less dangerous, because avowed and open. The most venial of the sins of Hell is incontinence, which chiefly concerns the individual alone’ (Symonds’ *Introduction*, p. 120).

III. i. 11. In VII. ix. 4 Aristotle gives an instance of *καλή ἡδονή* overpowering a resolution to act in the case of the Neoptolemus of Sophocles, who was unable to abide by the determination which he had formed to deceive Philoctetes, *καίτοι δι’ ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἐνέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ καλήν*. Cf. VII. ii. 7, where the paradoxical phrase *σπουδαία τις ἀκρασία* is suggested for this case.

P. 119, III. i. 13. Hence in the case mentioned by Jeremy Taylor, ‘He that threw a stone at a dog, and hit his cruel stepmother, said that though he meant it otherwise, yet the stone was not quite lost,’ the act would not be involuntary, not being *ἐπὶ λυπὸν καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ*. Somewhat similar would be Aristotle’s condemnation of Pompey’s morality in *Ant. and Cleop.* Act II. Sc. vii., when he will not consent beforehand to a scheme of treachery, but regrets that it had not been carried out without his being consulted:—

‘Repent that e’er thy tongue
Hath so betrayed thine act; being done unknown,
I should have found it afterwards well done,
But must condemn it now.’

P. 120, III. i. 14. *οὐ δοκεῖ δι’ ἀγνοίαν πράττειν . . . ἀλλ’ ἀγνοῶν* δι’ ἀγνοίαν πράττειν is applied to an act *caused* by ignorance; *ἀγνοῶν* πράττειν to an act which is merely *accompanied* by ignorance.

P. 121, III. i. 17. *ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ μυστικά*] Æschylus is said to have been accused of divulging some portions of the Eleusinian Mysteries in one of his plays, and to have defended himself on the ground that never having been himself initiated, he must have done it, if at all, unconsciously.

P. 122, III. i. 20. The conception of an Involuntary act is more

definite and positive than that of a Voluntary act. Hence Involuntary is investigated first (as in Book V. Injustice is discussed before Justice, cf. V. i. 8), and this Definition of 'Voluntary' simply *excludes* the two conditions which have been shown to constitute Involuntariness, *viz.*, *βία* and *ἡ καθ' ἑκαστα ἀγνοία*. The words *οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ* refer to the former, and *εἰδότε τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις* to the latter. In V. viii. 6, 7, Involuntary acts *βίᾳ* are described as *ἀτυχήματα*, those δι' ἀγνοίαν as *ἀμαρτήματα*.

The supplementary §§ 21, etc., contain an argument similar to that in §§ 11, etc. : as it was there shown that the *violence* of pleasure is not such as to constitute the involuntariness of *compulsion*, so it is contended here that the *blindness* of passion or desire does not constitute the involuntariness of *ignorance*.

P. 123, III. i. 25. ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ] This is true in all cases, for ἀκούσια βίᾳ are of course λυπηρὰ at the moment (*κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν*, § 6), and ἀκούσια δι' ἀγνοίαν are ἐπὶ λυπὰ (§ 13) as soon as we discover what we have done.

— 27. φευκτά μὲν] The converse of the argument from *δεῖ* in § 24. In that case we ought to *do* something; in this case we ought to *avoid* something.

Ἀποπον δὴ, κ.τ.λ.] The reason for this assertion seems to be that so many of our actions proceed rather from unreasoning impulse than conscious and deliberate purpose, that we should have to relegate too large a proportion of our lives to the sphere of involuntary action on the supposition in question. The opponent's contention would prove too much, as in § 22. Τὰ ἄλογα πάθη refer to *θυμὸς* and *ἐπιθυμία*; cf. *Rhet.* I. x. 8, ἄλογοι δὲ ὀρέξεις, ὀργὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία.

P. 124, III. ii. 3. Compare I. xiii. 18, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ δλως ὀρεκτικόν, which shows that ἐπιθυμία falls under *ὀρέξεις* as its genus.

P. 125, III. ii. 6. It is difficult to find a precise equivalent for *θυμὸς*, but we can gather its meaning (1) from Plato's use of *θυμὸς* or *τὸ θυμοειδὲς* as the element of Spirit, or Will, or Resolution, or whatever it may be called, which gives practical effect to the abstract decisions of Reason, in its conflict with the *ἐπιθυμίας*, and causes the man's action to follow *it* rather than *them*; (2) From Aristotle's use of the word elsewhere, *e.g.* the description of the Spurious Courage of *θυμὸς* (High Spirit or Impetuosity) in III. viii. 10, etc.; also the opposition of impulsive to deliberate action, τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ . . . τὰ ἐκ προνοίας, *Eth.* V. viii. 9; also from its occasional interchange with *ὀργή*, *e.g.* *Rhet.* I. x. 8, etc.,

Eth. III. i. 24, V. viii. 9; also from the greater evil of ἀκρασία τοῦ θυμοῦ as compared with ἀκρασία τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, *Eth.* VII. vi. (cf. II. iii. 10, χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ). Hence I have ventured, though with much hesitation, to translate it *h.l.* 'Spirit,' in the sense of an impulsive and resolute, but unreflecting, source of action. St. Hilaire, though translating the word by 'colère' in i. 27, paraphrases it in this chapter 'la passion que le cœur inspire.'

P. 131, III. iii. 11-13. θέμενοι τέλος τι . . . ἀφίστανται] Shakespeare has described the process similarly in 2 *Henry IV.* Act I. Sc. iii.—

'When we mean to build,
We first survey the plot, then draw the model;
And when we see the figure of the house,
Then must we take the cost of the erection;
Which if we find outweighs ability,
What do we then, but draw anew the model
In fewer offices; or, at least, desist
To build at all?'

P. 136, III. iv. 4. In technical language, the σπουδαῖος is related to *ράληθές* as the *causa cognoscendi*, not the *causa essendi*. Such a relation is similar to that claimed by the Vatican Council towards Papal Infallibility, as *declaring*, but not *constituting*, the Popes infallible.

P. 137, III. v. 1. As a further illustration of Plato's theory of the involuntary error of Vice, we might say that he regards a vicious choice as like that of a man who should take poison mistaking it for wholesome medicine. *At the time* he takes what he thinks is good for him, though it is in reality bad. He does not however choose it as such, and so he commits not a 'crime,' but a 'blunder,' which, in Plato's estimate at any rate, was better. Aristotle, in V. ix. 6, adopts language very similar to that of Plato, when he says οὔτε γὰρ βούλεται οὐθεὶς ὁ μὴ οἶεται εἶναι σπουδαῖον. So also in *Rhet.* I. x. 8.

P. 138, III. v. 4. οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς, κ.τ.λ.] It should be noted that πονηρὸς has the double sense of 'wretched' and 'wicked' (compare 'cattivo' in Italian),—language, in this and many other words, reflecting the natural tendency to connect physical and moral imperfections. The former sense was doubtless intended by the unknown author of the line quoted in the text, as the antithesis with μάκαρ would show.

P. 139, III. v. 7-15. The general argument of these sections is that legislators never punish except for what is voluntary, and they are so careful about this as to follow up to their sources vicious acts, which might seem *prima facie* involuntary, and if they can trace them, however remotely, to an *avoidable* cause, they treat them as voluntary, and

punish accordingly. So fully, therefore, do *mankind generally* hold the voluntariness of Vice, that we are treated as responsible not only for our immediate actions, but also for all the demonstrable and inevitable results of our actions, however little we may have contemplated those results. If we fire a train of gunpowder, we are responsible for the damage done at the other end, though it may be far beyond our reach.

P. 143, III. v. 17. *ὁ παρ' ἑτέρου . . . εὐφύτα*] Compare *Poet. c. xxii. § 9, μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο* [τὸ μεταφορικὸν εἶναι] οὔτε παρ' ἄλλου ἐστι λαβεῖν, *εὐφύτας τε σημειῖν ἐστιν*.

P. 147, III. vi. 10. *ὑπόγυια ὄντα*] Lambinus translates, 'iis impendentibus atque instantibus quæ mortem afferunt.' The following illustrations are in favour of the interpretation 'handy,' or 'close at hand,' rather than 'sudden.' In *Pol. VII. (VI.) viii. 3*, Commerce is said to be *ὑπογυότατον πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν*, the readiest or most handy means for securing independence. And *Rhet. II. iii. 12*, *κεχρονικότες, καὶ μὴ ὑπόγυιοι τῇ ὀργῇ ὄντες* παύει γὰρ ὀργὴν ὁ χρόνος, where *ὑπόγυιος* means 'while they are still close at hand to the feeling of anger': 'quum non recentes ab ira sumus' (Muretus). [Compare τῷ παθεῖν διτι ἐγγυάτω κείμενον, *Thuc. III. xxxviii. 1.*]

Twice in the *Rhet.* (I. i. 7, II. xii. 11) the adverbial phrase *ἐξ ὑπογυίου* occurs = 'suddenly,' 'on the spur of the moment.' It seems probable that Aristotle would have employed it here if that had been the sense intended. His meaning seems rather to be that courage is exercised not only when death actually occurs, but also in dangers like those of war, when it appears imminent or close at hand, even if it be ultimately escaped. Thus a prisoner may be actually led out *ὡς ἐπὶ θάνατον*, or *βίβσανον*, and even if he were released unhurt, might have displayed courage as genuine as if he had actually died. The passage will thus be very similar to that in *Rhet. II. v. 2*, where, after defining those things which are, strictly speaking, *φοβερά*, Aristotle adds, *καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά*: ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστι κίνδυνος, *φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός*. Cf. *Statius Theb. vii. 702*, 'morti contermina virtus.'

P. 148, III. vii. 1, 2. Compare *Macbeth*, Act I. Sc. vii.—

'I dare do all that may become a man;
Who dares do more is none.'

P. 150, III. vii. 7, 8. Observe the two characteristics of the *θρασύς* here indicated—(1) his excess of confidence (§ 7); (2) his desire to *display* his courage; he wishes 'to appear unto men' to be brave (§ 8). So

also the *βάναντος* in IV. ii. 20. With the words *ἐν οἷς οὖν δόναυται μμεῖται* compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act III. Sc. ii.—

‘There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.
How many cowards, whose hearts are all as false
As stairs of sand, wear yet upon their chins
The beards of Hercules and frowning Mars,
Who inward searched, have livers white as milk;
And these assume but valour’s excrement
To render them redoubted.’

P. 150, III. vii. 9. *θρασύδειλοι*] Another instance of this character on its comic side may be found in Sir Andrew Aguecheek in *Twelfth Night*. See especially Act III. Sc. iv., and his disposition as described in Act I. Sc. iii.—‘He is a great quarreler, but that he hath the gift of a coward to allay the gust he hath in quarreling,’ etc.

P. 151, III. vii. 13. Very similarly Sir T. Browne, *Rel. Med.* i. 44, writes,—‘It is a brave act of valour to contemn death; but where life is more terrible than death, it is then the truest valour to dare to live.’ We might compare with the opinion of Hadrian, quoted in the Notes, a well-known order of the day of Napoleon, in which he declared any Frenchman who committed suicide to be a deserter from the army. So in *Ethics* V. xi. 2, 3 the Suicide is described as *τὴν πόλιν ἀδικῶν*. In Hamlet’s celebrated Soliloquy (Act III. Sc. i.) the question of Suicide is argued on grounds similar to those in the text, but with the different result that the possible future ills after death leave the balance in the cowardly calculation *against* suicide. Compare Claudio’s conclusion in *Measure for Measure*, Act III. Sc. i.—‘Ay, but to die,’ etc.

P. 152, III. viii. 2. Shakespeare represents Ulysses as plying Achilles with a similar argument—*Troilus and Cressida*, Act III. Sc. iii.—

‘But it must grieve young Pyrrhus now at home,
When fame shall in our islands sound her trump,
And all the Greekish girls shall tripping sing,—
“Great Hector’s sister did Achilles win,
But our great Ajax bravely beat down him.”’

(So a few lines below)—

Ach. Shall Ajax fight with Hector?
Patr. Ay, and perhaps receive much honour by him.
Ach. I see my reputation is at stake.’

P. 153, III. viii. 5. Tacitus (*Hist.* iii. 18) notices the converse effect

of facility of retreat in diminishing the courage of soldiers: 'Et propinqua Cremonensium mœnia, quanto plus spei ad effugium, tanto minorem ad resistendum animum, dabant.'

— 6. *κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου*] Another illustration of this might be found in the strange and dazzling costumes adopted by the Samnites, in B.C. 308, to strike terror into the Romans. The Dictator Papirius Cursor forewarned his troops of the unreality of such a display, 'horridum militem esse debere . . . illa prædam verius quam arma esse,' etc.— (Livy ix. 40.)

P. 156, III. viii. 11. *θυμοῦ ἐξελαυνόμενα . . . προορώντα*] Compare Shakespeare, *Ant. and Cleop.* Act III. Sc. xiii.—

'To be furious

Is to be frighted out of fear; and in that mood,
The dove will peck the estridge; and I see still,
A diminution in our captain's brain
Restores his heart.'

— 12. *φυσικωτάτη, κ.τ.λ.*] In reference to the comparative amount of the elements of *θυμὸς* and *προαίρεσις* in Courage, Professor Mahaffy (*Rambles in Greece*, p. 146) remarks that the ordinary Greek Courage involved more *θυμὸς* than accords with our notions, but that these again seem to allow more of that element than Aristotle's ideal of Courage. [See Introduction, p. xxxvi, etc., and note on ix. 4.] Greek generals, instead of advising coolness, specially incite to rage, *δργῇ προσμύζωμεν*, etc., as if a man not in this state would be sure to estimate the danger and run away.

P. 158, III. viii. 16. *ἀξίωμα*] In *Pol.* II. v. 25, *οἱ μὴδὲν ἀξίωμα κεκτημένοι* ['peu jaloux de leur dignité' (St. Hilaire)] are opposed to *θυμοειδὲς καὶ πολεμικοὶ ἄνδρες*. See *inf.* p. 234 *fin.*, on the advantage gained by even the *χαῖνος* in this respect.

P. 161, III. ix. 6. *ἐτοιμοὶ γὰρ οὗτοι κ.τ.λ.*] Like the 'Luculli miles in Horace *Ep.* II. ii, 26-40.

P. 162, III. x. 3. *φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς, κ.τ.λ.*] This seems to be precisely the type of character assigned to the Athenians in *Acts* xvii. 21, 'who spend their time in nothing else but to hear and tell some new thing.'

P. 169, III. xii. 3. *δόξετε δ' ἂν, κ.τ.λ.*] The former of the cases mentioned in the note would, in fact, be exactly that of Falstaff in his well-known soliloquy on Honour, 1 *Henry IV.* Act v. Sc. 1; or again in *Sc.* 3 (*fin.*), 'Give me life: which if I can save, so; if not, honour comes unlooked for, and there's an end.'

P. 171, III. xii. 6. The absence of *κόλασις*, indicated by the word *ἀκόλαστος*, is expressed by the Latin 'improbis.' Compare with this passage I. iii. 7, where those who live *κατὰ πάθος* are described as children in character.

P. 182, IV. i. 30-32. A good illustration of this better type of *ἄσωτος* will be found in Timon of Athens, as depicted by Shakespeare in the first two Acts of the play. Compare especially with § 31 *fin.* Timon's reflection in Act II. Sc. ii.—

'No villainous bounty yet hath pass'd my heart;
Unwisely, not ignobly, have I given.'

Dante also recognises two somewhat similar classes of Prodigals, whose moral turpitude he considers to be so different that he places those corresponding to Aristotle's better type (§ 31) in the fourth circle of Hell, but the latter in the seventh circle, ranking them, in fact, with the Suicides. Cf. *δοκεῖ δ' ἀπώλειά τις αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῆς οὐσίας φθορά, ὥς τοῦ ζῆν διὰ τούτων ὄντος* (§ 5). He also connects the Vice of the former with *ἀκρασία*, that of the latter with *κακία* (*Iñf.* xi. 70, etc.)

P. 188, IV. ii. *Μεγαλοπρέπεια*. I am inclined now, on the whole, to prefer the translation 'Magnificence' for *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. That word is not, it is true, in our usage limited to the expenditure of money; but, on the other hand, it is not so restricted to the notion of mere amount as Munificence would seem to be. It is important to observe that the *conspicuousness* and *grandeur* of the expenditure and its occasion is the essential point of difference between *μεγαλοπρέπεια* and *ἐλευθεριότης*. Naturally, greatness of amount is an almost necessary accompaniment of such conditions. Still it is only *one* form of the grandeur implied in *μεγαλοπρέπεια*. Cf. *οἷον μέγεθος* (§ 10); also, *διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι* (§ 18). We see also in both the Excess and Defect that *display* and *showiness* are an essential element in this group of habits. The *βάνανσος* thinks *most* of the display, and that in reference to himself chiefly (§ 20). The *μεγαλοπρεπῆς* thinks worthily and adequately of the display, and not exclusively in reference to himself. (Contrast *ἐμμελῶς* in § 5 with *λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος* in § 20. See also *πῶς κάλλιστον καὶ πρεπωδέστατον*, § 9, etc. etc.) The *μικροπρεπῆς* does not rise to a grand occasion at all. He is 'paltry' rather than merely 'sordid.' Note that he too is described as *τὰ μέγιστα ἀναλώσας* sometimes (which could scarcely be said of the 'Sordid' man), but that he wishes to make a display and keep his money too; and so *ἐν μικρῷ τὸ καλὸν ἀπολεῖ* (§ 21). He lacks that almost 'scientific instinct' (see §§ 5, 10) by

which the *μεγαλοπρεπής* sets off with a 'grand style' (§ 19) all that he does.

P. 198, IV. ii. 14. *προϋπάρχει . . . διὰ τῶν προγόνων*] Compare Shakespeare's *Henry VIII.* Act I. Sc. i.—

'Propped by ancestry, whose grace
Chalks successors their way.'

P. 195, IV. ii. 19. *οὐκ εὐνέμβλητον*] Cf. iii. 24. It is related of Lorenzo de' Medici, surnamed 'the Magnificent' (*μεγαλοπρεπής*), that even in his childhood, having received as a present a horse from Sicily, he at once sent the donor in return a gift of much greater value, remarking, when reproved for profuseness, that there was nothing more noble than to overcome others in acts of generosity.—(Roscoe's *Life*.)

P. 198, IV. iii. 5. *τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι*] This notion enters into the Greek ideal even of female beauty, e.g. Homer, *Od.* xiii. 289, *δέμας δ' ἦλκτο γυναικὶ καλῇ τε μεγάλῃ τε*; *Od.* xviii. 248, *ἐπεὶ περὶ σσι γυναικῶν εἰδὸς τε μέγεθος τε* (a sort of S. Barbara after Palma Vecchio). So Aristotle, *Rhet.* I. v. 6, says, *Θηλειῶν δ' ἀρετῇ, σώματος μὲν, κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος*.

P. 201, IV. iii. 16. *μείζους . . . ποιεῖ*] Hence the relation of *μεγαλοψυχία* to the other virtues is somewhat like that of the Chief Good to the other Goods, as described by the words *πασῶν αἰρετωτάτη μὴ συναριθμουμένη* (I. vii. 8). *Μεγαλοψυχία* unites and includes them all, and it also gives them an additional lustre, '*οἷον κόσμος τις*,' very much as *μεγαλοπρέπεια* 'sets off' expenditure, *καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης δαπανῆς*.

— 17. We might illustrate this lofty indifference of the *μεγαλόψυχος* to the opinions of others, by a saying of Angelo Politiano (*Ep.* iii. 24), 'I am no more raised or dejected by the flattery of my friends or the accusations of my enemies, than I am by the shadow of my own body; for although that shadow may be somewhat longer in the morning and the evening than in the middle of the day, I do not think myself a taller man at those times than I am at noon.'

P. 203, IV. iii. 21. *Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς, κ.τ.λ.*] Cf. La Rochefoucauld *Max.* 25: 'Il faut de plus grandes vertus pour soutenir la bonne fortune que la mauvaise.'

P. 204, IV. iii. 25. *Δοκοῦσι δέ, κ.τ.λ.*] Demosthenes contends that the reverse *ought* to be the case (*De Cor.* p. 316):—*ἐγὼ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνησθαι πάντα τὸν χρόνον, τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐπιλελῆσθαι, εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ, τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομνησκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν δοιοῦν ἐστὶ τῷ ὀνειδίζειν.*

P. 205, IV. iii. 25. τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκοῖται τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς] Compare Shakespeare, *Ant. and Cleop.* Act III. Sc. i.—

'I have done enough : a lower place, note well,
May make too great an act : for learn this, Silius,
Better to leave undone, than by our deed
Acquire too high a fame, when him we serve's away.

Who does i' the wars more than his captain can
Becomes his captain's captain : and ambition,
The soldier's virtue, rather makes choice of loss,
Than gain, which darkens him.
I could do more to do Antonius good,
But 'twould offend him.'

ὅλο καὶ τὴν Θέτιν] Mr. Monro of Oriel College has kindly sent me the following note on this passage :—

'The reference to the prayer of Thetis is, I think, correct. Aristotle is probably repeating an observation made by one of the earlier *grammatici*, the point being this:—In *Iliad* i. 394-407 Achilles advises Thetis to remind Jove of a great service she had done him, and which he tells at length. In the regular Homeric style the same story would be repeated in the prayer of Thetis, vv. 503-510, in place of which we only have the general form εἶποτε δὴ σε, κ.τ.λ. Thetis does not *relate* her services—οὐ λέγει τὰς εὐεργεσίας. This is just the sort of point which an ancient critic would notice, and I have no doubt that it had been noticed before Aristotle's time.'

Similarly in *Twelfth Night* (Act III. Sc. iv.) Antonio οὐ λέγει τὰς εὐεργεσίας to Sebastian, though compelled to hint at them—

'Is't possible that my deserts to you
Can lack persuasion? Do not tempt my misery,
Lest that it make me so unsound a man
As to upbraid you with those kindnesses
That I have done for you.'

P. 206, IV. iii. 27. ἀργὸν καὶ μελλητὴν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμῇ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare *Hamlet*, Act IV. Sc. iv.—

'Rightly to be great,
Is not to stir without great argument,
But greatly to find quarrel in a straw,
When honour's at the stake.'

— 29. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον, κ.τ.λ.] Contrast this with the description of the ἀρεσκος in vi. 1. 9. He lives altogether πρὸς ἄλλον, and that,

ἀνευ πάθους καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ (ib. § 5). But if the μεγαλόψυχος does in any degree conform his words or actions to suit another, it will be for the sake of a friend.

P. 206, IV. iii. 30. οὐδὲ μνησίκακος] Compare *Coriolanus*, Act v. Sc. iii.—

‘Thinkst thou it honourable for a noble man
Still to remember wrongs?’

P. 207, ib. 31. οὐδ’ αὖ ἀνθρωπολόγος] Contrast the χαῖνος, § 36 (fin.), λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν. Wordsworth’s well-known four sonnets on ‘Personal Talk’ may also be referred to in illustration.

οὐδ’ αὖ ἐπαινετικός] Compare what Thackeray says of Addison, ‘He did not praise, because he measured his compeers by a higher standard than most people have.’ Pope describes the same trait in Addison, ‘Alike reserved to blame or to commend,’ but with a cynical imputation. —(*Prologue to Satires*, l. 205.)

δι’ ὕβριν] Compare the account of ὕβρις, given in *Rhet.* II. ii. 5, as being τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ’ οἷς αἰσχύνῃ ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ ἄλλο . . . οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποιοῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. So (ib. § 4) ἐπηρεασμός (as resulting from καταφρόνησις) is οὐχ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ. The grotesque and sometimes coarsely comic treatment of his subject adopted by Dante in that part of Hell called Malebolge (where various types of fraud are punished) is an indication of his utter contempt for sinners of that class. He is κακολόγος δι’ ὕβριν.

— 33. μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα] A constant demand for *utility* Aristotle would apparently regard as a mark of rank ‘Philistinism.’ Cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) iii. 12, τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἀρμόττει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ ἐλευθέροις.

— 34. κίνησις βραδεία . . . καὶ λέξις σάσιμος] So Malvolio in *Twelfth Night*, Act III. Sc. iv., proposes to assume ‘a sad face, a reverend carriage, a slow tongue, in the habit of some sir of note.’

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. ἐαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act II. Sc. vii.—

‘And yet to be afraid of my deserving
Were but a weak disabling of myself’

Or again, *Henry V.* Act II. Sc. iv.—

‘Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin
As self-neglecting.’

So Dante on the demoralising effects of 'viltate' (μικροψυχία), *Inf.* ii. 45, etc. (Cary's translation),—

'Which oft

So overcasts a man, that he recoils
From noblest resolution, like a beast
At some false semblance in the twilight gloom.'

And La Rochefoucauld similarly of 'faiblesse':—'La faiblesse est le seul défaut que l'on ne saurait corriger' (*Max.* 130). 'La faiblesse est plus opposée à la vertu que le vice' (*Max.* 445).

P. 208, IV. iii. 35. ὠρέγεται γὰρ, κ.τ.λ.] The more so perhaps as Aristotle (*Rhet.* II. xiii. 9) states that a too great regard for self is a mark of μικροψυχία—μικροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὐτῇ [sc. ἡ λίαν φιλαυτία].

P. 213, IV. v. 3. With this definition of πραότης compare Dante's conception of it as being 'not so much unresisting gentleness to evil as the righteous indignation which repels it *without any feeling of personal irritation*.'—(M. F. Rossetti.) [See Supplementary Note on IV. iii. 31.] So in the *Convito* (iv. 17) he gives as a description of the πραότης of Aristotle, 'The Virtue which moderates our anger and our too great patience against our external ills.' If we look only at the former aspect of it (see § 6, *fin.*), the πρᾶος might degenerate to Hamlet's description (Act II. Sc. ii.), and become

'Pigeon-livered and lack gall,
To make oppression bitter.'

Further, Dante punishes this vice of defect (Accidia) in the same Circle with the vice of Excess (Iracundia). These habits are distinguished from νέμεσις with its related vices, in that the former involve the notion of *personal* injury (including that of friends, ὁ γὰρ φίλος ἔρεπος αὐτός); also that they include what Bishop Butler calls 'harm' as well as injury. See also Supplementary Note on II. vii. 15.

P. 214, IV. v. 8. παύονται δὲ ταχέως] Cf. Shakespeare, *Henry VIII.* Act I. Sc. i.—

'Anger is like
A full-hot horse, who being allowed his way
Self-mettle tires him.'

ἦ φανεροί εἰσι] Cf. VII. vi. 3, ὁ θυμώδης οὐκ ἐπίβουλος, . . . ἀλλὰ φανερός.
—8, 9] The first two classes here mentioned resemble the 'passionate' and the 'peevish' of Bishop Butler's eighth Sermon (p. 440, ed. Angus):—'As to the abuses of Anger, which, it is to be observed, may be in all different degrees (ἡ ὑπερβολὴ κατὰ πάντα μὲν γίνεται, § 7), the first which occurs is what is commonly called passion. . . . This dis-

temper of the mind seizes men upon the least occasion in the world, and perpetually without any reason at all, and by means of it they are plainly every day, every waking hour of their lives, in danger of running into the most extravagant outrages (§ 8). Of a less boisterous but not of a less innocent kind is peevishness (cf. *οἱ ἀκρόχολοι*, § 9), which I mention with real pity for the unhappy creatures who . . . are obliged to be in the way of it (cf. *τοῖς μάλιστα φίλοις*, § 10). That which, in a more feeble temper, is peevishness, and languidly discharges itself upon everything which comes in its way (*πρὸς πᾶν ὀργίλοι καὶ ἐπὶ παντί*), the same principle in a temper of greater force and stronger passions becomes rage and fury.'

P. 217, IV. vi. 2. *δύσκολος*] Equivalent to *difficilis* in Horace's description of Old Age, *A. P.* 173. Conversely, Dante mentions 'Affability' (by which word he translates Aristotle's *φιλία*) as one of the four Virtues peculiarly appropriate to Old Age (*Conv.* iv. 27).

P. 220, IV. vi. 8, *fin.* With this characteristic of *φιλία* compare 'Let the righteous rather smite me *friendly*, and reprove me' (Ps. cxli. 5). Also Shakespeare, *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III. Sc. i.—

'Thus for my duty's sake, I rather choose
To cross my friend in his intended drift,
Than, by concealing it, heap on your head
A pack of sorrows,' etc.

IV. vi. 9. (As another illustration of the habits of the *κόλαξ*)—Swift in his *Journal to Stella* writes: 'Did I ever tell you that the Lord Treasurer hears ill with the left ear, just as I do? I dare not tell him that I am so, for fear he should think that I counterfeited to make my court.' A striking, though exaggerated, illustration of the Churl (*ὁ πᾶσι δυσχεραίνων*) may be found in *Apemantus* (*Timon of Athens*), who stands in vivid contrast with the herd of *κόλακες* who surround *Timon* in his prosperity.

P. 222, IV. vii. 5. *ἐὰν μὴ τινος ἕνεκα πράττη*] Some special motive may intervene as a disturbing force, and then the resulting act may not be a true index of general character, of what the man is *ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ*. e.g. one who is *δύσερις καὶ δύσκολος* by nature, may occasionally be transformed by self-interest into a *κόλαξ*.

P. 223, IV. vii. 7. *Οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις, κ.τ.λ.*] Hence one 'who sweareth to his neighbour and disappointeth him not, though it were to his own hindrance,' would be classed as *δίκαιος* rather than *ἀληθής*.

ἐν οἷς . . . *ἀληθεύει*] There is an abrupt change of construction here

from ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐν οἷς μὴθὲν διαφέρει . . . ἀληθεύοντος, which the former clause would have led us to expect.

P. 223, IV. vii. 8. *ἔτι μάλλον*] The mercenary, interested, or malicious lie is worse than the lie simple, just as κόλαξ is worse than ἀρεσκος, or the δλαζών ἀργυρίου ἔνεκα of § 11 is worse than the δλαζών of § 10. In the former case there would be falsehood and injustice as well.

— 11. The parenthetical use of ὁ δλαζών, if that reading be adopted, is exactly parallel to that of ὁ ἐγκρατής in VII. ix. 2.

— 12. οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει, κ.τ.λ.] The interpretation given in the Notes is confirmed by the use of the same phrase in *Rhet.* I. i. 14, to distinguish the Sophist from the Dialectician; the essence of the former being the *conscious* use of a fallacious argument against an opponent not likely to detect it (*argumentum ad ignorantiam*). The *motive*, or 'particular condition of the Will' (Grant), is the important point. Compare also the statement in VII. x. 2, that φρόνησις differs from δεινότης (mere cleverness or shrewdness), κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν. So in V. ii. 4, Aristotle observes that one who commits adultery τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἔνεκα, would not be called ἀκόλαστος, but ἀδικος or πλεονέκτης. The difference of purpose (προαίρεσις) in that case, as in the case in the text, quite alters the moral character of the act. Cf. VIII. xiii. 11, and see Glossary.

P. 225, IV. vii. 13. ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰ εἰρημένα] ἐν αὐτοῖς refers to τὰ τοιαῦτα, and τὰ εἰρημένα are the qualities of being profitable, and of being easily assumed without detection.

— 14. μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι] The καὶ is explained by a reference to § 2, where τὰ ἐνδοξα were stated to be the sphere of ἀλαζονεία also.

P. 226, IV. vii. 15. καὶ ἡ λίαν ἔλλειψις ἀλαζονικὸν] Repudiating for oneself μικρὰ καὶ φανερά at once suggests, and is of course intended to suggest, a 'par exemple!' on the part of others, and so amounts to 'fishing for compliments.' Dickens has familiarised us with types of this character in Pecksniff and Uriah Heep. In fact, this baser type of εἰρωνεία approaches most nearly in Aristotle's catalogue to the modern vice of Hypocrisy, and only needs the condition of being exercised in a moral or religious sphere to make it identical with it. The following illustrations may be added:—When Diogenes, treading on Plato's carpet, is said to have exclaimed, 'I am treading on Plato's vanity,' the latter replied, 'Yes, and with a different vanity of your own.' So S. Augustine, 'Vainglory often glories most vainly of the very contempt of vainglory.' Congreve has indicated a more harmless type of the same disposition—

'Careless she is with artful care,
Affecting to seem unaffected.'

La Rochefoucauld attributes to human nature generally this characteristic of *βαυκοπανουργία*—‘On ne se blâme que pour être loué’ (*Max.* 33).

P. 227, IV. viii. 3. *εὐτροποι*] This quickness of intellectual movement in the *εὐτράπελος* stands in contrast with the afterthought-wit so happily described in the French phrase, ‘l’esprit de l’escalier;’ and it is similar in kind to the power of employing metaphor (*τὸ γὰρ εὖ μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστίν*), stated by Aristotle (*Poet.* xxii. § 9) to be a mark of genius.

P. 228, IV. viii. 6. *τῶν καινῶν*] This expression (as in the *Poetics*) does not refer to what is technically known as the ‘New,’ but the ‘Middle’ Comedy. The ‘New’ had not yet arisen. (See Donaldson, *Theatre of the Greeks*, sixth ed., pp. 63, etc.)

πρὸς εὐσχημοσύνην] It does not, however, therefore follow that the latter method has the advantage from the point of view of morality. It is quite possible to maintain the reverse. Speaking of Shakespeare’s occasional *αίσχρολογία*, Coleridge writes:—‘It may sometimes be gross, but I boldly say that he is always moral and modest. (?) In our day, decency of manners (*εὐσχημοσύνη*) is preserved at the expense of morality of heart, and delicacies for vice are allowed (*ὑπόνοια*), whilst grossness against it is hypocritically, or at least morbidly, condemned.’

— 7. *τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα*] Compare with this expression the definition of *εὐτραπεία* in *Rhet.* II. xii. 16, as *πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις*.

P. 229, IV. viii. 9. *ἔδει δ’ ἴσως καὶ σκώπτειν*] Juvenal (iii. 153) regards liability to ridicule as the hardest part of the lot of poverty; and La Rochefoucauld remarks, ‘Le ridicule déshonore plus que le déshonneur’ (*Max.* 326).

— 10. *πᾶσι δυσχερᾶν*] Compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act I. Sc. i.—

‘And other of such vinegar aspect
That they’ll not show their teeth in way of smile,
Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.’

P. 240 (Introductory Note to Book x.) The same distinction, derived doubtless from Aristotle, between the Active and the Contemplative Life, constantly reappears in Mediæval writers. With Dante especially it is a favourite subject. He symbolises the antithesis in the *Commedia* by Leah and Rachel, and also (in a somewhat different aspect) by Matilda and Beatrice, and in the *Convito* by Martha and Mary. The following passage especially may be quoted in illustration,—‘In truth it should be known that we can have in this life two kinds of Happiness, according as we follow two different good and excellent paths which lead us thither;

the one is the Active Life and the other the Contemplative. The latter (though by the Active we arrive, as has been said, at true Happiness) leads us to the highest Happiness and Felicity [compare *εὐδαιμων* and *μακάριος* in I. x. 14], as the Philosopher proves in the tenth Book of the *Ethics*.—*Convito*, iv. 17.

P. 243, X. vi. 3. *τῶν παιδιῶν αἱ ἡδέϊαι*] Such recreations as are suggested in the Note would fall under the head of *συμφέροντα* rather than *ἡδέα* (see II. iii. 7). A higher class still might deserve the title of *καλὰ* (see VII. iv. 5), and such the *σπουδαῖος* would take pleasure in (§ 5), since he, like all men, needs *ἀνάπαυσις* (§ 6). To such Aristotle would rather apply the term *διαγωγή* [cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10, *τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν*], and he would consider Music as fulfilling such a condition. The whole passage in *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10-13, should be compared where Aristotle again explains why *παιδιά* is often thought to be *τέλος*, and why it is not really so.

P. 246, X. vi. 6. *οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις*] Cf. *Pol.* V. (VIII.) v. 10, *ἡ γὰρ παιδιά χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι . . . [ἡ δ' ἀνάπαυσις] τῆς διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης λατρεῖα τίς ἐστίν*.

P. 253, X. vii. 8. *Οὐ χρὴ κατὰ, κ.τ.λ.*] This standard of Happiness, though superhuman (*κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων*), is still human, in the same way that the Christian standard of moral perfection is a true standard to set before men, even though the highest human efforts can never be otherwise than an asymptote in reference to it.

P. 255, X. viii. 3. *συνέξευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, κ.τ.λ.*] Hence the *ἀκρατής* cannot be *φρόνιμος*, though he may be *δεινός*, see VII. x. 1. Also in VI. xiii. 6 we read, *οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κυρίως ἀνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἀνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς*, and in VII. ii. 5, *πρακτικὸς γε ὁ φρόνιμος*.

P. 256, X. viii. 4. *αἱ γὰρ βούλησις ἀδελοί, κ.τ.λ.*] Compare *Measure for Measure*, Act I. Sc. i.—

'For if our virtues

Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike

As if we had them not.'

— 5. The dispute as to the relative importance of intention or act, 'will' or 'deed,' in Morals, twice referred to by Aristotle, may remind us of the later theological controversy respecting the rival claims of Faith and Works.


P. 261, X. viii. 11. κλίνουσι τοῖς ἐκτὸς τούτων ἀσθανόμενοι μόνον]
Compare *Merchant of Venice*, Act II. Sc. ix.—

‘What many men desire! that “many” may be meant
By the fool multitude, that choose by show,
Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach;
Which pries not to the interior.’

— 13. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια, κ.τ.λ.] Compare Addison, *Cato*, Act v.
Sc. i.—

‘If there’s a power above us
(And that there is all nature cries aloud
Through all her works), he must delight in virtue,
And that which he delights in must be happy.’

The following scheme will show at a glance the connection of Ch.
vi.-viii.



[The occasion of a Fourth Edition being called for induces me to add a few more 'Supplementary Notes and Illustrations,' some of which, it is hoped, may be interesting to more advanced students than those for whom the footnotes generally are intended.]

P. 38, B. I. viii. 1. In illustration of this use of *ὑπάρχοντα*, compare *Poet.* xxii. 2, where 'a riddle' is defined, *τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι*, i.e. 'while describing actual facts to make an impossible combination.'

P. 66, B. I. xiii. 15. ἀλλή τις φύσεις τῆς ψυχῆς] A good account of Aristotle's theory of the three 'φύσεις τῆς ψυχῆς' in contrast with the view of Plato of three souls in one body (see Dante, *Purg.* iv. 5, 6), will be found in Grote's *Aristotle*, II. pp. 191-6, 221, etc. The varieties of soul are not mutually exclusive species of the same genus, but successive types of development, the higher types possessing all the properties of the lower, *plus* others of their own.

Pp. 104, 281-2. αἰδώς and νέμεσις] We might add to the illustrations above given the Homeric conception of αἰδώς and νέμεσις. 'If a man breaks *θέμις* in any way, he feels that others will disapprove. This feeling is called αἰδώς. Hence αἰδώς has as many shades of meaning as there are ways in which *θέμις* can be broken:—"sense of honour," "shame," "reverence," etc. And the feeling with which he himself regards a breach of *θέμις* by another person is called νέμεσις,—"righteous indignation."' (Jebb's *Introduction to Homer*, p. 55.)

Pp. 119, 283, III. i. 13. Add the following illustration from *Cic. Phil.* II. xii. § 29: 'Quid refert utrum voluerim fieri, an gaudeam factum?'

P. 146, III. vi. 5. οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι ἀνδρείος] This is well illustrated by the following remarks of Fuller (*Holy War*, v. c. 2) in reference to many of the Templars having succumbed to torture. 'It is to be commended to one's consideration whether slavish and servile souls will not better bear torment than generous spirits, who are for the enduring of honourable danger and speedy death, but not provided for torment, which they

are not acquainted with, neither is it the proper object of valour.' Comp. *inf.* c. ix. § 6.

P. 151, III. vii. 12. Add to the illustrations in the note the graphic contrast drawn by Livy (vii. 10) between the Gaul and Torquatus before engaging in single combat. He says of the latter, 'pectus animorum iraeque tacitae plenum, omnem ferociam in discrimen ipsum certaminis distulerat.' Conversely, Tacitus ascribes both to the Gauls and Britons the habit censured by Aristotle in the text: 'in deposcendis periculis eadem audacia, et ubi advenere, in detractandis eadem formido.' (*Agricola*, c. xi.)

Pp. 152-3, III. viii. 2, 3. In the following passage Dante recognises this form of courage due to αἰδώς :

But shame soon interposed her threat, who makes
The servant bold in presence of his lord.

Inf. xvii. 89, 90. (Cary's Translation.)

P. 176, IV. i. 11. τῶν ἀπ' ἀρετῆς] We may compare with this periphrasis the following expressions in the Epistle to the Romans: οἱ ἐξ ἐπιθελίας (ii. 8), οἱ ἐκ περιτομῆς (iv. 12), οἱ ἐκ νόμου (iv. 14).

Pp. 205, 291, IV. iii. 25. Compare further Tac. *Ann.* v. 18 (*fin.*): 'Nam beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse: ubi multum antevenere, pro gratia odium redditur': which is thus commented on by Oldbuck in Scott's *Antiquary*: 'from this a wise man may take a caution not to oblige any man beyond the degree in which he may expect to be requited, lest he should make his debtor a bankrupt in gratitude.' In *Germ.* xxi. (*fin.*) Tacitus mentions as a proof of the generosity of the German barbarians, 'nec data imputant, nec acceptis obligantur.'

P. 206, IV. iii. 28. εἰρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς] Most mss. read εἰρωνεῖα (*auct.* Grant) which certainly avoids the great difficulty of finding any construction for the accusative εἰρωνα.

P. 214, IV. v. 8. ἀνταποδιδάσιν κ.τ.λ.] Thus Cleon (*ap.* Thucyd. III. xxxviii. 1) remarks that summary vengeance is always most effective and satisfactory; and conversely (in illustration of § 10) Tacitus says of Domitian (*Agricola*, c. 42) that he was 'praeceps in iram, et quo obscurior eo irrevocabilior.' 28



TURN
→

CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
202 Main Library

AN PERIOD 1	2	3
HOME USE		
	5	6

ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS

1-month loans may be renewed by calling 642-3405

3-month loans may be recharged by bringing books to Circulation D


Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to due date

DUE AS STAMPED BELOW

CIR. AUG 10 '77		
JV 15 1980		
AUTO. DISC.		
SEP 24 1986		
AUG 23 1997		
CC. MOFFITT SEP 09 '96		
RECEIVED		
SEP 10 1996		
CIRCULATION L		
3/23/97		
CC. MOFFITT JAN 23 '97		

YB 24728

GENERAL LIBRARY - U.C. BERKELEY



8000860562

68819

B430

A2 M6

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

